ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

The Philosophy of the Grammarians

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and

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This volume, the fifth in the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, is devoted to the philosophy of the Grammarians. The introductory essay is intended to set their school in its context and to summarize the main Grammarian teachings. The summaries of primary sources that follow the introduction aim at making available the substance of the main philosophical ideas contained in these works, so that philosophers who are unable to read the original Sanskrit and who find difficulty in understanding and finding their way about in the translations (where such exist) can get an idea of the positions taken and arguments offered. The summaries, then, are intended primarily for philosophers and only secondarily for indologists. Certain sections of the works have been omitted or treated sketchily because they are repetitions or deemed less interesting for philosophers, though they may be of great interest to Sanskritists. The summaries are not likely to make interesting consecutive reading: they are provided in the spirit of a reference work. The appendix, which contains a lengthy bibliography of original and secondary writings on the philosophy of Grammar, is also presented as an aid to research.

References in the footnotes such as “G273” are to the bibliography presented in the appendix. References such as “RB10337” are to the first volume of this encyclopedia, 2nd edition (1984). Abbreviations used are listed at the beginning of the appendix.

Preparation of this volume has been made possible by grants from the American Institute of Indian Studies and the University of Calgary. These grants made possible the obtaining of the summaries and funded the travel that the editorial work required. The editors wish to thank Pradip R. Mehendiratta for his good offices. A debt of gratitude is also owed to the late Professor T. R. V. Murti, who gave generously of his time in working with Harold Coward in the volume’s planning stages. A research fellowship awarded to K. Kunjunni Raja by the Calgary Institute for the Humanities enabled the two editors to work together in completing the project. Special gratitude is due to Karl H. Potter, editor of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, for his many contributions, which have added greatly to the value of this volume.
PART ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE GRAMMARIANS
HISTORICAL RÉSUMÉ

1. The Place of Language in Indian Philosophy

Language has been one of the fundamental concerns of Indian philosophy and has attracted the serious attention of all thinkers from the outset. In India the study of language has never been the monopoly of the Grammarians or the Rhetoricians. All schools of thought began their philosophical discussions from the fundamental problem of communication. The poet-philosophers of the Rg Veda were greatly concerned with the powers and limitations of language as a means of communicating their mystic, personal experiences of an ecstatic nature to their fellows and they tried to stretch the power of language by various means. They praised language as a powerful and benign deity (vāc), ever ready to bestow favors on her devotees. The entire creation of the world was attributed by some sages to divine language, and it was generally recognized that the ordinary speech of mortals was only a fraction of that language.

Among the six accessories to the study of the Vedas (Vedāṅgas) two are directly concerned with language: grammar (vyākaraṇa), or linguistic analysis, and etymology (nirukta), or interpretation of the meanings of selected words in the Vedas through etymological methods. Another accessory, metrics (chandas), is concerned with prosody.

Among the systems of Indian philosophy (darśana), Pūrvamīmāṃśa is called vākyasāstra or the science of sentence interpretation, and the Nyāya system was also intrinsically language oriented. The Buddhist and Jain schools of thought have also devoted considerable attention to the working of language. Grammar and literary criticism (sāhitya) are directly interested in language problems, including semantic and philosophical issues, and Grammarians have claimed the status of an independent darśana for themselves.

The Indian approach to the study of language and linguistic prob-
lems has been characterized by both analysis and synthesis. On the one hand, a systematic attempt was made to analyze speech utterance in terms of sentences and words, stems and suffixes, morphemes and phonemes. The verbal root was considered as the core element to which preverbs, primary suffixes, and secondary suffixes, as well as nominal or verbal terminations, were added to evolve the word. On the other hand, rules of coalescence (sāndhi) between these various elements and between words in a compound word or a sentence were studied and systematized. Rules of syntax were also studied carefully and attempts made to identify the cementing factors helping to form an integral unit.

The analytical method was older and more popular. The Sanskrit term for grammar, vyākaraṇa, means literally “linguistic analysis”. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, in the beginning of the seventh century, said that “we cannot think of any point of time totally devoid of some work or other dealing with the grammatical rules treating of the different kinds of roots and suffixes.” 1 Sākalya’s Padapāṭha of the Rg Veda was one of the early attempts in the direction of analysis; he broke down the samhitā text of the Rg Veda into words, identifying even the separate elements of compound words. The Brhaddevatā, attributed to Śaunaka, says that a sentence is made up of words, and words are made up of phonemes (varga). 2 Pāṇini, who flourished about the fifth century B.C., brought the descriptive grammar of the Sanskrit language to its highest perfection in his Astādhyāyi, which has been praised by Leonard Bloomfield, the father of modern linguistics, as “the greatest monument of human intelligence.” 3 Pāṇini’s primary concern was the building up of Sanskrit words, both Vedic and classical, from verbal roots, preverbs, primary and secondary suffixes, and nominal and verbal terminations; but he was also interested in syntactic problems involved in the formation of compound words and the relationship of the nouns in a sentence with the action indicated by the verb. Pāṇini did not neglect meaning, but he was aware of the fact that meaning was likely to change over time and that the final authorities regarding meaning are the people who speak the language.

It was the etymological school of Yāśka, author of the Nirukta commentary on the Nighaṭṭu list of select words in Vedic literature, that undertook a semantic analysis of words with their components in order to explain their meanings in the contexts of their occurrence. This school generally subscribed to the view that nouns are derived from verbal roots. The Unāḍīśūtras follow this view and attempt to find derivations for even apparently integral words.

Mīmāṃśa, called vākyāśāstra, was mainly concerned with the methodology of textual interpretation in order to give a cogent explanation of prescriptive scriptural texts. It had to deal with apparent
absurdities, inconsistencies, and contradictions, besides ambiguities, and evolved rules of interpretation that were accepted generally by all schools of thought and were used freely in legal practice and in commentaries. The Mimâmsakas used both analysis and synthesis in their approach to textual problems. They gave a semantic definition of the sentence, evolving the concepts of mutual expectancy (akâńkṣa), consistency (yogyatā), and contiguity (āsatti) as factors necessary for the existence of a sentence. It was the Mimâmsâ school that developed the theory of metaphor to explain the apparent absurdities and inconsistencies in Vedic texts.

The Nyâya school, mainly interested in the theory of knowledge and the truth or falsity of judgments, had to be concerned with the theory of meaning, because understanding the proposition was a primary requirement for making any significant study about it.

The literary critics who were concerned with the understanding and appreciation of literature were very much interested in the stylistic analysis of language and in finding out the deviance of literary language from ordinary language, in order to see how far poets have been able to communicate their vision of beauty and emotional experience through the medium of words.

It is clear that for centuries the various schools of thought in India have carried out studies that have produced insights into the working of language. The Grammarians' interest was not confined to the description and analysis of a particular language, but extended to the true nature and potentialities of language, including its role in effecting liberation.

2. The Basic Problems of Philosophy of Language

A. Linguistic Elements

One of the fundamental problems discussed is the relation between the linguistic elements (śabda) and their meanings (ariha). The term śabda is normally used by the Grammarians to refer to a linguistic element, a meaningful unit of speech.4 Patañjali's definition is that śabda is that which, when articulated, is seen to convey the idea of the referent. Maṇḍana Miśra defines it in his Sphoṭasiddhi as the cause that produces the idea of its meaning. In any case, it is the meaning bearer. In ordinary parlance people may use the word śabda to mean sound, as pointed out by Patañjali himself, but for the Grammarian it is the meaning-bearing unit.

Is it the articulated sound, or the phoneme (varṇa), or the word (pada), or the sentence (vākya) that is referred to by the term śabda? According to the sphoṭa theory of Bhartrhari it is the complete utterance of the sentence that is the unit, and it is called vākyaśphoṭa; but at a
lower analytical level the word can be considered as the unit, for which the term *padasphota* is used by the Grammarian. Those who know the language very well think and speak in units of sentences and also hear whole sentences. It is only those who do not know the language properly who hear words or phonemes or bits of sounds and have to struggle with them to get the connected sentence meaning. But in grammatical texts the words are taken as the unit for the sake of easy understanding.

This view is not acceptable to the Mīmāṃsakas, who consider the letter (permanent articulated sound-unit) or phoneme (*varga*) to be the *sabda* or unit of language and the meaning bearer. They assume phonemes to be permanent and each utterance to be their realization. To the Naiyāyikas *sabda* means sound produced by the speaker and heard by the listener, and it is impermanent; *pada* means a morpheme (meaningful unit).

B. Meaning (*Artha*)

What is meant by *artha* or meaning? Is it the universal that is intended, or the particular? According to Kātyāyana and Patañjali, two different positions were held by two ancient Grammarians, Vyādi and Vājapyāyana, the former holding that words refer to *dravya*, “substance” or “individual”, and the latter holding that words (including proper names) refer to *jāti*, “universal” or “attribute”.

Pāṇini seems to have left the question open, holding that words could refer to individuals or to the universals. The Mīmāṃsakas held that the primary meaning of a word is the universal and the sense of the particular in a sentence is obtained either through secondary significative power (according to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas) or through both the universal and the particular being grasped by the same perceptive effort simultaneously (according to the Prabhakaras). The early Naiyāyikas considered the meaning of words as comprising universal (*jāti*), configuration (*ākṛti*), and particular; later Naiyāyikas held that the primary meaning of words is the individual as qualified by the universal (*jātivistīṣṭavyakti*). The Buddhists of Dignāga’s school held that the meaning is *vikalpa*, a mental construct that has no direct correspondence with the real, its nature being to exclude other things (*anuddoha*). The function of a word or a name is the exclusion of other possibilities.

C. Significative Power (*Sakti*)

The significative power of words (*sakti*) is based on the relation that exists between a word and its meaning. The Grammarians hold that in the case of ordinary words in everyday speech it is permanent; but in the case of technical terms it is based on the convention. The Mīmāṃsakas consider the relation as “original” (*autpattika*),
that is, as permanent or eternal. The Grammarians explain this permanence in two ways: \textit{pravāhanityatā} and \textit{yogyatānityatā}. We learn language from our elders; they in turn learned it from their forefathers; thus it could be traced back to any conceivable period of human society. This type of permanence is \textit{pravāhanityatā}. The other view is based on the innate capacity of words to express any meaning; this capacity (\textit{yogyatā}) is restricted by convention. Patañjali made a distinction between absolute eternity (\textit{kūfasthanityatā}), by which an item is not liable to any modification, and the perennial nature as used through generations of speakers (\textit{pravāhanityatā}).

D. Polysemy

It is generally believed that in an ideal language a word must have only one meaning, and a sense must have only one word to express it. This binary relationship between a word and its meaning is accepted in principle by all schools of thought. It is also believed that this relationship, which is the basis for the significative power of words, is stable and constant because linguistic communication would be impossible without it. If there is no general understanding of the meaning of words shared by the speaker and listener there will be chaos and mutual comprehension will be jeopardized.

The existence of polysemy is recognized in actual practice, however. Two words may have the same form, and the same word may develop more than one meaning. The problem of homophones and homonyms has been discussed by scholars like Bhartṛhari. Yāska’s discussion about the principle of word derivation in Sanskrit also sheds considerable light on the problem of synonyms. Nouns are normally derived from verbal roots. If all nouns are so derived from verbal roots denoting action, every object will have as many names as the actions with which it is associated, and by the same token each noun could be applied to as many objects as are associated with that action indicated by that verbal root. Yāska’s answer to the problem is that there are no restrictions. Language designates things in an incomplete manner; it can choose only one of the many activities associated with an object. Hence there is some sort of permanent relation between a word and its meaning.

It is accepted that even the primary meaning of a word is not definitely circumscribed and that the boundaries of the meaning often change on the basis of contextual factors, not only in the case of ambiguous words but even in that of ordinary words: thus “man is mortal” does not mean “woman is immortal”; but in the phrase “man and woman”, “man” does not include “woman”. When there is conflict between the correct etymological meaning and the popular usage, the meaning current in popular usage among the educated
elite is to be accepted. Grammatical analysis and etymological interpretations are only means of approach; the final authority is the popular usage of the cultured.

E. Secondary Meaning (*Laksanā*)

Even though it is accepted that every word has a primary stable meaning core, in actual practice shifts in meaning, metaphoric transfers, and secondary usages are quite common. If there is discrepancy in sense when the primary meaning is taken, the passage will have to be explained by resorting to the secondary meaning. There are three conditions considered necessary for resorting to secondary meaning. The first, is inconsistency or incongruity of the words taken in the literal sense. A sentence like "He is an ass" or "He is a firebrand" cannot be taken in the literal sense because the human being referred to cannot be an animal or an inanimate object. A sentence like "The house is in the river" does not make sense, because a house cannot exist in the river. In such cases the primary meaning of the word has to be given up and another meaning used. The second condition is that the actual meaning and the primary meaning must be related in some way; it may be on the basis of similarity or common quality or it may be on the basis of some other relationship like proximity. The example "He is an ass" can be explained if the term "ass" is interpreted as "a fool" (as the donkey is notorious for its dullness). The example of the house on the river has to be explained by taking "river" to mean the bank of the river on the basis of proximity. The third condition for resorting to secondary significance is either sanction by popular usage, as in the case of faded metaphors, or a special purpose for which it is resorted to, as in the case of intentional metaphors. The inconsistency of primary meaning can mean impossibility of syntactic connection from the point of view of meaning, or it can mean inconsistency in the context. As an example, in "see that crows do not spoil the curd" "crows" implies all beings, including a dog, who might spoil it.

Literary critics like Ānandavardhana proposed the element of purpose in intentional metaphors and pointed out its importance in enriching literature's content.

F. Conditions for Syntactic Relation

How can we get a connected meaning from a sentence if each word gives only its isolated sense, which is of a universal nature? This problem has been discussed in India since ancient times, and three main factors have been pointed out as unifying of sentence meaning: expectancy (*ākānksā*), consistency (*yogyaṭā*), and contiguity (*āsattī*). Words in a sentence must have mutual expectancy. Pāṇini hinted as much when he stressed the need for *sāmartya* or capacity among the meanings of
words for mutual connection, mainly in compound words. This 
śāmartṛya has been interpreted as similar to ākāṇkṣā or mutual 
expectancy and unity of sense. Later the Mīmāṃsakas developed this concept, 
and the logicians made further modifications. Mutual expectancy 
consists in a word being unable to convey a complete sense in the 
absence of another word. Literally it is the desire on the part of the 
listeners to know the other words in the sentence in order to complete 
the sense. A word is said to have expectancy for another if it cannot, 
without the latter, produce knowledge of its interconnection in an 
utterance. The Mīmāṃsakas were more interested in psychological 
expectancy, while the logicians and the Grammarians stressed the 
need for syntactic expectancy.

To this primary condition were added two more, yogyatā or consist-
tency of sense and āsatti or the contiguity of the words. Grammarians 
did not emphasize the importance of yogyatā for to them it is enough 
for a sentence to give a syntactically connected meaning. Its veracity 
is not a condition. From the Grammarian's point of view laksana, 
secondary meaning, is also of little interest. "He is a boy" and "He is 
an ass" are equally valid for them. Even empty phrases like "the child 
of a barren woman" are linguistically valid to them, for Grammarians 
are not concerned with the real existence of the thing meant by an 
expression. Yogyatā involves a judgment on the sense or nonsense of a 
sentence. There is difference of opinion about whether it should be 
taken as a positive condition. If the lack of yogyatā—inconsistency—is 
only apparent and can be explained away by resorting to the meta-
phorical meaning of a word in the sentence, there is no difficulty in 
understanding the sentence's meaning.

Āsatti or contiguity is the uninterrupted utterance or the unbroken 
apprehension of the words in a sentence. In the case of elliptical 
sentences, one school believes that the syntactic relation is known by 
supplying the necessary meaning, while another school insists that the 
missing words have to be supplied and the meaning obtained. Some 
take tātparya, the intention of the speaker known from contextual 
factors, as a fourth condition for understanding the meaning of a 
sentence.

G. Sentence Meaning

Regarding the comprehension of the sentence meaning there are 
two main theories, called anvītābhidhāna and abhihitānvaya. Speech is 
purposive in nature. People use words with the intention of conveying 
a connected, unified sense. Hence from the use of words in juxtaposition 
it is assumed that the speaker has uttered them with the intention 
of conveying a connected sense. Expectancy, consistency, and conti-
guity help in this comprehension of a unified sentence meaning. The
sentence meaning is something more than the sum of the word meanings. Besides the word meanings, the syntactic connection of the word meanings has to be conveyed. The *abhihitānwaya* theory says that in a sentence each word gives out its individual isolated meaning (which is universal) and their significative power is exhausted with that. Then with the help of *lakṣanā* (secondary significative power) the syntactic relationship is obtained, and thus the sentence meaning is understood. According to the *anvītabhidhāna* school, by contrast, each word in a sentence conveys not only its isolated meaning but also the syntactic element. The words convey the meaning of the universal and simultaneously the meaning as referring to the particular. The words themselves also give the syntactic relationship. Thus the entire sentence meaning is conveyed by the words themselves. The Naiyāyikas, who believe that the words in a sentence denote primary meanings that are particulars as qualified by universal traits, contend that the sentence meaning is an association of the word meanings (*saṃsargamaryādā*).

H. *Sphota* Theory

Even in ancient India there were some scholars who emphasized the unreal nature of words and advocated the need for taking the sentence as a whole. In the *Nirukta* Yāṣka refers to Audumbarāyana's theory that it is the statement as a whole that is regularly present in the perceptive faculty of the hearer. The *sphota* theory, fully promulgated by Bhartṛhari in the fifth century of the Christian era, is one of the most important contributions of India to the problem of meaning. He insisted that the fundamental linguistic fact is the complete utterance or sentence. Just as a letter or a phoneme has no parts, so also the word and the sentence are to be taken as complete integral units, not as made up of smaller elements. Bhartṛhari says that although linguistic analysis—splitting sentences into words and further into roots and suffixes and into phonemes—may be a useful means for studying language, it has no reality. In a speech situation, communication is always through complete utterances. The speaker thinks and the listener understands the utterance as a single unit. It is only those who do not know the language thoroughly who analyze it into words, and further bits, in order to get a connected meaning. Those who know the language will conceive the idea and the expression as a single unit and express it; and the listener likewise comprehends it as a whole, the understanding is as an instantaneous flash of insight (*pratibhā*). The fact that the expression has to be through the medium of phonemes, through a temporal or spatial series, does not warrant our considering it as made up of parts. When a painter conceives a picture in his mind and paints it on a canvas, he may use various colors, and make various strokes; that does not mean that the picture is not a unit. And
we see the picture as a unit, not as different colors and strokes. Just as the meaning is unitary, integral, and indivisible, the symbol that signifies it must also be unitary and indivisible. This concept is called *sphota*—the sentence taken as an integral symbol, in which its apparent parts are irrelevant to it as parts. It is not something hypothetically assumed to explain language behavior; it is actually experienced and known through perception. On hearing a sentence those who know the language well hear the sentence, not the phonemes or sound bits or even words. Those who do not know the language may hear only the sound bits. The *sphota* theory says that hearing the whole sentence is the real experience, while the apparent experience of hearing the sound bits is only for those who do not know the language.

I. Componential Analysis of Word Meaning

It may be noted that even the so-called unity of meaning is often an illusion, for it is the language that makes the unity. Yāska in the fifth century B.C. and, following him, Bhattṛhari in the fifth century of the Christian era have pointed out that a verb conveys a series of operations or activities taking place in a particular temporal sequence. Thus the word "cooks" conveys the idea of a series of activities—preparing the fire, putting the vessel on it, pouring water in the vessel, washing the rice, putting it in the water, blowing the fire to make it burn properly, putting out the fire, removing the excess water, and so on. It is the word "cooks" that collects all of these activities into a unitary, integral action. Each of these activities can be further analyzed into a series of activities taking place in time.

Later philosophers of language made further componential analysis of words from the semantic point of view and declared that every verbal root (*dhātu*) involved two semantic factors, activity (*vyāpāra*) and goal or result (*phala*). The verb "he cooks" means an activity directed toward the softening of the rice, and so forth. There is a difference of opinion about whether both are primary meanings of the verbal root or one can be taken as the main meaning and the other as subsidiary. The verb was divided into the root and the suffix, and separate meaning bits assigned to them. Maṇḍana Miśra said that the meaning of the root is the result, and it is the suffix that indicates the activity. With the addition of preverbs the meaning changes considerably in Sanskrit, and there have been discussions of whether all the meanings are present in a latent form in the root, to be revealed by the preverbs, or these preverbs can be assigned specific meanings.

J. Suggestion (*vyāñjanā*)

The theory of literal (primary) and metaphorical (secondary) meaning developed by the Nyāya and Mīmāṃśā schools of sentence inter-
pretation in ancient India was extended farther by Ānandavardhana in the second half of the ninth century to include emotive and other associative meanings under linguistic meaning. He did not attack the usual division of speech into words, into stems and suffixes and the distinction between the primary and secondary meanings of words. He accepted all of these concepts, but in addition he postulated a third capability of language, which he called vyāñjanā or the capacity to suggest meaning other than its literal or metaphoric meaning. Ānandavardhana pointed out that this suggestive function of language has a vital role to play in literature.

K. Time

The concept of time and its divisions were discussed by such Grammarians as Patañjali and Bhartṛhari. The division of time into past, present, and future has a place in grammar, but the rules of usage given are not strictly followed in actual practice. The present tense (laṭ) is used to indicate the entire stretch of time included from the beginning of the action till its completion. “He is cooking” can mean he has started cooking and the operations are not yet completed. The present need not be momentary. Usages like “the mountains are standing” and “the rivers are flowing” mean that they continue to stand or flow.

Bhartṛhari considers time to be the most important power of Śabda Brahman, relatively more independent than other powers, and to be responsible for regulating them. The ancient authority Vārsāyāni said that becoming (bhāva) has six stages from birth to decay.8

L. Gender

Grammatical gender has attracted much speculation because in Sanskrit the grammatical gender does not coincide with sex, and words referring to the same object may occur in different genders.

3. The Literature on Grammar

Grammar (vyākarana) was recognized from the earliest times in India as a distinct science, a field of knowledge with its own parameters that distinguished it from other sciences such as astronomy (jyotiṣa), architecture (śilpaśāstra), agriculture (kṛiṣāstra), and the like. The coverage in this encyclopedia thus presents a peculiar problem somewhat different from that faced in dealing with the literature of other philosophical systems. Whereas in the cases of those other systems the “philosophical” literature is confined to that material which relates to the overall aim of liberation and those treatises which discuss theoretical issues pertinent to that aim in a polemical context, in the case of the
grammatical literature the coverage has been widened to include those works which deal with theory of meaning and the related issues discussed in the previous section. As a result, the literature that is summarized here in the subsequent pages represents a selection from the total corpus of vyākaraṇa literature classified as such in India. For that reason it seems appropriate to attempt at this point to place the writers treated in the body of this volume within the total roster of authors whose works constitute the entire corpus of grammatical literature.

To this end we have provided as an appendix a bibliography of vyākaraṇa works and authors that covers what is currently known of the literature on grammar in general. Within the confines of this literature the present volume provides summaries of some works that are (1) in print and (2) especially relevant to the concerns touched on in the preceding section. Many of the works that are not summarized do, without doubt, bear on these topics. The distinction drawn must seem from the standpoint of Indian tradition rather artificial. We can only remind our readers that the entire project of this encyclopedia is directed toward a readership that comprises in the main those trained in philosophy as understood in the western world. The bibliography will suggest to such readers the extent of classical writings on grammar in general. From these writings we have selected the ones that seem most informative concerning matters of general philosophical interest, as “philosophy” has been understood for the purpose of this entire encyclopedic project.

The origin of grammar in India, as with so much else, is unclear. What is clear is that it was recognized as a field of study from a very early time. Pāṇini and Yāska, who must represent a stage of thought several centuries prior to the Christian era, both refer to a number of grammatical authorities and their views. In some cases the names cited by both writers are identical. According to a statement in the Brāhmaṇas it was the god Indra who first analyzed a speech utterance in terms of its parts.9 Some scholars speak of an “Aindra” school of Grammarians in locating the origins of grammar. Patañjali refers to a tradition involving the futile attempt of Byhaspati to teach the language by enumerating its words and their meanings.10 The earliest historical figure who dealt with linguistic study seems to be Śākalya, author of the Padapātha of the Rg Veda, who is mentioned by Pāṇini. According to Bhartṛhari, the sage Audumbarāyaṇa (also mentioned by Yāska), together with Vārṭtākṣa, seems to have held views similar to the sphota theory.11 A late tradition makes Śphoṭāyana, mentioned by Pāṇini, the founder of the sphota theory.12 Śakaṭāyana held the view that all words must be derived from verbal roots; some people consider him to be the author of the Unādisūtras. Gārgya and others held the view that not all nouns can be traced to verbal roots. But no authenticat-
ed works of any of these pre-Śaṅkara writers have come down to us, and it is difficult if not impossible to say which, if any, of Śaṅkara’s rules may have been taken from his predecessors.

Yāska and Śaṅkara are the two great early writers on language. They belong to a period several centuries before Christ, possibly the fifth century. Yāska is generally considered to be earlier than Śaṅkara, but Paul Thieme holds that Yāska knew Śaṅkara. George Cardona thinks it wise to leave the problem open. The two writers are classified into different genres of literature by the Indian tradition. Yāska’s Nirukta provides the name for a discipline of etymology counted as separate from grammar (vyākaraṇa), the discipline for which Śaṅkara stands as the major seminal figure. (The bibliography appended to this volume confines itself to works classed in the latter discipline.)

A. Śaṅkara’s Aṣṭādhyāyī

Śaṅkara’s basic work is merely titled “The Eight-Chaptered” (Aṣṭādhyāyī). But a very remarkable work it is, providing a model for recent and contemporary work in descriptive linguistics that can stand with the best efforts of modern analysts. The eight chapters constitute a complete descriptive analytical grammar of the Sanskrit language, comprising about four thousand rules called sūtras preceded by a list of sounds divided into fourteen groups, which are called the śīva-, ṭṛipti-ḥāra-, or maheśvara-sūtras. In these rules the language is analyzed into verbal and nominal bases, so that the bases have come to be cataloged in two lists known as dhātupāṭha—the exhaustive lists of primitive verbal roots—and ganapāṭha—the selective lists of nouns, verbs, and so on for application in his rules. It is not clear whether one person wrote all these different components of the fundamental Śaṅkara corpus. A further feature of Śaṅkara’s method is a set of metarules of paribhāṣas, which tell us in which order to apply the rules, where exceptions are to be made, and so forth. All of these components are, in any case, made the subject of a grand commentarial tradition extending to the present.

Certain additional materials are ascribed to Śaṅkara by the tradition, though scholarship is less agreed on the authenticity of these ascriptions. Among them, one group of sūtras, the Unādiśūtras, provides rules for introducing affixes after verbal roots to derive nominal bases. The authorship of these Unādiśūtras is frequently attributed to Śaṭkārīya; and some scholars have found them to date from a later period. It is likely that there is truth in all of these views, in other words, that the sūtras represent a development of analysis over a long period.

A second set of ancillary sūtras are the Phīṣūtras, which provide principles of accentuation. A feature of these rules is that accents are presupposed for nominal bases, from which the rules derive revisions
of accentuation for the wholes of which those bases form a part. Because Pāṇini’s rules contain none specifying accents for nominal bases, Cardona reports that “it is clear that the phūtsūtras cannot be attributed to Pāṇini.”18 In fact, they are traditionally ascribed to Sāntanava, a rather later writer. Still, there are scholars who believe the Phūtsūtras date from a pre-Pāṇinian period.

The Lingānuśāsana rules concern gender; they dictate how to determine the gender of linguistic items based on their structure and meaning. Although some scholars believe that this set of rules antedates Pāṇini and was known to him, Pāṇini in fact had his own rules governing gender, which in some respects complement and in others contradict the rules in the Lingānuśāsana.

There are also two texts dealing with phonetics called Pāṇiniyaśikṣā, one of which has regularly been attributed to Pāṇini. It seems unlikely that either of them is by Pāṇini himself.16

Pāṇini’s system is remarkable in several respects. It purports to derive all the forms of the Sanskrit language that correspond to correct usage from operations on two kinds of primitives—affixes (pratyaya) and bases (prakṛti). The bases are of two kinds themselves, verbal (dhātu) and nominal (prātipadika). The rules indicate how affixes are to be introduced after bases to generate the correct inflected forms of the language. They also tell us what compounds can be formed, and how to derive, for example, active and passive sentences. Some rules tell us under what conditions one form can be substituted for another.

These rules are ordered, though not in a recognizable, systematic fashion throughout. In some cases the actual order in which the rules are given dictates the order in which they are to be applied. In other cases one rule blocks application of another—for example, a particular rule governs its own domain and restricts the scope of a more general one. There are negative rules (niṣedhasūtra), which preclude application, as well as definitions (saṃjñāsūtra) and metarules (paribhāṣā) which serve to interpret and fix the scope of the operational rules (vidhiśūtra). Still another type of rule is the extension rule (atideśasūtra), which extends the scope of a rule beyond its normal bounds.

The remarkably systematic nature of Pāṇini’s grammar is further reflected in Pāṇini’s use of abbreviated expressions—symbols—to indicate certain recurrent features, notably syntactic functions such as agent, action, and object (known generally as kārakas). He also introduces “markers” (Cardona’s term for it) to provide placeholders for certain functions and to form abbreviations (such as a marker X followed by a marker M signifies X and all the items following in a list up to and including M).17
B. Vārttikakāras

Inevitably, in such a complex undertaking as Pāṇini's system provides, there were attempts to criticize and improve on his rules and definitions. Within what comes to be known as the Pāṇinian school of grammar, comprising those who accept a tradition going back to Pāṇini and not to others to be discussed shortly, the first emendation of the Astādhyāyī of which we know appears to have come in the form of comments (vārttika) attributed to Kātyāyana.

Considerable time must have elapsed between Pāṇini and Kātyāyana because there are sufficient differences in their language to account for some of the Vārttikas. A similar gap of time has to be assumed between Kātyāyana and Patañjali, author of the Mahābhāṣya, so Kātyāyana may be assigned to the third century B.C. Although he is nowadays counted as a Pāṇinian, he may have belonged to a different school.

Various other authors of comments on and criticisms of Pāṇini probably lived in this period, and some names are mentioned that likely include a number of them, such as Śakaṭāyana, Śākalya, Vājapyāyana, Vyādi, and Pauṣkarasādi. We know little about their ideas, though a few of Vyādi's rules are held traditionally to have come down to us, and Śakaṭāyana is believed to have been the author of the Uṇādisūtras accepted by Pāṇini.

C. Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya

Kātyāyana's Vārttikas come to us as a part of the “great commentary” (mahābhāṣya) on Pāṇini ascribed to Patañjali (who may or may not be the same as the author of the Togasūtras). The Mahābhāṣya takes the form of dialogues between student and teachers, some of whose solutions to problems are unacceptable, while one provides the final true view (siddhānta). Not all of Pāṇini’s rules are discussed, and it is not always easy to identify the final view or to differentiate Kātyāyana’s contributions from those of Patañjali, not to speak of the possibility of subsequent interpolations. Nevertheless, the Mahābhāṣya provides the classical interpretation of Pāṇini’s system and is made the subject of subsequent commentaries through the centuries until the present time. Furthermore, in Patañjali’s work, especially in its introductory passages, important philosophical ideas are broached, so that the Mahābhāṣya is perhaps the earliest philosophical text of the Grammarians.

D. Other Schools of Grammar

For the period between the time of Patañjali (perhaps 150 B.C.) and that of Bhartrhari (perhaps fifth century after Christ), scholars trace the origins of a number of the other systems of Sanskrit Grammar,
including the Digambara school of Jainendra and the Buddhist Cāndra school, as well as the Kātantra tradition.

The Kātantrasūtras are traditionally ascribed to Śarvavarman, who is dated by Shripad Krishna Belvalkar without much evidence as having flourished in the first century of the Christian era. The evidence, such as it is, is that Durgāśīṃha, a commentator on these sūtras who must have lived around or before A.D. 800, had a text of the sūtras that had already undergone considerable transformation or had possibly been lost, as there is a quite distinct version of them current in Kashmir by approximately the same time. The origins of Kātantra seem to have come out of a felt desire for a more popular and easier grammar than Pāṇini’s formidable system provides. It has spawned a fairly consistent line of commentators lasting until the present time.

In keeping with the motivations to brevity and simplicity, the Kātantrasūtras return to the older method of ordering the syllables (as found in the Prātiśākhyaas), arrange discussions of things more naturally (similarly to the arrangement later adopted within the Pāṇinian tradition by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in his Siddhāntakaumudi), and omit many of the most difficult rules prescribed by Pāṇini. The result is a work of about fourteen hundred sūtras only, in contrast to Pāṇini’s four thousand.

As is well known, the Jains were divided from an early period into the Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions. Each developed its own literature, and not surprisingly each developed its peculiar grammatical tradition.

The Digambara tradition goes back to the Jainendrayākaraṇa, which the Jains attribute to Mahāvīra, the Jina (founder of Jainism), who answers questions put to him by Indra, but which is a work that appears to have been composed about A.D. 500 by Pujyapāda or Deva-nandin, who is also known as the author of certain fundamental philosophical works (see the first volume of this encyclopedia [2d ed. p. 99]).

According to Belvalkar the Jainendra grammar is a condensation of Pāṇini and the vārttikas, a condensation accomplished by the use of short technical terms that make study of the work very complicated. This difficulty may account for the relative dearth of commentaries that have been composed on it, those of Abhayananandin (perhaps 750) and of Somadeva (1250) seeming to be the only ones still extant.

The Śvetāmbara version of grammar stems from a later date. Its basic works are the Śabdānuṣṭāsana and Amoghavytti of Abhinava Śakaṭāyana, not to be confused with the ancient authority by that name. This Śabdānuṣṭāsana draws on the work of all the authors discussed so far, as well as on Candragomin’s Buddhist tradition; indeed, the dependence on this last tradition is fairly widespread. This system was carried on through the usual commentarial works until it was supplant-
ed for the most part by that of Hemacandra’s Śabdānuśāsana, also addressed to the Śvetāmbaras.

Buddhist Grammar dates at least from Candragomin, to whom the Cāndrasūtras are ascribed, and who appears to have lived about Bhaṭṭhārari’s time, in the fourth or fifth century. Once again it depends largely on Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali, though it is somewhat briefer—3,100 sūtras in all. There are also accessory lists: a Dhātupāṭha, Liṅgānuśāsana, Gaṇapāṭha, Upasarga-vṛtti, and Varṇasūtras, and a commentary on this material written by Candragomin, fragments of which have come down to us. This grammar seems to have been popular, was translated into Tibetan and was circulated throughout Buddhist lands. It is still studied in Tibet, though not in Sri Lanka, where it was later superseded by Kāśyapa’s Bōṭāvabodha (ca. 1200).

E. Bhaṭṭhārari (perhaps fifth century)

It was Bhaṭṭhārari who led Grammar into philosophy proper, by making a case for vyākaraṇa as a darśana, a view about ultimate things, eventually about liberation. He was also the major architect of the sphoṭa theory, which is regularly identified as the unique contribution of Grammarians to the philosophical problem of meaning. The locus classicus for his thoughts on these matters is the work popularly called Vākyapadiya, but he also wrote a commentary on the Mahābhāṣya and possibly other works. We have made the commentarial tradition on Bhaṭṭhārari’s Vākyapadiya central to the concerns of this volume. The first such commentator was Bhaṭṭhārari himself, it would seem, for he now appears to have been the author of a commentary on at least the first two books of the three that constitute the Vākyapadiya or Trikaṇḍī.

F. The Fifth Through Tenth Centuries

Attacks were leveled against Bhaṭṭhārari’s sphoṭa theory by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the famous Mīmāṃsaka, and by the Buddhist Dharmakīrti. Maṇḍana Miśra, the great Advaitin and Mīmāṃsaka, wrote an independent work, Sphoṭasiddhi, defending sphoṭa against these attacks and vindicating Bhaṭṭhārari’s position. And just at the end of this period we date Helārāja, probably the most important commentator after Bhaṭṭhārari himself.

This period also features the production of a very influential commentary, the oldest extant complete running commentary, on Pāṇini’s grammar, the Kāśikā-vṛtti. It was composed by two authors, Jayāditya and Vāmana, around the middle of the 7th century. The Kāśikā was in turn commented upon by Jinendrabuddhi, a Buddhist known for philosophical works as well as for his grammatical erudition.

To this period likewise belong Abhayanandin, the Jainendra
commentator, Abhinava Śakaṭāyana, author of Šabdānuṭāsana, and Durgāsimha, the Kātantra commentator, all mentioned earlier.

G. Eleventh Through Sixteenth Centuries

We have now arrived at an era in which a number of grammatical traditions were in place. The next few centuries featured in the main commentators explaining and furthering these traditions, with one or two new additions to the field.

Within the Pāṇinian tradition itself the most important commentators early in this period included Kṣāravāmīn, author of a commentary on Pāṇini’s Dhatupātha; Haradatta, a commentator on the Kāśika; Maitreya Rakṣita, a Bengali Grammarian who wrote on the theory of verbal bases; and most notably, Kaiyāṭa, the major commentator on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya. It is on Kaiyāṭa’s Pradīpa rather than on the Mahābhāṣya itself that the subsequent commentators mainly based their remarks. Kaiyāṭa must have lived about the beginning of the eleventh century. Still other figures of importance are Puruṣottamadeva, author of commentaries on Pāṇini and Patañjali (though the latter has been lost), and Rāmacandra, author of Prakṛtyākaumūḍi, on Pāṇini.

The period is likewise marked by the composition of various materials stemming from the traditions of Kātantra. In Jainism, as was pointed out before, the field was commandeered, at least within the Śvetāmbara branch, by Hemacandra, a polymath writer who is probably the most important and influential Jain scholar the tradition has ever known. His Šabdānuṭāsana is even longer than Pāṇini’s—some 4,500 sūtras—and draws on his predecessors, especially on Śakaṭāyana’s work. At least a quarter of the work deals with the various prākrta (Prakrit) languages, the ancestors of the modern regional languages of northern India, which are today beginning to take on their developed form. Hemacandra also composed a commentary, the Brhadārīti, which quotes many writers either to support or to criticize them.

A new school of Grammar, known as the Jaumara school and influential especially in West Bengal even today, takes its rise from a grammar called Samksiptasāra, composed by Kramadiśvara about the middle of the eleventh century. This work again depends on Pāṇini, with a few rules rejected and the sūtras rearranged. He makes many innovations both in the method and in the organization. The text as known to Gopīcandra, another influential writer of this system, contains a chapter on Prakrit. The school actually takes its name from Jumaranandin, who revised the Samksiptasāra, probably in the fourteenth century.

Two other new systems are those of the Sārasvata and the Mugdhabodha. The Sārasvata school appears to have been popular in northern
India from its inception in the thirteenth century down to the time of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, when the revival of the Pāṇinian tradition put most of the other schools of grammar into a decline. The basic work of the system is the Sārasvatīprakriyā, composed by Anubhūti Svarūpācārya about 1270. Anubhūti Svarūpācārya also wrote works on Advaita Vedānta. About the same time Vopadeva (or Bopadeva), a native of the Maharashtra country, wrote a grammar known as Mugdhabodha, which once more represents an attempt to simplify and abbreviate Pāṇini’s system, this time with evidence of a religious purpose. Vopadeva’s arrangement, like that of the Kātantra, promised to make his grammar more accessible, but as he also rearranged the order of the syllables and removed all the markers his system was not easily recognizable to Pāṇinians. Nevertheless, the Mugdhabodha system was very popular up to the time of Bhaṭṭoji, who went out of his way to refute it.

The picture, then, of Grammar during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is one in which a number of competing grammatical systems flourished with different degrees of popularity in different parts of the subcontinent, and the Pāṇinian system itself was only one among them.

H. The Modern Period: Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, Kondā Bhaṭṭa, and Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa

The Pāṇinian tradition suffered through the difficulty of its system so that, as we have seen, other traditions grew up over the centuries that rivaled or surpassed Pāṇini’s school in popularity and influence. Although some attempts had been made by grammarians who remained within the Pāṇinian tradition to simplify the system, notably Rāmacandra’s Prakriyākaumudī, it was Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita at the end of the sixteenth century who produced a version of the Pāṇinian grammar that made it generally accessible and served to elevate that tradition to its present place of unrivaled eminence. Bhaṭṭoji’s work is called Siddhāntakaumudī. Cardona, referring to a traditional explanation, notes that kaumudī means “moonlight,” and just as moonlight brightens and cools, the kaumudī works “dispel ignorance while not involving the great effort necessary to understand works like the Mahābhāṣya,” works that previously had to be mastered in order to grasp the sense of Pāṇini’s rules. Bhaṭṭoji also wrote a commentary on the Siddhāntakaumudī, the Praudhamanorama. The modern commentarial literature concentrates on the Siddhāntakaumudī version of the system; the number of commentaries on it and on Praudhamanorama far outnumbers the number composed after Bhaṭṭoji on Pāṇini and Patañjali themselves. These commentaries are not always in agreement with Bhaṭṭoji; in addition to abridgment, his approach involved new interpretations of some of the rules, which departed in several instances from the interpretations of the classical Pāṇinians.
Bhaṭṭoji wrote, in addition to the *Siddhāntakaumudi* and its commentary, another work, the *Śabdakaustubha*, in which he collected the interpretations of earlier writers on Pāṇini's rules, especially those of Patanjali. This work is incomplete, dealing only with the first, second, fourth, and part of the third chapters of Pāṇini's eight. In addition, Bhaṭṭoji is responsible for seventy-four verses on grammar, sometimes referred to as the *Vaiyākaraṇamātonmājana*, which form the text around which Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, the next great figure after Bhaṭṭoji, assembles his magnum opus, the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana* with its sāra.

Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa provided in his work of 1630 refutations of rival theories of meaning proposed by other schools, principally the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. The work thus stands as the most important treatise after Bhartṛhari's to stem from the Pāṇinian school concerning philosophy as understood for the purpose of this volume. Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣanāsāra* is an abridged version, presenting the arguments alone without the considerations of other views that accompany them in the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana* itself.

Similarly, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in the early eighteenth century dealt with philosophical matters. Nāgeśa was the pupil of Hari Dīkṣita, author of *Śabdaratna* (or perhaps two *Śabdaratnas*, a longer and a shorter), who in turn was Bhaṭṭoji's grandson. His output was lavish, including commentaries on Bhaṭṭoji and Kāiyata as well as a number of original works. Of the latter, three versions of a *Mañjuśā* developing from Bhaṭṭoji's verses are particularly pertinent to questions of philosophy. The shortest of them, *Paramalaghumanjusā*, is summarized below. Nāgeśa is the most acknowledged grammarian of modern times, though he also wrote treatises on several of the other philosophical systems—Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Nyāya. There is also a separate work on the *sphota* theory, of great interest for purposes of this discussion.

The foregoing summary mentions only a small number of writers on grammar who have graced the ages in India. The bibliography appended to this volume will suggest to the casual reader the extensive development of this topic and the attention given to it, and it may offer the less casual reader guidance in seeking more detailed information. From among the welter of authors and works mentioned there, this volume concentrates on those who contributed most tellingly to the philosophical aspects of the subject—its theory of meaning and related matters. Although it is hard, and perhaps not really necessary, to distinguish the most philosophically relevant texts from the rest, Table 1.1 will help the reader pick out those authors whose writings promise the most rewards for the philosophically oriented.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Patanjali</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>North of Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī b.c.? Ayodhya? (T)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Bhartrihari</td>
<td>A.D. 450?</td>
<td>? Vākyapadiya or Trikāṇḍī (T)</td>
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<td>3. Vṛṣabhadeva or Hari Vṛṣabha</td>
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<td>? Mahābhāṣyadipikā or Triṣūya (E)</td>
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<td>7. Kaiyāṭa</td>
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<td>Kashmir Mahābhāṣyaprakāśī (E)</td>
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<td>8. (Ṛṣiputra)</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>Kerala Sphoṭasiddhikālika (E)</td>
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<td>Paramesvara II</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>9. Satyānanda or Rāmacandra</td>
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<td>Kashmir Mahābhāṣyaprātipalaghuvarana (E)</td>
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<td>Sarasvati</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>Varanasi Sphoṭatattvavijnāna (E)</td>
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<td>11. Annambhaṭṭa</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>Andhradesa Mahābhāṣyaprātipodīyotana (E)</td>
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<td>12. (Śeṣa) Nārāyana (Bhaṭṭa)</td>
<td>1546</td>
<td>Varanasi Mahābhāṣyasūktiratnakāra (M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Istvarānanda or Istvarīdatta Sarasvati</td>
<td>1550?</td>
<td>? Mahābhāṣyaprātiparbhadīvarana (E)</td>
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<td>15. Author unknown</td>
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<td>? Sphoṭasiddhiniyavavicāra (E)</td>
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<td>16. (Śeṣa) Cintāmaṇi</td>
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<td>17. Bhaṭṭaṭṭi Dīkṣita</td>
<td>1590</td>
<td>Andhradesa Vaiyakaranasiṣṭhāntakārikā (E)</td>
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<td>18. Śeṣa Viṣṇu</td>
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<td>Varanasi? Mahābhāṣyaprakāṣikā (M)</td>
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<td>19. Śivarāmendra</td>
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<td>Sarasvati</td>
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<td>20. Nārāyana (Śāstrī)</td>
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<td>21. Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa</td>
<td>1640</td>
<td>Varanasi Vaiyakaranabhāṣya and Sāra (E)</td>
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<td>22. Nārāyana Bhaṭṭatīrī</td>
<td>1640</td>
<td>Melputtur (Kerala) Apoṇīyapramāṇa (T)</td>
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<td>23. Cokkanātha Dīkṣita</td>
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<td>South Mahābhāṣyaratnakāvalī (M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Hari Dīkṣita</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>Varanasi Sābadarśana (Bṛhat- and Laghu-) (E)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>26. Jagannātha Paṇḍita</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>Patna</td>
<td>Prabodhacandrikā (M)</td>
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<td>27. Rāmabhadra Dikṣita</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>Tanjore</td>
<td>Šaḍdaṁtinisiddhāntasaṁgraha (E) Şādabhedanirūpā (E)</td>
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<tr>
<td>28. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>Maharashtra/Allahabad; Nāgeśa spent his scholarly life in Varanasi</td>
<td>Bhatamatijātā (M) Laghumaṁtiṭa (E) Paramalaghumatijātā (part T; E) Mahābhāṣyapraddhāpyota (E)</td>
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<td>29. Gopālakṛṣṇa Śāstrin</td>
<td>1720</td>
<td>Pudukottah</td>
<td>Mahābhāṣyatābdikacīvantāmaṇi (M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Dharaṇidhara</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>Tiksnajnatiya</td>
<td>Bodhapaddhati (M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>31. Vaidyanaṇātha Paḷiyagūḍe</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>Varanasi</td>
<td>Mahābhāṣyopradipḍoddotacāhyā (E) Leghumatijākālā (E) Jñānānta (M) Mahābhāṣayaviśvara (M)</td>
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<td>32. Kāśīśvara Śarman</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Šabdarthaśararamatijārī (M) Šabdarthatarkānta (M) Vaiyākaranabhāṣyasārasradarpana (M)</td>
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<td>33. Satyapriya Tirtha Śvāmin</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Sphoṭacandrika (E) Tarkacandrika (M) Vṛttiṇiḍi (E) Šabdātriveṇi (E)</td>
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<tr>
<td>34. Jayakṛṣṇa Maunin</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Vaiyākaranabhāṣyasārasradarpana (M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>35. Harivallabha</td>
<td>1747</td>
<td>Gives his native place as Kurmaṇgiri</td>
<td></td>
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<td>36. Śrīkṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Maunin</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Sphoṭacandrika (E) Tarkacandrika (M) Vṛttiṇiḍi (E) Šabdātriveṇi (E)</td>
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<td>37. Āśādhara Bhaṭṭa</td>
<td>1770</td>
<td>Traditionally considered to have come from Baroda</td>
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<td>38. Rāmasevaka Upādhyāya</td>
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<td>?</td>
<td>Mahābhāṣyapradipḍpayaṁkhyā (M) Šabdataṭṭvaḥprakāśa (M)</td>
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<td>39. Indradatta</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Mahābhāṣyapradipḍpayaṁkhyā (M) Šabdataṭṭvaḥprakāśa (M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>40. Kṛṣṇamitrācārya or Durbalācārya</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Vaiyākaranabhadhaṁjaṁjukka (E) Vaiyākaranabhadhaṁjukka (E)</td>
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<tr>
<td>41. Manyudeva</td>
<td>1815</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Vaiyākaranabhadhaṁjukkā (E)</td>
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<td>42. Bhaṭṭa Miṣra</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Vaiyākaranabhadhaṁjukkā (E)</td>
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<td>43. Kumāra Tatāya</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Sphoṭaparīkṣa (E) Mahābhāṣyapāṭrijātaṁ nāṭakam (M) Mahābhāṣyapāṭrijātaṁ nāṭakam (M)</td>
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<td>44. Satāra Rāghavendra- drācārya Gajendragadkar</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Mahābhāṣyapāṭrijātaṁ nāṭakam (M) Mahābhāṣyapāṭrijātaṁ nāṭakam (M)</td>
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<td>45. Gangādhara Kavirāja</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>Jessore</td>
<td>Trikāṇḍaśabdaśāsana (E)</td>
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<td>46. Anantācārya</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Musarapakkam</td>
<td>Trisṭrāpyākara (E) Saranatadārthavīcāra (E) Saranatadārthavīcāra (E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Khuddi Jhā (Śarman)</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Varanasi</td>
<td>Vaiyākaranabhadhaṁjukkā (E)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Notes: The table contains historical resumes of notable figures, including their names, dates, places, and titles of their works. The titles are in different languages, with a mix of Sanskrit and other ancient Indian languages, highlighting the contributions of these scholars in the field of Sanskrit grammar and the Vedas.
(Because it is difficult to give an exhaustive list of modern scholars, main works are given in the appendix. Dates for modern scholars given above are publication dates for their major works.)

4. PROBLEMS OF LANGUAGE
DISCUSSED BY OTHER SCHOOLS

A. Mîmâṁsā

Mîmâṁsā deals mainly with the interpretation of the Vedic passages that give rules about the various rituals and sacrifices. The Veda consists of metrical hymns (mantras) and prose passages (brâhmanas). The brâhmanas are classified into two sections: (1) prescriptions, including injunctions (vidhi) and prohibitions (nîśedha); and (2) supplementary descriptions (arthavâdas), which are classified into three
HISTORICAL RESUME

groups: (a) **guṇavādas**, statements that are contradicted by our experiences in the world and have to be explained figuratively to get a cogent meaning, such as “the mind is a thief” (*stenam manah*), (b) **anuvādas**, involving repetition of ideas already known, such as “fire is the antidote to snow” (*agnir himasya bhesajam*), and (c) **bhūtarthavādas**, which deal with things that are unknown but may be taken to be true, for example, statements like “Indra killed Vṛtra.”

In the **arthavāda** section of Jaimini’s *Mimāṃsāsūtras* the question is raised whether the **arthavāda** passages in the Veda can be considered as authoritative. The aim of the Vedic texts is to bring about action, hence apparently only injunctions and prohibitions can be held to be authoritative; the **arthavāda** passages, not directly related to any command or prohibition, seem to be unauthoritative. But the final view of the Mīmāṃsakas is that the **arthavādas** are also valid instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), because they are supplementary texts to be read along with the injunctions or prohibitions as a unit.

Regarding the interpretation of an injunction itself there is difference of opinion between the two schools of Mīmāṃsā—the Bhāṭṭa, following Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s views, and the Prabhākara, following Prabhākara’s views. According to the Bhāṭṭa school the content of an injunction is the realization that the action enjoined will produce some beneficial result. For every Vedic injunction the three basic components that must be indicated are: **śādhyā** (what is to be brought about), **śādhanā** (the means or *karaṇa*), and **iṭīkartaṇyātā** (in what way it is to be brought about). In the Bhāṭṭa system the **śādhyā** of the **śabdāt bhāvanā** is the **ārthī bhāvanā** and the **iṭīkartaṇyātā** is the **arthavāda** associated with the injunctions. Kumārila says that not even a fool will act without a purpose. There is no need to say who should act, for anyone who is desirous of the fruit will come forward to do it. According to the Prabhākara, however, the basic components that need to be indicated are: the **viśaya** (the act enjoined), the **niyojya** (the person who is enjoined to do it), and the **karaṇa** (the means of doing it). There is no need to indicate the fruit of action for, according to Prabhākara, the Vedic injunction is to be obeyed simply because it is a command. The law is to be obeyed because it is the law, not because of the expectation of any reward or the fear of punishment.

The definition given by the Mīmāṃsakas for a sentence is in *Mimāṃsāsūtra* 2.1.46. A group of words serving a single purpose (**artha**) forms a sentence, if on analysis the separate words are found to have mutual expectancy (**ākāṅkṣā**). The principle of syntactic unity is that “So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words, which on being separated, are found to be wanting and incapable of effecting the said purpose, they form one syntactical unit—one complete Yajus-mantra.” Here the sentence definition is based on psychological
Prabhakara says that in this definition the term artha stands for both meaning and purpose and that the two are interrelated. Kumārila Bhāṭṭa says that it is possible to take artha as meaning in order to allow a wider scope to the principle, but he does not accept that interpretation himself. Bhartrhari refers to this definition and says that it is not identical with the definition given by Kātyāyana, that a sentence is that (group of connected words) which contains a single finite verb (ekāti).19

It was the Mīmāṃsakas who took a leading part in studying the working of lakṣaṇa or the secondary significance of words. They had to recognize it in order to explain apparent inconsistencies when words are taken in their literal sense. The main condition of a metaphoric transfer is this inconsistency (mukhyārthādha). The Prabhakaras held that the inconsistency is the impossibility of taking the word in the literal sense, while according to the Bhāṭṭas it is the unsuitability in the context. The role of contextual factors was also recognized by both schools. A sentence may have a secondary meaning according to both the schools, while the Nyāya school allows it only for the individual words.

B. Nyāya

The Nyāya school is greatly interested in problems of language. A considerable portion of Navya-Nyāya is concerned with logical grammar, analyzing and classifying the significant elements of sentences and discovering rules that determine the motion of a meaningful sentence. It is to the Nyāya school that the modern sabdabodha studies look for inspiration and help. Sabdabodha means "knowledge of the sentence meaning," and it is studied from the listener's point of view.

The Naiyāyikas use the term pada (word) for any meaningful unit, not necessarily a free unit; and they use the term vākya (sentence) for any syntactically connected "words". Thus for them an expression like ghātam can be taken to be a "sentence" because it is made up of two "words", ghāta and -am, and is logically complete.

The Naiyāyikas believe that the relation between words and their meanings is not natural, but conventional, being established by the will of God in the case of ordinary words and by the will of man in the case of technical terms. This conventional relation is called significative power (śakti). Meaning (artha) includes the universal (jāti), the configuration (ākṛti), and the individual (vyakti), according to early Naiyāyikas; but later they considered it to be the individual as qualified by the universal (jāti-viśeṣa-vyakti).20

There is significative power only for primary meaning; secondary meaning is accepted as being related to the primary meaning. The
Naiyāyikas accept secondary meaning only for an individual word in a sentence, not for the sentence as a whole, by contrast to the Mīmāṃsāsakas, who accept secondary meaning for a sentence. The early Naiyāyikas considered the impossibility of connecting the word meanings in a sentence to be the incompatibility that prompts their having secondary meaning; but according to the Navya-Nyāya school it is the unsuitability of primary sense in view of the sense intended in the context. The three conditions of expectancy, consistency, and contiguity necessary to unify the sentence are accepted by the Naiyāyikas; but to them the expectancy is syntactic, not psychological. Some of the Naiyāyikas accept intention (tātparya) as another condition, but not all. Suggestion (vyāśijana) is not acceptable to the logicians who include it under inference.

C. Buddhist Logicians

The Buddhist Logicians of Dignāga’s school have been very interested in the philosophy of language. How far can verbal communication be successful? Dignāga was greatly influenced by his elder contemporary Bhartṛhari. According to the Buddhist idealists reality consists of unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa), which are momentary and in perpetual flux. Perception is the sensation of the unique particulars, but all cognitions are based on concepts that are conceptual constructions (vikalpa), which cannot directly grasp reality. Words produce conceptual constructions, and conceptual constructions produce words. The Buddhists do not accept the universal as a reality. The function of a word, that is, a name, is the exclusion or elimination of other possibilities. Construction-free (nirvikalpaka) perception of the unique particular alone is real perception; verbal knowledge based on concepts is only inference, according to them, and has no direct correspondence with the real external things.

Bhartṛhari too seems to have held an idealistic view of reality. All verbal discourse is meaningful in terms of our conceptual images and the words that symbolize them. He seems to deny the possibility of a construction-free knowledge beyond the reach of words. All knowledge is interpenetrated with words, and it is impossible to have a cognition free from word association (see Vākyapadiya 1.123).

Dignāga’s indebtedness to Bhartṛhari can be discovered in his main work, Pramāṇasamuccaya vyārtti 5, on apoha-pariccheda.22 Looking for prototype of the theory of anyāpoha (exclusion of others), Masaaki Hattori successfully demonstrates that there is a striking resemblance between Dignāga’s concept of apoha and Bhartṛhari’s concept of the universal (jāti) discussed in Vākyapadiya 3.1, jātisamuddeśa.23 Dignāga quotes three verses of Vākyapadiya in Pramāṇasamuccaya vyārtti 5 in order to support his arguments. To clarify the grammatical distinc-
tions between two words with different nominal endings and those with identical endings, he quotes *Vākyapadiya* 3.14.8. To support the argument that a universal word (jātisabda) may be applied directly to members of that universal, he quotes *Vākyapadiya* 2.158. To support the argument that a universal word may never be applied to members of that universal, he quotes *Vākyapadiya* 2.155.

Finally, Dignāga declares in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* that the meaning of a sentence (vākyartham) is “intuition” (pratibhā), apparently under the influence of *Vākyapadiya* 2.143ff.: “When abstracted from a sentence, the meaning of a word is discriminated. The meaning of a sentence called pratibhā is first produced by it [that is, the meaning of a word].”

**D. Literary Criticism**

Grammar provided the foundation from which the detailed discussions of literary criticism arose. The importance of emotions with special reference to the theater were stressed in Bhārata’s *Nātyaśāstra* (third century of the Christian era), which gives detailed directions regarding the communication of emotions by the actors. Ānandavardhana accepted the importance of emotions in all literature and evolved his dhvani theory to explain the poet’s communication of aesthetic experience through the medium of language by using the method of suggestion.

Ānandavardhana, the author of the *Dhvanyāloka*, flourished in Kashmir under the patronage of King Avantivarman in the later half of the ninth century. The theory of primary and secondary meaning, developed by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas in ancient India, was further extended by him to include emotive and other associative meanings also under linguistic meaning. He postulated a third potency of language named vyanjana, which he called the capacity to suggest a meaning other than its literal and metaphorical (secondary) meaning. Under the term “meaning” is included not only the information conveyed but the sociocultural significance, the figures of speech, and also the emotion induced; and among the indicators of meaning, Ānandavardhana did not confine himself to the words and sentences, but included all the contextual factors, the intonation and gestures, the sound effect produced, the rhythm and the meter, as well as the literal sense. Although suggestion (vyañjanā) is a comprehensive linguistic phenomenon, Ānandavardhana confined his attention to poetic language and studied the problem only from that standpoint. Strictly speaking, the dhvani theory of Ānandavardhana is only an extension of the rasa theory of Bharata to the domain of literature, as has been pointed out by writers like Abhinavagupta.

Ānandavardhana’s basic postulate is that an emotion cannot be evoked in the reader by merely referring to its name or by its bare
description. It has to be suggested by describing the situation and contextual factors such as the reactions of the characters. Not only the literal meaning, but also the suggestive possibilities of the expression, such as the sound echoing the sense, rhythm, imagery and symbols, selective exaggeration of the prominent element, and the suppression of the irrelevant, and bringing out the etymological significance through subtle supplementation—all of these devices are to be used for helping to evoke the right response in the reader. Words and expressions are to be selected from those in common usage in such a way as to help evoke the emotional effect desired.

The linguistic speculations of ancient Indians such as the grammarians and logicians generally took a word as the unit of speech and considered a sentence as a combination of words for the purpose of communicating meaning. How is syntactic unity effected from a series of isolated words uttered in a sequence? This question was discussed and various explanations given by different schools of thought. The literal and metaphorical meanings of words were also discussed and the conditions for resorting to a word’s metaphorical meaning in a sentence were evolved. But there were some scholars, like Bhartṛhari, who exposed the unsatisfactory nature of a linguistic theory dependent entirely on individual words and their lexical meanings; Bhartṛhari’s theory of sphota emphasized the importance of taking the whole utterance as a significant unitary linguistic symbol. Anandavardhana took his cue from Bhartṛhari in developing his theory of suggestion in poetry.

Logicians, interested more in accuracy and precision in the use of words that they want to analyze objectively than in the fullness of expression and the possibilities of extending the range of meanings to the domain of the inexpressible, are satisfied with the normal sense; but poets and critics who deal with the totality of human experience cannot ignore vast areas of human behavior. The suggested meaning is too vague, fleeting, and subjective to have a place among logical meanings; the subtle and subjective suggestions implied in language (vyanjana) do not lend themselves to logical discussion and analysis. The suggested meaning depends on contextual factors, and the same utterance may convey different suggestions to different people depending on their mental makeup and expectations. There is no invariable connection between an expression and the suggestions conveyed. Anandavardhana included the emotions evoked in the listeners under the rubric of meaning, which naturally necessitates the assumption of a limitless suggestive power for language, for even logicians cannot argue that the emotions induced by language can be included under the literal meaning. Emotions can be evoked by music or dance where no expressed sense is involved; the emotive element in a language
cannot be explained in terms of the primary literal meaning or even the metaphorical sense of words.

It is true that intentional metaphors can suggest further ideas; but these suggested meanings have to be assigned to the suggestive power of language. The break in the flow, due to the incompatibility of the expressed sense, in the case of a metaphor is a signal to the listener to stop and think about the possible interpretations and thereby lead him into the sphere of suggestions. Ānandavardhana was concerned only with poetic language and confined his attention to the suggestion of meanings of aesthetic value. His theory of dhvani is vyanjāṇḍ or suggestion as applied to poetry.

It was Ānandavardhana who for the first time enunciated the theory of angirasa according to which there should be one predominant sentiment or rasa in a literary work such as a drama, epic, or lyric to which all the other rasas introduced should be subordinate. Mutually conflicting or supportive emotions could be delineated appropriately in a work, provided there is one rasa predominant throughout, the others being kept in the background as subsidiary. Earlier writers like Bharata had not stressed this point but considered that a work such as a drama has to cater to the different tastes of various types of people and must therefore deal with various emotions and rasas. Bharata seems to have felt that each character in a play may have one dominant emotion, but he did not consider the need for a predominant rasa for the work as a whole. Structural unity in plot was, however, stressed by him. Ānandavardhana perhaps felt that unity in theme implied a predominant rasa for the work as a whole and that great classical writers have always taken this idea for granted; so he boldly stated that even the construction of the plot must be made in such a way that there is scope for a predominant rasa; incidents and descriptions irrelevant to the development of the main rasa should be avoided, and even the introduction of figures of speech and selection of the work's texture should be in keeping with the rasa delineated. In all such cases the propriety from the point of view of the rasa is the most important factor to be considered.

Another point stressed by Ānandavardhana is that the imaginative sensibility requisite for proper literary appreciation can be acquired only by a close study of classical works and by the constant practice of response to works of art. Because the most important element in the meaning of a poem is the emotion suggested, it can be understood and appreciated only by sahrdayas or men of like sensibility, not by all scholars and logicians, who may only be able to get at the literal meaning through analytical study. The process is one of getting the reader's heart and mind tuned to the same frequency as that of the transmitting artist. Poetry does not give out its full charm to all, only to a select few.
As the *Rg Vedic* seer observed, the goddess of speech exposes her full charm and yields herself completely only to the deserving devotee, just as a loving wife does to her husband. Bharata, who had to deal with the problems of the theatrical performances, considered that a drama should please all types of people, not merely the specialists. Anandavardhana, by contrast, considers that literary taste has to be acquired through practice. Even among connoisseurs tastes differ; some themes such as love stories and adventures may have a wider attraction than stories dealing with the quiet life of a recluse. The ideal *sahṛdaya*, however, is one who can raise himself above his petty prejudices and individual predilections and appreciate things from the poet’s point of view.

Anandavardhana exalts the freedom of the creative writer, which transcends even the powers of nature. He says that in the boundless *samsāra* of poetry the poet is the sole creator, the whole world transforms itself depending on his wishes. If the poet is pervaded with *rasa*, the whole world of his creation will be suffused with that *rasa*. A good poet makes even insentient objects act as sentient beings. As Abhinavagupta explains it, the poet’s intuitive power (*pratibhā*) enables him to create a world according to his wish. This tendency of infusing life into insentient objects of nature is a special feature of Indian poetry, though it has been criticized by Ruskin as the “pathetic fallacy.”

In India even poetics or literary criticism claims to be not only a science (*alaṃkāraśāstra*) but also a *darśana* or philosophy. The main aim of literature and dramaturgy is to give unalloyed pleasure to the readers or the audience by evoking *rasa*. This *rasa* realized and enjoyed has often been compared to the bliss experienced by the mystics on getting a glimpse of the ultimate Reality or Brahman; some have claimed that *rasa*-realization is identical with Brahman-realization; there has also been a claim that it is superior to the bliss the yogins get in their deep meditation, for less effort is involved in it.

The *Rg Veda* can be considered not only as the earliest religious text, but also as the earliest literary work in India, if not in the world. The Vedic seers were mystic poets fully conscious of language’s importance and of the problems of faithfully communicating intimate personal experiences. Some of the concepts that are universally accepted by the critics and are clearly found in the Vedas include:

1. The need for a vision in the mind, which is integral and pleasurable, as the source for all poetry and philosophy. The term *pratibhā* was not found, but the root *dṛś*, “to see” or “to visualize” is frequently used to convey the idea.

2. The importance given to craftsmanship in composing poetry. Words have to be selected (from those used in everyday life) and arranged properly, with due regard to the meter used. The words
must be “as sharp as arrows” and the hymn is to be composed carefully, like an artisan constructing a chariot.

(3) Poetry can be understood and appreciated only by the few who are of the same mental nature as the poet (“sakhāyah sakhyāni jñāte” Rg Veda 10,71.2c).

Bhaṭṭanāyaka (late ninth and early tenth centuries) seems to have been the first to associate aesthetic experience with mystical experience. The subject is completely dissolved in the object contemplated and the entire surroundings disappear from his attention, because of the concentration on the thing contemplated, in both aesthetic experience and mystical experience. Bhaṭṭanāyaka stated that aesthetic experience is similar to the experience of the Absolute Brahman. Abhinavagupta also accepts Bhaṭṭanāyaka’s opinion regarding the similarity between aesthetic experience and the mystic experience of the Absolute.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka seems to have gone one step further to claim the superiority of aesthetic experience to the yogins’ mystical vision. He says that rasa or aesthetic pleasure is poured forth spontaneously by speech like a cow giving forth its milk to its calf; therefore, it is different from (and superior to) that (mystical vision) milked (laboriously) by the yogins.

Abhinavagupta recognizes the similarity between aesthetic experience and the mystical experience, but points out the boundary line that separates the two. The mystical experience of the ultimate reality is total and complete, and the yogin is far beyond any form of discursive thought. Aesthetic experience gives bliss only temporarily and cannot be considered supreme bliss, though it is superior to the worldly joys. Ānandavardhana was an advocate of rasa, but realized its limitations, for in one of his verses quoted in the Dhvanyāloka he says that after experimenting with the imaginative poetic vision capable of affording aesthetic experience and also with the intellectual powers for analyzing and understanding the truth about reality, he is exhausted and has realized that the bliss that the devotee gets by contemplation of God is far superior.

Later Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, author of the Rasagaṇādāhara, states that rasa is identical with consciousness (cit) or Brahman, and aesthetic experience, in its true sense, is the realization of that consciousness by the removal of the veils covering it.

_Rasa_ is unique and at the ultimate stage there is no plurality. The division of _rasa_ into eight or nine is based on the different permanent moods (sthāyibhāvas) that lead to the _rasa_. At a still lower level even the _sthāyibhāvas_ are sometimes referred to as _rasa_.

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The goal of the Indian Grammarians' philosophy, which we here call *vyākaraṇa*, is not mere intellectual knowledge, but direct experience of ultimate truth. Knowledge of grammar resulting in correct speech not only conveys meaning but also enables one to "see" reality. This is the philosophical meaning of the Indian term *darśana*, which literally means "sight". It is this feature that sets Indian philosophy apart from modern western perspectives on language. *Vyākaraṇa* not only addresses itself to the analysis of grammatical rules (though that is certainly important) or to theorizing about the way speech conveys meaning (though that too is achieved), it also insists that one should not be satisfied with mere intellectual conviction but should transform that conviction into direct experience.¹

From the early Vedas the Indian approach to language has never been narrow or restrictive. Language was examined in relation to consciousness—(the scope of the inquiry) not even limited to human consciousness. All aspects of the world and human experience were regarded as illuminated by language. Indian philosophy also postulated that language had both phenomenal and metaphysical dimensions. It is remarkable that in the ancient hymns of the *Ṛg Veda* a semitechnical vocabulary was already developed to deal with such linguistic matters as grammar, poetic creation, inspiration, illumination, and so on.² Although there was careful concern for the phenomenal or outer aspects of language, the Indians always paid equal attention to the inner or metaphysical aspects of language. Indian philosophers of language seem to have successfully avoided the two reductionist mistakes of much western modern language speculation. They did not reduce language to the condition of a merely human convention having only scientific or factual referents; neither did they fall into the error of metaphysical
reductionism that so devalues the meanings of human words that language ends up as obscure mysticism. Grammarians like Pāṇini and Patañjali and etymologists like Yāska were clearly concerned with human speech in the everyday empirical world, but they also made room for metaphysical study. Similarly, the great Indian philosopher of language, Bhārtṛhari, begins his Vākyapādiya with a metaphysical inquiry into the nature and origin of language in relation to Brahma, but then goes on in the second and third chapters to explore technical grammatical points involved in the everyday use of language. In classical Indian thought on language, the study of a particular phenomenon and the contemplation of it as a metaphysical mystery are not mutually exclusive. They are both considered parts of a darṣana or systematic view of truth.

There is one more aspect of traditional Indian philosophy of language that must be understood by the modern reader. Whereas the contemporary writer often thinks in terms of using language creatively, that is, to create something “original” or “new”, the vyākaraṇa conception is quite different. The correct or insightful use of language is not seen as conveying new knowledge, but rather as uncovering ancient knowledge that has been obscured due to the accrual of ignorance. The Vedic sage does not produce something new out of his own imagination, but rather relates ordinary things to their forgotten eternal truth. Thus, from the perspective of grammatical philosophy the philosophical study of language and correct grammatical usage are seen as “ignorance-clearing activities”, which together open the way to a direct perception of truth.

As a systematic means to knowledge vyākaraṇa suffers from certain special difficulties. Language is the object of study in vyākaraṇa, yet all thinking about language must, by virtue of human limitations, be done in language itself. One cannot get outside of language so as to examine it objectively. Language must be used to study language from within. Vyākaraṇa does not draw back from this difficulty but relishes its challenge; it recognizes that, as Hans-Georg Gadamer puts it, all knowledge of ourselves and all knowledge of the world comes to us through language. Thus the correct knowledge of language is basic to all other approaches to reality—all other darśanas.

2. Sabda Brahman and Its Manifestations

It was Bhārtṛhari who in Vākyapādiya 1.1 first systematically equated Brahman (the Absolute) with language (śabda), going on to argue that everything else arises as a manifestation of this one Sabda Brahman. But equating Brahman with language is found much earlier
in the Vedic literature. The Asyavāmīya Hymn (Ṛg Veda 1.164) states that the ultimate abode of language (vāc) is Brahmān. Language is described as being at the pinnacle of the universe. Three-quarters of language remain hidden in a cave, while the fourth part fashions creation (Ṛg Veda 1.164.10, 41, 45). In Ṛg Veda 10.71 it is made clear that the manifestations of Brahmān in language are not equally perceived by all people. Those who have purified themselves, namely, the ṛṣis or “seers”, experience the full manifestation of language. Others, whose ignorance obscures their minds and sense organs, hear little of the fullness of language. The Vedic seers are not considered to be composers of the hymns but rather the “seers” of eternal truth. In Ṛg Veda 1.164.37 language is related to cosmic order (ṛta) and is understood as logos, which manifests itself as both the uttered word (for use in ritual chanting) and the inner word that reveals truth.

The equation of Brahmān with language is also found within the Upaniṣads. In the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.1.2 Brahmān is identified as the one reality, without a second, which is identical with language. The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad 3.3 links the unspeakable absolute with the speakable via the symbol of aum. Aum is described as traversing the phenomenal levels of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep and as reaching out to the absolute. Brahmān is identical with language, the basic manifestation of which is aum. Bhartrhari echoes this assertion in Vākyapādiya 1.9 in describing aum as “the source of all scripture and the common factor of all original causes.” Vyākaraṇa scholars have focused on those Vedas and Upaniṣads which equate language, Brahmān, and absolute reality. Passages that state otherwise are ignored or passed over. This practice, of course, is usual within each of the Indian philosophical schools (dārtānas)—at least in those which claim to be orthodox (āstika) or grounded on the Vedas.

The Vedas occupy a primary place in the manifestation of Śabda Brahmān, as well as being the means by which Śabda Brahmān may be realized and release experienced. The Veda, though One, is divided into many and spreads out through its various recensions and manifesting sounds (dharma) to the diversity of people. Although the experience of the Vedas may be many, the reality they reveal is the one Śabda Brahmān. Vedic language is at once the creator and sustainer of the world cycles and the revealer of the Divine. Language is taken as having Divine origin (daivi vāk), as Spirit descending and embodying itself in phenomena, assuming various guises and disclosing its truth to the sensitive soul. As Aurobindo describes it,

The language of the Veda itself is śruti, a rhythm not composed by the intellect but heard, a divine Word that came vibrating out of the Infinite to the inner audience of the man who had
previously made himself fit for the impersonal knowledge. The words themselves, *dṛṣṭi* and *sruti*, sight and hearing, are Vedic expressions; these and cognate words signify, in the esoteric terminology of the hymns, revelatory knowledge and the contents of inspiration.

In contrast with western views of revelation, there is nothing miraculous in the manifestation of the Vedas to the rṣi. The rṣi “sees” the divine truth not because it is given to him in an act of grace, but because he has made himself fit, through heroic practices of self-purification, to “see” the truth directly. He then puts it into spoken words, the Vedic hymns, for the purpose of helping others who are still caught in ignorance to purify themselves until they too have the experience of directly “seeing” Śabda Brahman. Vyākaraṇa has the special task of keeping the Vedas uncorrupted so that the manifestation of Śabda Brahman remains available to all in pristine form. Should *vyākaraṇa* fail to provide this service and allow the Vedas to become corrupted through sloppy usage and transmission, then the possibility of realizing truth could be lost for the generations yet to come in this cycle of creation. For this reason *vyākaraṇa* is described by Bhartrhari as more important than other darśanas. As the other schools base themselves on the Vedas, the loss or corruption of the Vedas would render the fruits of their particular approaches useless and misleading.

The fact that Indian philosophy is based on oral traditions is another reason why *vyākaraṇa* takes its teaching to be of primary importance. Because the authoritative manifestation of Śabda Brahman is found first in spoken form and only secondarily in written forms, the role of *vyākaraṇa* in providing the rules and teaching that keeps the oral forms of language pure is of fundamental importance to all other philosophic schools. For example, Pāṇini’s *Asṭādhyāyī* is a grammar founded upon oral usage rather than upon etymology or derivation. The same stress on language’s oral character is found in the discussions offered by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* and Bhartrhari in the *Vākyapādya* of the way uttered words convey meaning. It is perhaps worth noting in passing that for Indian philosophy, the normative form of language is not written but oral and that *vyākaraṇa* plays the important role of keeping the oral form disciplined and pure in its presentation. Without this purity the truth-bearing capacity of language could be restricted and the manifestation of Śabda Brahman obscured. Knowledge of the Vedas is not simply the “book-learning” of main ideas that characterizes modern western scholarship. In the Indian tradition, language is only fully alive when spoken. Thus knowledge of the Vedas includes and requires the ability to speak the words with correct accent and meter. And consistent with the oral emphasis, thinking is seen as internal speaking to which not enough *prāṇa* or breath has been added.
to make it overt. Writing, the focus of attention for the modern West, is seen by *vyākaraṇa* as a coded recording of the oral, which can never perfectly represent all the nuances of the spoken word and is therefore always secondary. The *vyākaraṇa* approach is opposite to that taken in modern western scholarship. In modern biblical studies, for example, the scholar's aim is to get back to the earliest available written manuscript and then to use it as a criterion against which to check the text that is in use today. The rationale is that errors that have crept in over the years would not be present in the earlier manuscript. In addition, the modern school of Form Criticism has argued that before many of the scriptures (such as the Gospels) were written down there was a period of oral transmission, during which time the text (for example, the original teachings of Jesus) was modified by the needs of the people and the particular conditions under which they lived. This period of oral transmission is judged to be unreliable due to its failure to carry forward the original sayings in a pure and unchanged form.14

The *vyākaraṇa* practice is the exact opposite. When India achieved independence in 1947, one of the first acts of the new government was to establish a commission of senior scholars to go from place to place and listen to the assembled Brahmins reciting the Vedas. They would listen for errors in meter, accent, and *sārridhi* and for any loss or change in words. It was the rigorous practice of the *Prātiṣākhya* that was being checked by the senior scholars. They had mastered the *Prātiṣākhya* and pure presentation of the Vedas through many years of careful oral practice and checking with their teachers. And the teachers of the present senior scholars had acquired their expertise not from books but from oral practice with the best teachers of the generation before them, who in turn had been taught by the best teachers before them, and so on in an unbroken oral tradition back to the Vedas.

It is not the dead or entombed manuscript but the correct and clear enunciation of the word in the here and now that makes for a living language and scripture. Large numbers of copies of "The Living Bible" stacked in bookstores or reverently placed on personal bookshelves are not true language or living scripture, according to *vyākaraṇa*. Only when a passage is so well learned that it is with one wherever one goes is the word really known. In such a state the words become part of or, even more exactly, are one's consciousness in the act of speaking. Books and all written forms are not knowledge in this sense of the word; rather they represent a lower, inferior, second order of language suitable only for the dull or the uneducated. The *vyākaraṇa* provides the training rules for the oral learning of language and for the presentation of the Vedic word in its pure form.

For *vyākaraṇa*, then, spoken language is the medium through which
Sabda Brahman is manifested, and the Vedas are the criterion expression of that manifestation.

3. The Function of Time

In Bhartrhari’s systematization of vyakarana philosophy time (kāla) is assigned the function of enabling the one Sabda Brahman to appear as the many. This position is consistent with that given time in the Atharva Veda and the Maitri Upanishad. In Vākyapadiya 1.3 Bhartrhari describes the creation of the objects of the universe as occurring in the first instance through the creative power of Sabda Brahman’s kāla or time power. Kāla is not different from Sabda Brahman but is that aspect of Sabda Brahman which allows manifested sequence to come into being. When such time sequences appear as differentiated objects, then time as a power seems to be different from Sabda Brahman, but really it is not (Vākyapadiya 1.2). Vākyapadiya 1.3 states that all other powers within the created universe are in the first instance governed by the creative power of time. Through time things come to be and pass away. Time is the efficient cause by which Brahman controls the cycles of the universe.

Two illustrations are offered by Bhartrhari to make clear his meaning. The power of time in the creative process is like that of the wire-puller in a puppet play (Vākyapadiya 3.9.4). Just as the wire-puller is in complete control of the puppet play so kāla has full control over the running of the world. Ordinary cause-and-effect processes cannot operate unless kāla or time power infuses them with life-force. This control of ordinary cause and effect by time is further illustrated in relation to the strings a hunter ties to the feet of small birds that he uses as bait for larger ones. The small birds can fly over a limited distance but they cannot go beyond the length of their strings. Like the strings controlling the movement of birds, so the objects of the created world are controlled by the “string of time” (Vākyapadiya 3.9.15).

It is in Vākyapadiya 3.9 that Bhartrhari presents his detailed analysis of time. Just as number measures material objects, time measures activity (3.9.2). In answer to the question of how activities are measured by time, Bhartrhari states in verse 3, “In the creation (arising), existence and destruction (of beings) which possess these (activities), time, remaining in a divided state, is said to be the (instrumental) cause.” Helārāja, in his commentary, explains the meaning of the verse as follows. Time is the cause of the birth, existence, and decay of everything. Thus we say some things are born in the spring, others in the autumn. The same can be said about their existence and their death. Time, though one, differentiates or sequences things through
states of birth, existence, and decay. It is in this sense that time is called the “wire-puller” of the universe. Yet, these everyday changes of state or sequences of action are not the true nature of time but superimpositions. Time in its own nature, as one with Śabda Brahmān, is transcendent of all change, yet also its cause.

To one familiar with Advaita Vedānta, the preceding description of time sounds very similar to Śaṅkara’s notion of māyā in relation to Brahmān. This view is certainly held by two eminent contemporary interpreters of the Vākyapadīya, Gaurinath Sastrī and K. A. Subramania Iyer. As we examine Bhartrhari’s description of kāla in Vākyapadīya 3.9, we will test this contention.

Verse 14 of Vākyapadīya 3.9 is worth careful attention in this regard. It reads, “By means of activities similar to the turning of the water-wheel, the eternal and all-pervasive time turns out (kalayati) all the fragments (kalāh — objects) and thus acquires the name of kāla (time).” Like the ever-renewed pushing or lifting up of water by the waterwheel, so the all-pervading and all-penetrating time drives or pushes (kalayati) beings or objects, releasing them from their material causes and making them move. That is why time is given the appropriate name of kāla. Helaraja goes on to observe that what Bhartrhari means to say is,

The soul of the universe is but one, called “para-Brahman” i.e., the real Being. This same one, due to its being the agent of manifold actions, is defined as possessing unlimited power. And thus, manifesting successive beings which revolve like the turnings of a wheel, it “drives” (kalayati) the beings. Therefore it is called time (kāla). This all-pervading one is independent. For this very reason, it has been established as being an independent power in the Vākyapadīya.19

If Helaraja is right, then Bhartrhari views time as a power of Śabda Brahmān, independent of all beings and objects yet also inherent in them, pushing them through the successive changes of life. Instead of the passive external superimposition of the successive changes upon Brahmān (the Advaita model), the image here is more characteristic of urgent change through pregnant forces within Śabda Brahmān.

The distinction between Bhartrhari’s conception of time and the Advaita Vedānta view of māyā is not that the locus of time or māyā is in Brahmān (for both schools seem to agree on this point), but rather a question of the ontological power ascribed to time or māyā. Bhartrhari’s time doctrine emphasizes the driving (kalayati) power inherent in Śabda Brahmān, which is the first cause of the bursting forth of worldly phenomena. The Advaita conception of māyā, though it does indeed
(in the Vivaraṇa tradition, at least) locate māyā in Brahmān does not attribute to māyā the same degree of ontological "pregnancy" or "driving force" as Bhartṛhari ascribes to time. While it is acknowledged that māyā has two aspects, obscuring (doarana) and projective (oikṣepa), the stress in Advaita interpretation is on the former more than the latter. For the Advaitin, the focus is on māyā's obscuring of Brahmān; for Bhartṛhari, it is the projective power or driving force of time that occupies center stage. While this difference may at first appear to be merely a question of emphasis, a substantive distinction appears when the ontological status of the phenomenal projection itself is analyzed. While for Advaita the projected world of māyā is neither real nor unreal but inexplicable (anirvacaniya), the time-driven world of Bhartṛhari, though increasingly impure as it becomes manifested as worldly phenomena, never loses its direct ontological identity with Brahmān. The relation between the phenomenal world and Brahmān for Bhartṛhari is continuous and does not have the mysterious break of an "all or nothing" sort that Śaṅkara's māyā doctrine and its rope-snake analogy requires. Whereas superimposition (adhyāsa) is a fitting term for Śaṅkara, it does not seem appropriate to Bhartṛhari. The illustrations offered in the Vākyapadīya are more often associated with images of Sadā Brahmān bursting forth in illumination (sphoṭa), of pregnancy (the peacock egg producing all the colors of creation), and of driving force like the pushing-up or lifting-up action of the waterwheel (kalavati).

According to Bhartṛhari, time is a creative power, while for Advaita (the Vivaraṇa Advaitin, at least) the obscuring function of avidyā is equated with māyā. Bhartṛhari in his commentary on 1.1 describes avidyā as the diversity of phenomena created by Sadā Brahmān's time power. It is probably open to question whether the term avidyā meant the same for Bhartṛhari as it came to be defined by Śaṅkara some centuries later. Modern commentators sometimes incorrectly apply concepts they have learned from Advaita Vedānta when interpreting the Vākyapadīya. Notions such as "superimposition" (adhyāsa), if seen through Advaita eyes, are probably misleading and unhelpful in understanding Bhartṛhari. We may make more progress by staying with the words of the verses and the clear illustrations offered in the commentary.

Bhartṛhari apparently never wrote a commentary for chapter 3. At present only Helārāja's Tikā (ca. A.D. 1050-1100) is available. In Vākyapadīya 3.9.62, Bhartṛhari discusses directly the ontological status of time, and Helārāja adds some helpful comments. Bhartṛhari observes that there are different doctrines about time: some call it "power" (śakti), some call it "soul" (ātman), and others, "deity" (devatā). Time is the first (stage) of avidyā, and does not exist in knowledge. Helārāja in his Tikā further describes time as an independent power of Brahmān.
and discusses its ontological status in relation to avidyā: "According to Bhartṛhari, time is the svātantrya śakti of Brahmā. Due to avidyā, there is, first of all, appearance of diversity. Diversity is temporal and spatial. The former comes first. Consciousness, at the stage called paśyānti, is without any sequence. When it becomes associated with prāṇaūṛti, it appears to have sequence due to time." As this comment makes clear, there are three ontological levels in Bhartṛhari’s thought: Brahmā, his powers of time and space, and the diversity of the phenomenal world. Once again he contrasts with Śaṅkara’s Advaita, where there is only one ontological level—Brahman—with māyā as an epistemological second level (which is neither real nor unreal but inexplicable). For Bhartṛhari the highest ontological level is pure Brahmā without sequence or diversity. It is the culmination of our experience of vāc or language. Although time is inherent in Śabda Brahmā at this stage, no sequence has yet occurred—it is still pure potentiality. The next ontological level, in descending order, is madhyamā. It is at this level that time begins to push or drive delimited portions of Śabda Brahmā into sequence, which it accomplishes with the help of prāṇa or breath. In our experience of language this stage corresponds to the separation of the unitary sphiṭa into the mental sequence of thoughts. The full-blown appearance of diversity appears when time has released all the secondary cause-effect relations that have been waiting as stored memory traces (sāṃskāra) or "seed states" in all the cycles of the universe. It is in this third or vaśkari level that the power of time as the sequence evidenced in ordinary cause-effect relations is fully experienced. To return to Bhartṛhari’s own analogy, at this stage we see the birds on time’s strings flying about to the full limit that their strings allow. Time is thus the governing power of all activity in the universe of manifested objects. It is time that drives or pushes objects into action to the point at which their own secondary cause-effect relations take hold. But it is also the behind-the-scenes activity of time that controls the extent of the secondary actions of objects, along with their moment of decay or withdrawal.

The notion of time functioning by permitting and preventing worldly activity is stated in Vākyapadīya 3.9.4 and reappears frequently throughout section 9: "Time has been called the wire-puller of the world Machine. It regulates the universe through prevention and permission." The Sanskrit terms involved are abhyanujña (permission) and pratibandha (prevention). As the wire-puller of the universe, time allows some things to appear at a particular time and prevents others from appearing. This scheduling activity is most important, for without it everything would appear simultaneously and there would be mass confusion. The function of time called “permission” allows things to be born and to continue in existence. By its other function, prevention,
time obstructs the inherent capacities of objects and "old age" is then experienced. It is in this way that the stages of life and the seasons are ordered. When time is functioning under its impulse of prevention, decay (jara) occurs. Decay and growth (krama) operate like pairs of opposites. When decay is active, growth is blocked, and vice versa. But the underlying substratum of all of this activity is the driving impulse of time. Time remains eternal even though the actions of growth and decay come and go.

As a result of the activity of growth and decay, time, which is one, attains the states of past, present, and future. Thus when an action ceases, time, conditioned by that action, is called past. When something is about to happen, time, conditioned by that event, is called future. When action has been initiated but is not yet completed, time is then called present. In this way the one transcendent reality—time—is experienced, through the actions of the secondary causes it releases or restrains, to be sequenced into past, present, and future. Time, says Bhartrhari, is like the everflowing current of a river, which deposits some things on the river bank and at the same time takes away others. So it is that the seasons change, as symbolized by the motions of the sun and stars. As Helaraja puts it, "The seasons may be looked upon as the abode of time, because it appears as the seasons. The power called 'Freedom' of Brahma is really time and it appears diversified as the different seasons like Spring, etc." Thus the appearance of the universe, which is really without sequence, as something with sequence, is the work of time.

In another analogy, past, present, and future are said to be like three paths on which objects move without any confusion. Helaraja's comment likens this view to the Sāmkhya-Yoga explanation of time found in Vyāsa's commentary on Yogasūtra 2.13. Here the activity of time is equated with the ever-present movement of the guṇas on the three paths of being (adhavan). The notion that objects and mental states do not all occur simultaneously due to the prevention and permission activities of time is clearly stated. The psychological mechanism involved is that of inherent tendencies or memory traces (samskāra), which sprout like seeds when the conditions created by the ever-changing guṇas are favorable. The point of this parallel between Sāmkhya-Yoga and vyākaraṇa doctrine is to show how the three apparently conflicting qualities can coexist in harmony. As Helaraja puts it,

Just as the three ingredients, having the characteristics of serenity (sattva), activity (rajas) and inertia (tamas), though existing simultaneously due to their eternity, acquire the subordinate and principal relation and effect beings through their peculiar evo-
lution, in a proper manner in the splendor of their own course of action, so also, these (three) time-divisions, by the magnificence of their own power (become) capable of effecting sequence in external aspects.38

The past and the future hide objects, so they are like tamas or darkness (says Bhartṛhari). The present enables us to see the objects, so it is like light or the sattva of the Sāmkhyas. Rajas stands for the activity of time itself.39 For both Sāmkhya-Yoga and the Grammarian the harmonious coexistence of objects on the three paths of time makes the ordered sequence of the world possible. Time, like an eternal road, is the substratum on which the objects of the world come and go. The road, like time, always remains the same.40

The essence of Bhartṛhari’s viewpoint is that time is an independent power (sakti) of Śabda Brahman. Time is characterized by its two energies of prevention or decay and permission or growth. If we look for the precursors of this doctrine of time, we can find a continuity back through Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya to the Vedas. Although Pāṇini is silent on the philosophical aspects of time, Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya discusses time in two places. At 2.2.5, kāla is described in terms of the growth or decay of bodies. Vākyapadīya 3.9.13 seems to be a direct reference to this passage of the Mahābhāṣya. Again, at 4.2.3 of the Mahābhāṣya, Patañjali defines time as eternal.41 But Patañjali does not say whether time is to be taken as a power of Brahman (Bhartṛhari’s view) or as a substance (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view).42 In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory time is viewed as an independent substance. Time is present everywhere as the eternal connecting relations between pairs of objects.43 Some later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories seem to have followed Bhartṛhari’s lead and identified time and space with ākāśa and with Brahman.44

A direct precursor for Bhartṛhari’s view in the Vākyapadīya is available in the Maitri Upaniṣad discussion of time. As mentioned earlier, in Maitri 6.15 time is described as the form of Brahman that has parts. These parts (namely, the year, and so on) grow and decay. Time is said to cook all things in the Great Soul (mahātman).

Bhartṛhari has on occasion been mistakenly called a Buddhist. The Buddhist (Mādhyamika) view of time, however, is radically different from that of the Vākyapadīya. For the Buddhist there is no present time (vartamānakāla) apart from the past and future.46 But the Buddhist emphasis on the constant process of change—and thus the necessary reference to past and future—seems too one-sided when it leaves no room for the present. We do experience the present as an ongoing moment, and this concept Bhartṛhari accommodates successfully.

Bhartṛhari’s notion of the dynamic limiting function of time
(kālaśakti) lies behind the discussion of the levels of language in the Vākyapadiya. After setting forth the absolute nature of Brahman as being the one eternal essence of word and consciousness, Bhartṛhari introduces the notion of time as the power or means by which this one unchanging absolute (Śabda Brahman) manifests itself as the dynamic diversity mankind experiences as creation. Time is the creative power of Śabda Brahman and is thus responsible for the birth, death, and continuity of everything in the cosmos. Time is one, but when broken or limited into sequences appears as moments or actions. These segments of time are mentally categorized as seconds or minutes. Such limited segments of time are then mentally unified into day, week, month, and year. In the same fashion notions of past, present, and future are developed. When time is viewed as an action not yet completed, the notion of the present is established. An action that has been completed is time as past, and an action yet to be completed is time as future. All of ordinary life is sequenced by these three powers of time. Yet all the while, declares Bhartṛhari, there is really no sequence at all. From the ultimate viewpoint all three powers of time are constantly present. Time is one. Although the effects of the three powers of time (that is past, present, and future) are mutually contradictory, they function without causing any disorder in the cosmos. They are like three paths on which objects move about without any confusion.

Bhartṛhari enters into this deep discussion of time in relation to the absolute not as a fascinating metaphysical aside, but to explain how the unitary Śabda Brahman manifests itself in experience as the diversity of words called language. As a Grammarian, he is also providing a metaphysical basis for the experience of the tenses past, present, and future in language. And it is past and future that have the veiling function of keeping one apart from the absolute eternal present. In religious terms union with the eternal present is union with the divine, which, for Bhartṛhari, is the inherent goal toward which all language, all grammar, is reaching.

4. Vyākaraṇa as a Means of Release
(Śabdāpravayoga)

For the Hindu the ultimate goal of philosophy is liberation (mokṣa). Before Bhartṛhari, Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya included in the aims of grammatical study (vyākaraṇa) the attainment of heaven (svarga) through the correct use of words and liberation from bondage (mokṣa). While it is clear that for Patañjali liberation is the divine Word, he does not specify how this divine Word is to be achieved. Satyakam Varma solves this problem by assuming that the Patañjali of the Mahābhāṣya
is the same as the Patañjali of the Yogasūtras and that the description of how yoga of the Word is to take place is given in the latter work. While not all scholars agree that the same Patañjali authored both the Mahābhāṣya and the Yogasūtras, Satyakam Varma’s suggestion of obtaining help from the Yogasūtras has independent merit in the attempt to understand the grammarian concept of sabdāpūrvayoga or the yoga of the Word (literally, yoga preceded by the Word). For present purposes, however, an attempt will be made to interpret sabdāpūrvayoga by using only the Vākyapadiya.

Bhartrhari emphasizes the aim of grammar as leading both to heaven and to liberation not only in the Vākyapadiya but also in his commentary on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya. At the beginning of the Vākyapadiya Bhartrhari says that grammar is the door leading to liberation (1.14); it is the straight, royal road for those who desire salvation (1.16); and by means of it one attains the supreme Brahman (1.22). At the end of the first chapter Bhartrhari returns to the topic and states that “the purification of the word is the means to the attainment of the Supreme Self. One who knows the essence of its activity attains the immortal Brahman” (1.131). The yoga of the Word, then, has the power to take one from the ordinary experience of the word all the way to union with the Divine.

A. The First Stage

The first requisite step is the purging of corrupt forms from one’s everyday language. While Bhartrhari allows that corrupt forms of words can convey meaning, spiritual merit can be attained only by the knowledge and use of the correct forms of words, which is the spiritual role of grammar. As Bhartrhari puts it in the vṛtti on 1.131: when speech is purified by the adoption of the grammatically correct forms and all obstruction in the shape of incorrect forms is removed, there results a spiritual merit that brings the experience of well-being (abhyudaya). This abhyudaya is also translated into English as “moral power” of the sort that begins to move us in the direction of identifying ourselves with the divine. This identification is the first step in the yoga of the Word—the repeated use of grammatically correct language that generates more and more abhyudaya until the way is prepared through the lower levels of language (vaikhari and madhyamā vāk) for the dawning of the mystical vision (pasyanti).

For the modern mind it is hard to imagine just how the grammatically correct use of words could be understood as generating moral power, spiritual well-being, and the dawning of the mystical vision. In order for us to empathize with this first step in the yoga of the Word, it will help to remind ourselves how Bhartrhari understands the function of time in relation to the correct use of words. The appearance of the
unitary Śabda Brahman as having parts (words) and sequence (word order) is the work of time. The entire universe is like a puppet show with time as its wire-puller. Time regulates the universe through prevention or decay and permission. Time controls the birth, death, and sequence of all objects, including all words. Time allows some things to appear at a particular time and prevents others from appearing. As the sequencing activity of all experience, time translates into grammar as the rules by which the appearance and disappearance of words in correct linguistic sequence is to take place. Underlying all activity, including all linguistic activity, is the driving impulse of time. Time, as the first power of the divine Word, remains eternal, though the activity of language may come and go.

Incorrect usage results from attempts by humans to change the sequencing of language to suit themselves, without regard for the divine Word. Such ego-centered word use leaves behind memory traces, which serve to conflict and obscure the proper sequencing of Śabda Brahman by its time power. Without the aid of grammar and its purifying rules, such a confused mental state is the usual result. The truth of the Vedic teaching and glimpses of Śabda Brahman are obscured within consciousness by the layers of traces laid down by incorrect word use. Strict adherence to grammar, and its teaching of correct word use, gradually results in removal of these obscuring traces from consciousness. As the proper, non-ego-centered sequencing of language is established, the truth of the Vedic teaching can be seen and responded to. Then increased moral power and the first glimpses of the divine Word are experienced. This achievement is the truly creative function of the Word—not the making of something new by human ego-centered activity (the modern western notion of creativity), but the revelation of the real nature of things through the reflective power of language.

Only when the rules of grammar are followed is word use crystalline enough to let the divine show through. Repeated practice of proper word use restores to language its mirrorlike quality, enabling a reflection of the transcendent Word to take place. Such a polishing and purification of the mind and its constituent word structures is the goal of stage one in the yoga of the Word.

B. The Second Stage

Stage two occurs when one focuses on the purified reflective power of the word until union with Śabda Brahman is realized. Bhartṛhari quotes some verses describing the process in the vyākhyā on Vākyapadiya 1.131:

"After taking his stand on the word which lies beyond the activity of breath, after having taken rest in oneself by the union resulting in the suppression of sequence,"

"After having purified speech and after having rested it on the mind, after having broken its bonds and made it bond-free,"
"After having reached the inner light, he with his knots cut, becomes united with the Supreme Light."65

The middle passage should be taken first. Speech has been purified (stage one) until the mind is using only correct grammatical structures, which is what the phrase "resting it on the mind" implies. The purging of ego attachment is essential in such a purification and must be carried even farther in stage two. The "breaking of bonds" referred to are the memory traces and their tainted motivations left by egocentric activity—in either spoken words (vaikhari vāk) or inner thoughts (madhyamā vāk). These ego bonds are removed by meditating on the divine Word (Sabda Brahman) so that the purified forms of language are being clearly reflected. The amount of such meditation required will be equal to the strength needed to negate the egocentric traces stored up within the mind.

The first passage emphasizes the need for "suppression of sequence." The function of time in sequencing the divine Word into thoughts and uttered sounds must now be suppressed. While such sequencing of language is essential in ordinary day-to-day activities, as well as in the understanding of the Vedic teaching, there comes a time when all that must be left behind. Immersion in worldly life as a student or householder, while necessary and good in itself, is not the ultimate goal. Study of the Vedic texts, while necessary, is not to be clung to as if it were the final end. Attachment to language use in either of these areas is only indicative of a failure to go beyond ego. Especially damaging is ego attachment to the Vedic words themselves—a textual literalism or fundamentalism reminiscent of a line from T.S. Eliot’s play Murder in the Cathedral: "To do the right deed for the wrong reason is the greatest sin."66 Spiritual pride is always tragic, and spiritual pride attached to the divine Word is especially so. The nyākārāya practice of sabdapūrvayoga guards against such a result by insisting that the sequenced word of scripture be allowed to carry one beyond itself to liberation. This obstacle will undoubtedly be the most difficult one for the grammarian yogi to overcome. After having honed his grammatical style and knowledge of scripture to a fine edge, it will be difficult to let go of that laboriously won achievement. But that is exactly what Bhartrhari requires, otherwise the traces of ego attachment to the uttered word will block out the reflection of the divine in it.

Giving up attachment to sequenced language, purified though it may be, implies moving from spoken words (vaikhari) and inner thoughts (madhyamā) to the direct mystical vision (patyanti, pratibha, or sphaṭa). As the first passage indicates, the function of breath here is important.
In *vaikhari* breath is very active in producing the sequence of uttered sounds. At the level of inner thought (*madhyamā*) breath is still active, though in a more subtle way, in fashioning sequences of thought. *Paśyanti* lies beyond the activity of breath and sequence. The mind is quiet and focused, allowing the *pratibhā* or intuitive perception of Śabda Brahman. Thus, through *śabdapūrvayoga*, the yoga of the Word, we are to pass on from the gross sequence to the subtle sequence and finally to that stage in which sequence is entirely eliminated. Like a perfectly still pond, consciousness, when stilled from its sequencing activity, clearly reflects the reality before it. For Bhartrhari, it is Śabda Brahman, the essence of consciousness, that stands revealed at the center of the stillled mind.

The third passage quoted by Bhartrhari reflects just such an experience: “After having reached the inner light, he, with his knots cut, becomes united with the Supreme Light.” Although the “cutting of the knots” is not defined by Bhartrhari, Vṛṣabha describes it as a cutting of the bonds and knots of “ego sense.” Going beyond the ego-sense of “I” and “mine” is obviously a major challenge in the yoga of the Word. It is repeatedly mentioned by Bhartrhari. For example, in the *vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* 1.130 he says that those who know the yoga of the Word break the knots of ego-sense and are merged with the divine Word. If ego attachment in any form remains, the *paśyanti* stage will not be fully realized. In the *vṛtti* on 1.142, *paśyanti* seems to be endowed with a number of phases (of increasingly pure reflection). In the lowest it seems to be still echoing some of the faint sequencing activity of *madhyamā*. At a higher level it assumes a quality in which all word forms are submerged beyond recognition. At the highest level it completely transcends all associations with word forms. Hence *paśyanti* can reflect worldly word forms and can also totally transcend them. Even though it may come into contact with the sequenced and often egocentric word forms of *vaikhari* and *madhyamā*, it remains pure, untouched, and spiritual in nature. To those who are trapped in ego knots and impure word usage, *paśyanti* may appear to be mixed up and contaminated. But in reality it is not. As one adopts correct word forms through a rigorously and reverent study of grammar, one’s consciousness is purified and the true inner vision of *paśyanti* revealed. As Bhartrhari puts it, those whose inner vision is unobstructed (with ego knots) see, without error, the power of words and know the true nature of things. The word forms are seen for what they are, namely, partial manifestations of the one divine Word, which in *paśyanti* stands clearly revealed. The yoga of the Word is the meditational exercise in which the mind is concentrated on the unity of the divine Word and turned away from the diverse thoughts and sounds that manifest it. The whole meditational process, with its culmination in the vision of the divine Word and final
reunion with it, is poetically described in the Rg Veda stanza "Maha devo martyāṃ āviveśa":

The spiritual aspirant reaches the Essence of Speech—the pure luminous Eternal Verbum, which lies beyond the vital plane (prāṇavṛttim atikrānte) by withdrawing his mind from external nature (ātmānam samḥytya) and fixing it up on his inner nature (ātmani). This entails the dissolution of temporal sequence of thought activity (krama-sanphāra-yogena). The purification of the Verbum results from this and the aspirant enters into it having severed all his ties with the material objective plane. This leads him to the attainment of the internal light and he becomes identical with the undying and undecaying Spirit, the Word Absolute.

Bhartṛhari claims that in the spirituality attained through the practice of the yoga of the Word a greater measure of divine light shines through: "Those persons in whom correct speech exists in a greater measure, in them also resides, in a greater measure, the holy form of the creator." And as long as a grammarian in the state of spirituality is alive, the divine light of the Word resides in him as in a covered vessel. When such a one dies this holy luster merges into Śabda Brahma, its source.

The yoga of the Word demonstrates that the meaningfulness of words is not merely intellectual, it is meaningfulness that has spiritual power. With the proper yoga, words have the power to remove ignorance (avidyā), reveal truth (dharma), and realize liberation (mokṣa). The vṛttri on Vākyapadiya 1.5 states it clearly: "Just like making gifts, performing austerities and practicing continence are means of attaining heaven. It has been said: When, by practicing the Vedas, the vast darkness is removed, that supreme, bright, imperishable light comes into being in this very birth." It is not only this lofty goal of final release that is claimed for the spiritual power of words, but also the very availability of human reasoning. Without the fixed power of words to convey meaning, inference through words could not take place. Because of the power inherent in mantras for both human inference and divine truth, great care must be given to the yoga of words.

In word yoga, the repeated chanting of mantras is an instrument of power. The more traces there are to be overcome the more repetitions are needed. Vākyapadiya 1.14 Vṛttri suggests that repeated use of correct mantras removes all impurities, purifies all knowledge, and leads to liberation. The psychological mechanism is described by Bhartṛhari as a holding of the sphota in place by continued chanting. Just as from a distance, or in semidarkness, it takes repeated cognition of an object before one sees it correctly, so also repeated chanting of the mantras
results in the *sphoṭa* being perceived in all its fullness.\(^6^5\) Manḍana Miśra describes it as a series of progressively clearer impressions until a clear and correct apprehension takes place in the end.\(^6^6\) To begin with, such *mantra* chanting will be mainly at the *vaikhari* or outer word level. But as spiritual improvement is made, the chant will be more and more internalized on the *madhyama* or inner word level. Eventually all sequenced chanting activity will submerge into the still steady *mantra* *samādhi* of *paśyanti*, and the final goal of the yoga of the Word will have been realized.

For the *vyākaraṇa* our outer words and inner thoughts are but reflections, more or less perfect, of the one divine Word. The great *ṛṣis* or seers recognized this fact and made themselves empty channels through which the divine Word could reverberate with little distortion. The great Grammarian teachers, basing themselves on the *ṛṣis*’ utterances, formulated this wisdom into a teaching informing all of life and even into a pathway to final liberation.

While not all may agree with the spiritual vision of the Hindu Grammarians it must be conceded that we do find here a view of language that makes sense of poetry, revealed scripture, science, and the mystical chanting of *mantras*, and which in addition strongly resonates with our ordinary everyday experience of coffee-cup chat. It is a way of seeing language that effectively explains why it is that sometimes when we listen we do not hear. It also teaches how to remove the obstructions in one’s consciousness so that real hearing becomes possible and suggests in a different way the ultimate wisdom of the observation. “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1).
Recent western thought has focused much attention on the relation between language and knowledge, but it has consistently taken a narrower perspective than *vyākaraṇa* would accept. Within the contemporary school of linguistic philosophy, language seems to be restricted to the printed word and then analyzed for a one-to-one correspondence with objective reality. While the computer-like functions of language must be highly respected, modern linguists and philosophers often seem to consign all other dimensions of the word to the unreality of a mystic’s silence. Ernst Cassirer has taken a much broader perspective including the natural sciences, the humanities, and all human cultural activity of language. *Vyākaraṇa* would applaud Cassirer but expand the realm of language even further. According to Bhartṛhari, “There is no cognition without the operation of words; all cognition is shot through and through by the word. All knowledge is illumined through the word.” The fundamental epistemological presupposition from Bhartṛhari’s perspective is that the problem of meaning is basic. It is through the meaning conveyed by words that all knowledge is experienced. In this sense, then, the philosophy of language is not just another school of philosophy but is the basic foundation for all philosophy. As T.R.V. Murti has so aptly put it, “The problem of what we can know is closely bound up with the question of what we can say. It is only thought as expressed in words that can be understood, communicated and criticized. Language is not an accidental, dispensable garb which could be put on and put off. It grows with thought, or rather thought grows with it. In the ultimate analysis they may be identical.” Meaning and cognition are understood to manifest themselves together as expressions of one deep spiritual impulse to know and to communicate. Consciousness (*caitanya*) is identical with speech (*vāc*).
1. Śabda as Pramāṇa in Relation to Other Pramāṇas

Before a discussion of śabda or testimony as a means of knowledge (pramāṇa), it may be useful to sketch the scholastic Indian conception of knowledge (pramāṇa). In Sanskrit the word jñāna stands for all kinds of cognition, irrespective of the questions of truth or falsehood. Pramāṇa, however, is used to designate only a true cognition (yathārthajñāna) as distinct from a false one (mithyājñāna). A pramāṇa is an active and unique cause of a pramāṇa or knowledge. The Śāmkhya and Yoga schools of Indian philosophy accept three pramāṇas: pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), and śabda (testimony). The Mīmāṃsā school defines six pramāṇas: pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda, upamāna (analogy), arthāpati (presumption), and abhāva (nonapprehension). The same six pramāṇas are also stated by Vedānta. Of course, there are many differences of definition regarding specific pramāṇas among the schools.

Within vyākaraṇa, Bhartṛhari in his Mahābhāṣya accepts three pramāṇas: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and scripture (āgama or śabda). Perception is judged as liable to be erroneous, and at times inference is seen as superior to perception. But āgama or śabda, which consists of the revealed (sūtṛi) and remembered (smaṛti) scriptures, is a strong pramāṇa and is more dependable than inference. Several verses in the Vākyapadīya (1.27–43) examine the relations obtaining between the pramāṇas of reason and scripture. In Bhartṛhari’s view it is not justifiable to replace scripture with inference in nonempirical matters or to hold that philosophical views (vāda) can be free from scripture. Inference alone, without the steadying influence of scripture, is an inadequate means of valid knowledge. As Vākyapadīya 1.34 puts it, “Whatever is inferred with great effort by clever reasoners is explained otherwise by cleverer ones.” Thus dharma or right conduct cannot be determined by reasoning without the help of the scriptural tradition (verses 1.30–31). And any attempt to establish the nature of objects by inference will likely fail because their properties differ according to place and time (verse 1.32). Knowledge of this sort can only be derived from the scriptural tradition (śabda), and then only after long hours of practice (abhyāsa; verse 1.35). The words of the ṛṣis convey supersensory knowledge that cannot be set aside by inference, because with their consciousness purged of ignorance (avidyā) they have directly perceived divine truth (Śabda Brahman; verse 1.38). The role of vyākaraṇa is to safeguard the transmission of this scriptural knowledge and to assist the hearer in realizing the truth of śabda.

The early grammarians Paṇini and Patañjali define śabda primarily in terms of the spoken word. In the beginning of his Mahābhāṣya, Patañjali defines the word as “That on the utterance of which there is
understanding regarding objects (sampratyaya).”11 This definition of sabda does not identify the word with the uttered sound only. The distinction between word (sabda) and sound (dhvani) is basic to the understanding of language in Indian philosophy.12 To take the physical sound as the word is to conflate entities of two different orders, like the confusion of the soul with the body. “The word, like the soul, has a physical embodiment in the sound and is made manifest through the latter, but the conveyance of meaning is the function of the word; the sound only invokes the word.”13 If the word (sabda) is only invoked and not constituted by the uttered sounds (dhvani), a question then arises about the nature of this sabda that is manifested. The Cārvāka, Buddhist, and Jain schools, along with many modern linguists, think all words to be the result of human convention. Where human convention is not allowable, the divine convention of God may be invoked—as is done by the Nyāya, for example. Against this view, and in agreement with the Mīmāṃsā, vyākaraṇa maintains that the relation between words and meaning is eternal, underived, and impersonal. The relation between sabda and its meaning is not an arbitrary convention established by man or God or both. Not only is there no record of any such convention, says the vyākaraṇa, but the very idea of “convention” itself presupposes language—the thing claimed to be derived from convention.14 Therefore, language must be taken as having existed without beginning.

Murty suggests that the attempt to discover a temporal beginning of language may arise from a confusion of sabda with dhvani.15 While speaking sounds and learning how to group sounds into syllables and the like may well be conventional, the fact of verbal communication necessitates the acceptance of sabda as a given that the learned sounds manifest but do not constitute. Otherwise, there would be as many different words “cow” as there are people speaking, for each person produces the complex of sounds involved slightly differently, namely, with different accent, speed, and so on. Each single utterance of the word would be unique. The fundamental point of the vyākaraṇa position is that in spite of the individual differences in speaking it “cow” is recognized as the same word, “cow”. This aspect of vyākaraṇa doctrine provides an eastern parallel to the western notion of Platonic forms. The word “cow”, like a Platonic form, is identical and immutable even though instances of its utterance may vary. The nub of the argument, as in Plato, is that verbal communication necessitates the acceptance of some kind of eternal word forms. The Platonic problem of the relation of the Idea to the “copies” appears in vyākaraṇa as the relation of the immutable word to the many verbal manifestations that evoke it. But vyākaraṇa goes beyond just establishing the eternality of sabda. It identifies sabda with Brahman, so that all words ultimately mean Brahman—
thus the absolute as Šabda Brahman. As Mādhava puts it in his
Sarvadarśanasamgraha,

Brahman is the one object denoted by all words; and this one
object has various differences imposed upon it according to each
particular form; but the conventional variety of the differences
produced by these illusory conditions is only the result of igno-
rance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the power of
"concealment" (exercised by illusion) at the time of the con-
ventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place.16

Thus, knowledge of the meaning of words not only removes ignorance
but also leads to the final bliss of identity with Šabda Brahman.

2. Theories of Error

In vyākaraṇa as in most other Indian philosophies, error or ignorance
(avidyā) is ascribed the important function of obstructing the real from
view. Although some scholars suggest that Bhartrhari's theory of error
is analogous to Śaṅkara's analysis of the rope-snake illusion,17 other
interpretations, which would distinguish ṣvākaraṇa from Advaita
Vedānta, appear viable. Śaṅkara describes error (avidyā) as being over-
come by a single negation. Bhartrhari, however, in his Vākyapadiya
seems to hold that error is overcome positively by an increasingly clear
cognition of the word form or sphota, which the succeeding perceptions
reveal. Whereas the overcoming of error for Śaṅkara takes a negative
form, for Bhartrhari it is positive.

The uttī on Bhartrhari's Vākyapadiya 1.89 and Maṇḍana's comment
on sūtra 19 of the Sphotaśuddhi state that the final clear perception of the
sphota is achieved through a series of errors. The analogy is offered of
the way that, from a distance, one may (if one is in India) mistake a tree
for an elephant. But if one keeps on looking at it, the tree is ultimately
recognized in its true form. In this situation the truth has been arrived
at through a series of errors. The sense organ (in this case the eye) has
been in contact with the tree throughout. The errors of perception have
had the tree as their object, but the cognitions produced by the eye have
had an elephant as their form. When the final or true cognition takes
place, however, it has the form of the tree itself and is one with its
object; but this true cognition has been arrived at by going through the
series of erroneous perceptions that preceded it. Now this change from
error to true perception cannot be explained by factors such as change
in distance, for simply standing in the same spot and gazing with intense
concentration often produces the desired result. According to Maṇḍana,
"it is the previous cognitions (having tree as the object and the form of
the elephant) leaving progressively clearer residual impressions, which
become the cause of the clear perception of the tree."\(^{18}\) There could
have been no erroneous cognition of elephant had the tree not been
there as an object for the sense organ to contact in the first place. The
error, therefore, may be described as misapprehension or vague percep-
tion. In Bhartrhari’s theory of language, the \textit{sphota} is similarly said to
be the object of the cognitions of each of the letters, and yet it at first
appears in the form of a letter. But through the additional cognitions of
the subsequent letters, the \textit{sphota} is seen with increasing clarity until,
with the uttering of the final letter, the \textit{form} of the letters has become
identical with that of the \textit{sphota}. Here the letters are seen in a position that
at first glance seems parallel to the snake in the famous rope-snake
illusion of the Advaita Vedántins. The perception of the rope as snake
is error, but it is through negating the erroneous snake perception that
the true rope perception is finally realized. And were it not for the prior
existence of the rope, the erroneous perception would have lacked the
necessary ground for its phenomenal existence. Similarly, in this case,
the letters are seen as dependent on the \textit{sphota} for their phenomenal
existence, but in that phenomenal existence as being the \textit{means} by
which the noumenal \textit{sphota} may be perceived. This apparent parallel,
however, does not hold up under closer analysis. Advaita theory pro-
vides for only true or false cognitions and allows no progressive approxi-
mation to the \textit{real},\(^{10}\) as is the case in a series of erroneous \textit{sphota}
perceptions. Whereas the Advaitin describes his error as being transcended
via a single negation (such as when it is realized that "it is not snake"),
the grammarian holds that his error (for example, the vagueness of the
perception of the whole in the first letter) is positively overcome by the
increasingly clear perception of the \textit{sphota} revealed by the succeeding
letters. This analysis of the way error is overcome would seem to give
further weight to Gaurinath Sastri’s suggestion that in some ways the
doctrine of reflection (\textit{abhasa}) of the Kashmir Trika writers may provide
the closest parallel to \textit{sphota} theory.\(^{20}\) In the Kashmir Trika view
consciousness (\textit{caitanya}) is the only reality, and all external manifestation
is held to be a reflection on consciousness as on a mirror. Error, in this
view, occurs not because the initial perception has no existence but
because its reflection of the object captures or includes only a part of its
totality and fills in the gaps with other material (traces) taken from the
old stock of memory. This error is positively transcended as the form of
the reflection is progressively purified of memory material until it
perfectly reflects the object. This perfect reflection, which is true know-
ledge, is further described as a union of the subjective and objective
aspects of consciousness—a return to the oneness that is its essential
nature.\(^{21}\) From this brief glance at the Kashmir \textit{abhasa} theory, it would
seem to provide a helpful parallel supporting the vyākaraṇa view of the way in which the manifest letters erroneously but positively approximate their true object, the sphota itself.

To return to Maṇḍana, his explanation of the paradox of the way the indivisible sphota appears as the letters, and the letters as the parts of the partless sphota, is as follows. He says it is the sounds that resemble one another that are the cause of both the error and the final correct cognition of the sphota. If, for the manifestation of two different word-sphotas, one has to make similar movements of the vocal organs, the letters produced by these movements appear to be parts of both of the indivisible words. This error is fostered by the construction of such artificial devices as alphabet letters or word syllables, usually for teaching purposes. It is precisely because of this kind of confusion, says Maṇḍana, that sentences, words and letters appear to have parts, while in reality they do not. The obverse applies to the sphota. From the phenomenal viewpoint the sphota "cow," for example, may appear to possess qualities such as accent, speed, loudness, time, place, and person in its utterance. That they are qualities of the phenomenal sounds and not the noumenal sphota is what makes possible the common recognition of the word "cow" in spite of its diversity of utterance. From the sphota viewpoint, it is this noumenal grounding or basis that makes possible such things as the translation of thought from one phenomenal language to another.

Maṇḍana offers the example of a picture. He points out that in our cognition of a picture, although we may be aware of the different parts and colors, the picture is perceived as a whole over and above its parts. Similarly, when we perceive a piece of cloth our cognition is of the cloth as a whole and is quite distinct from the particular threads and colors involved.

In both of these examples there is a necessary perception of the parts prior to the perception of the whole. This aspect is brought out clearly by Bhartrihari, who describes the painter as going through three stages when he paints a picture: "When a painter wishes to paint a figure having parts like that of a man, he first sees it gradually in a sequence, then as the object of a single cognition and then paints it on cloth or on a wall in sequence." So also the hearer of a word perceives the word in a sequence of letters, which manifest in him the whole word as the object of a single cognition. As a speaker, however, he utters the whole word in its differentiated appearance as a sequence of letters. It is in this context that the perception of the many letters, before the final perception of the unitary sphota, is described as error, illusion, or appearance. But it is a unique kind of error in that it has a fixed sequence and form, ultimately leads to the perception of the truth, and is thus regarded as a universal error. The chief cause of this universal error is described as avidyā, the limitation of the individual self-con-
sciousness. A characteristic of this avidyā is that it provides no means for cognizing the sphota other than the letters. That is why all individual selves universally experience the same error with regard to speech; but it is an error that ultimately leads to cognition of truth. It is only through this error or appearance of differentiation that the individual sphota comes within the range of worldly usage so that we ordinary mortals have a way of comprehending it.28

With the preceding understanding of Bhartṛhari's sphota theory in mind, we are now able to observe its significant difference from Śaṅkara's view of error. Whereas the Advaitin usually describes his error as being transcended via negation (such as when it is said that "it is not snake"), the Grammarian holds that his error (for example, the vagueness of the perception of the whole in the first letter) is positively overcome by the increasingly clear cognition of the sphota revealed by the succeeding letters.29 And the final clear cognition is a case of perfect perception or pratibhā—a flash of intuition revealing the sphota or whole word.30 At the more mundane level of psychological functioning, however, the positive process of perfecting the perception is described by Subramania Iyer as follows:

(The final) clear cognition is a case of perception. The previous cognitions also had the sphota as their object, but the cognition of it was vague and that is why they had the form of the sounds. But when the final cognition reveals the sphota in all its clarity and distinctness, it no longer has the form of sounds. The error has given place to truth. Such a cognition can only be perception. The object and forms of the cognition are now identical.31

Bhartṛhari characterizes the conformity between the object and the form of the cognition in the final intuition as a certain fitness (yogyatā) between the sounds and the sphota, which results in the clear manifestation of the word.32 The perfect perception in which there is identity between the object (namely, the sphota) and the form of its cognition (namely, the letters of sounds) is a special kind of perception that—the modern reader must realize—is held to be a function of the mind33 rather than of the external sense. The designation of the final cognition of the sphota as a case of perception, not of inference, has important logical implications.34 Maṇḍana expresses the point clearly: "The revelation (of an object) clearly or vaguely is confined to direct perception. In the case of the other means of knowledge there is either apprehension (of the object) or not at all."35 According to almost all schools of Indian philosophy, the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) other than perception either reveal the object completely or do not reveal it at all. There can be increasing clarity of revelation only in the
case of perception. This point is most important for the *sphota* theory in its contention that the error due to the vagueness of perception of the initial letters may be gradually and positively overcome, as described above. It is also crucial for the *sphota* theory in its contention that the existence of the *sphota* is not a postulation, as the Mīmāṃsākās maintain, but is proved by direct perception.

Śaṁkara in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 1.3.28 argues against Bhartṛhari's notion that the *sphota* is directly perceived. According to Śaṁkara, only the individual letters of a word are perceived, and they are combined through the inferential activity of the mind into a word aggregate. Because the psychological process is one of inference instead of perception, there can be no question of degrees of cognition. The inference *pramāṇa* is an all-or-nothing process. The error, if it is to be overcome, must be completely replaced all at once by a new inferential construction of the mind or by a superconscious intuition of Brahman. Thus the position of Bhartṛhari (that the overcoming of error is a perceptual process admitting of degrees of positive approximation) and the position of Śaṁkara (that the overcoming of error is a negative process of inference—admitting of no degrees) are not at all analogous.

3. Theories of Paradoxes

The logical principle "everything is either *P* or not *P" has its limitations, especially in Indian philosophical discussions. Indian Grammarians and Logicians have classified negation into two types: *prasajyapratisedha*, verbally bound negative, and *paryudāsa*, nominally bound negative. The nominally bound negative like *a-brāhmaṇa* ("non-brahmin," generally referring to a *kṣatriya*, or the like) has a positive significance, and the negation is mainly for excluding some from the scope of the term negated. The verbally bound negation is a form of total negation and precludes an activity.

The Mādhyamika Buddhist proposes the fourfold negation (*catuskoti*) to deny all alternatives to the absolute. The Advaitin's "indescribable," used to indicate the nature of māyā, is also not within the "either yes or no" principle. The Mādhyamika thesis "The phenomenal world is indeterminate" means that no predicate is applicable to the world. Now the question is raised, "Is 'indeterminate' a predicate or not?" If it is, then the world is not indeterminate, for at least one predicate is applicable to it. If it is not, then we cannot say that the world is indeterminate. Such paradoxes are met with the reply that "indeterminate" itself is not a predicate.

Bhartṛhari discussed some paradoxes in his *Vākyapādiya*. One is the famous liar's paradox. "I am not telling the truth"; if this statement is
true, he is a liar and his statement cannot be true, in which case it is true. Bhartrhari says that a statement of this type does not refer to itself. Another interesting remark from Bhartrhari regards the term "indescribable" (avācyā): "What you consider as avācyā can at least be referred to by the term avācyā (indescribable), and then it becomes vācyā or describable."

4. LEVELS OF LANGUAGE

The idea that various levels of language and knowing exist is present in several schools of Indian philosophy, but it is an idea that modern scholars in their first encounters with eastern thought either miss or misunderstand. The notion of levels of language is a necessary development in view of Bhartrhari's absolutism. A monistic hierarchy such as the following necessarily results: just as the phonemes are only unreal abstractions of the word, so also words are unreal abstractions of the sentence, and the sentences are unreal abstractions of the paragraph. Even the paragraph is not the ultimate unity, for it is only an artificial division of the chapter of the book. At the top of this language hierarchy there is only one indivisible reality within our literary self; which, due to our human ignorance or limitation (avidyā), can only manifest itself in such unreal forms as the book, the chapter, the paragraph, the sentence, and the word. The underlying principle, maintains Bhartrhari, is that all difference presupposes a unity (abhedapurovako hi bhedaḥ). Where there is difference or parts there must be an underlying identity, otherwise the one could not be related to the other and each would constitute a world by itself. This concept provides the grounding for Bhartrhari's metaphysical speculation and for the notion of a hierarchy of levels of languages (Vākyapadīya 1.1).

Language can be seen to operate on at least two levels. There is the idea that comes as an inner flash (the cartoon image of the light bulb going on), and there is the outer speaking of words and sentences that attempts to convey the idea to others. The words and sentences are called by Bhartrhari vaikhari vāc—the uttered sounds that combine to make up the sentence, book, or poem. The inner idea or sphota is aptly designated as pālyanti vāc—the intuitive flash of understanding of the sentence, book, or poem as a whole.\(^\text{37}\) Between these two levels there is a middle or madhyamā vāc—the level of thought. Here the unitary idea or sphota appears separated into its sequence of thoughts, words, and phrases, none of which has yet reached the level of uttered sound. According to Bhartrhari, vāc or language passes through these three levels whenever one speaks. Šabda, which is at first quite internal, is gradually externalized for the purpose of speaking. Hearing, of course,
operates in the reverse direction. Whether one is dealing with factual scientific language or a poem that can be understood on various levels, Bhartrhari's sphota theory seems to provide an adequate explanation. The complete continuum of cognition is covered. All of these points are in complete accord with Bhartrhari's basic premise already mentioned, namely, that there is no possible cognition in which language does not figure. Knowledge, consciousness, and the word are all inextricably intertwined.38 Once this supposition is accepted, the idea of levels of language seems quite logical.

Thought at the buddhi or differentiated stage of word sequences is perhaps best understood as internal speaking. And pratibha, intuition, may be seen as a kind of muted speaking. The point being emphasized is that for Bhartrhari speaking is the essence of consciousness and the means to all knowledge. And it must also be clearly understood that by "speaking," "language," or "thought" what is meant is the conveyance of meaning—"thinking" here does not primarily refer to concept formation, the drawing of inferences, and so on, all of which would exist at the two lowest levels (vaikhari and madhyamā) only. When "meaning" is identified as intertwined with consciousness (as Bhartrhari identifies it), it satisfies instances of pratibha as well as instances of more commonplace cognition and can therefore be held to be logically possible at all levels of vac, including even the very highest (namely, the pramāṇa).

Let us now examine each level in somewhat more detail.39 Vaikhari is the most external and differentiated level in which vac is commonly uttered by the speaker and heard by the hearer. It is prāṇa (breath) that enables the organs of articulation and hearing to produce and perceive sounds in a temporal sequence. Prāṇa may therefore be taken as the instrumental cause of vaikhari vac. The chief characteristic of vaikhari vac is that it has a fully developed temporal sequence. At this level a speaker's individual peculiarities (such as accent) are present, along with the linguistically relevant parts of speech. Going further inward, as it were, madhyamā vac is the next level, and its association is chiefly with the mind or intellect (buddhi). It is the idea or series of words as conceived by the mind after hearing or before speaking out. It may be regarded as inward speech. All the parts of speech that are linguistically relevant to the sentence are present here in a latent form. At this level a variety of manifestation is possible. The same sphota or meaning is capable of being revealed by a variety of forms of madhyamā, depending on the language adopted. Although there is not full temporal sequence of the kind experienced in spoken words, word and meaning are still distinct, and word order is present. So temporal sequence must also be present, along with its instrumental cause, prāṇa. Traditional yoga is able to demonstrate a subtle but direct connection between breathing and cognition.40
The next and innermost stage is *paśyanti vāc*. *Paśyanti* is the direct experience of the *vākya-sphoṭa*—of meaning as a noumenal whole. At this level there is no distinction between the word and the meaning, and there is no temporal sequence. All such phenomenal differentiations drop away with the intuition of the pure meaning in itself. Yet there is present at this level a kind of "going-out" or desire for expression. This impulse is the *pratibhā* "instinct," which in one sense may be said to motivate the phenomenalization into sentences and words of the *paśyanti* vision, so that communication may occur. Thus the Vedic vision or *dhi* of the rṣi, which in itself is *paśyanti*, becomes phenomenalized so that by its uttered word men might rise above their ignorance and be grasped in their cognition by the revelation of ultimate reality. Therefore, there is a sense in which Veda and *pratibhā* are identified as *paśyanti vāc*. Because *paśyanti* is, by definition, beyond the level of differentiated cognition, it is impossible to define it in word sentences. It occurs at the level of direct intuition and therefore must finally be understood through experience. Nevertheless, there has been no dearth of speculation over the exact nature of *paśyanti* and the possibility of yet a higher level of language, namely *para vāc*.

1. SIGNIFICATIVE FUNCTION

Significative power (sakti) is defined as the relation that exists between a word (sabda) and its meaning (artha). This relation is considered to be permanent and stable, so that linguistic discourse be possible. The Naiyāyikas consider this significative power to be conventional, having been established by the will of God. The Grammarians consider the relation to be based on the superimposition of one on the other, creating a sort of identity, one evoking the other. The Buddhist Logicians also consider that there is a causal relation between a word and its meaning. This relation is primary denotative power and is called abhidhā.

The function of words for conveying meaning is not restricted to this primary significative power. The binary relationship—every meaning having only one word and every word having only one meaning—may be an ideal, for avoiding confusion and ambiguity. But in all natural languages there are several exceptions to this rule. Even the borders of the meaning are not always fixed and depend on contextual factors, both situational and syntactic. Moreover, unconscious shifts of meaning and figurative usages as well as conscious, intentional devices used by poets and mystics have made the problem of meaning more complex.

Various other functions of language are accepted by different schools of thought to explain the diverse types of language behavior within their field of investigation. The number of functions also varies, depending on the areas meant by sabda and artha. Abhidhā, laksanā, gauni, tātparya, vyāñjanā, bhāvakatva, and bhajanakatva are the main functions introduced to explain the various types of meaning conveyed by speech. Some are for words, others may be for sentences or for the complete utterance.

Of these types laksanā, secondary significative power, is the most important and popular. Three conditions for a laksanā are generally
accepted by all schools. The first is incompatibility or inconsistency of
the primary meaning in the context, which produces a break in the
flow of thought, forcing the listener to think in order to understand
what the speaker has meant by the uncommon usage and why he has
used the word in an irregular way. This inconsistency can be either
the impossibility of associating the normal meaning with the other
word meanings of the sentence or the normal meaning's unsuitability
in the context. The second condition is some kind of relation between
the primary, normal meaning of the term and its actual meaning inten
ded in the context. This relation can be one of proximity with contra
riety or one of similarity or common quality. The latter type is called
gauṇī lakṣanā, which the Mīmāṁsakas treat as an independent function
called gauṇī; according to them, real lakṣanā is only of the first type, a
relation of proximity with contrariety. The third condition is either
acceptance by common usage or a special purpose intended for intro-
ducing the lakṣanā. All faded metaphors (nirūḍhā lakṣanā) fall into the
former category, and metaphoric usages, especially by poets, fall into
the latter.

It may be noted here that Pāṇini did not accept lakṣanā as a separate
function in language, though later Grammarians such as Patañjali did
so. It was the Mīmāṁsakas who developed it to enable them to explain
Vedic passages properly. To them there can be lakṣanā not only for
words, but also for sentences as a whole. The Buddhist who considered
that words deal only with mental constructs (vikalpa) that have no
direct connection with reality considered secondary meanings (lakṣanā)
or metaphor (upacāra) as helping language to deal with reality.
Dignāga, the promulgator of the apoha theory, accepted that words may
not have any positive content, but the sentence conveys a meaning
that is of the nature of pratibhā.

Additionally, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa introduced a new function called
tātparyavṛtti to explain how individual word meanings in a sentence
combined to form a unified sentence meaning. Although he accepted a
kind of abhīhitānvaya (verbal comprehension) theory, he could not
resort to lakṣanā like the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, because Naiyāyikas
accept lakṣanā only for words.

Ānandavardhana, who advocated the vyākṣanā vṛtti, included the
purpose of intentional metaphors under it and pointed out its import-
tance in enriching the contents of literature. To him tabda meant not
only the words, but contextual factors also, and under artha he included
not only ideas, but figures of speech and emotions.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka claimed that poetic language has a special function
(svāpāra), which he called bhāvanā or bhāvakatva, that helped in the
universalization of the emotions depicted and helped the readers to
concentrate. He also claimed another function, bhajakatva, for literature;
bhojakatva is the power of making the listener share the poetic emotions. These functions are not accepted by other scholars.

Pāṇini did not accept lakṣaṇa as a separate function in language. The so-called incompatibility, either impossibility or unsuitability to the context, on which lakṣaṇa is based according to later writers on the various schools, including the Grammarians, he did not consider to be linguistically relevant. "He is an ass" and "he is a boy" are equally correct from the grammatical point of view. His grammar accounts for some of the popular examples of lakṣaṇa like "the village on the river" (gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ) by considering proximity as one of the meanings of the locative case. Similarly, Pāṇini does not mention or provide for the condition of yogyata or consistency, given as one of the conditions for the unity of the sentence. Agniṁa sāncati ("He sprinkles with fire") is grammatically correct, though from the semantic point of view it may not be proper, because sprinkling can be done only with a liquid and not with fire.

These two cases are similar; in both there is an inconsistency or incompatibility either real or apparent. If it is real, there is lack of yogyata and the sentence becomes a nonsense. If it can be explained by resorting to a transferred meaning for one of the terms, the sentence becomes acceptable as an instance of lakṣaṇa. Pāṇini does not make provision for the semantic appropriateness of the utterances derived by his rules. Statements may be true or false intrinsically or extrinsically. The correctness of a statement like the following depends on external factors and has to be checked before decision, for example: "There are fruits on the tree near the river." But there are other statements the correctness of which can be self-evident if one examines the words and their meanings: "He is the son of a barren woman"; "This triangle has four sides"; "The circular square" are all anomalous utterances. If one of the lexical items arrived at by componential analysis of a word in a sentence prevents its co-occurrence with another word in it, it is said to be anomalous. But sentences that have no such resistance are acceptable. "A square has four sides"; "Linguistics is the science dealing with language"; such sentences are intrinsically true. As far as Pāṇini is concerned all of these sentences are grammatically acceptable, and the Grammarian is not concerned with the correctness or compatibility of the meaning.

A metaphorical sentence and a normal sentence cannot be distinguished by their syntactic form. All metaphorical sentences are semantically deviant but syntactically normal. In such cases there is a semantic obstruction based on the violence to the co-occurrence restrictions for one of the lexical items. In the sentence "He is an ass," the word "ass," referring normally to the animal also called a donkey, is syntactically identified with the boy, who is known from the context to be a human
being (componental analysis also shows that he is a human being). Semantically this identification is impossible. The apparent anomaly can be solved by interpreting the word properly in the context of utterance. Such intentional deviance is resorted to as a communication device by poets everywhere. If the anomaly cannot be solved the sentence becomes no sentence. But from Pāṇini’s point of view all such sentences, metaphorical as well as anomalous ones, are grammatically acceptable.

2. **Sphota and Word Meaning**

In his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* Mādhava describes *sphota* in two ways: first, as that from which the meaning bursts or shines forth; and, second, as an entity that is manifested by the spoken letters or sounds. *Sphota* may thus be conceived as a two-sided coin. On one side it is manifested by the word sound; on the other side it simultaneously reveals word meaning. In more philosophic terminology *sphota* may be described as the transcendent ground in which the spoken syllables and conveyed meaning find themselves united as word or *śabda*. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa identifies this theory with a sage Sphoṭāyaṇa, mentioned by Pāṇini in one of his rules. This tradition is unknown to Bhartrhari, who considers Audumbarāyaṇa (mentioned by Yāska) as having a view similar to subsequent *sphota* theory. The original conception of *sphota* seems to go back to the Vedic period, when vāc or speech was considered to be a manifestation of the all-pervading Brahmaṇ, and the *pranava* (*aum*) was regarded as the primordial speech sound from which all forms of vāc were supposed to have evolved. *Aum*, the sacred syllable, is said to have flashed forth into the heart of Brahmaṇ while he was absorbed in deep meditation and to have given birth to the three Vedas containing all knowledge. Perhaps this claim provided the model upon which the *vyākaraṇa* philosophers based their conception of *sphota*. Indeed, *sphota* is often identified with the *pranava*.²

A. Patañjali’s *Sphota*  

The Grammarians developed *sphota* theory as they set out to analyze the way word knowledge is manifested and communicated in ordinary experience. Patañjali provides the point of departure for the development of *sphota* theory when, at the beginning of his *Mahābhāṣya*, he asks, “What is the word ‘cow’?” and answers, “It is that which, when uttered, brings us knowledge of creatures with dewlap, tail, hump, hooves and horns.”³ Thus Patañjali emphasizes the fact that knowledge is the key factor—a word is a word only when it has a meaning. Here he is arguing against the Mimāṃsā view that a group of letters when
spoken is a word, even when there is no meaning or when the meaning is not understood. After discussing the need for something to hold the letters together as they come in temporal sequence so as to provide a cognition of the whole, Patañjali concludes that even though the letters cannot coexist at the time of utterance, they can do so in the mind of the speaker as well as in the minds of the listeners. He distinguishes between sphaṭa and dhvani. Sphaṭa is the permanent element in the word and may be considered the essential word. Dhvani—the uttered sounds—is the actualized and ephemeral element and an aspect of the sphaṭa. For Patañjali the sphaṭa may be a single letter or a fixed pattern of letters. It is the norm that remains unaffected by the peculiarities of the individual speakers. Thus the sphaṭa is permanent, unchanging, and is manifested by the changing sounds (dhvanis) uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener.

On the basis of Patañjali's thought sphaṭa, though one, may be classified as both internal and external. The internal form of sphaṭa is its innate expressiveness of the word meaning. The external aspect of sphaṭa is the uttered sound (or written word), which is perceived by our sense organs but serves merely to manifest the inner sphaṭa with its inherent word meaning.

B. Bhartrhari's Sphaṭa Theory

While Patañjali provided the initial framework, it is in Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya that sphaṭa is given systematic philosophical analysis. Vākyapadīya 1.44 states, “In the words which are expressive the Grammarians discern two aspects: the one (the sphaṭa) is the cause of the real word (while) the other (dhvani) is used to convey the meaning”. These two aspects, though they may appear to be essentially different, are really identical. The apparent difference is seen to result from the various external manifestations of the single internal sphaṭa. The process is explained as follows. At first the word exists in the mind of the speaker as a unity or sphaṭa. When he utters it, he produces a sequence of different sounds so that it appears to have differentiation. The listener, though first hearing a series of sounds, ultimately perceives the utterance as a unity—the same sphaṭa with which the speaker began—and then the meaning is conveyed.

In his discussion, Bhartrhari employs several technical terms: sabda/ sphaṭa, dhvani, and nada. By sabda and/or sphaṭa, he refers to that inner unity which conveys the meaning. The dhvanis are described as all-pervasive and imperceptible particles, which, when amassed by the movement of the articulatory organs, become gross and perceptible sounds and are then called nada. These nadas function to suggest the word, sphaṭa, or sabda. Because these nadas, which are gross and audible, have division and sequence, it is naturally assumed that the suggested
word also has parts when in reality it is changeless and sequenceless.\textsuperscript{10} Bhartṛhari offers the illustrative example of reflection in water. Just as an object reflected in water may seem to have movement because of the water’s movement, so the word or \textit{sphota} takes on the properties of uttered speech (sequence, loudness or softness, accent, and so on) in which it is manifested.\textsuperscript{11}

The question may arise of why this changeless whole or \textit{sphota} should ever come to be expressed in the phenomenal diversity called language. In Bhartṛhari’s view, such phenomenalization occurs because the \textit{sphota} itself contains an inner energy (\textit{kratu}) that seeks to burst forth into expression. Thus the unitary \textit{sphota} is seen to contain all the potentialities for diversity, like the seed and the sprout or the egg and the chicken. Bhartṛhari, in his \textit{urtti} on \textit{Vākyapadiya} 1.51, explains it as follows:

The external (audible) word employed in verbal usage is merged in the mind after suppressing all assumption of differentiation, without, however, abandoning the residual force of the differentiation, as in the case of the yolk in the egg of the pea-hen. Just as one single word can merge, so can passages consisting of as many as ten parts. The word, thus merged, with all differentiation suppressed, again assumes differentiation and sequence, when through the speaker’s desire to say something, the inner word is awakened and it becomes the sentence or the word, each with its divisions.\textsuperscript{12}

Here Bhartṛhari seems to be suggesting two ways in which the energy of speech (\textit{kratu}) causes the phenomenalization of the \textit{sphota}. On the one hand, there is the potentiality for bursting forth pent up in the \textit{sphota} itself, while on the other hand there is the desire of the speaker to communicate. This desire for communication, however, is described as existing solely for the purpose of revealing the \textit{sphota} that is within.\textsuperscript{13} Unlike thinkers who conceive of language in conventional or utilitarian terms, Bhartṛhari finds language to contain and reveal its own telos.

C. Maṇḍana Miśra’s Defense of Bhartṛhari’s \textit{Sphota} Theory

In the \textit{Vākyapadiya} Bhartṛhari masterfully supports his \textit{sphota} theory with illustrations from ordinary life. While they may convince one that the \textit{sphota} theory is not implausible, such examples can hardly be taken as proof of the theory. Maṇḍana Miśra took up this challenge in his \textit{Sphotasiddhi}—to demonstrate the existence of the inner word as distinct from its sounds in terms of logical necessity and consistency. His opponent in this task was the skillful Mīmāṃsā philosopher, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

The debate begins with a restatement of Patañjali’s question, “What
is meant by ‘word’?” and his answer, śabda, or that which has a meaning.14 Kumārila objects that Patañjali’s definition fails by being both too wide and too narrow. The definition of “word” in terms of meaning alone is too wide. Smoke, for example, signifies the meaning fire but is not taken as a word for fire. The definition is too narrow in that it holds śabda to be that which is heard. But the ear hears only a group of phonemes or letter sounds, each one of which (according to Patañjali’s definition) should be regarded as a word even though it does not signify any external fact. This problem results in the difficulty that in the word “cow,” for example, the individual phonemes c, o, and w may be heard by the ear of the young child and therefore qualify as śabda, even though the word “cow” as yet carries no meaning for him. This view conflicts with Patañjali’s contention that the śabda is that significant word-whole which conveys meaning. Consequently, the uttered word “cow” would at the same time be śabda and not-śabda. It would be śabda in the sense that it consists in a commonly understood spoken word. But it would not be śabda before its meaning was known—although it would become śabda after the meaning is known. For three reasons—first, that smoke should not be called śabda even though it causes the cognition fire; second, that phonemes, even though they are audible, should not be called śabda; and third, that the same thing should not at one moment be aśabda and the next moment śabda—Kumārila maintains that Patañjali’s definition of śabda as interpreted by the Grammarians is not correct.16 In Kumārila’s view, it is the fact of being audible that is the criterion for śabda, and the phonemes alone meet this requirement, so it is the phonemes that are commonly accepted as śabda. Anything over and above the phonemes (such as sphota) does not deserve to be called śabda, for there is no such common usage.

Maṇḍana rejects Kumārila’s criticism as frivolous misinterpretation. Saying that the signifying power is the criterion for śabda does not mean that a word ceases to be a word when it fails to communicate a meaning to an unlearned child. According to the Grammarian, the key point is that the word is capable of conveying meaning—regardless of its being understood or not understood in specific instances. And because the phonemes or letters that constitute a word do not have this capacity individually, they cannot be called śabda. Having refuted Kumārila in this summary fashion, Maṇḍana goes on to elucidate the Grammarian interpretation of śabda in answer to Patañjali’s question: “In that complex cognition expressed by the word ‘cow’ and which consists of many aspects such as the universal, the particular, quality, action, phonemes, sphota, etc., which aspect is it to which the name śabda refers?”16 śabda, maintains Maṇḍana, cannot refer to the individual phonemes because in themselves they convey no meaning. In common experience the whole word is the unit of language that is taken to be
meaning-bearing. The common man takes a noun or verb to be a unity signifying meaning—without reference to the plurality of letters and syllables, which are the products of speculative thought. Manḍana further criticizes Kumārila’s objections and establishes the basis for the sfhoṭa position as follows:

As for the definition that a word is what is cognized by the auditory sense-organ, it is vitiated by serious defects. The auditory organ also apprehends qualitative differences of pitch and modulation and such universals as wordhood and the like. These attributes though known through the organ of hearing are not words. Moreover, word is not known only by the auditory organ but also by the mind. So the definition proposed by Kumārila is misleading and apt to create confusion. The verdict of unsophisticated common sense that “cow” is a whole word which yields meaning, ought not to be brushed aside as an uncritical appraisal. The unity of the significant word is a felt fact and no amount of quibbling can conjure it away.17

Of the various aspects of the complex cognition “cow,” Manḍana makes clear that it is the sfhoṭa or felt word-unity that is capable of conveying meaning and therefore is the essential characteristic—without which it would cease to be what it is. Other aspects of the complex cognition, such as the particular, the quality, the phonemes, and the like, are merely occasional aspects.

The next step in the argument occurs when Kumārila extends his definition of the phonemes as sabda to rest not only on their uttered quality but also now on the contention that it is they (and not a so-called sfhoṭa) that cause the understanding of meaning. “Why not say that the phonemes themselves are the cause of the understanding of meaning and that, when grouped according to units of meaning which are understood, they are called words (pada)?”18

In rebutting this new contention that it is the phonemes that convey meaning, Manḍana reasons as follows. Phonemes cannot singly convey the meaning because, as Kumārila admits, a collection of them in the form of a word or pada is needed. Neither can the phonemes coexist as a pada, for they are uttered singly and perceived in a certain order. When they are spoken by different speakers or in a different order or at the same time, they do not convey a meaning. At no time can all the phonemes or letters of a word exist together and work together; their individual natures, being eternal and unchanging, are such that no joint simultaneity is possible. Phonemes are necessarily successive and therefore cannot work together to produce a pada that conveys a meaning. Therefore, the understanding of meaning, which
cannot be due to the phonemes, points to a cause that is something different from the phonemes.\footnote{19}

Kumārila counters this rebuttal by giving further development to the Mīmāṃsaka view as stated in the Śabara Bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.5. Let it be admitted that the understanding of meaning does not take place from the phonemes in their individual condition. But if, when grouped as \textit{pada}, they are seen to acquire some special efficacy that provides for the conveying of meaning, what then remains to block the acceptance of the collection of phonemes alone as \textit{pada}? Nothing is required but the phonemes. Without them, however, there is no possibility of conveying meaning. In this regard, the case of the phoneme is very much like that of the common seed. The seed will not produce a new effect (a sprout) as long as it is isolated, but when it is helped by a group of other factors such as soil, moisture, and so on, the sprout appears. Now the sprout is commonly judged as being the effect of the seed when combined with a group of helping factors. Similarly, these phonemes, when combined with a group of helping factors (such as being uttered by the same person in a particular sequence), are commonly held to become the cause of the understanding of meaning. As a parting shot, Kumārila invokes a principle of economy: "As long as there is a visible cause and a visible mode of its being, there is no occasion for thinking of an invisible cause."\footnote{20}

In reply, Maṇḍana admits that a special efficacy may be shown to be the property of an otherwise ordinary cause but maintains that it is just that special efficacy which has not been demonstrated in the case of phonemes as potential conveyers of meaning. Maṇḍana asks, What is the difference between \textit{o} in the word \textit{go} (cow) and an isolated \textit{o}? The obvious difference is that in one instance the \textit{o} is isolated, while in the word it is accompanied by another phoneme. But can it really be called accompaniment when, by the time of the speaking or hearing of the \textit{o}, the other phoneme is no longer being perceived at all? A previously uttered phoneme, which has ceased to exist leaving no trace, and an unborn phoneme (or one that is as yet unspoken) are on the same footing. If previously spoken phonemes can be said to give help to a successor, then it should also be admitted that unspoken phonemes could also be of help—clearly discrediting the argument. Thus, the previously uttered phoneme \textit{g} cannot in any way help the \textit{o} to produce a special functional effect because it is dead and gone.\footnote{21}

Kumārila responds by putting forth yet another explanation. He offers the example of how the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices, along with other rites, have sequence and yet produce their effect together—as do the repeated saying of the Veda for its memorization. In such examples different acts occurring at different times are still found to produce qualitatively and numerically different effects. This
same kind of process, he argues, should be accepted in the case of phonemes.\footnote{22}

Maṇḍana is quick to note, however, that although these examples may seem plausible they are not parallel to the case of the phonemes. In sequences such as the examples offered, where the resultant is unitary, thinkers agree that the new effect is due to a trace or lasting impression that each part in the series leaves behind and which helps toward the one result. As Maṇḍana puts it, "In new and full moon sacrifices and the like, which have sequence, certain new elements (apūra) which are produced by the acts and which last and are looked upon as powers or functions actually help (in producing the single effect)."\footnote{23} In the case of Vedic recitation, the final learning is achieved with the aid of the memory traces left by the preceding repetitions. In the case of both the sacrificial apūras and the memory traces, there is a kind of continuing existence or simultaneity that allows for cooperation among the serial instances toward a unitary result. But, as Maṇḍana points out, the same is clearly not possible in the case of the phonemes, which have already been described as leaving no trace.

Kumārila counters by allowing that phonemes may indeed leave lasting traces or impressions (saṃskāras), and through the traces left by the perceptions of the earlier phonemes and the last phoneme, the unitary meaning of the word may be conveyed.\footnote{24} The last phoneme, when helped out by the traces of the previous phonemes, conveys the meaning.

Maṇḍana finds a fallacy in Kumārila's reasoning. He points out that traces that are generated by individual phonemes can only reinstate those same individual phonemes. The memory trace for each phoneme will be present but, just as in the case of the original utterance or hearing, only individually—when the $o$ is uttered, or remembered, the trace for the $g$ will have ceased to exist. There can only be the cognition of one phoneme at a time, and this principle applies equally to the traces and the original utterance or hearing of the phoneme. Thus, the possibility of the phonemes producing traces gets one no closer to accounting for the generation of a meaning whole.\footnote{26}

Kumārila defends his position by once again introducing an argument of economy (that position which resorts to the smallest number of postulated special powers or entities is best). Now it is agreed that each phoneme, whether in its original utterance or hearing or in its trace, cannot coexist with other phonemes so as to give the meaning of the word. Therefore, some cause for the occurrence of meaning must be postulated. The weakness of the sphota theory is that it has too many postulations: first, it must postulate the existence of the sphota as some kind of unseen entity, and, second, it must then impose upon this postulated sphota the capacity to convey meaning. For the sphota theorist two
things have to be postulated. The upholder of the phoneme, by contrast, has to make only one additional postulation. As has already been made clear, the existence of the trace is accepted by both the disputants. The only point at issue is whether it can be the cause of the understanding of meaning. All that is needed, claims Kumārila, is that a new function be postulated for the trace, which everyone agrees exists. It is the cognition of the final phoneme, accompanied by the special function of the traces of the previous phonemes, that conveys the meaning. Thus only one additional postulation is required, the postulation of a new function for the traces. The sphaṭa theorist is in an inferior position because he has to postulate both a new substance (namely, the sphaṭa) and a new function (its ability to convey meaning).26

To Maṇḍana, Kumārila's explanation seems to be an oversimplification. The memory impression or trace is not seen but is a capacity or function that is inferred from the existence of the original phoneme. The difficulty comes when Kumārila postulates yet another function as resulting from the trace, which is itself already an inferred function. Maṇḍana maintains that the postulation of functions and the like is unacceptable because it results in an infinite regress. In addition to this problem of infinite regress, Maṇḍana finds logical weaknesses in Kumārila's view that it is the cognition of the final phoneme, accompanied by the cognitions of the previous phonemes, that conveys the meaning. This view cannot hold, says Maṇḍana, because the traces left by the letters are the same even when their order is reversed. How is it, then, that the meanings of the words "now" and "won" are not identical? As the letters and traces involved in the two words are identical, their meanings should also be identical, which is clearly not the case.

Letting go of this argument, Kumārila takes up his final and seemingly most potent line of attack. He returns to the proposition that the last phoneme, accompanied by the traces of the previous phonemes, expresses the meaning. To avoid the difficulties encountered earlier, he now defines sāṃskāra not as a memory trace, but rather as "something else which is brought about by the cognition of the phonemes uttered separately in a fixed order by a particular speaker and leading to the understanding of meaning and it is similar to the effect called āpūrva (residual force) brought about by the performance of the different rites like a sacrifice and leading to heaven."27 The distinguishing feature of the trace that causes remembrance is that it causes something similar to that which produced it, which is not, however, the case of āpūrva in a sacrifice. In a sacrifice, the individual acts performed perish immediately, but the āpūrva or aftereffect of the whole sacrifice inheres in the self of the sacrificer as a special kind of potency until it brings the reward of heaven. Its result is thus very different from its cause, and
this unusual kind of causal relationship is necessitated by scripture's declaration that the performance of a sacrifice produces such a result. In Kumārila's view, the āpūrva or aftereffect kind of saṃskāra, which is left by the different letters upon the subject, is analogous to such religious heaven. Just as in a sacrifice it is the determinate order of performance by a single agent that is responsible for the spiritual leaven, here also the determinate order of the phonemes uttered by a single person is responsible for the unusual result. Therefore, it is when the last phoneme is spoken or heard in the midst of the "leavening" effect of the saṃskāras of the previous phonemes that the meaning is conveyed. For Kumārila, śabda is the last phoneme being heard or spoken and conveying the meaning (when helped by the saṃskāras of the previous phonemes).

The exact nature of this help is that the saṃskāras of the previous phonemes become a kind of intermediate cause (vyāpāra). They help the last phoneme in its task of conveying meaning. This help does not depreciate the causal value of the previous phonemes in any way, for it is in harmony with their purpose—the phonemes are not uttered just for the sake of pronouncing letters or leaving impressions, but also for the purpose of conveying a meaning. This importance of and necessity for the phonemes as causing the conveyance of meaning must also be admitted by the proponent of the sphaṭa, Kumārila claims. The proponent of the sphaṭa or undivided word entity has to admit that it is manifested by the phonemes uttered or heard in a definite order. As no single letter can be said to reveal the sphaṭa, it must then be revealed by all the phonemes combined with one another. Neither can it be that each phoneme in succession reveals only a part of the sphaṭa, because the sphaṭa, by definition, is held to be a simple indivisible whole. For the very reasons given by the sphaṭa theorist himself, the phonemes of a word existing in a fixed sequence have no way of pooling themselves or their traces so as to result in a unitary whole. Just as the Mīmāṃsaka has been forced to do, so also the sphaṭa theorist is forced to postulate some special kind of leaven of a trace by means of which the phonemes reveal the whole meaning. Why then, asks Kumārila (revealing his economy principle once more), does he not attribute the conveying of meaning to a special trace function itself and leave out the extra step of postulating a special kind of trace and then postulating the sphaṭa? For these reasons, concludes Kumārila, "it is better to assume that the special trace which has to be postulated conveys the meaning (rather than that it reveals the word)."\textsuperscript{28}

Maṇḍana answers the foregoing criticism by making clear that the sphaṭa theory does not postulate a new kind of āpūrva for the conveyance of meaning. Sphaṭa theory needs nothing more than the postulation of the ordinary memory trace. It is just the commonly accepted traces
(saṃskāra) or dispositions (vāsanā) that result in the revelation of the sphota. The only new thing postulated by sphota theory is the sphota itself, and in fact even that need not be postulated because it is directly perceptible.29 Now, maintains Maṇḍana, this position is far superior to Kumārila’s, in which the one new thing (namely, the apūrvā-type trace) cannot be perceived and has to be postulated on the authority of scripture and on analogy to religious merit. Even this analogy is very weak, for although the postulation of apūrvā or religious merit is necessary to validate the moral law and religious rites, there is no such necessity in the apprehension of the word and its meaning. The cases are not parallel. Also ignored is the common man’s intuition, “I understand the meaning from the word,” and the teaching of tradition that “the word, the meaning, and their relation are eternal.” There is a natural connection between word and meaning that is inalienable. The conventions we learn as children serve only to bring that relation out and to make the meaning present to us. Maṇḍana summarizes his rejection of Kumārila’s position as follows: “Because it has been said that the impressions, after all, do not constitute the word, the final phoneme is not expressive, (therefore) a collection of phonemes does not constitute the word and it does not convey any meaning.”30

In this debate Kumārila’s attempt to identify sabda with the uttered phoneme seems to be discredited by the reasoning of Maṇḍana, who at the same time has vindicated the identification of sabda with sphota. Nevertheless, Maṇḍana still has to show how sabda as sphota may be comprehended using only ordinary memory traces of the phonemes to reveal the sphota. He must also show the sphota to be not a mere postulation but a perceivable reality, otherwise much of his logical argument simply collapses. These tasks he undertakes in kārikās 18 and 19 of the Sphotaśādhi.

In his explanation Maṇḍana depends on the basic concepts put forward by Bhartṛhari in chapter 1 of his Vākyapadiya. The sphota is something over and above the phonemes. The phonemes are changeable (capable of variations such as accent, speed, and the like), and when uttered serve only to manifest the changeless sphota, which exists within the speaker and is potentially present within every hearer. The phonemes do not convey the meaning, but the sphota, once manifested, does so. Between the sphota and its word-meaning aspect the relation is that of expression and thing or meaning expressed. It is a natural relationship, and is indestructable and beginningless. Convention only serves to bring it out. Bhartṛhari emphasizes that the sphota is an entity that exists within each person. All of us have the capacity instinctively to feel its existence within, and ultimately to perceive it directly with the mind. The contention that the sphota may be directly perceived, and is not merely an inference, is one of the key points of sphota theory.
Keeping these basic concepts in mind, let us now examine Maṇḍana’s detailed description of the way the *sphota* is both cognized and perceived without recourse to any new *apārā*-type postulations.

Maṇḍana explains the process by which the *sphota* is cognized in his commentary on *kārikā 18* of the *Sphotasiddhi*:

Each sound individually reveals the whole *sphota*. Nor do the other sounds thus become useless because there is a difference in the revelation. It is like this: All the previous sounds bring about in the listener whose mind is free from any particular residual impression (*sanskāra*), cognitions in which the word figures vaguely and which sow seeds in the form of residual impressions capable of producing a later clear cognition of the word. The last sound produces a clear cognition in which figures, as it were, clearly the image of the *sphota* caused by all the seeds in the form of residual impressions left by the vague cognitions of the previous sounds.81

Maṇḍana offers the analogy of a jeweller who assesses the genuineness of a precious stone. His continuous gaze is really a series of cognitions, each of which perceives the genuineness of the stone but with increasing clarity. Each cognition leaves its *sanskāra* or common memory trace. The last cognition, helped by the trace of the previous ones, fully perceives the genuineness of the stone; but for the traces of the intervening cognitions, there would be no difference between the last one and the first one. An important point is that the jeweller is described as “expert”, meaning that before beginning the examination he already had the image of a precious stone ingrained in his subconscious, and it was this image (like the inherent *sphota*) that was revealed to the jeweller’s mind by his series of partial perceptions.

The *sphota* is a unity that already exists in the mind of the speaker. He utters sounds in order to manifest it, and once manifested the *sphota* conveys the meaning. A reasonable explanation of this process by which the *sphota* and its meaning are held to be revealed is offered by Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa in his *Sphotatattvanirūpaṇa*. As the phoneme *c* is spoken by someone who intends to say “cow”, the hearer grasps not only the phoneme *c* but also the whole word rather vaguely, as it is now known that the speaker is pronouncing a word beginning with *c* and not with any other sound. But there are a multitude of words beginning with *c*, and we do not know which one is going to be uttered; thus the vagueness of our knowledge. But, when the speaker utters the next phoneme, *o*, the field of possible words is further narrowed. All words not having *co* at the beginning are now excluded, and the hearer’s knowledge of the whole is less vague. When the final phoneme, *w*, is uttered, all doubt
disappears as the \textit{w} unites with the memory traces \textit{co} to manifest the whole \textit{sphota "cow"}, which immediately conveys its meaning.\textsuperscript{32}

The preceding explanation makes clear the reason behind Maṇḍana’s insistence that a speaker’s efforts to utter the phonemes will differ according to the \textit{sphota} that he wants to manifest. Even though the phoneme may be the same (for example, the \textit{w} in “won” and “now”), the physical effort involved in vocalizing it will vary according to the position it occupies in the word. Thus the overall physical effort in saying “won” will be markedly different from that involved in saying “now,” even though the same three phonemes are involved in each case. Consequently, the \textit{sphota} theorist has a basis for claiming that the \textit{sphotas} manifested by the two vocalizations would be different, as would the meanings revealed.

This last point is important in relation to the Mīmāṃsaka contention that, because the phonemes are changeless, no mere difference in order or effort of vocalization can be important to the production of different meanings. Therefore, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, were it not for the postulation of the special “\textit{apūrva}-like effect,” the same meaning should result from “now” and “won.” From the \textit{sphota} viewpoint, however, it is the \textit{sphota} that is changeless and not the phoneme, and the evident variations in the pronunciation and ordering of phonemes in speaking different words is seen to be consistent with both \textit{sphota} theory and the evidence of experience. “Now” and “won” are composed of the same three phonemes but do require that the vocalization of those phonemes be given different orders and intentions or efforts for the appropriate \textit{sphota} to be manifested and its meaning revealed.

The strength of this \textit{sphota} explanation of the way the word meaning is revealed rests not only on its concurrence with experience but also on the fact that no new kind of trace is postulated. The trace employed is the usual trace providing for the remembrance of the phoneme that originally caused it. “The weak point of the Mīmāṃsaka explanation,” as Subramania Iyer puts it, “was that it either postulated a new power for the ordinary kind of residual trace, or postulated a new kind of residual trace in order to explain the fact that, though caused by the cognition of the sound, it does not stop at causing a remembrance of it but causes the understanding of the meaning also.”\textsuperscript{33} In other words, the trace is supposed to have an object different from that of the cognition that deposited it in the first place, which is, says the \textit{sphota} theorist, a logical impossibility. In his case, the original \textit{sphota} (which lay behind the vocalization of the phonemes by the speaker) and the end \textit{sphota} (which is the object of both the uttered phonemes and their traces) are identical. Consequently, the object (that is, the \textit{sphota}) of the phonemes and the traces is the same, and there is no logical difficulty of the kind that besets the Mīmāṃsaka.
Maṇḍana’s explanation of the paradox of the way the indivisible sphoṭa appears as the phonemes, and the phonemes as the parts of the partless sphoṭa, is as follows. He says it is the sounds that resemble one another which are the cause of both the error and the final correct cognition of the sphoṭa. If, for the manifestation of two different word sphoṭas, one has to make similar movements of the vocal organs, the phonemes produced by these movements appear to be parts of both of the indivisible words. This error is fostered by the construction of such artificial devices as alphabet letters or word syllables, usually for teaching purposes. It is precisely because of this kind of confusion, says Maṇḍana, that sentences, words, and phonemes appear to have parts where in reality they have none. The obverse applies to the sphoṭa. From the phenomenal viewpoint the sphoṭa “cow”, for example, may appear to possess qualities such as accent, speed, loudness, time, place, and person in its utterance. That these qualities belong to the phenomenal sounds and not to the noumenal sphoṭa is what makes possible the common recognition of the word “cow,” in spite of its diversity of utterance. From the sphoṭa viewpoint, it is this noumenal grounding or basis that makes possible such things as the translation of thought from one phenomenal language to another.

A later scholar of considerable note, Vācaspati Miśra, attempts to reject Maṇḍana’s concept of the relation between the phonemes and the sphoṭa. This criticism occurs in its fullest form in Vācaspati’s Tattvabindu. The argument is stated as follows: “The particular sounds which manifest sphoṭa, are they different from sphoṭa or non-different therefrom?” If nondifferent, says Vācaspati, then each phoneme should manifest the sphoṭa, and the remaining phonemes would be futile. If different, then there is no ground for relating the phonemes to the manifestation of the sphoṭa. If the phonemes are treated as illusory, then their reality is discredited—yet in experience we undoubtedly cognize individual letters. What is the justification for treating such cognitions as illusory?

In supporting the sphoṭa argument of Maṇḍana, S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri effectively answers these criticisms of Vācaspati. To the criticisms regarding difference and nondifference Sastri replies, “Such a question has little application to Maṇḍana’s doctrine. To him indeed sphoṭa is non-different from the sounds, as a whole is from its parts; and yet it is different too, since the whole is neither each part nor a mere aggregate of parts. The existence of functioning of such wholes can only be denied by defective psychology.” As regards the justification for treating cognitions of the phonemes as illusory, Sastri answers:

The obvious reply is that not the existence of these cognitions but their significance is in question, just as in the case of the reflection.
The reflection exists without doubt, but it is not real. And sublation in this case consists not in that presentation ceasing to be or giving place to another presentation, but in that presentation as such failing to fulfil what is expected of it. If each cognition as an independent part could by combination with other such parts explain the whole, then it would be unsublated; since, however, it fails of its purpose, since it seems to fit in more naturally with a theory which treats it not as a producer but as manifest, it is in so far forthsublated. The reflection is sublated not as a reflection, but as the face; the letter-cognition is sublated not as letter-cognition but as an independent productive constituent of meaning.\textsuperscript{38}

Sastri observes that Vācaspati adopts and attempts to develop Kumārila's viewpoint further by trying to show that meaning somehow results from the phonemes entering into a single memory. As Sastri points out, however, such an explanation is untenable in the light of experience. If "cowness" is associated with the remembered letters c, o, w, that meaning should not be recalled except when all three letters are present. How is it, then, that when there is a misprint such as "coe" or a mispronunciation such as "coo" we still correctly apprehend the meaning to be "cow"? The same sort of thing is evident when a letter or sound is omitted in the course of writing or speaking. The explanation in all of these situations would seem to be that we do not pass from part to part but rather apprehend the whole, filling up gaps or correcting errors when they occur.

With regard to memory and sequence, Vācaspati, following Kumārila, maintains that in the memory itself the phonemes have no sequence, being presented together, but that memory follows experience, conforms to it, and the sequence in which the letters are experienced is repeated in memory. This contention, however, does not square with the view that letters, being eternal and pervasive, can have no sequence belonging to themselves. This difficulty is overcome in the sphota view, which holds that the sequence is determined by something other than the letters—by the sphota intended. It is not the case that the letters in sequence constitute the word; rather, it is the word or sphota that determines the sequence. The question may then be asked, Is the word existent or nonexistent prior to the phonemes being apprehended in sequence? In purely empirical terms, this question may be shelved by saying that, though not present in my mind before I learn the sequence, it is present in the mind of another who instructs me; and in this fashion the process may be pushed farther and farther back, there being no authority for postulating the origin of language at any particular time. But such empirical indefiniteness does not seem adequate in the face of the common ground that necessarily appears
to underlie all empirical languages—requiring the *sphota* interpretation that the word both is and is not prior to the apprehension of sequence. This paradox is ridiculed by Vācaspati, who describes it as the *sphota* claim that the unreal helps the real. Sastri, in answer, states the *sphota* argument, “It is real, otherwise it could not be manifested in sequence; it is not existent, otherwise there would be no need for manifestation.”

This solution, Sastri observes, is in line with the solution to the problems of human knowledge and activity in general. “Knowledge is of the novel and yet not of the non-existent. Activity realizes a purpose which is real yet not actual.” As both the Advaita Vedānta and the *sphota* theorists point out, the only solution to this paradox, which seems to be universally present in human experience, would seem to be to take the phenomenal as partial and therefore defective and illusory appearances of the unitary real. It is from this viewpoint that *sphota* theory claims that there is a whole (namely, *sphota*) that is increasingly revealed by particular phonemes uttered in sequence. As Sastri concisely puts it, “The succeeding sounds make more clear what was less clearly expressed by the preceding sounds; the latter provides the substructure, former superstructure, while all of them together reveal the one design, which while prompting their utterance is certainly not produced by them.”

3. Universal and Particular

In his *Sphotasiddhi* Maṇḍana Miśra also analyzes the relation between the universal and the particular. When one perceives the universal of an object, the particular and its qualities are also perceived, yet the essential cognition is that of the universal. To put it another way, when the cognition of the whole takes place we are also aware of the parts that make up the whole, but it is the cognition of the whole that is dominant. Maṇḍana offers the example of a picture. He points out that in our cognition of a picture, although we may be aware of the different parts and colors, the picture is perceived as a whole that is over and above its parts. Similarly, when we perceive a piece of cloth our cognition is of the cloth as a whole and is quite distinct from the particular threads and colors involved.

To illustrate this point, both Bhartrhari and Maṇḍana refer to the Vaiśeṣika conception that when two things are brought before us we first perceive each one separately, and only on the basis of these separate perceptions does the notion of two arise. This method of perception applies to all higher numbers—their cognition and production is possible only by way of previously cognized lower numbers. So also
it is by way of the lower differentiated forms of speech that the higher unities, the word *sphoças*, may be understood.⁴⁵

4. Contextual Factors

The need for taking into consideration the contextual factors in determining the exact meaning of an expression has been emphasized by various thinkers in India from very early times. The *Brhaddevatā* says that the established rule regarding the meaning of a Vedic passage as well as of an ordinary sentence is that the purpose to be served (*artha*), the subject matter under discussion (*prakarana*), an indication from another place in the text (*liṅga*), its suitability (*aucitya*), the place (*deśa*), and the time (*kāla*) have to be taken into consideration for determining it. Of these terms, *vākya*, *prakarana*, *liṅga*, and *artha* are also known to the Mīmāṃsā school of interpretation. According to them there are six means of proof to be taken into consideration: *śruti* or direct statement, *liṅga* or implication from another word, *vākya* or syntactic connection, *prakarana* or context of situation, *sthāna* or position, and *samākhyā* or the etymological meaning. Of these six, each one is stronger than the succeeding ones. In the *Vākyapadīya* Bhartrhari gives two lists of contextual factors; the first is almost a paraphrase of the list given in the *Brhaddevatā*. The second is a bigger list and is given as contextual factors that determine the exact meaning of a word in the case of ambiguous and equivocal expressions. This second list is discussed in detail by later writers like Nāgęśa, the Grammarian and Ālaṃkārikas like Mammaṭa and Jagannātha Paṇḍitāraja. The contextual factors taken into consideration in determining the meanings of ambiguous expressions include the factors of situational context and the context within the sentence.

Even to understand the purport of an essay or a text as a whole, the Mīmāṃsakas have pointed out certain factors to be taken into account. The six factors for determining the purpose of a text are given thus: consistency in the meaning between the introduction and conclusion; repetition of the main topic; the novelty of the subject matter; the result intended; corroborative and eulogistic remarks, as distinguished from the main theme; and arguments in favor of the main topic. These six *liṅgas* or indications for deciding the purport of a text are accepted by all schools of thought.

Literary critics from the time of Ānandavardhana lay great stress on the importance of contextual factors in conveying suggested meaning. The situational context—such as the speaker, the listener, the time and place, the tone, as well as the social and cultural background—has an important role in bringing out the suggestion. It was Bhartrhari
who pointed out that in many cases of language behavior, the literal meaning conveyed by the expression is not the intended meaning and that contextual factors play a vital role in determining the intended sense of a passage. It is because of these contextual and grammatical factors determining the intended sense that homonyms do not introduce the slightest confusion in actual speech.
SENTENCE MEANING

1. FACTORS OF SENTENCE UNITY

A. Ākāṅkṣā

Those who believe that a sentence is made up of words, each with an independent meaning of its own, will have to explain how a connected and cogent meaning is understood from the sentence. This problem has been discussed by all schools of thought in India, and various theories have evolved. Mīmāṃsā, the vākyāstra, takes a lead in this field. Bhartrhari too has discussed various aspects of the problem and made his observations, though his final view is that the partless sentence is the unit of utterance.

Pāṇini uses the term vākyā in the general sense of an utterance but does not define a sentence. It is Kātyāyana who defines it as that (group of words) containing a finite verb. Pāṇini does not seem to have subscribed to such a view, for his rule tīṇatīnāḥ, referring to the application of the accent of “a finite verb when not followed by another finite verb”, shows that he had no difficulty in allowing more than one verb in the same sentence. Pāṇini’s view of the sentence seems more akin to that of the Mīmāṃsakas than to that of the Logicians. Even later Grammarians agreed that there can be simple sentences with more than one finite verb if other conditions are fulfilled, for example, pāṣya mṛgo dhūvati, “See the deer is running.” ¹ The Nyāyasūtra does not refer to the sentence or the sentence meaning, though Nyāya is very much interested in the word meanings. Perhaps early Naiyāyikas believed that a sentence is a collection of words and that the sentence meaning is a combination of the word meanings. A formal definition of the sentence is also found in the Brhaddevatā (2. 117). But it is in the Mīmāṃsāsūtra that we first come across this definition: “A group of words serving a single purpose forms a sentence, if on analysis the separate words are found to have ākāṅkṣā or mutual expectancy”
This definition was mainly for the Yajurveda passages. Here for the first time the importance of ākāñkṣā in unifying the words in a sentence is brought out. In this definition two terms deserve special attention, arthaikatva (unity of purpose) and ākāñkṣā (mutual expectancy). The term arthaikatva can also be interpreted as unity of meaning; explained in this way it can have an extended application, even to ordinary sentences. The Mimāmsā principle of syntactical unity (ekavākyatā) states that if a group of words can be interpreted as a single sentence, it is not proper to split it and interpret it as two sentences. A sentence like paśya mṛgo dhāvati, “see the deer is running,” would be a single sentence according to this principle (not treating it as two: “the deer is running” and “see him”).

This condition of mutual expectancy, first promulgated by the Mimamsakas and later accepted by other schools, stresses the necessity of interdependence of words to give a unified sense as in a compound word or a sentence. Pāṇini seems to have accepted something of the sort while mentioning sāmartṛhya, “capacity”, as a condition for forming compound words (Aṣṭādhyāyī 2.1.1); for sāmartṛhya refers to semantic connection by syntactic elements. Two meanings are given by Kātyāyana for the term sāmartṛhya: first, ekārthihāva, emergence of single integrated meaning, which is similar to arthaikatva in the Mimāmsā definition of the sentence; and, second, vyāpeksā, which is equivalent to ākāñkṣā in the Mimāmsāsūtra. It is not clear whether Pāṇini himself intended those meanings or Kātyāyana is reading them in the light of the Mimāmsā definition. Strictly speaking, sāmartṛhya is the capacity of the words for mutual association, vyāpeksā is their interdependence, and ākāñkṣā is the need one has for the other in order to complete the sense. Pāṇini is referring to the compound formation while the Mimāmsakas are dealing with the Vedic sentence, but the principle involved is the same. Patañjalā explains the two views as mutually exclusive and accepts the ekārthihāva point of view as the final one, for according to the Grammarians the elements of a compound give up their individual meanings and acquire a special signification. He thinks that according to the vyāpeksā view the individual members retain their own meanings but are mutually related. Kaiyāta points out that the former is a condition for the compound word, and the latter for the sentence. According to Bhartṛhari the sentence is the unit sphaṭa, and unity of meaning is certainly necessary. We may say that in all cases there should be unity of meaning when viewed as an integral unit and interdependence when viewed from the point of view of the parts.

Ākāñkṣā can be seen from two points of view, psychological and syntactic. The Mimamsakas are interested in the psychological expectancy, while the Naiyāyikas take it as a syntactic expectancy. Bhartṛhari
actually criticizes the Mīmāṃsā definition of the sentence on the ground
that its ākāṅkṣā would imply that a passage of several grammatical
sentences would have to be considered as one sentence. The Mīmāṃsakas
have to solve the problem by referring to the basic psychological
expectancy.

Śālikanātha, a follower of Prabhākara, says that ākāṅkṣā, being the
curiosity on the part of the listeners, has been explained by some as
invariable association. This definition will lead to complications, as
there is no limit to such mental association. He says that only those
that are essential for the accomplishment of the intended purpose
need be taken as requirements, not all the kāraṇa associations. “Bring
the cow” is complete in itself, but if the phrase “with a stick” is added,
that phrase is in need of a verb for completeness, and hence “Bring
the cow with a stick” becomes a single sentence. If the phrase were not
added, it would mean that the speaker was indifferent to the way the
cow was brought.

To the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas the three basic requirements for
the accomplishment of the intended purpose are: the person who is
enjoined to do the act, what to do, and how to do it. If one of these
essential requirements is not given in the sentence it has to be assumed
as in elliptical sentences. To the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, by contrast,
the essential psychological requirements in a sentence are: the act
enjoined (itikartavyatā), the means (sādhana or karaṇa), and the fruit of
action (phala or prayojana).

The Grammarians and the Logicians take ākāṅkṣā as syntactic, as it
is only the need for the syntactic completeness of the sentence. The
later Naiyāyikas define ākāṅkṣā as a kind of syntactic need that one
word has for another in a sentence in order to convey the interrelation
of words. It is the ākāṅkṣā that leads to the knowledge of the syntactic
relation in a sentence. Ākāṅkṣā plays an important role in the teaching
method of Sanskrit texts. In a sentence the finite verb is taken first
and then questions asked to get the necessary words to fill the kāraṇa
relations.

Nāgēśa says that ākāṅkṣā is the desire on the part of the listeners,
on hearing a word in a sentence, to know the idea that can be related in
order to get a complete sense; it is only in a figurative sense that the
expectancy is attributed to the word.

In the Vedāntaparibhāṣā (4.4-7), Dharmañjñādhvarindra says that
there are two kinds of ākāṅkṣā, natural expectancy (utthitākāṅkṣā) and
potential expectancy (utthāpyākāṅkṣā). Ākāṅkṣā can also be mutual or
one-sided. In “bring the cow with a stick,” the phrase “with a stick”
has expectancy toward the verb “bring,” but “bring the cow” has no
direct expectancy toward the phrase. There is no end to potential
expectancy, and the addition of the word to resolve it depends on the speaker's intention.

B. Yogyatā

To the primary condition of mutual expectancy were added two more by the Mīmāṃsakas, yogyatā (consistency of sense) and āsatti or samnidhi, which stands for the contiguity of the words. These three conditions have been generally accepted by all schools of thought as essential for śabdabodha. To them some have added a fourth, namely, the knowledge of tātparya, the intention of the speaker or the general purport of the sentence.

Yogyatā is the logical compatibility of the words' consistency in a sentence for mutual association. Really it involves a judgment on a sentence's sense or nonsense. The meaning of a sentence should not be contradicted by experience. "He wets it with water"—here there is yogyatā, because wetting is generally done with a liquid; but in a sentence "He wets it with fire" there is no yogyatā, because the idea of wetting is incongruous with that of fire.

There is no unanimity of opinion regarding the exact role of yogyatā in the comprehension of meaning from a sentence. Some Naiyāyikas hold that a decisive knowledge of yogyatā is a prerequisite for verbal cognition. Others say that what is required is only the absence of a knowledge of incompatibility. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that incompatibility with the actual facts does not prevent verbal comprehension, but only the validity of the knowledge. Perhaps it is the inconceivability of the mutual association of the word meanings that renders the whole sentence nonsensical; it is not the lack of correlation with the actual facts but the impossibility of connecting the word meanings that stands in the way of verbal comprehension.

Sometimes the lack of yogyatā is only apparent and can be explained away by resorting to the metaphorical meaning of a word in the sentence; if the incompatibility can be removed thus and yogyatā restored, there is no difficulty in comprehending the meaning of the sentence. The apparent incompatibility of the expressed sense is an essential condition for laksanā (secondary meaning).

C. Samnidhi or Āsatti

Sāmnidhi or āsatti is generally explained as the condition that the words in a sentence should be temporally contiguous. It is the uninterrupted utterance or the unbroken comprehension of words when they are in juxtaposition. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that it is the continuous moving about of the words in the listener's mind (buddhau vipariyṛtti). The Prabhākaraśaśa also explain it that way. Lack of sāmnidhi can occur in two ways—not being uttered together and not being
signified by words. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that verbal cognition is possible only when the necessary words are together in the mind. The Prabhākaras consider that only the contiguity of cognition of the sense is necessary. Thus in the case of elliptical sentences, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas want the missing words to be actually supplied.

The Navya-Nyāya school defines *āsatti* as an immediate recollection of the meanings of words through their expressive power or secondary signification (*lakṣaṇād*); even if the words are separated there is *āsatti* if the meanings of the words are recollected without any interruption. This recognition happens in the case of verses. Early Naiyāyikas thought that the knowledge of *āsatti* is the cause of verbal comprehension. The Navya-Nyāya school considers that *āsatti* itself is the cause (*svarūpe sati śābdabodhahetuk*).

In the case of elliptical sentences, in which the intended meaning is understood from the context even though some of the words necessary for syntactic completeness are lacking, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas believe that it is necessary to supply the missing words in order to have verbal comprehension of the sentence meaning. The Prabhākaras hold that it is easier to supply the meaning than to presume the missing words as implied.

2. The Role of Tatparya or Intention

The term *tātparya* has been used by the different schools of thought in India with varying subtle nuances, depending on the basic standpoint taken by each; but the general idea is quite clear. The term refers to the meaning intended to be conveyed by an utterance, and it can be viewed as the meaning intended by the speaker or as the purport of the utterance. The role of contextual factors in deciding this *tātparya* is also generally accepted by all, along with the importance of *tātparya* in deciding the meaning of a sentence. There is, however, no unanimity of opinion regarding the exact role played by *tātparya* in verbal comprehension.

The meaning of a sentence can be considered from two distinct standpoints, from the point of view of the speaker and from the point of view of the listener. The general western approach has been from the speaker's point of view, while the Indian approach, especially the later śābdabodha approach, has been mainly from the listener's point of view.

In a normal speech situation there can be five different aspects of the meaning of an utterance: what is in the mind of the speaker who makes the utterance, what the speaker wants the listener to understand, what the utterance actually conveys, what the listener understands as the meaning of the utterance, and what is in the mind of the listener on hearing the utterance.
In a perfect linguistic communication all five of these meanings must coincide; but often due to various causes there are bound to be differences standing in the way of easy communication. In all cases of successful lying or misdirection, what is in the mind of the speaker at the time of utterance is different from what is intended to be conveyed to the listener. And very often what the listener understands as the meaning of the utterance is different from what the speaker intends to convey; this problem can be caused by the lack of expressive power on the speaker's part or the inability to understand on the listener's part. What is in the speaker's mind before he speaks or in the listener's mind after hearing the utterance is rather intangible and does not easily yield to objective scientific analysis. It is the actual utterance that can be objectively analyzed into its components of words, morphemes, and phonemes, and studied; but that does not mean that the other aspects are less important.

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, who take the sentence to be a concatenation of the individual words it contains, have necessarily to depend on the power of tatparya to explain how a connected meaning is comprehended from a sentence. Each word in a sentence gives its own isolated meaning; but a string of unconnected isolated senses cannot produce a unified meaning. People use words with the intention of conveying a connected sense; hence from the use of words in juxtaposition (samabhītyāhāra) it is assumed that the speaker has uttered them with the intention of conveying a connected sense, for otherwise the simultaneous utterance would be of no avail, but for such an intention tatparya works as a general motivating force to help in correlating the word meanings and forming the sentence meaning.

Tatparya is the intention or the desire of the speakers, according to the Naiyāyikas. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, it is the purport of the sentence. This tatparya is all-comprehensive, but not all-powerful or absolute. Normally it cannot change the sakti, the primary meaning of a word. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the sakti or the relation between a word and its meaning is autpattika, innate or permanent; according to the Naiyāyikas, this sakti is conventional or sāṃketika, but permanent, being based on the will or icchā of God in the case of ordinary words and of the authors in the case of technical terms and the like.

According to the Naiyāyika, the śabdabodha or understanding of the sentence's meaning is possible only through the knowledge of the words' meanings, which form the immediate cause (kāraṇa); the knowledge of the expressive power of sakti in the individual words obtained through recollection is the sahakāri kāraṇa. Before one considers the question of the speaker's intention, understanding the individual meanings of words on the basis of their sakti is essential. It is only in
the case of ambiguous words, in which more than one sense is possible, that the speaker's intention or contextual factors are taken into account.

In the case of metaphorical expression, such as "the village on the Ganges," in which the literal meaning is unsuitable, the incompatibility has to be removed by taking one of the word meanings as having been used in a sense different from its normal sense, but somehow related to it. In a particular sentence in which there is contextual incompatibility, it is on the basis of the tātparya that the listener decides which of the words is to be taken as metaphorical. Some farfetched relationship can always be assumed between the primary meaning and the intended meaning.

Along with ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā, and āsatti, some Naiyāyikas want to include tātparya or a general knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker, which may be termed "prehension," as an essential factor in all cases of verbal comprehension. Some others believe that the speaker's intention need not be considered as a direct factor, as it could be included in ākāṅkṣā itself. Tātparya plays a part in deciding āsatti also. Gaṅgeseśa and Viśvanātha have included tātparya as a fourth requisite.

Even though the Mimāṃsakas do not accept tātparya as a separate factor, it is accepted as a general motivating force. According to the Prabhākaras, the tātparya enables primary meaning itself to give both its word meaning and the syntactic relation. These anvītabhidhānavādins think that the sākti of words is understood with reference to a meaning that is related to some kārya. All sentences, especially in the Veda, have to be ultimately meaning injunctions or prohibitions. The later theory of Dhanika, who includes dhvani under tātparya, follows this anvītabhidhānavāda.

According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the individual words in a sentence give their isolated meanings, and the sentence meaning is located through lakṣanā, based on tātparyañuṇāpatti. It is Jayanta Bhāṭṭa who in his Nyāyamañjarī advocates tātparya as a separate factor to explain the emergence of the sentence meaning from the associationist point of view. He does not refer to lakṣanā in this case, because sentence lakṣanā is not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas. Harissiddhāntavāgīśa, in his commentary on Sāhityadārpana, says that this tātparyasakti is the same as the sansargamaryādā of later Naiyāyikas.

Among Ālaṃkārikas, Ānandavardhana accepts only three functions of words, abhidhā, lakṣanā, and tātparya. He mentions the padarthavākyārthanyāya but does not refer to it as a function. Tātparyavrtti was accepted for the first time by Abhinavagupta in his Locana. He followed Jayanta Bhāṭṭa in this respect. Later Ālaṃkārikas took it as a general view accepted by Dhvanikāra himself. Thus Ruyaka says wrongly that Dhvanikāra accepted vyanjanā as the fourth vyāpāra, distinct from abhidhā, lakṣanā, and tātparya. Later Ālaṃkārikas took the tātparyavrtti
as the view of abhihitānvayaśādins and confused it with the Bhāṭṭa view, though the Bhāṭṭas have definitely stated that they accept only laksanā and not tatparya to explain the emergence of the sentence meaning from the word meanings.

3. Anvitābhidhāna and Abhihitānvaya Theories

We saw earlier that the two main theories about sentence meaning are the anvitābhidhāna, advocated by the Prabhakara Mimāṃsakas, and the abhihitānvaya, held by the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka.

Prabhakara and his followers denied that words convey a meaning except in the context of a sentence, even though they regarded words as real and actual constituents of language. Like the Bhāṭṭas, the Prabhakaras have to accept the reality of individual words and their individual meanings, and agree that the primary meaning expressed by the word is a universal (jāti). All of these points are specifically stated in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras, and no Mimāṃsaka can doubt its validity. It is also clear that the purpose of words in a sentence is to give a cogent, connected meaning. The difference between the two schools involves the following questions:

(1) Does the unitary sentence meaning arise directly from the words themselves or indirectly through the recollection of the word meanings? The anvitābhidhāna theory takes the former view, while the abhihitānvaya theory takes the latter.

(2) The meaning of a sentence is made up of the individual word meanings and their mutual relation. Can both of these elements be directly conveyed by the words? The Prabhakaras say that the intention or purport, known from contextual factors, will make the primary, denotative power of the words convey both. But Bhāṭṭas hold that the primary denotative power of words is exhausted by conveying their isolated, individual meanings and stop with that. The connected meaning is conveyed through the secondary power of the sentence (laksanā). The individual meaning is a universal; but in the sentence meaning has to apply to the individual. The latter is also achieved by the power of laksanā.

Some of the Naiyāyikas also accept the abhihitānvaya theory, but because according to them the primary meaning of a word is the particular qualified by the universal (jātivishāntavyakti), they do not have to depend on laksanā to get the sentence meaning. To get the syntactic relationship between the words, they cannot resort to laksanā, because they accept it only for words, not for a sentence. One of the Naiyāyikas, Jayanta Bhāṭṭa, proposed a new function of the sentence, tatparya, to account for the syntactically connected meaning.

The Prabhakaras stress the natural process by which children learn
their language. It is by watching language used and by witnessing the
activity of elders in daily life that children come to know the significance
of words. Through the substitution method they come to know the
meaning of words; this process is natural and subconscious. Later the
child comes to understand the meaning of even new sentences. But from
the world he knows that words are never used in isolation but have
meaning only in the context of a sentence. The constituent words in a
sentence convey meaning only as they are related to the sentence
meaning. Thus in the sentence “Bring the cow,” the word “cow”
means not the isolated concept cowness, but cow as related to the action
of bringing. So also the word “bring” means the action of bringing in
relation to the cow. The words themselves give their own meanings and
their syntactic relation, so the sentence meaning is directly conveyed by
the sentence.

This view is rejected by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka because of the fallacies
of interdependence and complexity. According to them we are able to
understand the individual meanings of words, even though we might
have learned them by hearing people uttering sentences and watching
their reaction. Unlike the words, the sentence does not have an indivi­
dual meaning of its own. When we hear a sentence, we have first an
understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after another;
then these word meanings are related on the basis of expectancy and
other factors, and we arrive at the unified meaning of the sentence as a
whole.

The association of the word meanings is brought about by laksanā,
according to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, but the Naiyāyikas explain it by resort­
ing to sansargamaryādā.

4. Sentence Sphoṭa

Bhartrhari identifies Brahman, the ultimate being, with the essence
of the speech principle; it is without beginning or end and indestructi­
ble. The entire world is an appearance (vivarta) of this speech principle.
Symbol and meaning are only two aspects of this speech essence. It is
the same speech essence that appears in the form of various ideas and
meanings on the one hand and their symbols—words and sentences—on
the other, and thus constitutes the phenomenal world. This speech
essence is of the nature of consciousness: though unchanging and part­
less, it appears to be evolutionary and pluralistic on the basis of its own
powers like time, which, though really identical with it, seems to be
different. The eternal, timeless speech principle appears to be changing
because of the working of the time factor. Time is an inherent power of
the absolute, but it is relatively independent and exerts its influence in
bringing about the other powers of the speech essence.
The basic principle of Bhartṛhari’s theory of language is that the complete utterance or the sentence is the unit of speech and should be considered as a single, unanalyzable entity. The utterance alone is valid with respect to actual language. The meaning of the utterance or sentence is also integral and indivisible and is of the nature of pratibhā, an intuitive flash of insight. This partless expression in the sentence sphaṭa manifests in a flash the integral meaning. Sequence and time factor do not really belong to the sentence but are unavoidable as means for revealing the sentence. Sentence sphaṭa as the expression (sabda) and pratibhā as the meaning (artha) are the basic factors in linguistic behavior.

In the speaker's mind before he begins to speak and in the listener's mind after hearing, this unity is clear. But because of our inability to communicate it in an instantaneous flash, the sentence has to be uttered as a sequence of words, each word in its turn being a definite sequence of phonemes or letters. If both the speaker and the listener are quite proficient in the language, as in the case of the mother tongue, they do not feel that they are uttering or hearing articulated sound-bits or words. The speaker utters the sentence and the listener hears it as a sentence. If the language proficiency is meagre, the listener may be hearing the words and trying to organize the meanings into a unit. If the hearer does not know the language, he will hear only a series of articulated sounds or mere sound bits. All analysis of the sentence into lesser meaningful elements such as the word, bases, and affixes may be a convenient fiction. It is true that Grammarians' main work is to analyze the utterance into its component parts in order to help the students understand the meaning, but they are aware that this linguistic analysis has no real validity except as a help to the students.

Even though the sphaṭa theory envisages different subdivisions of the sphaṭa, Bhartṛhari accepts only the sentence sphaṭa as the real unit of speech. Letters and words have only a pragmatic value, as useful units that build up higher units of speech, the sentence. The meaning of this single, indivisible utterance is pratibhā, a flash of insight, the real nature of which is indefinable. Its existence is ratified only in the individual's experience of it, and the experiencer himself cannot describe it adequately.

In the discussion of the sphaṭa theory it has been pointed out that the actual sounds uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener are the vaikṛta dhvani, containing many irrelevant, idiosyncratic, and non-linguistic elements. This vaikṛta dhvani reveals the prākṛta dhvani, which is the linguistically relevant phonematic pattern of the utterance, free from the variations in intonation, tempo, pitch, and so on, which do not affect the language. Of course in languages in which the tone or pitch or length is relevant, these factors will be part of the prākṛta dhvani itself.
In normal linguistic discourse both the speaker and the listener are conscious of the normal phonological or phonematic pattern only. All nonlinguistic matter is eliminated at this stage; but the time sequence is still present. It is this prākṛta dhvani that reveals gradually, phoneme by phoneme and word by word, the sentence sūkṣma, the integral linguistic symbol. The role of the phonemes (vāraṇa) is only to reveal the word sūkṣma and the role of the words to reveal the sentence sūkṣma. The smaller elements cannot, individually or collectively, reveal the integral unitary meaning directly because of their appearance in a temporal sequence, because of their not being associated with parts of the meaning; their role is to build up the higher unit until the sentence sūkṣma is revealed. This sentence sūkṣma gives forth instantaneously in a flash the meaning of the sentence.

Bhārtṛhari has stated that the speech principle (sabdabodha) has three stages in the course of its manifestation, namely paśyanti, madhyamā, and vaikhari. The vaikhari level corresponds to the vaikṛtadhwani of the sūkṣma theory and is the actualized and manifested speech, the sounds spoken by the speaker and heard by the listener. The madhyamā level seems to correspond to the prākṛta dhvani, because the linguistically relevant elements, including the sequence, are present in both. The next stage, paśyanti, has been identified with pratibhā indicated by the vākyasūkṣma. When we speak of the vākyasūkṣma as the meaning revealer and of pratibhā as the meaning, the two seem to be different; but actually they are only two aspects of the same entity. Whether Bhārtṛhari considered the Śabda Brahman as a level higher than the paśyanti is not certain, for scholars are not unanimous on this point. He says that grammar is the highest place for vāc in its threefold aspect—paśyanti, madhyamā, and vaikhari. That claim does not preclude the possibility of a higher level about which one cannot say anything. According to some scholars the paśyanti level has two aspects, the higher being also called parā paśyanti, at which all distinctions are obliterated.

Even though Bhārtṛhari considered the sentence to be the only unit of expression in actual life, he was fully conscious of the importance of linguistic analysis into words and other units as a useful means for understanding the languages. This awareness is apparent from the third book of the Vākyapadīya, where various problems are discussed on the basis of morphemes and phonemes that make up the sentence.

5. Śabdabodha

Indian thinkers on language belonging to the different schools of thought considered language behavior in a linguistic situation not only from the speaker's point of view but also from the listener's. The various
theories of śābdabodha or judgment consider the process of cognition of the sentence meaning from the listener’s point of view.

The modern technique of śābdabodha was developed and perfected by the school of Navya-Nyāya, founded by Gaṅgēśa about A.D. 1320 using technical terms for specifying the meaning of a sentence precisely and accurately. Literally the term śābdabodha means “verbal comprehension” or “verbal cognition”; it is used to indicate the meaning of a sentence as understood by the listeners. In modern works the term is used to refer to the linguistic paraphrase of the sentence, in which the exact denotation of each element in the sentence is clearly and precisely indicated. The śābdabodha approach of understanding a sentence meaning is intended to avoid syntactic ambiguity by specifying the exact relations among the various elements in a sentence. The vagaries of the sentence’s surface structure will be absent in the śābdabodha paraphrase, and the linguistic analysis at the syntactic level will become precise.

The śābdabodha approach of analyzing the meaning of a sentence is analogous to the deep-structure level in Noam Chomsky’s analysis of a sentence. He distinguishes between the surface level and the deep-structure level. The underlying relations between the elements of a sentence at the śābdabodha level need not always be the apparent relations at the surface level. Thus ghaṭasya nirmiṭīḥ, “making the pot,” and caitrasya nirmiṭīḥ, “creation by Cāitra,” though similar in Sanskrit at the surface level, have different śābdabodhas. The genitive case in the first phrase indicates the object of the verb, while in the second expression the genitive case indicates the agent; the former is ghaṭakarmikā nirmiṭīḥ, creation that has the pot as its object, but the latter is caitrakartṛkā nirmiṭīḥ, creation that has caitra as its agent.

The technique of śābdabodha was also adopted by later workers in the various other schools of thought. But on the basis of the difference in their basic assumptions there is difference in the emphasis, and the same sentence or expression has different śābdabodha paraphrases in the different schools, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Grammarians. They differ particularly about which element in a sentence should be regarded as predominant. The Logicians (the Naiyāyikas) are mainly interested in analyzing propositional sentences from a static point of view, so they consider the substantive (in the nominative case) to be the most important element. The Grammarians, as well as the early etymological schools, consider the sentence from the dynamic point of view and take the finite verb to be the most important element. The followers of the Mīmāṃsā school, mainly concerned with the interpretation of Vedic injunctions, try to analyze the implications of imperative sentences. The same Sanskrit sentence may be interpreted differently at the deep-structure level in the śābdabodha by the different schools of thought, because they differ in their basic standpoints.
The sentence *caitrah ghaṭam karoti,* "Citra makes a pot," will be interpreted by the Grammarians as "ekatvāvacchinnacaitrakartkāḥ ekatvāvacchinnaghaṭakarmakaḥ vartamānakālakaḥ kāraṇavyāpāraḥ," the operation or activity of making, in the present tense, which has Citra in the singular number as its agent and pot in the singular number as its object. To the Naiyāyika or the logician the same sentence will mean "ghaṭakarmakārāṇakṛtman caitraḥ," Citra who has the activity of making which has pot as its object. These interpretations could be further elaborated by pointing out all the implications of the sentence. The passive sentence "caitraṇa ghaṭah kriyate" (a pot is being made by Citra) could be analyzed in the same way, because from the *śādabodha* point of view there is little difference in meaning between the active sentence and its passive form, according to the Grammarians. The Naiyāyikas, however, make a clear distinction between the two.

Among ancient writers neither Pāṇini nor Gautama was interested in discussing the sentence. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says in his *Nyāyamañjari* that the absence of any reference to the sentence in the *Nyāyasūtras* shows that the early Naiyāyikas considered the sentence to be merely a combination of words. Among Indian Grammarians it was Kātyāyana who first defined a sentence as *ekatiḥ,* that which has one finite verb. Pāṇini seems to have held the view that a sentence may contain more than one finite verb, for his rule *tiṇ atiṇaḥ* ordains the acute accent to a verb when it follows a nonverb (in a sentence). Later Grammarians have also accepted such sentences. Strictly from the formal surface-level approach, as advocated by Kātyāyana, such a sentence may be considered a complex sentence made up of two sentences, but at the deep-structure level, from the semantic point of view, they constitute a single sentence.

We have already seen that the Mīmāṃsakas first promulgated and the other schools later accepted the theory that the writing of the sentence is based on the three factors of mutual expectancy or interdependence of the meanings of the words in it, compatibility or absence of incompatibility, and proximity. The Mīmāṃsakas considered mutual expectancy to be psychological, while the Logicians and Grammarians took it to be syntactical. Between the two schools of Mīmāṃsā, the Bhaṭṭa and the Prābhākara, there is difference in view about the factors involved in an injunctive sentence. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, every command to do something raises three questions: What should be done? How is it to be done? and Who is to do it? A command or law should be obeyed because it is a law, not because of any profit motive or fear of punishment. Kumārila’s view was that nobody would act without a purpose. According to the two schools of Mīmāṃsā, every complete sentence must satisfy these basic psychological requirements,
The Mīmāṃsā schools held that the finite verb is the central element in a sentence. It consists of two elements: the verbal root (ḍhātu) and the verbal suffix (pratyaya). Of these two, the Mīmāṃsakas held that the verbal suffix is semantically more important than the root. The verbal suffix denotes bhāvanā or the efficient force, which is defined as that activity which brings something into being, "bhavitur bhāvanukū-laḥ bhāvakavyāparaviśeṣaḥ," the operation of the operator conducive to the production of the result. Bhāvanā in turn is of two kinds: sābdi bhāvanā and ārthi bhāvanā. The injunctive sentence induces the hearer to perform some action, which is denoted by the optative suffix līn; this type is the sābdi bhāvanā. The ārthi bhāvanā is based on it and is the activity of the agent that leads to the result. In the Bhāvanāviveka, Maṇḍana Miśra defines bhāvanā as the absence of inactivity in general (audāśinyavichittisāmānyarūpa).

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas accepted individual words and their independent meanings. The Bhāṭṭa schools accepted the abhihitānvaya theory of verbal comprehension, according to which the words in a sentence escape their isolated meanings and the syntactic connection among them is found through secondary meaning. The Prabhākara school held that the words themselves conveyed their individual meanings and the syntactic relation (the anvitābhidhāna theory). The Nyāya school espoused the association theory of verbal comprehension and held that the syntactic connection among word meanings is obtained through the sansargamāryādā, the power of mutual association.

In nilo ghaṭaḥ, "a black pot", the syntactic relation between the two word meanings is identity; it is conveyed through the power of association, called sansargamāryādā by the Logicians. It is not directly conveyed by any element in the sentence. If the underlying syntactic relation between the elements in a sentence is conveyed through some morphemic element in the surface structure itself, it is called prakāra. Thus in the phrase dhānyena dhanavān, "possessed of wealth in the form of grains," the relation of identity of dhānyya and dhana is conveyed by the instrumental ending ena (dhānyābhinnadhanavān). Thus a distinction is made between the two types, one in which the syntactic relation is inherent in the constituent elements and the other in which this relation is absent and has to be found through implication or suggestion.

Every verbal root consists of two elements: phala, "the result," and vyāpāra, "an activity." Thus the meaning of every root can be analyzed as a kind of activity producing some result. Thus pac, "to cook," means vikliṭhyānukūla vyāpāra, an activity conducive to the softening. In a transitive sentence the activity pertains to the agent (karti) and the result of the operation accrues to the object.

In this chapter and the preceding ones we have shown how the
Grammarians developed a consistent system for handling technical grammatical issues as well as epistemology and metaphysics. True to the Indian tradition, the philosophy of Grammar has shown itself to be both a means of theoretical knowledge and a spiritual discipline leading to mokṣa or release. The Grammarians began simply with the investigations of words, of how to manipulate and acquire them. But this systematic study of overt speech led to an awareness of higher and higher levels of language until the Word Absolute, Śabda Brahman, was discovered. From this metaphysical perspective, Śabda Brahman is the underlying principle of unity that makes possible all diversity.

For the philosophy of Grammar, the division of speech into words and letters is a convenient fiction made for pedagogical purposes, to teach words with precision and economy of effort. The basic division of sentences into words and words into bases (nouns and verb roots) with their respective suffixes is seen to be phenomenal and not ultimately real. A clear analysis of a hierarchy of levels of language is offered from overt or vaikhari speech to internal or madhyamā speech, with all of these levels being preceded logically by a more unitary stage, paśyantī, in which there is no sequence of words but just a glimpse of the separation of word and meaning—the intentionality of the primordial urge to express oneself. All of these concepts presuppose a unitary ground out of which distinction is manifested. This ground is called Śabda Brahman because the approach to this Absolute (Brahman) and the manifestation of it is through words (śabda).

The philosophical analysis of language offered in the Grammarians' literature that follows is not just a logical exercise to satisfy intellectual curiosity, but an earnest and sustained spiritual approach to identify oneself with the ground of all speech phenomena, Śabda Brahman.

The philosophy of Grammar sees itself finally as a straight pathway to ultimate freedom (mokṣaṇamām ajihmā rājapaddhatiḥ).
PART TWO

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE OF GRAMMARIAN PHILOSOPHY
The earliest available literature, the *Rg Veda*, contains glowing tributes to the power of speech. To the Vedic seers, who were facing the problem of communicating their mystic experiences, language was naturally an object of wonder and reverence. Many of the later philosophical theories on language may be seen in a subtle form in the Vedic literature itself. There are three hymns that deal mainly with divine Speech (*Vāc*): the *Aṣyavāmiya* hymn (1.164), which is one of the most philosophical hymns of the *Rg Veda*, but full of difficult symbols; 10.71 on the origin of language, which has been subjected to a great deal of interpretation by later Grammarians; and 10.125, where the Goddess of Speech, Vāgambhirṇī, herself describes her power and functions. (These follow paraphrases of these three hymns.)

*Aṣyavāmiya* Hymn

The seer Dirghatamas asks the question: "I ask thee about the ultimate abode of speech," and answers "the ultimate abode of speech is this Brahman."

The place of *Vāc* is at the peak of the universe. "On the top of yonder sky, they say, is *Vāc*, who knows all, but does not enter all" (verse 10).

*Vāc* has been divided into four parts. Those Brahmins with insight know them. Three parts that are hidden in the cave, the mortals do not activate. They speak only the fourth part (verse 45).1

The seer Dirghatamas tells us that *Vāc*, like a bull, lowed and thus fashioned the tumultuous, chaotic floods (verse 41). But she had also
produced the *akṣara*, the permanent syllable with which the chaotic material was to be organized. She taught it to Agni.

*Vāc* possessed the *akṣara* of the *Ṛg* (verses 39, 42), who possesses a thousand *akṣaras*.

The same *Vāc* is described by the Brahmins by different names: Agni, Yama, and Mātarīśvān (verse 46).

*Vāc* is also identified with the river Sarasvatī. In the Brāhmaṇas the two are equated: “Your inexhaustible breast, Sarasvatī, a source of delight with which you cause all the choicest things to flourish, which grants treasure, bestows wealth, confers good food—present that here to be sucked” (verse 49).

*Rg Veda* 10.71

*Bṛhaspati!* When they came forth to establish the first beginning of language, setting up names, what has been hidden in them as their best and purest good became manifest through love. (1)

When the sages fashioned language with their thought, filtering it like parched grain through a sieve, friends recognized their friends. Their beauty is marked on their language. (2)

They traced the course of language through ritual; they found it embodied in the seers. They gained access to it and distributed it widely; the seven chanter cheered them. (3)

Many who look do not see language, many who listen do not hear her. She reveals herself like a loving and well-adorned wife to her husband, only to some. (4)

Although all the friends have eyes and ears, their mental intuitions are uneven. Some are like shallow ponds, which reach up to the mouth or armpit; others are like ponds that are fit for bathing. (7)

Here the contrast between the two types of people is clearly indicated—those who see *Vāc* and understand her and those who see the form but do not understand her. The Vedic seers were not claiming to be composers of the hymns, rather the seers of an eternal, impersonal truth.

*Rg Veda* 10.125

Here *Vāc* is a personal deity.

I travel with the Rudras and the Vasus, the Ādityas and the Viśvedevāḥ. Both Varuṇa and Mitra do I support, Indra, Agni, and the Āśvins. (1)

I am the sustainer and nourisher of Soma, Tvaṣṭr, Pūṣan, and Bhaga. I bestow wealth on the zealous patron of the sacrifice who makes the oblation and presses the Soma. (2)

I am the queen, the gatherer of treasures, the one with penetrating perception, the first of those who should be worshipped. The gods have
distributed me manifoldly and caused (the chants) to enter many places. (3)

I am the one through whose māyā everyone sees, breathes, and hears. (4)

I am the lone speaker of welcoming words for the feast to the gods and men. Whoever is my favorite, him I make powerful, a true knower of the mystic power, a ṛṣi and an intelligent man. (5)

I stretch the bow for Rudra so that his arrow may reach the hater of religion and destroy him. I rouse the battle fury for the people. I have penetrated heaven and earth. (6)

I breathe like the wind supporting all the worlds. Beyond the sky, beyond this earth so great have I become by my might. (8)

The Vedic seers believed that metaphysical knowledge can be had through transcendental vision by the exercise of mental concentration. It is a sort of intuition. The source of all true knowledge is Vāc, who may communicate it to whomsoever she favors.

Rg Veda 1.164.37 deals with the question of man’s self-knowledge. “What This is I know not (what I am in reality I know not). Shackled in mind, I move about. As the first born of ṛta has approached me, then I got a portion of that Vāc.” This first born of ṛta is Agni; Agni possesses a part of Vāc, has a function in the cosmos, and is immortal.

Here Vāc must be clearly understood as Logos, and its connection with self-knowledge is a seminal thought already exhibited by this text. Furthermore, its connection with ṛta is significant, because the latter stands for the regularity, invariability, and consistency of such paramount importance in the Logos insofar as it is the ratio that goes with it. The idea that the imperishable Vāc (Word/Logos) is the first born of ṛta shows up again in the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa 2.8.8.5 (“Vāg aṃ śaram prathamajā ṛtasya”). Now the question about Vāc and the question about the self are not associated with each other accidentally, for, on the contrary, that they are related at the greatest depth becomes evident in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads.

Cows are often used as symbols for Vāc. Ancient texts on etymology and interpretation inform us that “cow” stands for speech. The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (5.8.1) says that “one should meditate on speech as a milk-cow.”

The deity Vāc was identified with Sarasvatī in the Atharva Veda (5.7.5) as Vāc Sarasvatī; also in the Brāhmaṇas. In the Rg Veda, Sarasvatī is an earthly river, 1.164; 49 foreshadows the later identification.

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Vedas is that the two aspects of Vāc, which may be distinguished as the revealing word and the word in invocation (or recitation), are at root the same. The integrity of these two is quite significant in the way the Logos functions in the Vedas. And it is because Vāc as the Logos is the basis of the ratio
that ratiocination has the potential to act as the open door to truth (satya), though by itself it can never realize its own potentiality. But this frustrating incapacity of ratiocination teaches a positive lesson too, namely, that as thinking (manana) it is dependent on, and follows, the hearing (śravaṇa) of the Vāc and that it also leads the way to the deeper thinking called nididhyāsana. The primary complement to the mystery of self-revelation, indeed to the very concrete possibility of it, is the other mystery, namely, that of the release of truth the invoking word signifies. With both these, man’s power to know encounters its own transcendence. The unfolding of all these hidden dimensions takes place in the Upaniṣads.

_Atharva Veda_

Stanzas 1–47 of _Rg Veda_ 1.164 are reproduced with some variations, omissions, and additions in _Atharva Veda_ as hymns 9.9 (_Rg Veda_, 1–22) and 9.10 (_Rg Veda_ 23–47). Stanzas 48–52 of _Rg Veda_ 1.164 are omitted. It may mean that _Rg Veda_ 1.164 is a blend of two hymns originally separate.

_Upaniṣads_

Equating of Brahman with speech is also found in the Upaniṣadic literature.

“Speech, truly, is Brahman” (“Vāg vai brahmeti”, _Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad_, 4.1.2). Here Brahman is defined as one reality, without a second, which is identical with speech.

The _Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad_ (3.3) tries to link this absolute, which is unspeakable, with the speakable through speech itself “by creating the deeply meaningful symbol of _āum_ which traversing the phenomenal levels of consciousness, waking, dreaming, and deep, sleep reaches out beyond to the transcendent where the sound itself comes to an end.” Brahman, identical with speech, is also identical with _āum_. Just as leaves are held together by a stalk, so is all speech held together by _āum_ (_Chāndogya Upaniṣad_ 2.23.3).

The supersensuous vision of Vāc is the ultimate experience of the Real. For the Upaniṣadic seers this intuition of the self has an internal, rather than an external, focus in its symbolic expression.

Uddālaka’s teaching in the Sadvidyā passage of _Chāndogya Upaniṣad_ refers to the role of Vāc or language in the manifestation of the world (“Vācārāmbhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam,” 6.1.3). In clay products clay alone is the real (satya), while the product such as a pot or a bowl is the creation of Vāc in its dual role of name and form (nāmarūpa), the appearances. Vāc represents Brahman as the powerful and creative word.
There are several ancient statements quoted in Bhrtyhari's *vytti* on his *Vākyapadīya* proclaiming the greatness of the goddess of speech. Many of them have not been identified. It is *Vāc* alone that created the entire universe; the immortal and mortal—all came from *Vāc*. It is *Vāc* that sees objects, that talks about them; *Vāc* alone brings objects together; it is through *Vāc* that the world becomes many, that one reality transforms itself into many.

This attitude of high appreciation of language finds its echo in the words of Danḍin in the *Kāvyādarśa* (1.3): "The entire world would have been plunged in darkness, if the light in the form of language had not been shining throughout."

It may, however, be noted that Upaniṣadic seers have at times spoken also about the absolute reality as being beyond the range of language and mind, to point out the inadequacy of language to reveal Reality fully and clearly; for example, "From which the words, as well as the mind, return unable to approach it."

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**Vedāṅgas**

There are six *Vedāṅgas* or auxiliary sciences in the study of the Vedas; *śīkṣā* (phonetics), *vyākaraṇa* (grammar), *chandas* (meter), *nirukta* (etymology), *kalpa* (rubrics about rites and rituals), and *jyotisa* (astronomy/astrology). The first four are linguistic disciplines and the other two are nonlinguistic. Phonetics, grammar, and meter are traditionally assigned the task of safeguarding the sound aspect of the words in the Vedas, keeping the oral tradition intact. *Nirukta* is concerned with the correct interpretation of the words of the Vedic text, and it goes hand in hand with *vyākaraṇa*. Yāska says that a knowledge of grammar is a prerequisite to the study of *nirukta*. The validity of *nirukta* is based on the fact that it follows from a long tradition from the Brāhmaṇas themselves.

Like the *śīkṣās*, the *prātiṣākhya*ṣ were also devoted to the preservation of the correct pronunciation for the texts of the Vedic *mantras* and did their work with meticulous care, prescribing rules for prosody, phonetics, accentuation, and the rules of euphonic combination. The term indicates that it is a practical handbook for each school of the Vedas. There is a maxim that in case of conflict between the *śīkṣā* and the *prātiṣākhya*, the *prātiṣākhya* is to be followed.

While *vyākaraṇa* deals with linguistic analysis to determine the exact form of words, *nirukta* is concerned with linguistic analysis of the words to get the proper meaning of the words in the context. *Nirukta* emphasizes the derivation of difficult and apparently unanalyzable terms. The *Uṇādisūtras* take an intermediate standpoint and try to analyze irregular terms, using to a great extent Pāṇini's technique.
The earliest attempts at the interpretation of Vedic mantras is found in the Brāhmaṇas themselves, though not in a systematic manner. Explaining the ritualistic background and pointing out the esoteric significance underlying the rituals, they led the way for the ritualistic (adhiyajña) and metaphysical (adhyātma) interpretations of the Vedas, though the emphasis is on the former. In his Nirukta Yāska refers to the ancient view that the mantras of the Rg Veda admit of a threefold interpretation—from the point of view of the performance of religious rites (adhiyajña), with reference to the deities (adhidevā), and with reference to the soul (adhyātman). There was also a fourth way of interpreting the Vedas, the historical or aitihāsika, considering that the gods mentioned in the text are individuals figuring in legends and narratives. It is generally accepted that a text need not have an absolute single meaning. The Vedic poets like ellipses, double meanings, and obscurities. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (6.1.1.2) says that the gods like subtle ways (“parokṣapriyā hi devatāḥ”).

The Brhaddevatā, another ancient tool of Vedic exegesis, ascribed to Śaunaka, contains some discussions about language. At 11.117, it says that a sentence is a collection of words, a word is a collection of phonemes. And at 11.118, it says that the meaning of Vedic passages has to be understood with the help of contextual factors: the purpose to be served (artha), the subject matter under discussion (prakaraṇa), an indication from another place (liṅga), propriety, the place, and the time. This requirement applies even to ordinary sentences.
PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN YĀSKA’S NIRUKTA

K. Kunjunni Raja

The *Nirukta*¹ by Yāska (fifth century B.C.) is a commentary on the *Nighaṇṭu* or collection of Vedic words, discussing the etymology in context. *Nirukta* is one of the *Vedāṅgas* or ancillaries to the study of the Vedas. Yāska is generally considered to be earlier than Pāṇini; but Paul Thieme holds that Yāska knew Pāṇini’s work.² Cardona thinks that it is better to leave open the question of priority of one over the other.³

Yāska follows a long tradition in the Brāhmaṇas of giving the etymological explanation of words. Critics who find some of his etymologies fanciful forget this fact. He wanted etymology to work hand in hand with grammar. He stressed the importance of considering the context while explaining the meaning and etymology of words. The same word could be derived and explained in different ways to suit different contexts.

Yāska’s Definitions of the Verb and the Noun

“A verb is chiefly concerned with bhāva, whereas nouns have sattva as the chief element in their meaning.”⁴ The term bhāva is derived from the root bhū, meaning “to become,” and the term sattva is derived from the root as, meaning “to be.” These two roots, as and bhū, are almost synonymous and mean “to exist.”

*Nirukta* 1.2 refers with approval to the view of Vārṣāyaṇi that there are six modes for this bhāva or “becoming.” Vārṣāyaṇi says that there are six modes for bhāva: a thing comes into existence, exists, changes, grows, decays, and ceases to exist.⁵ One of these modes, “exists” (asti) is derived from the same root as sattva, hence there is a possibility of confusion.
Bhartṛhari explains that reality (sattā), when it appears in a temporal sequence in various particular things, is called kriyā or bhāva and, when viewed without any such temporal sequence, is called sattva. Thus, sattva and bhāva are two aspects of the same existence seen from the static and the dynamic points of view, respectively. Yāska himself has suggested the same by saying, “The verb indicates the action, which takes place in a temporal sequence.” And Patañjali says that even verbal nouns have the static element predominating their meaning.

Audumbarāyana’s Theory

“It is the statement as a whole that is regularly present in the perceptive faculty of the hearer.” According to the interpretation of this passage, Audumbarāyana and Vārṭtākṣa held the view that it is only the sentence that is really found in the minds of the speaker and the listener; therefore, the fourfold classification of words into nouns (nāman), verbs (ākhyāta), prepositions (upasarga), and particles (nipāta) has no absolute validity. Audumbarāyana’s theory is considered the forerunner of Bhartṛhari’s sphota theory.

Derivation of Nouns from Verbal Roots

The fundamental assumption of the etymologist was that nouns were derived from verbal roots. Yāska generally subscribed to this view, and we find in his Nirukta the tendency, often mechanical, to derive words from imaginary roots, as in the case of pumān from pums. Śakatāyana, to whom one tradition ascribed the Unadisūtras and who is mentioned by both Pāṇini and Yāska, seems to have been a staunch advocate of this theory. But Gārgya and some of the Grammarians held a more sober view that it is not possible to trace all nouns to verbal roots.

Following Gārgya, Yāska discussed the pros and cons of this problem. If all nouns are derived from verbal roots that denote action, on the one hand every object will have as many names as the actions with which it is associated, and on the other hand each noun can be applied to as many objects as are associated with an action indicated by that verbal root. Thus the term alva, “a horse,” derived from the root at, “to move,” would have to be applied to a camel as well, and for a pillar that stands upright fixed to a hole and joins a beam, different names indicating these different aspects would have to be applied. Yāska's explanation of this problem is that the words are used naturally (svabhāvatah). Language designates things in an incomplete manner; it can choose only one of the many activities associated with an object. Incidentally, this discussion also indicates the explanation for the presence of synonyms and homonyms in language.

Yāska accepts the general rules that all nominal forms are to be
derived from verbal roots and that in deriving words proper attention should be paid to accent, grammatical formation, and meaning. The particular rules mentioned are the following:

(1) A nominal form is to be derived from a verbal root that has the sense of that act which solely belongs to the thing denoted by the noun in such a way that its accent and formation are based on rules of grammar, for example, kāraka from ky.

(2) When the current meaning of a word does not agree with the meaning of the root apparent in it and when its nominal form cannot be developed in the ordinary manner from the root by the rules of grammar, one should take one's stand on the general meaning only and explain the word through its resemblance to the verbal or nominal form of a root with the related meaning. For example, hasta, "a hand," should be derived not from has, "to laugh" apparent in it, but from han, "to strike" because the hand is quick at striking.

(3) When there is no resemblance between a word and any form of a root that has its meaning, the resemblance or community of even a single letter (vowel or consonant) should be the basis of etymology.

(4) Even inflected case forms may be adjusted to the meaning.

(5) Similarly, secondary (taddhita) derivatives (formed by adding suffixes to nouns) and compounds (whether of two or more members) should be broken down into their component elements and the component elements explained. One should never give up the attempt at derivation ("na tveva na nirbruyāt").

Secondary Meaning (Laksanā)

Yāska knew that in etymology the semantic aspect is as important as the phonetic aspect; a word may be applied to a thing through similarity of meaning as well, through metaphoric transfer. He was also aware of onomatopoeia (śabdānukṛtya) as a factor in the naming of some birds, such as kāka; also dundubhi is derived similarly. But he does not mention secondary meaning (laksanā) explicitly.

Yāska's aim was to explain Vedic words in the contexts of the Vedic passages themselves; hence to suit the contexts he gave different derivations for the same word as it occurred in different contexts. Meaning was the principal element to which other elements were subordinated. Yāska was concerned mainly with the primary sense of words and did not pay much attention to the importance of metaphoric meaning. Thus the term asura referring to the gods and the same term referring to the demons are differently derived; he does not consider that the latter sense is through pejorative tendency. It may be noted here that even Pāṇini did not recognize metaphoric transfer as an extension of the primary sense, and he gave separate enumeration of the use of the container for the contained among the meanings of the nominative case,
Classification of Words

Yāska divided Sanskrit words into four parts of speech: noun, verb, preposition, and particle. A verb is concerned with dynamic activity involving the time factor, while nouns represent static things.\textsuperscript{12} Sarvanāman (pronouns) are also recognized. Regarding prepositions, Yāska says that Śākaṭāyana held the view that a preposition detached from the verb has no meaning, that it is only suggestive (dyotaka). Gārgya held the opposite view, that prepositions do have a meaning. Yāska seems to have agreed with Gārgya, for he enumerates twenty prepositions together with their meanings.
Pāṇini’s Asṭādhyāyī of the fifth century B.C. is a complete grammar of the Sanskrit language, including the Vedic language. In eight chapters, each subdivided into four pādas, it contains about four thousand rules in sūtra style, preceded by abbreviation rules grouping the phonemes of Sanskrit. The sūtras refer to groups of verbal roots (dhātu) and of nominal bases (gana), hence the dhatupātha and the ganapātha form adjuncts to the work. It is believed that meanings were attached to the roots later by Bhāmasena and did not form part of the original. The Unadīsūtras as they survive today are not Pāṇini’s.

Pāṇini refers to ten earlier authorities, most of them presumably grammarians. He also refers to differences in the usage of words by people in different parts of India (“northerners,” “easterners,” and so on). Considerable thought had been devoted before Pāṇini to phonological and grammatical statements. On the basis of all of these and his own observations of the language, Pāṇini composed the Asṭādhyāyī, which remains a monumental work, even now, as a model of descriptive grammar.

Cultural Usage of Language

Pāṇini uses the term bhāsa (speech) for the Sanskrit spoken by the cultured and educated people (śiṣṭa). They are the final authority in the case of language, says Patañjali, who points out the importance of cultivated usage in many places.

Pāṇini (or Kātyāyana) says that the authority of the popular usage of words (anyāna) must supersede the authority of the meaning dependent on derivation. The meanings of words (the relations between
word (*ṭabda*) and meaning (*arthā*) are also established by popular usage.\(^4\)

**Derivation of Nouns from Verbal Roots**

Pāṇini generally accepts the view that verbal roots are the basic units to which affixes are added. But he does not accept Śākaṭāyana's view that all nouns are derivable from verbal roots. The *Unādisūtras*, explaining the derivation of irregular nouns from verbal roots, are not Pāṇini's, though Pāṇini was aware of such attempts (3.3.1, 3.4.75). Patanjali refers to such irregular nouns as nonderivable nominal bases.\(^6\) Pāṇini seems to accept Gārgya's view that it is not possible to derive all nouns from verbal roots.\(^6\)

**Syntax**

Pāṇini is mainly concerned with the formation of correct words. But syntax is not completely excluded. His system implies a sentence analysis, and his discussion of compound formations is based on syntactic considerations.

Rule 2.1.1 is *samārthataḥ padavidhiḥ*, "an operation involving two or more words (*padas*) applies only to such words as are syntactically and semantically related." The term *samarthya* is explained by Patanjali and Kātyāyana as implying unity of semantic function (*ekarthibhava*) and mutual syntactic connection (*parasparā vyāpeksā*).

Thus Pāṇini's concept of a sentence seems to be almost the same as that of Jaimini, whose *Mimamsāsūtra* defines it thus: "A group of words serving a single purpose forms a sentence if on analysis the separate words are found to have mutual expectancy."\(^7\)

Of the three conditions of syntactic unity for a sentence, namely, mutual expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), phonetic contiguity (*sannidhi*), and semantic fitness (*yogyātā*), the first two are tacitly accepted by Pāṇini but not the third. Pāṇini does not make any provision for an utterance derived by his rules to be semantically appropriate; even deviant and semantically unacceptable sentences can be grammatically correct.

Pāṇini does not define a sentence (*vākya*). Kātyāyana's definition (*ekatī vākyam*), "a sentence is that collection of words having one finite verb," does not seem to reflect Pāṇini's view. Pāṇini's rule "an item terminating in a verbal ending (*tin*) has no high pitched vowel, after an item that terminates in an ending other than a verbal ending (*tin atīnāḥ*)" (8.1.28), shows that Pāṇini accepted the possibility of a finite verb preceded by another finite verb in the same sentence.\(^8\)

**Laksana or Secondary Meaning**

Pāṇini sanctions the nominative case ending not only for the nominal stem notion (*pratipādika*) but also for indicating the additional notions
of gender, measure and number. The rule reads: "The nominative ending is to be added when there is nothing but the nominal stem notion, nothing but the gender, nothing but the measure, nothing but the number" (2.3.46).

From the discussion of the term "measure" (parimāṇa) in this rule by later writers it is clear that Pāṇini wanted to justify the nominative ending in transferred uses such as that of the container for the contained. Jinendrabuddhi explains that the term parimāṇa here is an indicator (upalaksana) of other transferred senses, as in "the boy is a lion" (śīnho māṇavakaḥ). The term "measure" sanctions use of the nominative in cases like "a measure of grain" (prastho vrihiḥ), in which there is the additional notion of being measured by; hence even in cases like "the Brāhmaṇa is fire," in which the additional notion of "similarity to the fire" is to be indicated, the nominative ending is justified. From the preceding it is clear that Pāṇini did not accept secondary meaning as a separate function of words, for otherwise there was no need to include measure in the sūtra.

Explaining the sūtra 1.4.42, sādhakatamāṃ karaṇam ("karaṇa is that instrument which is the most immediate one in accomplishing action"), Patañjali says that the use of the superlative tama here is to indicate that the rules relating to the case endings (kāraka) may be applied even in extended cases, not only to those expressly stated but also to those implied thereby. Thus instances of implied usages of secondary meaning could also come under the scope of that sūtra. For example, proximity can be one of the implied meanings of the locative case, and gaṅgāyāṁti gāvaḥ, "cows on the Ganges," can come under the purview of the rule governing the locative.

Reference and Use

The dual function of an expression to refer to both its own form and its meaning is noted by Pāṇini. Rule 1.1.68 ("svaṁ rūpaṁ śabdasyā-śabdasaṁjñā") states that in his grammatical text an expression serves to denote itself unless it is a technical term.

In ordinary language a word normally refers to its meaning unless it is a quotation; and usually to indicate that it is a quotation the word iti (thus) is added at the end of the word quoted. But in grammatical metalanguage, a word normally refers to its own form except when it is a technical term. The rule agner dhak (4.3.23) introduces dhak eva after the term agni; the suffix is applied to the form agni and obviously not to its meaning (or synonyms). When iti is added to an expression in a rule, the preceding refers to the meaning and not to the form; thus in na vēti vibhāṣā the sanctioning option applies to the meaning "or not" and not to the form na vā.
PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN
PATAÑJALI’S MAHĀBHĀSYA

K. Kunjunni Raja

Patañjali’s *Mahābhāsyā* of the second century B.C. is an extensive
discussion of select rules from Pāṇini and Kātyāyana’s comments on
them given in his *vārttikas*. It is not a full commentary on Pāṇini’s
*Aṣṭādhyāyī*. It incorporates Kātyāyana’s *vārttikas*; it also contains
*vārttika*-like statements in verse (called *śloka-vārttikas*). It is an elaborate
commentary that analyzes each rule into its components, adding
items necessary to the understanding of the rule, giving examples and
counterexamples illustrating how the rule operates and discussing the
need for the *vārttikas* to bring out the full significance of Pāṇini’s *sūtra*
or to account for usages apparently not covered by the rule or against
the rule. Both Kātyāyana and Patañjali wanted to test the validity
and consistency of the rules. Some scholars have suggested that histo­
rical changes in Sanskrit are responsible for Kātyāyana’s comments
that modify and correct Pāṇini. Patañjali often presents arguments to
support or reject several views, leaving it difficult to know his “finally
accepted view” (*siddhānta*).

As far as the philosophical ideas are concerned, Patañjali seems to
have been influenced by Vyādi’s *Samgraha*, which is not extant; he
quotes many ideas from the *Samgraha* with approval. Most of the philo­
sophical ideas are found in the introductory section.

*Śabda* and *Artha*

Patañjali discusses whether the relation between a linguistic item
(*śabda*) and its meaning (*artha*) is permanent or the invention of
someone. A linguistic item, according to the grammarian, is not merely
the sound but that unit (or symbol) which, when articulated, brings
about the notion of the thing meant.¹
"What is the word 'cow'? It is that by means of which, when uttered, there arises the understanding of creatures with dewlap, tail, hump, hooves, and horns." The commentators have made it clear that the term "uttered" (uccarita) is used in the sense of "revealed" or brought to light (abhivyaktā). Thus Patañjali lays special emphasis on the fact that a linguistic item is a word only when it has a meaning. This concept contradicts the Mimāṃsā view that an aggregate of letters, when manifested, is a linguistic utterance, even when there is no meaning or when the meaning is not understood.

A linguistic item is considered eternal and not capable of being newly produced. Patañjali says that one goes to a potter requesting him to make a pot so that one may use it; but one does not go to a grammarian with the request to make new words so that one may use them. A distinction is made between absolute eternality (kūṭastha nityatā) and the permanence of the items as used through generations by speakers (pravāhanītyatā). Bhartrhari distinguishes between normal permanent words in a language (ajñānīka) and modern technical terms coined by writers like Pāṇini (ādhunīka).

Regarding the meaning of a word, the problem discussed is whether it is the universal (jāti) or the individual (dravya). According to Patañjali, Pāṇini accepted both as meanings, and in either case "meaning" refers to something permanent.

The relation between linguistic item and meaning is established (siddha) and is known from the usage of educated people.

Are Letters Meaningful?

On the one hand, letters may be said to be meaningful, because meaning can be understood from verbal roots, stems, suffixes, or particles that consist of a single letter, and also because the substitution of a different letter can produce a different meaning, while the absence of a letter may make it impossible to understand the meaning of a word. On the other hand, it may also be said that letters are meaningless in themselves, because a meaning is not understood by the hearer from each letter separately. Patañjali does not give any final answer to this question. Unlike Bhartrhari, Patañjali did not consider the word to be an indivisible and timeless symbol, apart from the letters that are revealed when the word is uttered.

The Primary Meaning of a Word

Patañjali discusses the problem of whether the primary meaning of a nominal word is the particular substantive or the universal essential attribute. Among grammarians Vyādi, author of the Samgraha, held that a word primarily denotes a substance (dravya), while Vājapyāyana
held the Mīmāṃsaka view that it is the universal (jāti) that forms the primary meaning of a word.\(^7\)

Patañjali says that according to Pāṇini the primary meaning of a word is both the universal and the particular, for sūtra 1.2.58\(^8\) is based on the view that a word means the universal, while sūtra 1.2.64\(^9\) is based on the assumption that a word means a particular.\(^10\) Helārāja says that according to the school of Pāṇini a word means both the universal and the particular.\(^11\)

Bhartṛhari discusses elaborately the various problems involved in these two views and concludes that whether the meaning of a word is the universal or the substance it is something real and permanent. Patañjali has also defined an “individual” (dravya) as that which does not lose its essence when different qualities come to inhere in it.\(^12\)

**Perception of a Temporal Series**

Patañjali and Kātyāyana discuss the problem of how a word can be grasped as a whole, if the different sounds come one after another in the exact order in which they are uttered, and there is not a single moment in which all of the sounds are perceived together.\(^13\)

Taking the example of the word for cow, gauḥ, he says, “When the speech is in g, it cannot be in au and h; when it is in au, it cannot be in g and h, and when it is in h, it cannot be in g and au. ... Each letter requires a special effort to produce it, and it disappears as the effort is changed to produce the next letter.”\(^14\)

Patañjali solves the problem thus: even though the letters cannot coexist at the time of utterance, they can do so in the mind of the speaker as well as in that of the listeners; the sequence of the letters is also to be grasped in the mind on the basis of the meaning.\(^15\) Patañjali does not discuss the problem in detail; but he says that the simultaneous grasping of the word as a whole is somehow effected in the mind, even though the letters that make it up are pronounced separately.

**Patañjali’s View of the Sphoṭa**

Patañjali distinguishes between sphoṭa and dhvani. The former is the permanent element in the word and may be considered the essential word, while the latter is the actualized and ephemeral element and an attribute of the former.\(^16\)

The sphoṭa as described by Patañjali may be a single letter or a fixed pattern of letters. It is the norm: it remains constant and is not affected by the peculiarities of the individual speakers. Even when pronounced by different speakers with different tempos its linguistic value is the same. The absolute vowel length and the individual peculiarities of the particular instances are the sounds (dhvani) and depend on the individuality of the speaker and on the effort with which the words are
uttered. The *sphoṭa* is permanent and unchanging and is manifested by the ephemeral sounds uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener, which are analogous to Bhartrhari's *prākṛta* sound and *vaikṛta* sound.

This distinction is supposed to have been made by Vyādi, author of the *Samgraha. Vākyapadiya* 1.77,17 defining the two types of sounds, is ascribed to Vyādi by commentators. According to this account, *prākṛta* sound (=Patañjali's *sphoṭa*) causes the perception of letters, and *vaikṛta* sound (=Patañjali's *dhvani*) causes the differences in speed of utterance.

Kātyāyana on 1.1.70 says that the letters are fixed and that the styles of diction depend on the speech habits of the speaker.18 Explaining this concept, Patañjali illustrates it with the analogy of a drum beat: "When a drum is struck, one drum beat may travel twenty feet, another thirty, another forty; but the *sphoṭa* is precisely such and such a size, the increase in length is caused by the sound."19 Patañjali uses the term *sphoṭa* even to designate a single letter (*vama*):20 "In both cases (*r* and *l*) it is only the *sphoṭa* that is taught in the *sūtra.*"

**Gender**

The *Mahābhāṣya* on *sūtra* 4.1.3 takes up the question of grammatical gender and first attempts to correlate it with sex: "A female is characterized by breasts and hair, a male by his body hair, and the others by neither."21 But this concept of gender (*liṅga*) does not apply to Sanskrit grammar. So Patañjali tries to explain grammatical gender in terms of the constituents (*gunas*). He states clearly that the grammarians cannot take the grammatical gender to be the same as the gender of normal worldly usage (referring to the sex).22 Every object is characterized by different states of constituent element (*guna*), and these states constitute the gender of the thing.23 Patañjali does not refer to the three Sāṁkhya *gunas* of *sattva, rajas,* and *tamas* here; but later commentators consider that they are implied.

Patañjali also proposed a formal definition of grammatical gender: that which is referred to by the pronoun *ayam* is masculine, that which is referred to by *īyam* is feminine, that which is referred to by *idam* is neuter.

**Purpose of Studying Grammar**

One who knows the correct formation of words (*śabdasaṁskāra*) can discriminate correct words (*sādhu*) from incorrect words. Although communication may be possible even by using incorrect words, it is only by the use of proper words that one achieves merit (*dharma*).

While discussing the Vedic hymn beginning "catvari śṛṅgāḥ..." Patañjali does not refer to the later theory of Bhartrhari according to which the symbolic meaning of the passage refers to the four stages in
the evolution of speech from the highest speech principle—*pārā, paśyanti, madhyama*, and *vaikhari*. The “four horns of the bull” are explained by Patañjali as the four classes of words, noun, verb, prefix, and particle (*nāmākhyātopasarganiśītāh*).
The central figure of the philosophical development of grammar is Bhartrhari, whose dates are still in dispute, though recent scholarship has come to general agreement about their likely confines. It has been shown that quotations from Bhartrhari's works appear in the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga, the great Buddhist logician, who must be dated in the fifth and sixth centuries. Furthermore, Śiṃhasūrigaṇi, a sixth-century Jain writer, tells us that Bhartrhari studied under a Grammarian named Vasurāta, whom he identifies as a brother-in-law of a pupil of another famous Buddhist, Vasubandhu. Erich Frauwallner suggests, on the basis of these considerations, that because Dignāga presumably flourished between A.D. 485 and 540, we may date Bhartrhari between 450 and 510 and Vasurāta between 430 and 490.¹

These dates are accepted by most recent scholarship as the best we can currently do.

As with many great figures of classical times in India, a large number of works have been attributed to Bhartrhari, and once again current scholarship has hardly settled all questions concerning the authenticity of some of these claims. By definition, the Bhartrhari we are speaking of is the author of the work that is regularly referred to as the Vākyapadiya, a seminal work on Grammar and grammatical philosophy the influence of which, though difficult to calculate precisely, is certainly considerable in subsequent philosophical developments, both within Grammar and outside it. This work has three chapters, and it was more properly termed Trikāṇḍi on that account. Ashok Aklujkar has argued that only the first two chapters constitute the Vākyapadiya. It seems likely that Bhartrhari also composed the commentary called vṛtti on at least the first two chapters of the Trikāṇḍi.² Beside this body of literature—verses and prose commentary—Bhartrhari apparently also wrote a commentary—or part of one—on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya. Again, the proper title is a matter of discussion: Aklujkar points out...
that the title Tripādi for it has extensive sanction among early commentators in the grammatical tradition, while the title under which it is frequently known nowadays, Mahābhāsyadīpikā, has only one manuscript mention in its favor. No doubt the work is referred to regularly as a tīkā on the Mahābhāṣya. It seems likely that it was a lengthy work, perhaps covering the entire scope of Patañjali's masterpiece, though only a small portion is now available.

There are occasional references to another work, called Sabdadhāту- samīkṣā, which is attributed to Bhartrihari by Somānanda and Utpalācārya, two Kashmirī Śaivas of the ninth and tenth centuries. Utpalācārya indicates that in this work Bhartrihari set forth the kind of awareness he calls paśyanti, which is also discussed in the Trikāṇḍi. This work has unfortunately not been preserved, as far as we can tell.

Indian tradition identifies Bhartrihari the Grammarian with the famous poet who wrote the Subhāṣītātīrīṭi, three sets of a hundred stanzas each bearing the titles of Niṭi-, Śṛṅgara-, and Vairāgya-sūtaka. Actually, the number of stanzas is many hundreds more than three hundred, which complicates the arguments on identity of authorship perhaps beyond hope of any definitive solution.

**Brief Analysis**

**Ashok Aklujkar**

**Language**

(1) Language (vāk) has four levels or phases: speech (vaikhari), mental/intellectual or potential speech (madhyamā), latent totality of units (paśyanti), and pure, basic language principle (porā paśyanti-rūpa).

(2) Viewed as a specific totality or sign system, language consists of three classes of units: phoneme (varṇa), word (pada), and sentence (vākya).

(3) If what is cognized is a meaning having no expectancy for an unused or absent word, then its signifier is a sentence. Such a signifier may consist of only one word.

(4) A single phoneme signifying some fairly well-associated meaning is a word.

(5) The sentence, word, and phoneme are unitary entities (sphoṭa). Only while being perceived (due to association with sound, which by nature has a sequence) and when conscious or subconscious grammatical analysis is being carried out do they appear to be made up of parts. Even so, the parts, though accepted commonsensically and on the level of analysis, do not exhaust the wholes.

(6) The linguistic units sentence, word, and phoneme can be regarded either as universals (sabdākyti) or as particulars (sabdavyakti).
(7) The linguistic units are permanent (nitya).
(8) The sentence is the primary linguistic unit.
(9) Language is infinite. There is no numerical limit to the sentences possible in a language.
(10) Sentence meaning is the direct or indirect basis of meaning at other linguistic levels. It is in the form of an action-oriented cognition or “intuition” (pratibhā). It comes into being through the instrumentality of word meanings but is not confined to them. As an event, it is a unitary entity. On the level of analysis, it can be conceived in various ways: as a coalescence (samsarga) of general word meanings; as a meaning that comes in addition (ādhikṣya) to the word meanings; as differentiation (bheda, apoha) from entities that are not intended; as establishment of a relation (sambandha); as relation that brings words, associated with general (sāmānya) meanings, into association with specific or qualified (viśiṣṭa) meanings; and as action as cognized from the verb (not the physical action) and as qualified by the meanings of other sentence components (viśiṣṭa kriyā).
(11) Word meanings are of the signified (vācyā, denotatum) or cosignified (djotya, functional/grammatical) variety. The former are meanings that are entirely unsigned prior to the use of words that signify them (consider the meanings of “bull,” “white,” and “moves”). The latter are meanings that are possibly signified but are not definitely known before the use of appropriate signifiers (consider the meaning of “and” as revealed by the pair of phrases “Devadatta Đittha” and “Devadatta and Đittha”).
(12) Signified (vācyā) meanings have either a reified, accomplished (śiddha) nature or a sequential, to-be-accomplished (sādhyā) nature. If a pronoun can stand for what a word signifies, then that signified belongs to the former category.
(13) Meanings of words, whether compound (ṛtī, samasta) or non-compound (asamasta), are unitary at the level of ordinary communication; they come to be viewed as made of parts on the level of analysis.
(14) Word meanings are primarily mental or intellectual entities (buddhyarthā), only secondarily and not always physical entities (vastvarthā). As mental entities, they are not just “images”. In fact, in the ultimate analysis, meanings have no existence apart from the linguistic units, which are also mental, that signify them.
(15) Word meanings, entertained as separate entities for the sake of analysis and in deference to the common way of thinking, can be regarded either as particulars or as universals.
(16) The relation between a word and its meaning can be characterized in several ways: as the relation of capability (yogyātā), as a cause-and-effect relation (kāryakāraṇabhāva), and as one of identification or superimposition (abhedaḥhyādopa or adhyāsa). Under any of these charac-
terizations, the relation is permanent (nitya), in different senses of the word "permanent." When a convention of the type "X means $X_1$" is established, "X" is not newly made capable of signifying "$X_1$"; only its capacity is thereby restricted.

(17) Language is innate and without a beginning. It has been in existence as long as living beings have been in existence.

Epistemology

(1) In the sphere of ordinary experience there is no cognition that is not oriented to some kind of object, nor is there a cognition that is purely of the thing or physical reality. Linguistic expressions and the conceptual scheme they embody invariably figure in cognitions.

(2) No type of cognition (perceptual, inferential, testimonial) points to reality without ever failing. Validity is not a built-in feature of any type. It can be determined only by testing the content of the cognition under consideration against the totality of experience and the principles the totality has developed.

(3) All cognitions are infused with language in one way or another.

(4) Extraordinary cognitions—in other words, cognitions that transcend the limitations of ordinary cognitions in terms of dependence on objects, reflection of preconceptions, validity, and presence of linguistic expressions—are possible in the case of those who have spiritually perfected themselves; but such cognitions are not the basis of worldly communication and conceptualization.

(5) Every cognition is unitary, that is, devoid of division and sequence. It appears as having parts or distinct elements (mātrā) because the diversity of its objects is transferred to it.

(6) The similarity and hence the universal (sāmānya) of cognitions are derived from the similarity of objects reflected in them.

(7) A cognition as an event, in its own consciousness form (saṃvidā-kāra), does not ever become an object of cognition; it is self-manifest.

(8) All cognitions enjoy the same period of existence.

(9) The distinctions drawn among sentience (citti), cognizer (buddhi) proceeding toward cognizing, instrument of cognition, fact of cognition, and the reflected form of the object are only conceptual; the entities spoken of are not physically distinct.

(10) The intellect can unify, juxtapose, differentiate, and identify entities irrespective of what obtains in the realm of perceptible reality. Furthermore, it has a capacity to view its own constituents as external to itself.

Ontology

(1) We can determine the existence or nonexistence of something only if it is reflected in cognition and hence in language.
Ontic decisions differ with difference of perspective. A scaled or tiered ontology is therefore to be preferred. For the grammarian or linguist, who has to work with meanings, it suffices to accept the existence of everything that language reflects as existing. By contrast, one is out to find out what really exists will realize that ultimately only the physical things and the language principle exist; the rest of the multiplicity of objects is simply a result of the interaction of these two existents. Qualities (guna/dharma), capacities (sakti), relations (sambandha), universals (jati), numbers (saṃkhyā), phases (avastha), grouping (sāhitya, sāmagri, samūha), and absence (abhava) do not have any existence of their own apart from the physical objects. Time (kāla) and space (dis) are, however, capacities and creations of the language principle. To come to the third tier of ontology, the perspective is of someone who wishes to go beyond worldly experience and existence. For him only the language principle exists; the traces of physical things that exist in the intellect in the form of specific linguistic expressions are necessarily wiped out.

(3) As a thing can be cognized and spoken of in a number of ways, it can be viewed as a collection of capacities.

(4) Actions can first be grouped into six categories: “is born,” “exists,” “changes,” “increases,” “decreases,” and “is destroyed.” These categories can be further reduced to three: “is born,” “exists,” and “is destroyed.” Because birth (or production) and destruction can be proved to be only appearance and disappearance of the specific forms of the thing (the thing is never entirely destroyed to be born or produced again), only “exists” or existence (sattā) ultimately remains.

New Contributions to the System

Bhartṛhari’s work is chronologically the fourth surviving work in the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition. Much earlier literature that shaped his thinking and much subsequent literature that could have indicated the extent of his original contribution has been lost to us. Consequently, one cannot determine with ease or certainty the contribution he made to his system for the first time. Bhartṛhari does not write in a way that would set apart his views from those of his predecessors or contemporaries. Although one feels the assurance of an original, self-confident thinker in his style, and the tradition speaks of his having held distinct views, Bhartṛhari makes neither a general claim of distinction nor specific statements identifying his own views. The following observations are, therefore, to be read as stating what is probably a new contribution.

(1) Grammar (vyākaraṇa) becomes a full-scale dārśana, a purposive view of reality, in Bhartṛhari’s work.

(2) Speculation on the nature and role of speech (vāc) going back to the earliest Vedic philosophers combines in Bhartṛhari’s work with
descriptive grammar, which arose out of concern with Vedic texts. Theories of grammar and theories of language are treated together in a measure far surpassing that of earlier available works.

_Trikāṇḍī or Vākyapādiya, with Vyrtti on Books 1 and 2_
_Ashok Aklujkar, with Karl H. Potter_


**BOOK 1**

1—4 (_E1; _T1_). Brahman has neither beginning nor end, either temporarily or spatially. It is the language principle (_śabdatattva_), the permanent syllable (_aṅkara_). It turns into (_vivartata_) a temporarily real multiplicity through its capacities of time and space.

_Vṛtti_ (_E1-14; _T1-3_). Brahman is a principle beyond all conceptual constructions (_vikalpa_). It has all powers (_śakti_) that are neither identical with nor different from it. Its form is a disjunction of _vidyā_ and _avidyā_. Even though its manifestations appear as temporally and spatially ordered, Brahman remains unaffected; it is free from spatial or temporal limitations. All of its manifestations, though apparently different from one another, are to be understood as linguistic, because they share their generative source (_prakṛti_). Because we grasp things through language they must be recognized as sharing in the language principle.

Brahman is said to be the permanent syllable because it is the condition (_nimitta_) of the permanent syllable. Its individual manifestation (_vyakti_) takes place for the purpose of making known to others what is inside each person's consciousness (_caitanya_).

"It turns into a temporarily real multiplicity"—that is, manifestation (_vivarta_) is a single thing's taking on unreal (_asatya_) distinctions as belonging to other things and without losing its own unitary nature; it is like the appearances of contents in dream,
(A number of verses follow that may or may not be quoted from elsewhere. These verses develop the idea of an inner controller [ontaryāmin], Brahman, who while remaining unaffected creates the diversity of the world out of language.)

2 (E14; T4). This (Brahman), which has been traditionally taught as single and appears to be many through its various powers, though not separate from its powers, appears to be so.

Vṛtti on 2 (E14-17; T4). “Through its various powers” the language principle, in which Brahman’s powers are collected, remains one, just as an awareness that comprehends many contents—earth, people, and so on—remains one. Thus the form (ākāra) of the awareness is not different from the form of the contents, for the unity of the one is not opposed to the diversity of the other. “Though not separate from its powers,” in other words, it is not that some of Brahman’s powers differ from others as, say, particulars and universals differ from each other, but rather, just as in illumination the illuminator appears different from what is illumined, though they are really identical (tādātmya), so it is here.

3 (E18; T5). The six modifications—birth and so on—are the source of the distinctions among states (bhāva), depending on the temporal power (kāloakti) of that (Brahman).

Vṛtti on 3 (E18-20; T5). All (other) powers come to be in dependence on the independent (power of) time. The apparent temporal sequence of things is a function of the limitations of the powers things have to take many forms, limitations operating through obstruction and permission. Thus time is the auxiliary cause (sahakārikāraṇa) of all modifications, in virtue of its postponing or effecting their occurrence. Because it thus produces sequential appearances, sequence is attributed to it (time), as the lines of a scale that result from contact with the thing being weighed are attributed to the scale. In this way the six transformations (paripāma) or modifications—birth and so on—become the source of the modifications in (types of) existence.

4 (E21; T6). That single seed of all things thus comes to have a state of multiplicity as experiencer (bhokṣya), experienced (bhokta), and experience (bhoga).

5 (E22; T7). The Veda is both a means of attaining to and a reflection of That (Brahman). Though single, the Veda has been passed down by tradition in many different ways.

Vṛtti on 5 (E22-26; T7-8). Attainment of Brahman is merely getting beyond egoity. Others say it is the absorption of the modifications into prakṛti, or stopping the organs (paikaranyas), or contentment not as a means (asādhanaparitrpti), or the Self, or desire for the Self, or not having any adventitious thing as one’s purpose, or possession of perfected powers, or escape from functioning in time, or attainment of no-self.
"A reflection" of Brahman means that the Vedas as language reflect Brahman as our dreams reflect or suggest waking things.

6–10 (E27-38; T9-15). Brief discussion of Vedic branches and of the Veda as a source of rites, smṛti, philosophical schools, and traditional lore.

11 (E39; T16). Grammar is the first among the (six) auxiliary sciences, the one nearest to Brahman, the best austerity.

Vṛtti on 11 (E40-41; T16-17). It is "first" because most important in gaining the same results as knowledge of the Vedas. It is "nearest to Brahman" because it is that science through which all the others are understood. It is the "best austerity" in contrast to other forms of austerity because it leads to the highest results.

12 (E41; T17). Grammar is the shortest path to attainment of the highest essence (rasa) of speech (vāc) that has become differentiated.

Vṛtti on 13 (E44-47; T19-20). The Sanskrit compound arthapravṛtti-tattva is analyzed in six alternative ways. What depends on language may be the expression of the speaker's intended meaning, the possibility of applying a word to a thing, the ability to combine words into sentences, the connecting of objects with actions, identification of a thing as to be accomplished, or the projection of the content of an awareness as an external object. By "the principles of language" is meant the proper forms of language.

Vṛtti on 14 (E47-49; T21-22). One who knows the correct forms of language understands the nature of language; he then goes beyond temporal sequence and gains union (yoga). Through the merit he gets by his correct usage he attains union with the greatest language essence (mahāntam sabdātmanam) and is without organs. He thus reaches the stage of undifferentiated speech and appreciates the chief among its modes, namely, intuition (pratibhā). Through that intuition and the repetition of the union the highest prakṛti, free from all modes, is realized.

15–22 (E49-51; T22-23). These stanzas dwell on the importance of grammar.

23 (E51; T24). Words, meanings, and their relations are held to be permanent (niṣya) in grammar.

Vṛtti on 23 (E52-63; T24-28). The basis of the science (of grammar) is that linguistic sounds, meanings, and the relation between the two is permanent. Here by "linguistic sound" we intend the general feature (ākṛti) of each word, not the differentiating genus of language as
such. "Being a linguistic sound" is a property that inheres in a thing along with a set of features (ākṛti) that are mutually opposed to other such features and so cannot coinhere with them in the same thing. It is this specific generic feature—for example, the feature of the word "tree"—that we call a "linguistic sound." Just as the universals "substanceness," "earthness," and "potness" can all coinhere in a pot, so in "tree" the universals "being attributive" (gunaṭava), "being a linguistic sound" (sabdatva), and "being the word 'tree'" (vṛksaśabdatva) coinhere.

**Objection:** The cases are not alike. The parts of a pot, which are not pots, combine to cause the manifestation of an instance of the universal potness. But the parts of a word do not combine to produce a linguistic sound; for they do not exist at the same time. The universal being a linguistic sound exists in each part of the word "tree," but if the general feature specific to the word "tree" exists in each part of the word "tree" we should think of trees as soon as we hear the first letter of the word.

**Answer:** No. The analogy intended is with specific actions such as lifting, turning, pouring, and the like, which arise successively and do not manifest a whole as product. And just as one does not recognize, say, lifting until it has gone on a bit, likewise one does not recognize that "tree" is being spoken until that action goes on a bit, so that several elements in the series manifesting that word can be grasped. The initial sounds in the series prepare the hearer’s mind so that when the last sound occurs he recognizes the word. Grammarians do not necessarily think of inherence as the medium by which a general feature or universal is suggested to the hearer. There are, indeed, various views among grammarians about the constitution of linguistic sounds and the manner in which such a sound is made known.

24-26 (E54; T30). Grammar deals directly or indirectly with eight topics: (1) meanings determined through analysis—abstracted meanings (apoddhārapadārtha); (2) given or stable meanings (sthitalakṣaṇa artha); (3) linguistic forms that are to be analyzed (anvākhyaṇa śabda); (4) linguistic forms that figure in grammatical derivations (pratipādaṇa śabda); (5) the cause-and-effect relation (kāryakāraṇabhdva sambandha); (6) the relation of capability (yogyaṭa saṃbandha); (7) the relation (s) that lead (s) to merit; and (8) the relation (s) that bring (s) about communication (pratyayāṅga saṃbandha). This work takes up some of these topics for consideration.

Vṛtti on 24-26 (E65-81; T31-37). (1) Abstracted meanings are a matter of theoretical preconceptions, choice and convenience for the purposes of the science of Grammar. (2) Given meanings are those conveyed by sentences, single despite being made known through awareness of the separated word meanings. (3) The linguistic forms
that are to be analyzed will differ depending on which of them, words or sentences, are taken to be the limit (avādhi) of analysis, and this factor also determines (4) the forms that will figure in grammatical derivations. (The rest are explained in turn.)

Verbal complementation is necessary for sentencehood. Where no specific action is mentioned, an action as existing is understood. Such single words or phrases are in fact sentences.

27–29 (E81–84; T40–42). While both grammatical and ungrammatical expressions are means of communication, only the grammatical ones are means of merit (dharma). Matters of merit are determined by reference to tradition (āgama) as maintained by the spiritual elite (śīta).

30–43 (E85–99; T42–51). Merit cannot be determined by tarka alone without the help of the tradition. Even the sages got their awareness of merit through the tradition. The traditions about merit cannot be sublated by tarka, because they are accepted by the world (lokaśiddha). The natures of things are very difficult to establish by inference, because they have different properties in different circumstances, because there are obstructors to the normal powers of a thing, and because what is inferred by a clever thinker can always be explained otherwise by one cleverer. Expertise in jewels or coins comes from practice (abhiyāsa), not from inference, and the fathers (piṭṛ), demons (rakṣas), and goblins have powers born of their karma that go beyond what perception or inference can explain, as well as the yogi’s power to see the past and the future. We must depend on the tradition, which hands down the direct awareness of people with such expertise and powers; one does not set it aside, any more than one sets one’s own perception aside, on the basis of mere reasoning. So the elite have explained language on the basis of impersonal scientific treatises (śāstra) and tradition (smṛti).

Vṛtti on 38 (E95–96; T48). Examples of things seen directly by those sages responsible for āgama include the inner controller (antaryāmin), atoms, unmanifest language-Brahman (anabhivyakta śabdabrahman), the gods, the tendencies bred by action leading to one result rather than others, the subtle body.

44–48 (E100–106; T52–55). Expressions that convey meaning, including their own form as meaning (upādāna śabda), can be viewed in two ways: as mental (buddhistha, sphota), as cause of expressions that are heard; or as audible (sruti, dhvani/nāda), as sequential sound that conveys meaning. Just as the fire in the sticks (that are rubbed) is the cause of the fire that springs up, likewise the language in the mind of the speaker is the cause of the audible language expressing it.

Vṛtti on 47–48 (E105–107; T55 56). When the speaker seeks to superimpose linguistic form onto his intended meaning, the language appears to change its nature into something else (the meaning) and to
project it as sounds from the vocal organ. Thus the unchanging (avivar-tamāna) language principle appears to be changing: in other words, it manifests through the imperceptible pervasive dhvani-sounds those gross nada-sounds which are articulated by the vocal organs. These gross nada-sounds, though temporarily ordered in a sequence, illuminate the sphota or mental language by obstructing it and permitting it (to manifest in the temporal sequence). Thus the sphota, though single, appears to have parts sequentially arranged.

49–52 (E107–111; T56–58). Other similes illustrating the relationships in question are now offered. The reflection in the water seems to move because the water ripples, just as the sphota appears to be protracted or short, fast or slow through being “reflected in” the gross nada-sounds. Or, just as awareness by nature grasps its own form as well as that of its object, likewise in language the forms of both the meaning and the language principle itself are illuminated. Again, a painter paints in stages a figure he sees as a single thing.

53–54 (E113–114; T59–60). Just as the speaker first thinks of the linguistic forms one by one, so the initial awareness (vyavasāya) of the hearer is produced from those (linguistic forms). But people, intent on understanding the meaning, do not attend to the linguistic forms per se.

Vṛtti on 53 (E113; T59 60). Because the hearer is concentrating on understanding the meaning (of the entire utterance), he does not identify a linguistic form as a separate item. So the linguistic forms are first experienced as primary in importance and then become secondary to the production of meaning.

55–60 (E115–119; T61–64). Just as light has two powers, as grasper and as grasped, so all linguistic forms have those two powers. Linguistic forms by themselves do not convey any meaning; only when they themselves become contents of awareness do they do so. That is why when the nature of a linguistic form is not understood the speaker is asked “what did you say?” It is unlike the case of the sense organs, which are not grasped when they reveal their objects. The action subsequent to the perception of a linguistic form sometimes has the form and sometimes the meaning, depending on the purpose in a particular context. For example, grammatical operations pertain to the forms of expressions covered by rules of grammar.

61–64 (E120–122; T65–67). In any case, that which is uttered can itself never be the object of the subsequent action; that object must be what it conveys.

65–57 (E124–127; T68–70). An expression may not convey meanings of other types, but it is never without its own form as meaning.

68–69 (E127; T70–71). Panini’s rule 1.1.68, “svaṁ rūpaṁ śabdasyā-śabdasaṁjñā”, has been interpreted variously, depending on whether the
own form (svarūpa) of an expression is viewed as an individual (vyakti) or a universal (jāti).

Vṛtti on 68–69 (E127–132; T70–73). Some Grammarians hold that unalloyed perception of and reference to individuals do take place; others are of the view that expressions, having come into existence because of the perception of universals, can refer to individuals only as colored by the universals.

70–74 (E133–139; T74–77). Some Grammarians say that (a linguistic form) is single, whether it be held to be a product or to be permanent; others say it is many whether it be produced or eternal. Some view realizations of an expression in different phonetic contexts as the presence of the same permanent individual; others as presence of what is felt to be the same but has in fact perished with each occurrence; still others as occurrence of what must be assumed to be the same for the sake of communication. Furthermore, there are thinkers who view all such realizations as different either because one permanent expression cannot become part of another permanent expression (then the latter will have parts and be impermanent) or because expressions are not permanent and hence cannot last long enough to become part of some other expression.

75–77 (E140–143; T78–80). Sphota, though without temporal distinctions, appears to have temporal divisions of two kinds: difference in the form of short vowel or long vowel, and so on; and difference in the form of a quick (drutā), medium (madhyamā), or slow (vilambita) pace of utterance, due to division in the manifesting sound (dhvani). A part of the sound is the minimum needed for the manifestation of the linguistic units (prākṛta dhvani); the remainder, if any, simply keeps the manifestation in effect for a longer time (vaikṛta dhvani). The former is related to the distinction conveyed by “short,” and so on, the latter to the distinction conveyed by “fast,” and so on.

78–80 (E144–146; T81–82). How exactly the sound manifests the sphota is variously understood. Some think that a dispositional tendency (samskāra) is produced in the auditory sense organ, others that it is produced in the linguistic form, and still others that it is produced in both. Only the organ is conditioned by applying ointment or by concentration (samādhāna), say the first group. But those who believe that the visual organ goes out to reach its object hold that both the content and the organ are conditioned by light, and thus the analogous view about sounds.

Vṛtti on 78–80 (E145–146; T81–82). That is to say, some think that the sound, when it has arisen, conditions the auditory sense and that the auditory sense, thus conditioned, becomes the means of auditory awareness. The second view mentioned is that it is the linguistic form that, conditioned by relation to the sound, is the content of the auditory
experience. The third view is that the sound conditions both the linguistic form and the auditory organ, which, along with other causal factors, produce awareness that has the linguistic form as content. This view is analogous to the view, mentioned in the text, about the way light conditions both sense organ and object in perception by those who think the organ goes out.

81 (E147; T83). Some Grammarians say that the sound is cognized as being the same as the sphota. Others say the sound is not cognized at all. Still others say that it is cognized as an independent thing.

82–92 (E148–157; T84–90). There is no doubt, however, that the manifestation (of the linguistic form) is gradual. Each succeeding element of the sound continuum serves to make the nature of the intended sphota clearer and clearer. There are sometimes interim cognitions of units other than the one intended—of units that could be regarded as parts of the intended unit. They are an unavoidable feature of the medium of manifestation and a consequence of the nature of the hearer’s cognitive mechanism. They are instrumental in producing the final cognition, but they are not parts of it.

Vṛtti on 92 (E157–158; T90–91). The Bhedavādins (believers in the ultimacy of distinctions between phoneme meanings) think that the word “cow” is just the several phonemes c, o, and w and that there is no indivisible linguistic form that they express and that is cognized by the understanding hearer. But according to their view, because the parts are manifested in sequence no single nature (of the linguistic form) could be cognized, and the final cognition in the series would have no content. A second view would be that all the parts, being eternal, are manifested at once, but then there would be no difference between the nature of the sounds “vega” and “gave.”

93–94 (E159–160; T91–92). The sphota is held by some to be a universal that is manifested by the individuals, the sounds. Others go beyond the level of specific units, where the distinction of universal versus particular is applicable, and think of one linguistic form (that is, one sphota) being manifested in various forms.

Vṛtti on 95 (E161; T92–93). Objection: The linguistic form is noneternal, because it is manifested, like a jar.

95 (E161; T92). Answer: Manifestation does not only occur in that which is noneternal; it is also seen that eternal universals are manifested by their individual (instances).

Vṛtti on 96 (E162; T93–94). Objection: Linguistic forms are not manifested, because the manifesters and the manifested are in different places—the linguistic forms are in one place, the vocal organs elsewhere.

96 (E162; T93). Answer: Only embodied things (kāyavat) can occupy places. Neither sounds nor linguistic forms are actually located anywhere in space.
Vṛtti on 97 (E163; T94). *Objection*: Linguistic forms are not manifested, because their so-called “manifesters” are regulated—the sounds that cause the manifestation of a particular phoneme cannot manifest any other phoneme—while manifested things, properly speaking, can always be manifested by several alternative things; a jar can be manifested—in other words, made a content of awareness—by a jewel or a lamp or some other source of illumination.

97 (E163; T94). *Answer*: Just as the fitness of a certain kind of sense quality to be the manifestation of a certain kind of sense organ is regular, so particular sounds are likewise fit to be manifested only by sphota.

Vṛtti on 99 (E164–165; T95–96) *Objection*: A linguistic form is not manifested, because we find that its manifesters undergo increase and decrease and difference in number depending on the way the vocal organ is used, and in proper cases of manifestation, such as illumination by a lamp, such changes in the manifesters never take place.

99 (E164; T95). *Answer*: There are many kinds of manifestation; consider a mirror, which manifests everything reflected in it; these reflected things change in various ways, but the mirror remains one.

Vṛtti on 99 (E165; T96). *Objection*: In the case of the mirror the prototype, for example, the moon, gets into the mirror.

100 (E165; T97). *Answer*: Big objects like the moon or a mountain cannot get into small objects, like a mirror or a diamond!

101 (E166; T97). So, phonemes, words, and sentences, which are without temporal distinctions, are taken to have such because of the temporal differences of their manifesting sounds.

102–107 (E167–173; T97–101). The terms sphota, dhvani, and nāda have been understood differently by those who do not advocate permanency. The explanation of short vowels, long vowels, and the like given by these thinkers is also different.

Vṛtti on 102–107 (E167–177; T98–101). They hold the sphota to be the first sound produced by the vocal organ. The dhvani, according to them, are the resulting sounds, which spread out from that first sound and by hearing which awareness of the sphota or first sound is made possible. Some say that the term nāda refers to what is manifested by the dhvani that result from the activity of the vocal organ. Still others think that the sphota and the dhvani come into existence at the same time; the sphota is the meaningful sound, the dhvani mere articulated sound. There is no consensus on this matter.

108–119 of Vṛtti (E177–195; T102–106). The process of speech production can be described variously.

112–114 (of E183–188), 120–122 (of T107–110). Knowers of the tradition say that the world is the transformation of language. All
understanding of what is to be done (*itikartavyatā*) depends on language. Even the child understands, because he has dispositional tendencies arising from prior births. Without such dispositional tendencies the child would not attempt to produce linguistic sounds.

*Vṛtti* on the preceding. What exists is as good as nonexistent unless it is spoken of. And even completely nonexistent things such as a hare's horn or the city of the Gandharvas can be involved in our activities like something real, provided they are brought to mind by hearing language. Because children have speech in them through the traces born of their use of language in previous births, they come to understand how to act purposively through awareness based vaguely on heard language. Children's attempts to speak are not taught them by others but arise by intuition.

115–117 (of *E*188–192), 123–125 (of *T*110–112). Language infuses all cognition. Without this close relationship between awareness and language nothing would become known; it makes identification of things possible. Language is the basis of all branches of knowledge (*vidyā*), or all crafts (*śilpa*) and arts (*kalā*).

*Vṛtti* on the preceding. When the linguistic bhāvanā is restrained, no (practical) effect is produced from the nonconceptual (*avikalpaka*) awareness that arises with regard to objects. For example, when walking quickly over earth and grass one is not aware of them and does nothing to or with them. But when the seed of the linguistic bhāvanā is awakened and the powers of words to express meanings are manifested, then the object becomes cognized as having a certain form; thus the object is clearly conceived and can be identified as having a certain form, and we are said to be aware of it. And when this language seed is awakened through certain other causal conditions it produces memory. Some teachers say that sleeping persons have awarenesses just like waking persons; the only difference is that the language-bhāvanā-seeds operate subtly in dreams—that is why that state is called "darkness." Finally, it is because of this close relation between language and cognition that we are able to understand the meaning of a sentence from hearing the words.

118–119 (of *E*193–195), 126–127 (of *T*113–114). The consciousness of all transmigrating beings does not go beyond language. The linguistic form that makes possible waking-state activities that are effective also becomes the object of effective activities in dreams.

120–123 (of *E*196–201), 128–131 (of *T*115–118). Some take everything to be merely the self (*svamātra*); others claim that everything is merely the Highest (*paramātra*); in any case, as things are presented by language so they are understood; the object is established by language. Even such a thing as the "circle of fire" (*alātacakra*), which is not an actual object, is brought clearly to mind by language describing it.
Because the Self is that with which one desires union and that Self is the language within us, one attains that highest Self (paramātman) through purification (sanskāra) of language, and one who is aware of the principles of language’s activity attains immortal Brahman.

Vyāti on the preceding. The first view (svamātravāda) itself has varieties. (a) There are those who think that all modifications are merely the self, existing inside each person but appearing to be external—“internal” and “external” being the results merely of usage. But that is impossible, for that self is single and immaterial. (b) Other svamātretavādins say that all awareness and all differences are transformations (parināma) of a single principle of conscious activity (citkriyātattva).

Likewise the second view (of paramātravāda) has varieties: some say that consciousness (caitanya) is the source of beings that differentiate themselves from it as oil from sesame seed, while others hold that it is more like sparks from a fire, or trees from seeds. But actually it does not matter whether an object exists externally; in either case it is always connected with language as the thing expressed by a linguistic form.

Language is of two kinds, eternal and produced. The produced sort is involved in usage and reflects the nature of language (or the self, which is language). The eternal sort of language is the source of all usage, unsequenced, within everyone, the seat of all modifications, the locus of all actions, the basis of satisfaction and frustration, capable of producing any effects anywhere but with its field of enjoyment restrained like a lamp covered by a jar, the limitless generating cause of all beings...the Lord of all (sarovāra), omnipotent (sārvasaktir), the great bull of language (mahān śabdanyāsabha). Those who know linguistic yoga (vāgyogavida) break the knot of egoity and are united with language without any distinction from it.

Well-being (abhyudaya) regularly follows upon purification of the language principle of all incorrect forms. Then by practice, after union with the language principle, and after having understood the intuition of which the source is that language-principle, attainment of the summum bonum (kṣema) must follow.

124–133 (of E203–212), 132–141 (of T119–124). The thesis that expressions sanctioned by the grammar of the elite can lead to merit can be supported in two ways. First of all, the thesis is a matter of tradition. One can always refuse to follow any tradition or to interpret the accepted tradition differently, but the only interpretation of the tradition that is proper is that which does justice to the capacities of words by taking into consideration their context, and so on. That grammatical expressions are meritorious is such an interpretation.9 In the second place, once a tradition is accepted, it can be supported by appropriate inference. Because pronunciation of certain words (in mantras and hymns) produces perceptible results like the removal
of poison and is said to produce imperceptible results of a specified sort, one can infer that it is possible that knowledge and use of grammatical expressions lead to merit. Grammar is a smṛti preserved or composed by the spiritual elite.

134 (of E213), 142 (of T125). Grammar is the highest station of the threefold speech (vāc) of vaikhari, madhyamā, and paśyanti, and it appears in a different form in each of its loci.

Vyātī on the preceding. The “correct/incorrect” (sādhu/asaśādhu) distinction extends only to the first three levels of phases of speech. Vaikhari is so called because it is cognized by others, is a content of auditory awareness, and is regulated according to the nature of what is heard. It is produced from a drum or a flute, and its correctness or incorrectness is well established, being mixed up with or manifested in varṇas. Madhyamā, however, resides within and seems to have sequence. The intellect (buddhi) is its only substratum (upādāna). Some think that even though sequence in it is suppressed, still it is accompanied by subtle breath. Paśyanti is achieved when sequence is suppressed, but it has the power to produce sequence even though it is without distinctions. It is restless and concentrated, hidden and pure. It is without form (nirākāra), or the forms of the objects of knowledge have been suppressed within it, but it may or may not appear to support distinctions of different sorts of objects. But the higher form of parapaśyanti is beyond ordinary usage and experience. It is not covered by grammar, which can at the most be an indirect instrument in reaching it. In the threefold speech there is innumerable variation. Not more than one-quarter of speech appears in human beings, and even of that one-quarter only a portion figures in communication. The rest remains unrealized potential.

135–137 (of E221–225), 144–146 (of T129-132). Grammatical treatises are composed from time to time by the spiritual elite in deference to differing capacities of individuals and by taking into consideration the changed capacities of expressions as far as merit and demerit are concerned. It cleanses one’s language.

Vyātī on the preceding. Some hold that scripture is authoritative only about things that have invisible consequences (adṛṣṭaphala) and hold human opinion to be doubtful and untrustworthy. They say that both śruti and smṛti are the product of a continuous tradition; śruti (scripture) is preserved in the same versions according to strict rules of expression, while smṛti was composed by the elite at different times and places in prose, poetry, or other forms.

Some teachers believe that no action has in itself a visible or an invisible consequence. Rather, by acting contrary to scripture one manifests demerit (pratyaudyā), and by acting according to scripture one manifests merit (dharma). Scripture itself teaches that, for example,
killing a brahmin is a sin in some contexts but a cause of exceeding well-being in others. Others think that scripture only makes known the particular power of each object known. Merit and demerit are the results of the natures of substances, not of scripture; scripture merely makes the natures of substances known.

138–147 (of E228–234), 147–155 (of T132–136). An *apabhramśa* or incorrect linguistic form (*asādhu śabda*) is that expression which the speaker employs with the intention of expressing the meaning associated with a specific expression derived by grammar, but which turns out to be different from that specific expression. *Apabhramśas* are not to be determined by taking only the form into consideration; with change in the intended meaning, an expression may cease to be *apabhramśa*. For those accustomed to grammatical speech, the *apabhramśas* convey meaning through the corresponding grammatical expressions. A reverse phenomenon is noticed when those who habitually use *apabhramśas* encounter grammatical speech.

**BOOK 2**

1–2 (E36; T1). A sentence has been characterized by “logicians” (*nyāyāvatāins*) in at least eight ways: (1) as verb (*ākhyāta*), (2) as a collection of linguistic forms (*śabda samghāta*), (3) as the proper universal (*jāti*) that occurs in the collection (*samghātavartini*), (4) as a single partless linguistic form, (5) as a sequence (of words), (6) as what hangs together in the intellect (*buddhyanusamhṛti*), (7) as the first word (*pada adya*), and (8) as all the words severally possessing expectancy (for each other, *prthaksarvapada sākāmsa*).

3–6 (E36–37; T2–4). The definition of Kātyāyana, the author of the *Vārttika* (namely, “a sentence verb along with the declinables, case words, and qualifiers”) does not agree with the Mimamsa definition, “that in which the words have mutual expectancy and which does not require additional words, has action as its principal element, has other subordinate words, and is a single linguistic form.” Some objections to Kātyāyana’s definition are met.

7–12 (E37–39; T4–5). Just as that single entity which is the awareness of all objects (*sarvārthapratyaya*) is differentiated according to the distinctions among what is perceived, so it is with the awareness of the meaning of the sentence. Just as one picture may be analyzed as having colored parts, so the one sentence, without expectancy, is said to contain linguistic forms that require each other. Just as a word can be analyzed as having stem, suffix, and so on (as parts), so the sentence can be analyzed as having words as parts. The parts of words are meaningless, but they come to be communicative through analysis by agreement and difference (*anwayavyatireka*).
13–14 (E39; T6). A linguistic form has no disjunction, so its meaning has none either. Only the ignorant thinks it actually does have parts.

Vṛttī on 13–14. The sentence sphaṭa is indivisible; its meaning—that is to say, intuition (pratibhā)—is likewise indivisible. It would be very difficult to understand the meaning of a sentence without analyzing it; nonetheless, a good student understands that such analysis is only a means to an end and that the linguistic form and meaning are indivisible.

15–16 (E39–40; T7–8). The general (noncontextual) meaning (of an earlier word in a sentence), having disappeared (after its utterance), cannot remain in the particular meaning (it has in the context of the other words in the sentence). By contrast, if the meaning of the sentence is not a matter of the linguistic forms that express it, the same should be held about the meaning of each word, so the relation between language and meaning would be destroyed.

17–18 (E40; T8–9). Some hold that the words of a sentence are only apparently similar to words noticed in isolation or in other sentences. The words of each sentence are in fact expressive of the sentence's particular meaning right from the start; the understanding of the sense becomes firmer as the sentence is gradually perceived. Thus, each word bears the meaning of the entire sentence in which it figures.

19 (E40–41; T9). When sentence and sentence meaning are said to be unitary, the reference is not to language in the form of sound. In addition to its speech form, audible to individuals other than the speaker, language has upāṃsu (“audibility only to the speaker”), paramopāṃsu (“appearance of an expression only in the intellect”), and pratīsamḥṛṭakrama (“latent, unthought expression”) forms. Beyond these four exists its undifferentiated form, bereft of sequence.

20–21 (E41; T10). Just as a motion is not grasped as distinct even though it is a particular movement, but when it is repeated its universal property as, say, turning is manifested, so linguistic forms such as phonemes, sentences, and words, even though quite different from each other, appear to be the same.

22–26 (E41–42; T11–13). How can an eternal thing really be earlier or later than something? It only appears to be so through the power of the one (the sentence sphaṭa). And just as, though awarenesses that something is “fast” or “slow” are without temporal extent, they appear to be temporally characterized, so vowels appear to be long or short. Time, which is eternal, cannot be differentiated through mātrās belonging to something else. But in the absence of distinct mātrās, how can there be any sequence? The awareness produced by them (the mātrās) is single and without parts; through its own power it seems to be differentiated and to have sequence.

27 (E43; T13). This sequenceless (sentence) (seemingly) has the
power of having sequence when analyzed. So its meaning, though not differentiated, is experienced as having distinctions.

Vyrtti on 27. It is like space (diś), which has no division but which we speak of as if it had them when we speak of "east", "west", and so on.

28-29 (E43; T14). If these words are in the sentence, and those phonemes are in the word, then in the phonemes there would be distinctions of parts, such as atoms. As these parts cannot combine there would be neither phoneme nor word—and then what could a word be?

Vyrtti on 28-29. If it is held (as in view [2] of kārikās 1-2) that a sentence is a collection of linguistic forms, then words and phonemes also in turn should be analyzed into components, say, atoms. But these ultimate atoms—by analogy with the process of analysis in question—would not be simultaneous and could not contact each other, so no phoneme, word, or sentence could result, for nothing could express any meaning.

30 (E43; T15). Others (who espouse view [6] of kārikās 1-2) say that the single inner language principle is illuminated by the sounds (nāda) uttered, and that unity is in the sentence.

Vyrtti on 30. They think that language is an inner consciousness that becomes the sentence when manifested by the sounds considered (wrongly) to be its parts. It is like the written symbols that are mistaken for the word.

31 (E44; T15). According to them the inner meaning is illuminated by its parts. Linguistic form and meaning are inseparable divisions of a single nature.

Vyrtti on 31. There are two versions of this opinion. On the assumption that external things are noneternal, the meanings reflected in the intellect are taken to be identical with the external objects. On the contrary assumption, that external object is eternal, it manifests itself according to the power of sequence in the intellect. So, both word and object meant are in the intellect. Another variation of this second assumption is that the object is reflected in the intellect, which inheres in the self that is pure consciousness but which assumes the form of the intellect, so that the power of being what is experienced and of being the experiencer, though actually belonging to different things, become indistinguishable in the intellect. In any case, on all such views the single intellect, in which the different powers of being meant and conveying meaning are not separated, is the locus of language—that is, of the sentence.

32 (E44; T17). The language principle (sabdātattva), the nature of which is essentially internal (antarmātrātman), is cause and effect, illuminator as well as illumined.

Vyrtti on 32. The linguistic principle, being identical with consciousness, is beyond the distinctions of presence and absence.
33 (E44; T18). That linguistic principle has the powers of existing or not existing; without sequence, it appears to have sequence and thus provides the basis for communication (Nyāyāhāra).

34–40 (E44–46; T18–21). Several possible objections to the thesis of unitariness can be refuted. The thesis can also be supported with positive arguments. Any view that admits actual presence of words in a sentence at the time of sentence cognition can be shown to end up in an absurd conclusion. Compound words serve as an analogy in that they are also made up of words. In their case too logic demands that unitariness be accepted.

41–43 (E46; T22–23). Some think of sentence meaning as that additional element which comes about when words with their ordinary, lexical meanings are joined by a relation. The substratum of this additional meaning is given differently as each word constituting the sentence and as the string of words taken as a whole.

44–46 (E46–47; T23–24). Some think of sentencehood as consisting in the delimiting or qualification, through being related, of a generality. Capabilities of words are only circumscribed when they join to form a sentence.

47–48 (E47; T24–25). Some think of words in a sentence as circumscribed or qualified right from the start. The adjacent fellow words simply make the qualification manifest.

49–53 (E48; T25–26). Some think of sequence as the crucial element of a sentence. It is sequence that reveals the unrevealed distinctions, already existent, of word meanings.

54–55 (E49; T26–27). Restatement of the preceding views.

56–57 (E49–50; T27). The sentence is the primary unit of language. Words and word meanings are derivative.

58–59 (E50; T27–28). Vedic statements and Patanjali's Mahābhāṣya are cited in favor of the view that the sentence is an indivisible unit (akhandapakṣa).

60 (E50; T29). Just as the meaning of the word is not understood from hearing any single phoneme, so the meaning of the sentence is not understood from hearing any single word.

Vṛtti on 60. Awareness of sentence meaning is self-illuminating, as well as illuminating its content. Being self-illuminating, that awareness is its own authority.

61–87 (E51–57; T29–42). Objection (by a Padavādin, Mīmāṃsaka, or upholder of the thesis that it is words that are the primary units of meaning): Just as sentence meaning is understood when the words are gathered together, so word meaning is understood when all of the phonemes are together. We only see a small object when it is together with others. So it is here. (1) If words did not have meaning, then it would be impossible to understand as we do (for example) "sacrifice
with rice" as meaning "sacrifice with a substance—rice if possible, if not some other substance"; for if "rice" excluded all alternatives it would exclude the meaning of substance as well. (2) If words had no meanings of their own, then one could not inquire about the meaning of an unfamiliar word. (3) The method proposed by Jaimini, which requires distinguishing primary from secondary meanings, becomes hopeless to apply, for one cannot distinguish between what is directly meant by a word and what is secondarily meant. (4) A compound (or complex) sentence is one in which the component clauses, through their expectancy for one another, combine to convey the meaning of the whole, which cannot happen according to the indivisible meaning thesis. (5) Jaimini's exegetical rules require the recognition of the meanings of individual words for their application. Because such meanings are denied the rules cannot be applied.

88–94 (ES7–59; T42–44). Answer: These arguments do not contradict our position, for we hold that a sentence, even though its meaning is indivisible, can be analyzed into smaller sentences (which can in turn be analyzed along the lines proposed in the objections). It is like the scent that appears different when found in distinct flowers, or like the "cowness" that is (erroneously) ascribed to a gayal because we have not previously seen a gayal; in the same way, when two sentences differ in only one word, they appear to be similar, even though the two sentences have entirely distinct unitary meanings. Just as light (prakāśa) and consciousness (cetas), though each without parts, seem to be similar to each other in one part and different in another, so the two sentence meanings appear to resemble each other in one part and to differ in another, though they are really without parts.

95–111 (E59–63; T45–49). There are several instances in which a meaning is cognized, but its usual signifier is either not explicitly present (because of extended meaning [tantra], or some other factor) or is present in an altered form (due to word-connection [samdhī], a different pronunciation, or the like). One who thinks that a sentence is made up of distinct words even at the time it delivers its meaning will not be able to account for this phenomenon.

112 (E63; T50). Answer to item (4) of the objections in 61–87 above: In the case of one-word sentences (padasarūpa vākya) one can say that what is ordinarily a constituent of a sentence has acquired an independent meaning. Similarly, if a sentence embedded in a larger sentence appears in separation, it will have an independent meaning.

113–115 (E63–64; T50–51). Those who maintain that a sentence has only purpose (prayojana) as its meaning, who say that it does not have a lexical (abhidheya) meaning as words do, cannot account for the relations between (such) sentences. But if it is (qualified) word meaning that is held to be revealed (by each succeeding word), the process
will be one of recurrence (ārtti) or restatement (anuvāda). The (sentence) meaning that is (said to be) complete with each (word, it should be noted), comes about when those (words) are together.\textsuperscript{12}

116–118 (E64–65; T51–52). Various views are held regarding meaning. Despite the sentence's having a single meaning, different opinions (vikalpa) with respect to the topic are derived based on the (different) experiences (bhāvanā) (of their proponents). Some say that every linguistic form causes an intuition (pratibhā) through practice (abhyaśa), as is seen in the understanding of meanings by children and animals. This practice is not a matter of tradition. Some say it is conventional. It is of the form “this is to be done after that.”

119–124 (E65–66; T53–54). There are twelve views of meaning that take sentence meaning to be constituted from word meanings: (1) Each linguistic form marks a notion that the form has a meaning, so that a word like “cow’s” meaning is like the meaning of words like apūrva, devatā, or svarga (in other words, each one means merely that something exists that corresponds to that form). The association of a linguistic item with a specific feature comes through usage, perception, and practice; it is not the content of the linguistic form, but is based on a distinct effort.

(2) According to a second view, some distinctive features (bheda) are revealed by the linguistic units that designate them. Some things that are only subsequently (or incidentally) understood are then taken to be the meanings of linguistic forms as well.

Critique of (2): But a linguistic form, when it evokes the notion of the generic property (jāti), does not evoke the idea of the individual distinguishing features that are characterized by that generic property.

125–142 (E66–70; T55–60). (3) Others say that the designation of a linguistic form is regular both as to usage (prayoga) (in other words, what is implied) and means (sādhana) (that is to say, instrumentality to a resulting action).

(4) The designation is a collection (samudaya), but without choice or combination (avikalpasamuccaya).

(5) Meaning is a nonexistent (asatya) relation (between the word and the property designated).

(6) Meaning is the relation with a linguistic form of something existent as obstructed (or conditioned, upādhi) by what is nonexistent.

(7) Linguistic form and its meaning are the same thing. In ordinary affairs the meaning is the more important aspect, but in grammar either may be relevant according to the speaker’s intention.

(8) Linguistic forms are invented so as to present in a manner regulated by a single meaning a thing having in itself no power, (9) or all powers.

(10) The meaning is an intellectual content (buddhivisaya) that is related to an external object (bāhyavastu) and is cognized as such.
(11) Some (meanings) are based on manifested memories that have distinct features. Others present themselves as bare awareness (saṃvinnāṭra).

(12) Just as a sense organ indicates its content in various ways, so the meaning is conveyed through language in many ways. A linguistic form intended by the speaker to mean one thing is heard as having various meanings by different hearers. And even the same hearer, at different times or different places, may understand a particular linguistic form in different ways. Everyone but those who have seen the natures of things are subject to this unreliability of language, and their visions, though based on reality, cannot be made relevant to practical affairs because those visions are not related to language. Language is no more reliable than perception—both are subject to illusions. The wise man should examine through reasoning (yukti) even what has been directly presented by perception, and in speaking he should follow the conventions of ordinary usage concerning objects, for they are difficult to explain correctly.

143–152 (E70–72; T60–63). Sentence meaning is produced by word meanings but is not constituted by them. Its form is that intuition, that innate “know-how” awareness (pratibha) possessed by all beings. It is a cognitive state evident to the hearer. It is not describable or definable, but all practical activities depend on it directly or through recollection of it. It comes to a person through maturing, just as animals and birds know innately how to act. Intuition is said to have six varieties: (1) natural (svabhāva), (2) Vedic (carāṇa), (3) through practice (abhyāsa), (4) yogic (yoga), (5) through invisible factors (adṛṣṭa), and (6) through instruction or intervention (upapāda).

Vṛtti on 143–152. Examples of (1), the tendency of prakṛti to evolve into buddhi, and the like, or our natural tendency to wake up after sleeping. Of (2), Vasistha’s knowledge. Of (3), water divination. Of (4), awareness of the contents of other people’s minds. Of (5), the power of Rakṣaokas to enter others’ bodies. Of (6), Sañjaya’s knowledge of the progress of the Mahābhārata wars through Krṣṇadvaipāyana’s specially qualified reports.

153–163 (E72–74; T63–68) Just as the word “cow” designates things that are associated with certain substances but does not itself designate those substances, so the linguistic form used to designate cows associated with a certain shape, color, and parts does not designate those portions. But language fails to function in usage if it is separated from its designation, as opposed to separation from the associated features, which does not preclude the functioning of language. Thus even though “cow” can be used of something where hair, hoof, and so on, are missing, it cannot be used where cowness is missing.

164–169 (E75–76; T68–71). There are different views regarding the
way that number and other factors are conveyed by the combination of suffix and stem or root. Some see no difference between the mode of conveying meaning seen in the case of stems or roots and the mode of conveying meaning seen in the case of suffixes. Others characterize the former as "designating" (abhidhāyaka or vācaka) and the suffixes as "indicative" (dyotaka). Their criterion is that of positive and negative concomitance (anvayavyatireka).

170-179 (E76-78; T70-76). Synchronic derivation of words (nirvacana, sabdavyutpatti) is an area in which there is considerable scope for difference of perception and choice of elements. In such a derivation, the precise meanings of elements are frequently ignored in favor of their general, approximate meanings.

180-191 (E78-81; T76-82). Regarding the stage in which a prefix or preposition is joined to a root, there are two views. Some see this stage as preceding the semantic connection of the root, through the action it denotes, with action bearers (sādhana); others see it as succeeding this semantic connection. The prefix can be said to be denotive (vācaka), indicative (dyotaka), or jointly signifying (saḥābhīdhāyin).

191-196 (E81-82; T82-84; T81-82). The indeclinable particles (nipāta) can be said to be either indicative or capable of conveying a meaning only in conjunction with other words (pada) that constitute the sentence.

197-204 (E82-84; T84-89). A fifth category of linguistic forms (in addition to nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles) is that of the postpositions (karmapravacaniya). Linguistic forms in this category serve to delimit in a unique way the action implicit in the relationship of the two words they connect. The other justification for their separate grouping is formal. Once the postpositions are separated from the prepositions the phenomenon of change of su to su can be better described in a grammar.

205-212 (E84-86; T90-93). Of words that have an identifiable designation several types can be specified from the point of view of their constitution. In some words the constituents have no meaning of their own; only the collection is a meaning bearer. In others, the constituents too bear meanings. Among the latter, in some the constituents contribute their meanings to make the meaning of the collection, while in some there is no recognizable or definite relationship between the meanings of the constituents and the meaning of the collection. There are also words in which a part is a meaning bearer and the remainder is not. One can also divide words into phonemes that have no meanings of their own; unless one chooses to identify some single-phoneme words with similar phonemes constituting a word. Some constituents of words (such as a root) have only abstracted meaning, based on grammatical analysis.
213–215 (E86; T93–94). Phonemes do not express any meaning by themselves. This fact is evident from the fact that word \( x \), which is distorted due to loss, addition, or reversal of a phoneme, does not fail to convey its usual meaning by reminding the hearer of the undistorted form, provided that the distortion is not such as to turn \( x \) into another word \( y \).

216–228 (E87–89; T95–100). A compound word conveys a specific undivided meaning. It should be viewed as made up of parts only in the context of analysis.

229–234 (E90–91; T101–102). The elements set up in grammar and the meanings associated with them are a matter of practicality. It is ignorance (avidyā) that is described in the science (śāstra) of Grammar in different ways. Understanding (vidyā) arises spontaneously, free from the alternative opinions (conceptual constructions?) (vikalpa) conveyed through tradition. Just as the result is not related on its occasion (nimitta) and is thus indescribable (nirūpakhyā), so understanding, though inexpressible (anākhyeya), is regarded as having the science of Grammar as its means (upāya).

235–238 (E91; T103). Understanding of linguistic meaning comes from repetition, which is beginningless and false and appears to be natural. For example, an uneducated person (apandita) takes an atom to have parts, and takes a whole made of parts to be joined with the parts (of other things). Because of our experience of pots and other things (as spatially divided), we take the world to be so divided, and because objects have a beginning, even the eternal Brahma is thought to have a beginning. Means that are intended for students can be misleading for children. One understands the truth by remaining on the path of untruth.

239–249 (E91–94; T104–108). (So), incompatibility of various sorts is noticed between the final meaning of a sentence and the meaning constructed by putting together the meanings of its components. Even the explanation of a simple negative sentence is fraught with logical difficulties as long as the explanation proceeds on the assumption that each succeeding sentence constituent modifies the meaning of the preceding constituent—that sentence meaning is perceived in parts and pieces. This point goes to prove the validity of unitariness.

250–257 (E94–96; T108–112). In the case of homophonous concatenations that figure as sentence constituents and are associated with more than one meaning (mutually related or unrelated), there are two views. Some theoreticians think of each such concatenation as one and the same word. Others prefer to look on such a concatenation as different words in reality.

Śrīpāla on 250–257. When identity of the word is presupposed, the process of its association with a meaning other than its regular meaning
is explained in various ways: first, the word, potentially capable of expressing any meaning, is restricted to one meaning by context. Second, the word is directly associated with only its regular meaning, but that meaning is changed through superimposition of another meaning. Third, the word has its own form as its invariable, immediate, and unique meaning. That meaning, in the form of form, is superimposed on each contextual meaning as the case may be.

258–262 (E96–97; T113–115). Considerations analogous to the ones in the preceding paragraph are applied by some thinkers to sentence and to Vedic mantras.

263–297 (E97–104; T115–129). Those who think that one linguistic form has many meanings base the distinction between its primary and secondary meanings on its being well known or not well known. Others trace the distinction to context. Again, it is taken to be a matter of the relative fullness or deficiency of features. Others think the meaning conveyed is a universal property. Still others say that the meaning conveyed results from deviation or distortion (viparyāsa) of some sort, as with the snake and the rope. Other such examples are cited.

298–313 (E104–107; T129–135). A word form conveys a cluster of (grammatical) meanings such as number, tense, and person. Not all of them are intended when the action expressed by the sentence is to be carried out. One must distinguish between possible and intended meaning, usual and contextually appropriate meaning, meaning element that prompts the use of a word (prayojaka artha) and meaning element that is unavoidable (nāntariyaka) because the word must appear with a certain suffix, or meaning that simply serves to indicate the participant in an action (upalakṣaṇa artha) and that means the participant itself (pradhāna artha).

314–317 (E108–109; T135–138). The factors that determine the meaning to be assigned to a linguistic form in a particular sentence are, among others:13 sentence (vākyā), especially the action expressed in the sentence; context (prakaraṇa), in terms of the general activity going on at the time of utterance; meaning (artha) of co-occurring words, or textual context; propriety or suitability (aucitya or auciti); spatial context (deśa); temporal context (kāla); relation (samsarga or samyoga), accompaniment by an entity that would serve to distinguish; absence of an entity that would serve to distinguish (viprayoga or viyoga); mention of an entity that regularly accompanies (sāhacarya); opposition (virodha); indication (liṅga) available in a related sentence; presence of a specifying word (anyādābdatamānidi or sābdāntarasamānīdhāna); probability (sāmarthya); gender (vyakti); accent (svara).

In the bhedaapakṣa or nānātmaapakṣa, which holds that a homophonous expression is in reality many words, these factors serve only to reveal the already existent distinction—to remove the obscuration caused by
the identity of form. According to the proponents of ekativapakṣa, they make known the then-operative capacities of the word—they delimit its potentiality.

318–324 (E109–110; T138–139). There are instances in which the meanings of the constituent words do not add up to the import or message of the sentence.

325–327 (E110–111; T140–141). Whether something is a word or a sentence does not depend on the number of constituents; the matter is to be decided on the basis of the meaning conveyed. Single words, whether noun or verb, that convey a self-sufficient meaning or one free of expectancy are sentences.

328–345 (E111–116; T141–148). Some hold that "deficient sentences" (elliptical sentences) or sentences in which one of the expected or ordinary constituents is missing convey their meaning by first reminding the hearer of their full form. This view is unacceptable; the so-called full sentence and the deficient sentence are in fact different expressions that are viewed as related in analysis and because of their similar outcomes. Categorization of words as nouns and so on is a product of analysis and a matter of convenience. It should not be viewed as primary truth to be retained at any price.

346–351 (E116–117; T148–151). In the case of a science like Grammar, a sentence is to be interpreted by taking into consideration what the related sentences state. The meaning to be assigned to a linguistic form in a sentence is held to be qualified by exceptions, specifications, and the like, right from the outset. The talk of a sentence (an exception (apavāda)), specification (vīśeṣavidhi), or prohibition (pratīṣedha) qualifying, obstructing, or canceling sentence p (a statement of a general rule, utsargavākyā, sāmānyavidhi) is to be understood as an inference that p does not reach the area of q and q does not reach the area of p (aprāptyanumāna). The cases in which acceptance of such demarcated areas is not possible are cases of option.

352–361 (E117–119; T152–155). There are instances in which an entity is referred to by an identifying expression (sāmyāna) and also by an expression that could be considered to be a part of that identifying expression (for example, datta is a part of devadatta). Some thinkers postulate the process of understanding the meaning here to be as follows: perception of the part (datta), recollection of the (full) expression (devadatta), cognition of the named, that is, the person Devadatta. It is better, however, to hold that the name and what seems to be a part of it are in fact two names associated with each other in genesis and analysis, but not in the act of signification. Grammar derives, through devices such as elision (lopa) and the like, parts that can designate, as not all parts are acceptable substitutes for the full name.
Some forms are acceptable only as identifying expressions, others almost identical with them are only acceptable in a role other than that of identifying. A name can occasionally be employed with the intention of designating the conditioning factor (nimitta) that led to its coining; it can also apply appropriately (in keeping with its meaning in nonidentifying use) to an entity (for example, krṣṇa, "black," employed as name of a person of dark skin). When a word is said to be a designator of some entity; its capacity (to designate) is only restricted; a new capacity for designation is not created (for its designative capacity is natural to it). In science (principally Pāṇini's Grammar), a longer identifying expression (mahātī samjña) indicates that the conditioning factor is intended or that a special consideration (such as assumption of recurrence) is involved. It is also noticed that the technical sense and the ordinary sense of an identifying expression are acceptable simultaneously in some instances and exclusively in others.

How the action expressed in a sentence takes place with respect to the entities mentioned in it depends on the nature of the action and the intention in a particular context. An action like eating applies in its completeness to each of the individuals designated in the sentence. A fine imposed on a community, by contrast, applies collectively, unless it is specified that each member of the community must pay a specific amount. A dramatic performance is realized only when each individual involved contributes his expected share of subactions. Seeing, to illustrate another variety, can be brought about either way: collectively or with respect to each member of the collectivity. Similar variation is noticed when identifying expressions in Pāṇini's Grammar are applied to their nominative or when rules describing changes, such as that from n to ň, are interpreted.

There are two views regarding the unity of an action involving many entities. Some think of it as becoming different with each change in the factors (agent, object, and the like) that are involved. It is expressed as one because the entities concerned are regarded as forming a collectivity. Others think of it as essentially single, but expressed with an indication of differentiation (such as plural number) because the factors involved are many and different.

Objection: Each constituent sentence (or clause) applies to each individual item to which the major sentence applies. These constituents are not what is meant by the major sentence, but when the major sentence is uttered the hearer understands the distinct meanings of the constituent sentences.

Answer: If the whole meaning of a linguistic form is contained in the meanings of its constituents, then what is the need for the existence of
separate word meanings? If the meaning of a linguistic form exists in each constituent, then either it contradicts that constituent’s own meaning, or it accords with it. And if the latter, then linguistic forms do not have eternal meanings (as the opponent believes).

394–398 (E127–128; T168–170). The single generic meaning is established with respect to each component expression as well as to the whole collection of constituents and to each segment of the sentence. Analogously, even though phonemes have meanings, the case ending is added to the stem and not to each phoneme. Just as everyone sees the same property by means of the same lamp, so grammatical number is understood from one case ending. Thus meaningfulness does not belong exclusively to word, phoneme, or sentence. Such a view, found in tradition, only appears to conflict (with ours).

399–404 (E128–129; T171–174). A linguistic form does not illuminate its objective unless it is used (that is to say uttered). Just as the visual organ sees (an object) only when it has access to it, so language expresses its meaning (or objective) only when intentionally applied to it. Just as the relation between an instrument (karana) and its object (karman) is brought about through action (kriya), so the relation between designating (abhidhana) and its designatum (abhidheya) is brought about through designation (abhidha). And when several (distinct) things might be designated by a certain designating expression, the linguistic form is established in a particular case through its intentional application (abhisamdhana). So, some say that Vedic linguistic elements are meaningless when they are repeated and that when taught to others they merely stand for their own forms, but that these same Vedic expressions, which each have a single meaning, when in use have different meanings depending on the different intentions of their speakers.

405–407 (E129–130; T174–175). Others, however, take each difference in usage to signify complete difference (between the meanings of the linguistic forms used), saying that a word such as aksya (which can mean a fruit, or dice, or an axle) is indeed many linguistic forms being considered as having a single common property (in virtue of all the words having the same ordered set of phonemes). So each linguistic form has its own fixed meaning, and there is no speaker’s intention other than just using the expression, which must have its meaning. The fact that an expression means different things in different contexts just shows that it is not one expression but several.

408–410 (E130; T176). For the advocates of the unitary sentence meaning, the question broached (between the advocates of fixed meaning and speaker’s intention) is a pseudoquestion because it rests on the incorrect assumption that the speaker begins with unrelated words and goes on to relate them.

411–418 (E131–132; T176–180). Among those who view the speaker
as proceeding forth with related words, there are two views. Some think of the action expressed in the sentence as related to its bearers only generally at the initial moment, while others think of the action as specifically related to its bearers right from the first moment. Others think that it is not language that establishes the meaning, but that language only produces a memory (smṛti), which is like the meaning in appearance. Thus, a burned man understands burning from his contact with fire; it is otherwise when one learns the meaning of burning from the word “burning.”

419–430 (E132–134; T180–185). Just as the sense organs—which differ by nature from one another and have each their specific sphere of operation—cannot function except through the body, so words—which are individually related to their meanings—do not have meaning disjoined from a sentence. The relational form (of the sentence) is grasped when the actual objects that are meant are connected to it, but its essential nature is not indicated thereby, as the meanings of the words are not seen. Awareness likewise remains in its true, formless state but appears to be colored by relations to actual things. Again, a meaning can only be designated as related to existence or nonoccurrence; so it is the sentence that is fit (to designate). The meaning of a word, whether existent or the opposite, is not understood in communication without some connection to an action. So it does not exist. Even the one-word sentence “(it) exists” cannot be thought without some relation (assumed) with an action in the form “it was” or “it was not.” It is the action (part of the meaning of the sentence) that is first analyzed, because of its primacy. The other means is used to effect that action. Its result is its motivation. But it is just the speaker, the intender, who forms the conception of the thing to be effected, its means, and the relation between them. A meaning (in other words, an objective that can be meant), because it has all powers (to play any role needed), is established as assisting in whatever the speaker wants to say.

431–440 (E135–136; T185–189). (Through language) things far apart can be presented as together, or vice versa; and one may be presented as many, or vice versa. This fact can be explained through supposing either that an object’s nature is everything or that it has no nature at all. It is language that has extremely fixed power, that relates (the things meant). A linguistic form is only an indicator (upalaksana) of an actual object (vastu); it does not express the powers (if any) of an object. The meanings of words are established through marks (laksana), but not as they actually are (vastutas); such an object is understood in different manners through its uses. The relationship that is the nature of a sentence’s meaning does not reside in the individual word meanings or in their aggregate. In communication we speak of it that way, but that is a product of analysis, which is needed to explain and thus under-
stand it. In such analysis parts are distinguished that require each other. So the unity of sentence meaning must be understood from small indications.

441 (E137; T189-190). The external meaning (or object), whether existent or not, is to be distinguished from that meaning which is notional (sampratayya). That distinction consists in analyzing the powers (of the words to signify external objects).

442-446 (E137-138; T191-194). A sentence is considered to be one by some if it has one finite verb; others thinks of it as one even if it has more than one finite verb, provided the verbs are expectant of (sākāṃkṣa) each other. Whether a sentence is complete should be determined by examining whether it is wanting in a word. Nonspecification of the way that the action expressed is carried out does not make a sentence incomplete.

447-450 (E138-139; T194-195). Action, while physically the same, appears different if the point of emphasis in the sentence is changed. Conversely, individual actions may be physically different due to difference of agent, means, and the like and yet may be expressed without an expression of the difference.

451-456 (E139-140; T195-197). Action expressed generally for a group takes place recurrently with respect to each individual agent in the group. Some explain this fact by pointing out that there is no one-to-one correspondence between linguistic utterance (uccāraya) and comprehension (pratipatti) in any case. Others theorize that the one initial sentence gives rise to many sentences, which then apply individually to the agents. The latter seek support for their view in Pāṇini’s practice of employing general and specific sentences.

457-458 (E140; T197-198). According to some thinkers the distinction between universal and particular is inapplicable to action. Others view action as containing a particular element (vyaktibhāga) and a common or universal element (sāṃnyabhāga). The latter, they say, explains expressions in which distinctions of time, agent, or object are not reflected.

459-475 (E141-145; T198-203). Sentences in which a single word performs a role in more than one part of the sentence—for example, having a different sense in combination with each of several verbs in the sentence—are explained in a variety of ways, based on (a) assumption of difference between utterance and comprehension; (b) recognition of sequence and simultaneity as possible processes in the employment of expressions; (c) division of words as aggregates of phonemes into those in which the distinction of parts is manifest, those in which that distinction is not explicit, and those in which there are no parts to begin with; (d) postulation of the arising of individual-oriented sentences in the period between utterance and comprehension; (e)
ascription of more than one capacity to an expression depending on the expectation (arthītva) of the hearer; and (f) acceptance of recurrence (avyṛtī).

476–485 (E145–146; T203–205). These epilogue verses make a few remarks about the passing of the Pāṇinian tradition, starting with the Samgraha (referred to also by Patañjali), proceeding through Patañjali himself, Candra, and Bhartrhari’s teacher, and having suffered at the hands of “dry logicians” (śuskarānuśāra) such as Baiji, Saubhava, and Haryakṣa. All the traditions discussed heretofore, and many more, were mastered by Bhartrhari’s teacher; a fuller discussion will be found in the third book, to follow. It is important to become familiar with other traditions than one’s own and to understand the older teachers, in order that one’s understanding be clear.

BOOK 3

1. On Universal Property (Jātisamuddesa)

1-5 (E58; T1-9). Words abstracted from sentences have been regarded as falling into two (noun, verb), four (with the addition of prepositions and particles) or five (with the addition of postpositions) categories. In the analysis into word meanings there are said to be two eternal word meanings for all language (or linguistic forms), namely universal and particular. Sometimes the particular as characterized by the universal of its class is intended, and sometimes without such a characterization.

6–13 (E58–59; T10–16). Every linguistic form first designates its own universal property, which is then identified by conceptual construction superimposed (adhayārapakalpaṇā) as having the form of the universal of a meaning (or thing meant, artha). This identification happens just as the principle in the quality “red color” is attributed to lac and is then, because of the lac’s being in contact with a piece of clothing, say, apprehended as residing in that piece of clothing; likewise, the universal property residing in language, because of the relation between language and meanings, is imagined to do the job of the universal property when there is attribution of properties to things meant. The universal property common to all universal properties is the linguistic form “universal property”; it is arrived at by elimination; the universal property common to linguistic universals is also “linguistic universal.” This linguistic universal is in linguistic forms but is different from linguistic forms; it includes as well the universal property “being a linguistic universal” (śabdajātītva). Even if universals can actually designate objects meant (and not only as an appearance, a superimposition), every linguistic form designates a universal, for the meanings of words are determined according to their (the words’) operations (vyāpāra).
So, even according to the view (not accepted by the author) that words designate substances (that is, particulars) they do so by virtue of having the properties of substances; so it is the property that should be held to be the meaning (of linguistic forms).

14-24 (E59; T17–21). A universal property is that property common to all members of a class which distinguishes the particular members of that class from nonmembers. Or, some say, the “general feature” (ākṛti) is that which is spoken of as common, and it is again spoken of as “particular substance” (dravya) to indicate differentiation. But difference or identity requires limitation (upādhi) by something other (than the things differentiated or identified). Only if things are connected (somehow) can they be thought to be different from or the same as each other. In fact, it is the one Self that has all powers; to suppose that things differ in their natures is unnecessary. So substance and the like are distinctly marked powers in tandem that assist men in gaining their purposes, but not separately. This connection among them is not, however, something above and beyond the powers, any more than the causal collocation (sāmagrī) of sense organs is something above and beyond those organs.

25-40 (E60–61; T22–30). It is the universal that is the prompter (prāyajaka) of the coming to be of the particular, being present antecedently in its causal conditions. Just as a face reflected in water is called merely a “face,” so it is only the universal manifested by the individuals that is designated (by language). And just as the differences among the sense organs, even though they be not perceived, lead us to postulate differences among the sense objects grasped by those organs, so in the same way the individuals, though not perceived, lead us to accept differences in our awareness of (their) universal properties. But it is the universal that is the existent (satya), the individual being non-existent (asatya). Indeed, it is existence (sattā) alone that differentiated through its relata is said to be the “universal”; and all language is based on that (“existence”). This existence is the meaning of the stem and of the root; it is the great Self, and it is designated “action” (kriyā) when there is sequence among individuals. This existence universal takes on six states (avasthā) when there is modification of becoming (bhāvavikāra) in apparent sequence; that sequence is likewise the nature of that Self in which time is seen as if it were divided into stages of before and after. The nonexistence of a thing is its being taken to be hidden (tirobhāva); its origination (janma) occurs when that existence universal has left a previous stage and has not yet arrived at the next one. The causes of our finding distinctions in this existence universal arise from its own powers.

41–48 (E61; T30–35). A universal does not need to have any shape of its own in order to manifest itself as earth or something else, and it
persists when its locus is destroyed. Some say that it is not the case that everything is simultaneously dissolved at the time of pralaya; others say that when the various objects are merged in prakrti their universals have a single locus, the dravyasattva (pure Substance?). Still another view is that each universal resides in every being, but only comes to be known in its particular manifestations. Yogis, however, are aware of universals through all their senses sharpened by practice.

Some universals—for example, the one expressed by the phrase “man-lion” (in other words, a heroic person)—have no linguistic forms that designate them but are established through expressions designating their parts that appear similar (to other words, namely, “man,” “lion”).

49–91 (E61–65; T35–56). That words have endings expressing number—despite their designating a single universal property each—can be explained in various ways in different cases. Sometimes the number serves other purposes; sometimes it is not even significant. Cases are adduced of these sorts.

In general, activity with respect to a particular thing (or substance) depends on our understanding its relevant qualities. Indeed, substance and quality are mutually dependent (sāmarthya). A sentence that indicates the relations of both quality and substance to an action should not be viewed as a compound sentence; both are conveyed together. Because it is the universal, and not the substance or quality, that is designated by the words, and because it is therefore the universal that is most closely connected with the action rather than the substance or quality, we find that one can maintain the action meant while substituting another quality for the one first indicated (for example, one can perform a sacrifice with a black goat if a white one is not available). And even though substance and quality are mutually dependent, the fact that one is allowed to find a substitute for a quality (in such a context as above) but not for the substance can be explained by noting that the universal property is closely associated with the kind of substance (goat) but not so closely with the quality (say, its color).

92–102 (E65–66; T57–61). Synonyms for “universal” are “lack of difference in form among things (of the same class),” “similarity,” “the powers involved in the very nature of things.” But even though one may get the idea of a stick from being aware that someone desires a stick, one does not thereby get the idea that he is actually a stickholder. For that one requires something else (namely, the universal). Otherwise the natural powers of things would remain indeterminate (avyapadesya) and communication could not occur. But when, abandoning distinctions, the nature of individuals is apprehended as single, then a single awareness occurs. When unity is considered to be among many, the idea of a “collection” (samūha) is born. And when the individual members
of the collection are considered first as different and then in terms of their unity, there arises the idea of their similarity. And just as an awareness, though different from the next one, is considered to be the same, so an object, though it has the nature of excluding others, is apprehended (as being the same in nature).

We do not have language to express the differences among things that are similar to one another; neither is that difference cognized. Thus, because of the difficulty of establishing the different specific contents of our awarenesses and of the meanings of linguistic expressions, we come to see them as identical. Or, according to the view of those who believe in relations, just as there are universal characters of (in) our awarenesses, so there are universals of (in) all objects, and the awareness universals prove the object universals.

103–106 (E66; T61–63). (Or, according to another view) the universals in the objects of our awareness help distinguish the awarenesses as well. An awareness does not require another awareness to cognize it, any more than a lamp requires another lamp to illuminate it. The awareness “this is an awareness of jar” is different from the awareness “this is a jar”; the form of being an awareness is not cognized as a content; we do not grasp its nature as distinct from the nature of the object meant.

2. On Substance (Dravyasamuddeśa)

1–6 (E66–67; T64–68). Synonyms of dravya (substance) are “self” (ātman), “actual entity” (vastu), “(thing having its) own nature” (svabhāva), “body” (sarīra), “thatness” (tattva).14 This eternal existent is made known to us through nonexistent forms (ākāra); likewise, it is this existent alone that is designated by linguistic forms that designate nonexistent limitations (upādhi). In the same way, though the word “house” designates a bare house, Devadatta’s house is designated by the word through temporary indications (nimitta) of it; or the word “gold” is used to refer to particular impermanent golden ornaments, even though really it refers to gold in its purity alone. And just as the power of the visual organ is limited when one looks through a tube, so the power of language to express all meanings is limited by the (particular) forms. But because those forms are essentially identical with the substance (whose forms they are supposed to be), language that designates them designates the eternal substance.15

7–18 (E67–68; T68–74). The tradition of old is that there is no distinction between substance (tattva) and what is not substance (atattva). Rather, substance when not properly understood (avicārita) is thought to be something other than substance. That (real substance), the form of which is not subject to conceptual construction (avikalpīta),
appears as if subject to constructions. For example, though not subject to temporal distinctions it appears as if it is. Just as the properties of contents cannot characterize awarenesses, yet appear to be characterizing them, so forms of the modifications, which cannot characterize substance, appear to do just that.

What is existent is that which remains at the end when forms disappear. It is eternal, expressed by language and not different from the language principle. It is neither existent nor nonexistent; neither single nor separate; neither connected nor disjoined; neither modified nor unmodified. This single (substance) is seen as language, meaning, and the relation between them. It is what is seen, seeing, the seer, and the result of seeing.

3. On Relation (Sambandhaparikṣā)

1–2 (E68; T76–77). From linguistic forms that are uttered three entities can be known: the speaker’s awareness (what he is thinking of), the external object, and the linguistic form’s own nature. A hearer may fail to cognize the first two, but not the third.

3–28 (E68–70; T79–92). The relation between word and meaning is indicated by the use of the genitive case ("y is the meaning of x"). There is no expression that designates this relation as a relation, for expressions reify—turn dependent entities like relation into independent, apparently substantive entities. This problem can be seen in the case of contact (saṁyoga) and inherence (samavāya), though neither of those two relations is the relation that connects linguistic forms and their meanings. Some say that relation is not among things meant by words (padārtha); others say that relations such as contact and inherence fall among the things meant. But they cannot comprehend the meaning relation in their system, for language can designate substances, qualities, and universals, and the relations between language and meaning differ in different cases. Anyway, there can be no word expressing inherence. Some words (such as ākāsa) designate their own substrata, or their own universal properties, to which they are related by inherence. Other words designate a quality that coheres in the same substratum as they do. A word such as "jar" designates an item that is related to it by the relation of being in contact with what it (the word) inheres in (samavetasaṁyoga). An expression such as "the jar’s black color" designates an item that is related to it by the relation of inhering in what is in contact with its (the word’s) inherence locus (svāravyasanyuktasaṁavāya). An expression such as "colorness" designates an item that inheres in what inheres in what is in contact with its (the word’s) inherence locus. A word such as "time" designates an item that is related to it by the relation of being in contact with what is in contact with its (the word’s) locus. (So the items belonging
to the other five categories of the Vaiśeṣika six are accounted for, but) no other relation is found to relate the word "inherence" to its alleged designatum. But that word, "inherence," cannot be meaningless, nor can any word mean any old object. So the (Vaiśeṣika) analysis of linguistic meaning in terms of contact and inherence will not work.

*Objection:* You say that inherence is inexpressible; but because you have just expressed it, it has become expressible! Or if you say even the word "inexpressible" does not express it, we could not understand what your claim means.

*Prima facie reply:* What we mean is that inherence's dependent nature cannot be expressed.

*Objection:* Then inherence itself cannot be expressed, and your words do not convey anything.

*Siddhantin's answer:* A doubt cannot be itself doubted. Again, a belief cannot itself come to be the thing it itself believes. To take another case: in saying "all that I am saying is false" (saraṃ mithyā bravimi) one does not intend to include that very sentence in the scope of its meaning, for then, as what one is saying would be implicitly false, the intended meaning would not be conveyed. Generally, what is expressive cannot at the same time be what it expresses, and if something $x$ is conveyed by $y$ then $y$ cannot itself be expressed by something other than $y$. Another example: "the thesis (pratijñā) is not probative (sādhaka)" does not apply to itself.

29–38 (E70–71; T92–97). The meaning relation is just the beginningless fitness (yogyatā) between linguistic forms and their meanings, analogous to the fitness sense organs possess for their contents. It is the correct (sādhu) linguistic form that expresses the fit meaning; incorrect forms are expressive only by inference. The word "relation" designates relations, and "fitness" designates fitness, because they are fit to do so (so that the analogous difficulty to the one about "inherence" does not arise). Awareness of this capacity comes through convention. Language is the cause of meaning, so from the meaning that is a content of (the speaker's) awareness language (for it) is understood (by the hearer). There was never a time that this fitness between language and meaning did not exist (as a general phenomenon); neither does it cease to exist when the thing a word refers to ceases to exist, for the thing is permanent as designatable (abhidheyatmanā).

39–51 (E71–72; T98–104). What words convey or imply can be called existence of a secondary nature (upacārasattā). This existence differs from actual existence in that it can be reconciled with any property—even with properties ordinarily thought to be contrary to existence. It is in this way that negative particles are meaningful, that we can talk of things not yet in existence, and so on.

52-60 (E72; T105-109). Coverage of only a part, grasping something
as limited by something else (such as a universal), reversal (or error, viparyaya), and absence or negation are inherent in linguistic communication. In this aspect it reflects features and limitations of cognition. There is, therefore, no ordinary way in which external things are cognized or expressed purely as they are. The child and the pandit, insofar as they are communicators, both express only partial views of things. Pure awareness (suddhajñana) (beyond the level of communication) embraces all objects and is not based (on sensory perception). An even purer stage, some say, occurs in awareness without form (arūpika). When awareness exhibits the forms of external objects it is, as it were, impure through getting mixed up with those forms. And a meaning becomes impure in the same way, falling away from its true nature through being limited. And because the meaning, the linguistic form, and the awareness are all thus in error, there is no essential difference in the manner in which positive things (bhāva) and negative ones (abhāva) appear in communication; both are mutually dependent in that respect.

61–71 (E72–73; T109–113). Positive and negative being are two conceptual constructions and are not different from the one self. Theories that seek to derive an existent from a nonexistent, or one existent from another existent, or a nonexistent from (the destruction of) an existent are logically problematic. They lead their proponents to advocate either something existent or something nonexistent as the ultimate source, but the derivation of the opposites from such sources is logically questionable. One must, therefore, accept as ultimate source an entity (atman, artha) that unites in itself both existence and nonexistence—which is indifferent to the distinction, which can be thought of either way. Linguistic usage does not proceed with this transcending reality as its basis. Its basis is rather what is thought to exist, what is conceptually constructed.

72–77 (E73–74; T114–115). Those who know the Upaniṣads (trayyantavedinah) have declared that what really exists is that on which is constructed seer, seen, and seeing. Language expresses the universal as well as the particular as differentiated. Therefore it operates with distinctions that do not really exist, and among such distinctions is that between positive being and negative being.

78–88 (E74–75; T116–119). Furthermore, language is incapable of expressing the cause-and-effect relationship without problematic implications. That an entity called effect comes into existence when another entity called cause is present is a matter of experience; it cannot be denied, it is like a miracle (atyadbhuta) in that words fail to convey it with precision. The sequence (krama) presuposed in the transition of cause to effect is not something physically different from the existent that undergoes the change, just as simultaneity is not physically over
and above the entities involved. The philosophers who accept a permanent existent have, therefore, thought of sequence as a capacity of the (one) existent. An entity does not actually exist merely because an expression for it exists. In the science of Grammar, however, all entities presupposed by expressions are thought to exist, and meanings of expressions are analyzed irrespective of actual existence or nonexistence.

4. More on Substance (Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa)

1–3 (E75; T121–123). The subject matter of the following chapters concerns certain word meanings (padārtha) abstracted in traditional ways from their forms in coalescence (samsarga, that is, the sentence) and from awareness (samvid). The nature of these word meanings is inferred from the rules of grammar. They are a basis of grammaticality (sādhutva).

A substance (individual, particular, dravya) is any entity that can be referred to by a demonstrative pronoun and that is viewed in the utterance as capable of differentiation.18

5. On Quality (Gunasamuddeśa)

1–9 (E75–76; T126–132). A quality (guna) is that entity which accompanies the substance, which is active in the role of differentiating it, and which is viewed as dependent on the substance for its existence. A substance cannot be referred to purely in itself; it needs qualities in order to be expressed. It is the excellence (or superiority, prakāra)19 of a quality, not of the substance, that is expressed in comparison and similar constructions. Because such expressions are particularistic (only relatively more specific, viśeṣaśabda, than some other expression), they cannot exhaust all elements of a substance that can be used for differentiating it. Thus there is always the possibility of being able to specify in a finer way, of turning the dependent element or guna of an earlier stage into the principal element (pradhāna) or substance of the next stage. (Compare the sentences “x has a form,” “x has a white form,” “x has a whiter form,” “The whiteness of x has a shine to it,” and so on.)

6. On Spatial Direction (Diksamuddeśa)

1 (E76; T133). Words refer to spatial direction (dīk), action bearers (or means, sādhana),20 action (kriyā), and time (kāla) as if they were actual entities. That they are in reality powers (sakti) arising from things is obliterated in usage.

2–5 (E76; T133–135). Spatial direction is that power which is behind such cognitions and usages as “x is before y,” “this thing is straight
(without bends),” and “this action is one of going upward.” It is single, but is divided into many (for example, the ten directions) on account of adjuncts (upādhi, such as contact with the sun at a particular time). Direction differentiates material things (mūrta) in terms of nearness and remoteness, while time distinguishes them in terms of sequence of actions. Direction is the basis of the talk of contact and disjunction through the perception of occupied and unoccupied regions of the sky or ākāśa.\textsuperscript{81}

6–11 (E76–77; T136–139). There is no fixed arrangement of spatial direction. The various compass directions, which seem to divide systematically, are mere names when they are divested of reference to the things (for example, the sun at a particular time) with which they are associated. Names of regions of space contain in some cases references to the directions used conventionally without regard to the actual position of the speaker or hearer.

12–22 (E77–78; T139–144). Based on distinctions such as “this,” “that,” “eastern,” “western,” and the like, which are introduced by spatial direction, are the divisions seen in things from mountains to atoms. These divisions are characterized in terms of the accompanying entity (for example, presence or absence of light) or configuration, but the concept or capacity called “spatial direction” is their ultimate foundation. Things per se are beyond division, sequence, and fixation by region. Division with which the adjuncts invest them has no end and cannot be something inherent to them. Yet division cannot be avoided. Spatial direction is operational everywhere. Along with time, it is part of the very nature of living beings. There would be confusion in communication and action if entities such as spatial direction were to be abandoned, if they could at all be abandoned. Sometimes they are explicitly present (with extent or limit mentioned), sometimes implicitly.

23–28 (E78; T144–146). It is also possible to view space as a property or power of consciousness (so far it has been viewed as a power of things). Under either alternative, there is no gain in trying to prove either that it is ultimately one or that it is ultimately many (in other words, that it is a set of several powers). Spatial direction is not an actual entity. Its existence rests on convention. Besides, singularity and plurality are mutually relative concepts; one presupposes the other. They cannot, therefore, be exclusively applied. If spatial direction is declared to be single, the sense of “single” cannot be the usual sense, which contains an implicit reference to plurality.

7. On the Means to Action (Śādhanasamuddēśa)

1–8 (E78–79; T147–152). Means (śādha) is the power to bring about the action (or actions) expressed in the sentence. This power is
located in what are viewed as the loci (agent, object) of the action as well as in other entities mentioned in the sentence that are not so viewed (such as the instrument, karaṇa). It need not always be physically or really present in the entities in which it is supposed to reside. It is what the intellect assumes to be present there. Entities are bundles of powers. The intellect enjoys autonomy in investing them with powers and in activating only some powers at the time of sentence formation. Thus it is possible, for example, to say “he is making a sound.” Although the sound has evidently not become a physical reality at the time of uttering this sentence, it is viewed as an existent acting as the power of an object with respect to the action of making.

9–13 (E79; T153–156). The “relationalists” (samsargavādinah, that is, the Vaiśeṣikas) view powers as ontically subsumed under the categories that they admit. A means for them is what should be viewed in the context of their ontology as instrumental in bringing about the action expressed. Thus, in “he sees a pitcher” the qualities of the pitcher such as its medium dimension are the means, but in “he sees a form (or color)” the universal called “formness” (or “colorness”) is the means. Such means are not specifically expressed in the words of the sentences concerned; they are implied by endings (vibhakti) and are logically reconstructed.

14–17 (E79–80; T156–157). Things that have come to exist are taken as means when they, as it were, oblige the action by being instrumental in bringing the object about. The power of being instrumental has been claimed by some to be an entity identical with the thing, or over and beyond the thing, which is instrumental in this manner. It does not matter (to the Grammarian) which is the case. As long as it is seen to be different it can be held to be the means. In the same fashion an action can be a means with respect to a succeeding action it might generate.

18–27 (E80; T158–166). These passages discuss the range of application of the terms kāraka and hetu.

28–31 (E80–81; T167–168). Powers are latent in substances that will become means of actions. These powers are revealed at the time the action takes place.

32–42 (E81–82; T168–172). Some thinkers view means as existing prior to the action, some as simultaneous with the action, and some as subsequent to the action. There is also a difference of views concerning what it is that brings about the action and bestows the status of means on entities—some of the candidates include karmic force (apūra), time (kāla), the power of time, and action itself. The division of means into six kārakas has also been viewed by some as natural, by others as derivative. Some have defended the identity with, as well as the distinctness from, the entity involved of the power that is means to action. It is not
realized that an assertion of identity has an implicit reference to difference and vice versa, and that reality transcends both concepts.

43-44 (E81; T173-174). By comparing and contrasting (anuvayayati-reka) pairs such as vrksas/vrksam, one is led to hold that case endings (vibhaktis) are themselves meaningful. The category to which their meaning belongs is called kāraka. It has seven varieties: karman, karana, kartya, sampradāna, apādāna, adhikaraṇa, and sēṣa.

45-53 (E82-83; T174-178). Karman, the object of action, which is of the kind that is what the agent wishes most to reach with his action, has three varieties: (a) a kind of object that is to be brought into existence (nirvartya) and is not a transformation of its material cause; (b) a kind of object that is a modification (vikārya) of its material cause; and (c) a kind of object that is to be reached or obtained (prapya), in which no change is seen to take place when the action succeeds. There are alternative ways of explaining (a) and (b), (a) as that kind of object which did not exist before its production, and (b) as either the result of the destruction of material or the result of modification of substance. As for those objects of action which are other than the kind most desired to be obtained, they are of four kinds: (d) that regarding which the agent is indifferent (audāsinya); (e) that which the agent (ordinarily) avoids (anipṣita); (f) that which is not covered by the other designations of kinds of kārakas; and (g) that which, though logically another kind of kāraka, is to be viewed as object (karman) in the process of sentence derivation on the Grammarian's instruction.

54-58 (E83; T179-181). The objects of types (a), (b), and (c) are involved as elements that bring about the action of which they are the objects. To that extent they are agents (kartrya). But the logical, first-level agenthood is replaced by objecthood in linguistic expression once another entity appears on the scene as instigating or causing the action—an agent marked by presanā, that is to say directing, commissioning, impelling, or setting in motion.

59-66 (E83-84; T183-187). These passages discuss Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini 1.3.67 and 3.2.60, concerning certain complications about expressions that indicate objecthood and agency.

67-80 (E84-85; T188-197). Discussion of other sūtras relating to object. Time and the like are objects with a different status, having become a kind of substratum for the substance objects. They are secondary (apradhāna) or external (bahiranga) objects. By contrast, the principal (pradhāna) object is the one that is the prompter (prayojaka) of the action.

81-86 (E85; T198-200) These kārikās discuss constructions in which the object does not appear in the accusative case.

87-89 (E85-86; T200-203). An action does not appear in a sentence as akarmaka—not requiring an object—simply because the object it
requires already exists or is supposed to exist before it is related to the object or because its relating to the object leaves no traces. It appears as *akarmaka* either (a) because the root used to express it has a different meaning elsewhere, or (b) because it already includes as a concept that which would be object in a construction with similar meaning, or (c) because its object is too well known to be specified, or (d) because the intention is merely to state it without specifying the object.

90–100 (*E86; T203–208*). The second category of case ending, instrument (*karaṇa*), is now discussed. The instrument is that entity after the activity or operation (*vyāpāra*) of which the action being expressed takes place in the speaker’s view at the time of sentence formation. Whether a specific instrument’s activity is actually or invariably necessary for the realization of the action concerned, or whether that activity in fact immediately precedes the realization of the action, or whether the instrument physically exists does not matter. Similarly, there need not be only one instrument for an action. All entities that are viewed as more instrumental in bringing about the action than the rest of the *kāraka* entities of the sentence can be instruments. Such an understanding of “instrument” does not conflict with the eminence enjoyed by the agent (*kārtya*) with respect to the action on account of his freedom to initiate or not to initiate it.

101–105 (*E87; T209–211*) The third category of case endings, the agent (*kārtya*), is next treated. An agent is defined as independent (*svatantra*) by Pāṇini (1.4.54) in the sense that it takes precedence over other *kārakas* in the speaker’s perspective and is viewed as bestowing particular roles on the other *kārakas*. It need not necessarily be sentient and capable of willful action. Whatever the speaker chooses to present as independent becomes the agent. This dependence on the speaker’s intention (*vivakṣā*) and the fact of *kārakas* such as agent being primarily linguistic (as opposed to actual) are evident from the following: what is physically single can be assumed to be different even in the course of one sentence. Usages such as “he kills himself with his own hands” (*hanty ātmānam ātmanā*) are possible because the (physically) same “he” is cognized from the perspective of three possible capacities: the capacity to be the agent, the capacity to be the object (*stmanam*), and the capacity to be the instrument (*atmanā*).

Realization of this phenomenon, namely, that different cognitive stances toward the same thing are reflected in linguistic usage, provides a key to the understanding, for example, of sentences speaking of the birth or creation of something. A sentence such as “a sprout comes into being” (*aṅkuro jāyate*) would have to be declared illogical, marred by internal contradiction, if the reference of “sprout” in it is held to be primarily to a sprout actually existent or nonexistent at the time of utterance (if the sprout already exists, how can one assert that it
[newly] comes into being? If the sprout does not exist at the time of utterance, how can one assert its coming into being?). But if the sentence is understood as implicitly containing two views of the sprout—as an entity in the mind of intellect and as a physical entity—then there is no incongruence. The natural understanding of the expression “sprout” is an existent sprout. As soon as the expression “comes into being” is connected with “sprout,” it is implied that the sprout cannot be an existent in the usual sense—that it must have an assumed existence; then only can it be the agent of “comes into being.”

106–113 (E87–88; T211–215). Other possible ways of accounting for a usage like “a sprout comes into being” follow:

(a) An effect is nothing but a specific form taken by the cause. The real meaning of a sentence such as “a sprout comes into being” is that the seed becomes a sprout. As the cause—the seed—becomes the effect, it is referred to by the word, “sprout,” which denotes the effect. Actually, there is no creation of something that did not exist before.23

(b) If the cause and the effect are not viewed as a continuum and the effect is thought to be something previously nonexistent that came into being, then also a usage such as “a sprout comes into being” can be understood in such a way as to be free from internal contradiction; it can be understood as meaning that the sprout, which existed as a universal, appeared in the form of an individual. As a universal it already exists and hence can become the agent of the action of coming into being.24 At the same time, as an individual the sprout is an entity to be produced, hence its coming into being can be asserted.

(c) In all linguistic indication whatever entity is perceived is perceived as a positive existent (bhāva). Even in sentences such as “X does not exist,” the word X denotes X as existing, as having some form (ākāra) or individuality (although the precise manner of existence, whether actual or imagined, permanent or temporary, may be stated later). Thus the existents as well as the nonexistents of the physical world are on a par as far as language goes; language can proceed without knowing which entity truly exists and which does not. As it is thus indifferent to external reality, the kind of problem that is seen in the case of “a sprout comes into being” is not a properly posed problem to begin with. The problem assumes that words of language are there to reflect external reality, when in fact the words are not intended to carry any such assurance.25

(d) The very concepts of “coming into being” and “going out of existence” are due to one’s thinking being misled by mere appearances. In reality there is only one undifferentiated, changeless entity. Hence, just as other usage in which existence or nonexistence is explicit or implicit is accepted as valid in ordinary life, “a sprout comes into being” should be accepted.
(e) The real meaning of “a sprout comes into being” is that the cause of the sprout (say, the seed) takes the form of the sprout. Here, although the cause is the real agent, it is referred to by “sprout”, the word standing for the effect, just as subactions that lead to the action of cooking are referred to by a word like “cooks,” as in “he cooks rice.”

114–121 (E88; T215–219). Sometimes, as in “the seed becomes the sprout” the cause (specifically, the material cause, prakṛti) is presented as the agent; sometimes, as in “a sprout comes into being,” the effect (the product, vikāra) is presented as agent. This twofold possibility of expression is due to the very nature of coming into being, namely, birth or creation. The entity that is coming into being straddles both the earlier (causal) phase and the phase to come. Consequently, it can be expressed through either.

122–128 (E88–89; T219–222). In causal constructions such as “Yajñadatta makes Devadatta cook rice,” the agent of the (apparently) incorporated sentence “Devadatta cooks rice” does not lose his independence (svātantrya) with respect to the kārakas of that sentence. It continues as prompted agent, while Yajñadatta becomes the causal or prompting agent.

The instigation of action that is seen in a causal construction is different from the instigation seen in an imperative or optative mood construction. The former applies to agents that are presumed to be already engaged in action and is a property of the expressed content. By contrast, the instigation in an imperative or optative mood construction belongs to one who expresses the content; in other words, in that instance instigation is a disposition and presupposes absence of engagement in action up to that point on the part of the one receiving the command or request (allusions to Pāṇini 1.4.52–55 and 3.1.26, and Mahābhāṣya thereon).

129–135 (E89; T223–226). The kāraka called sampradāna (indicated by the dative) is now discussed. Sampradāna is that kāraka which prompts or participates in the action of giving/parting with as recipient or destination of the object of the giving or parting.

136–147 (E89–90; T226–232). Next, the kāraka called apādāna (the ablative) is discussed. (That is apādāna which is uninvolved [udāsīna] in the action of moving away. Whether it be itself actually in motion or not, it is considered to be fixed [dhruva] with respect to that which is expressed as moving away from it.)

Apādāna has three varieties: first, one in whose case the action of moving away is explicitly stated (nirdiṣṭavisāya), for example, “village” in “he comes from the village”; second, one in whose case the explicitly stated action contains the element of moving away from it (upāttavisāya), for example, “cloud” in “the lightning shines from the cloud”; and, third, one in whose case no action (implicitly or explicitly)
containing movement is mentioned, but is nevertheless expected (apeksitakriyā), for example, “residents of Pāṭaliputra” in “the residents of Mathurā are richer than the residents of Pāṭaliputra.29

Which item is taken to be the fixed thing, the starting point, depends entirely on the context—in relation to the horse’s trotting, Devadatta is fixed, while in regard to Devadatta’s falling, the horse is fixed. If, as in the case of two rams separating, both are moving, there are two starting points, one for each act of separation. A speaker does not want to predicate simultaneously such contrary properties as difference and identity, or being the separating element and being the element separated from. A single item can be, for example, both an instrument (karana) and a starting point (apādāna) at the same time, but either there is a rule specifying which suffix takes priority, or else one assumes that the two capacities are in fact one.

148–155 (E91; T232–236). Next comes a discussion of the locative case relation (adhikarana). It indicates that which helps accomplish the action by holding (dhrārayan) the agent or the object. Such service may include nondestruction (of the cause, which will be the effect), independently supporting the weight of the agent or the object, or their connection with portions of space. Some say the locus of everything in contact with others is ākāśa, which allows us to say “this thing is here.” Likewise, the locus of all processes is time.

156–162 (E91–92; T237–240). The remaining type of meaning of case endings (namely, of the genitive case ending) is called “the rest” (teṣa). It indicates secondary or subordinate relationships, not an added kind of accessory to the action.

163–167 (E92; T241–243). The nature of the vocative case (sambodhana) is to call the attention of the hearer to somebody already there. The vocative is not part of the sentence meaning.

These meanings of the case endings are analyzed from the sentence meaning.

8. On Action (Kriyāsamuddesa)

1–10 (E92–93; T1–11). Whenever something, whether completed (siddha) or uncompleted (asiddha), is designated as something to be completed (sādhyā), it is to be designated as an action (kriyā), because it has the nature of sequence (krama) inherent in it. For example “it sounds,” “it whites” indicate actions (namely, of sounding, of shining as white) in contrast with merely “sound” or “white.” An action is a collection (samūha) of parts that originate in sequence and is conceived to be identical with those parts. Then each part comes to be called by the name of the action, so that differences between the parts in the process can be apprehended, along with different tenses indicating the
different times in the process. The whole action cannot be perceived, but is grasped from its perceptible parts, like the fire wheel (alātacakra).

11-19 (E93-94; T11-16). That action, which is expressed through verbs, has a form that, following temporal flow, is said to be existing (asti), until it has completely finished, when it is said to have become (bhāva). Each part of the action, which actually has no sequence, appears to have sequence because the powers of the subsequent parts are attributed to it. The primary meaning of "action" is that moment (in the sequence) immediately after which the result occurs. The other moments (prior to that one) are also called (parts of the) action because they have the same outcome as their purpose. As long as a thing exists in the form of a cause, before it is born, being something to be accomplished, it is indicated (by a verb). Once it is accomplished it does not require any more accessories, for its purpose is fulfilled. Thus, the verb is not used then.

21-25 (of E94), 20-24 (of T16-18). Others say an action is a universal that inheres in many particulars. It is not to be accomplished (being a universal and so eternal), but in its form as particular it is perceived as if it were something to be accomplished. Alternatively, it is that universal which inheres in the last (portion of the series of moments). Or, action is existence inhering in the agent and the object, or inhering in the specific operation. Still others say that action is something mental that is superimposed on objects.

26-35 (of E94-95), 25-34 (of T19-23). Among (Yāska's) six modifications of becoming (bhāvavikāra), two, manifestation and being hidden—or birth and destruction—are postulated of action for the purposes of practical affairs. All six are ultimately not different from existence. Birth is the stage of existence just prior to its accomplishment, and its (the action's) destruction is the stage following that—namely, the accomplishment itself. We use a verb to express the former, a noun for the latter. (Other versions of Yāska's account are considered.)

37-39 (of E95-96), 36-40 (of T23-25). Others think that action is activity (pravṛtti), not resident in anything particular, which together with accessories produces the result. At first, it is general (sāmānyas), then it becomes disjoined into parts. Still later, in the form of the operation (vyāpāra) it is established in the thing to be accomplished. This activity is the material (prakṛti) of all the accessories, the first among them. Others say that the operations are different from the activity.

40-53 (of E95-97), 41-52 (of T25-30). Because the (other) accessories are all completed things, the verb primarily designates action.

Question: What about a word like "cooking" (pāka), which, having case endings, functions as a noun but designates an action? How can the same word have two contrary attributes, of naming both an accomplished thing and something to be accomplished?
Answer: Just as in grammar we artificially divide a verb into two parts (root and suffix), one indicating the action, the other the accessories (such as number, tense, and so on), so the same analysis holds good for a noun (like pāka): its root designates the action, its ending the accessories. Thus the same word expresses both things, just as in a sentence such as “See! The deer runs” the same word, “runs,” expresses both the object of the seeing and the action of the deer.

54–64 (of E97), 53–63 (of T30–35). Because the meaning of verbs is an uncompleted process, there can be no identification of two actions except through using the expression “as it were” (iva), and no comparison or similarity (upamāna) between actions. Every action is completely present in its locus; so, because comparison (similarity) requires a standard having more or less of the relevant property, no comparison can obtain between actions of the same kind; and because actions of different kinds have no points of similarity at all, they cannot be compared either.

9. On Time (Kālasamuddeśa)

1–12 (E98–99; T36–39). Some say that time is a substance, single, omnipresent, permanent, without operation, the measure or dimension of things possessing motion. They say it is the cause of the origin, maintenance, and destruction of objects. Time is said to be the thread holder (sūtradhāra) of the world yantra (puppet show?), who by holding some back and allowing others to go on differentiates the universe. Time, though single, has many forms because of its being the locus of differences among the things residing in it. Nothing is one or many, white or nonwhite, in itself; a substance appears in one way or another due to its relations to other things. Because of the distinctions among those relata time is thought to be differentiated, so it provides the basis for the stages of processes. Again, actualization of a power is caused by time, so that the regulation of birth, maintenance, and destruction of a thing depends on time. Every stage of the world requires time, so time is the very self (ātman) of everything; it is operation itself.

13–26 (E99–100; T39–43). Time is the creator of the cycles. It holds back the various functionings of everything and then releases them, so that the potentialities come to mature at the appropriate time as particular manifestations of eternal activity. Then that power called inherence sublates differences and gives rise to an identity, as it were, between effects and their causes. This identity is prompted by universals, which come to be reflected in the particular effects. Then the qualities (guna), conditioned by their (own) causes, come to be perceived in those effects and in turn lead to the manifestation of their own universals. Because the loci of the particulars are eternal they persist over
periods of time, dependent on relevant causes of that maintenance, and continue to perform their functions with the help of other existing things. Eventually time, through its power called “old age” (jara), which is opposed to its other powers, prevents things from performing their functions by developing propensities that are contrary to those functions, which in turn results in the cooperating objects disappearing. So the thing perishes.

27–45 (E100–101; T43–48). Time is that with reference to which processes can be distinguished as fast or slow. It is the measure of the great ages differing in the moral qualities of the agents inhabiting them; it is the measure of the turning of the seasons. Though single, it comes to go by myriad names because of the divisions and distinctions among those things measured by it. When limited (upadhi) by motions it becomes differentiated into eleven forms of past, present, and future, specifically, five kinds of past, two kinds of present, and four kinds of future.

46–56 (E102; T49–52). It is time that makes the universe (viśva), which actually has no sequence, appear as if it had sequence. Past, present, and future are three powers of time; past and future cover over things while present illuminates them. The power called “future” allows birth to take place; the power called “past” suppresses birth. These three powers or “paths” (adhvan) have no sequence, but objects get sequence from them. Two of them are like darkness, and one is like light. An object is present while its causes are active and functioning; when they have stopped functioning it is said to be “past.”

Some say, however, that time has only two powers, one that brings about the appearance, the other the disappearance of things.

57–58 (E102–103; T52–53). There are those who say that time is only a mental construction. But whether it be dependent on awareness or existent outside of awareness, it is not possible to speak except in a temporal context.

59–62 (E103; T53–54). There are those who say that every object has three powers; through these powers every object either exists or does not. They say that sequence is just these powers. The same thing is seen or not seen depending on these powers; nothing is really destroyed.

Whatever be the various views about time, whether it be a power, the self, or a god, it is in any case the first form of ignorance to arise, and it is not known in correct understanding.

63–84 (E103–105; T55–62). Objection: If temporal differences are only apparent, how can one explain the fact that there is actually more water flowing out of the measuring instrument while pronouncing a long vowel than there is while pronouncing a short one?

Answer: There actually are differences in the objects by reference to which temporal differences are measured. The flow of water through
the measuring tube is itself the result of time's prevention or permission, though not solely; other factors enter in. For that matter, everything is differentiated only through other things. Temporal differences result from the dissimilarity between the parts of an action that are themselves constitutive actions.

85–90 (E105; T63–64). Objection: An actual entity either exists or does not; there is no third way. Thus there is no further possibility (for an action) beyond being past or future. A single thing without distinctions cannot have sequence, and if an action could be single, everything would be unified, consisting of partly existent and partly nonexistent elements.

Answer: The present time of an action is when it is perceived in its own form, when it is reflected in a single act of awareness.

91–114 (E105–107; T65–73). Objection: The nonaccomplishment of an action is its complete nonarising; it can be neither past nor future.

Answer: But the opposite action (namely, the one that happens because its opposite does not) has a limit either in the past or in the future, so the unaccomplished action is temporally located by reference to that.

The remainder of this section takes up further points relating to tense.

10. On Person (Puruṣasamuddeśa)

1–3 (E107; T75–76). Certain suffixes indicate limitations (on the action) according to whether the action is by the speaker or by someone else. Even when consciousness is not existent in these, it is understood through use of these personal suffixes. But the third-person suffix cannot express consciousness in the agent, even when the verb is such as buddh, jña, or cit (which indicate mental acts); these verbs themselves indicate consciousness, not the suffixes.

4–9 (E108; T77–78). Some say that wherever the second-person suffix is used the vocative meaning is to be understood as stemming from that suffix, not from the rest of the sentence.

11. On Number (Samkhyaśamuddeśa)

1–14 (E108–109; T79–84). Any existent has number. It is on number that identity and difference are based in the world. Whether number is a property different from or the same as its locus, in any case it is that on which differentiation is based. It distinguishes that in which it inheres (namely, substance), though it is sometimes imagined in other things (such as quality) and enables us to speak of their differences as well (as, for example, "twenty-four qualities"). Actually, the separation of quality from substance is a result of abstraction;
language and thought cannot deal with things except in terms of their properties. Thus we can think of, and speak of, the universal resident in universals, the individuator of individuators, the number of numbers, or the gender of genders. The different categories of things, though distinguished in theory and each having its own function, actually are found mixed up together, and their identification with one another depends on the occasion.

15–32 (E109–111; T84–92). Unity is the source of duality, and so on, for unity is prior to all other distinctions, which depend on a thing’s being single. Some think the two unities require a mediating enumerative cognition (apeksābudhi) to create duality; others do not think so. Still others say that duality and the like are a collection of two or more unities, and that the number of a collection is due to the differences among its constituents.

The remainder of this section treats the grammar of expressions indicating number.

12. On Aspect (Upagrahasamuddeśa)
1–27 (E111–113; T93–104). Ways of indicating in the verb the different sorts of purposes with which an action is done are discussed.

13. On Gender (Līngasamuddeśa)
1–31 (E113–116; T105–119). There are seven views about what gender is: it is the thing qualified by its relation to signs of gender such as breasts or hair; it is those signs themselves so related; it is the universal residing in those signs; it is (three) stages of the constituents (guna); it is the three constituents themselves in these stages; it is a meaning attributed to things by language; it is a property of language itself. The author appears to lean toward the latter two views.

14. On Linguistic Formations (Vṛttisamuddeśa)
1–627 (E116–135; T121–411). Five sorts of complex formations are treated in this section: primary derivatives (kṛdanta), secondary derivatives (taddhītānta), compounds (samāsa), reduction of two verbs to one (ekāśeṣa), and nominal verbs (nāmadhātu). As the discussion concerns technical grammar it will not be summarized here.

_Tīkā on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya_
_K. Kunjunni Raja_

Bhartrhari’s philosophical ideas are found in their fully developed form in the Vākyapadiya, which is his magnum opus; but the germs of his
theories may be found in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, of which a fragmentary manuscript alone is now available. It has been established that this fragmentary manuscript forms a genuine part of Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā. This work was mentioned by Itsing in the seventh century and by Kaiyāṭa as a source book for his Pradīpa commentary on the Mahābhāṣya.

The Tikā is not a regular word-for-word commentary on the Mahābhāṣya. It contains observations and comments on select words and points raised in them. Some of the ideas that were developed later into a cogent system are found scattered here and there in the commentary on the Mahābhāṣya. In some cases Bhartṛhari's comments in the Tikā help us to understand his basic standpoint in the Vākyapadiya.

Survey of Philosophical Topics

1. Sphota Theory

The sphota theory of the Grammarians considers the expressive word or sentence to be an integral, indivisible unit. The word sphota occurs in the Mahābhāṣya twice, without any reference to its meaning-bearing function but in the sense of a phoneme, shorn of all variations owing to the special circumstance. But Patañjali uses the term śabda in the sense of the meaning-bearing unit. Later commentators like Kaiyāṭa explain that by śabda Patañjali meant sphota. S. D. Joshi says that even in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadiya there is no clear statement that sphota is a meaning-bearing unit of language.

In the Bhasyaṭīkā Bhartṛhari says that there are different views on the problem. The one he seems to prefer is that sphota is the permanent essence (“etac cārthasvarūpam sphoṭo' yam eva śabdātmā nityah”). And Kaiyāṭa says in the Pradīpa that this definition has been established by Bhartṛhari in the Vākyapadiya.

Patañjali says that śabda is of two kinds, the eternal one (nitya) and the transitory one (kārya). Bhartṛhari's commentary gives the following clarification. The eternal one could be understood as either the universal or the sphota and the transitory one as either the particular or the sound (dvāna). It is clear that Bhartṛhari does identify śabda with sphota, the meaning-bearing unit. Kaiyāṭa is only following him.

Bhartṛhari distinguishes prākyatadhvani and vaikṛtadhvani in his Tikā thus: “Among the sounds which manifest the eternal word, some are primary and some secondary. That sound which is produced by the contacts of the vocal organs and that which is produced by such a sound, these two are primary. Through these two, distinction in vowels can be perceived. That sound which comes from another sound is called secondary, because no distinction is perceived through it.”
2. Meaning of the Term Nitya

While explaining the term *siddha* as *nitya*, Patañjali discusses its implications. Here Bhartṛhari explains two kinds of *nityatva* (eternity); *kūṭastha nityatā*, absolute eternality, and *pravāhanityatā* or continuity, which is free from three kinds of *anityatā*: *samsargānityatā* (disappearance due to contact, as in the case of the color of a crystal in the presence of a colored flower); *viparināmānityatā* (disappearance through transformation, as in the case of the color of a fruit changing when it becomes ripe); and *vastuvināsānityatā* (disappearance due to destruction).

3. Instruments of Knowledge (*Pramāṇa*)

Bhartṛhari accepts perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and scriptures (*āgama*) as means of valid cognition. Perception is liable to be erroneous, and sometimes inference may be superior to perception. Thus the perception of a circle of fire (*alātacakra*) is erroneous. *Āgama* or *sārda*, which consists of *śrutī* and *smṛti*, is a strong instrument of knowledge and is stronger than inference.

Scriptures form the basis for *dharma*. *Dharma* is the course of knowledge (*jñāna*). All the scriptures have their source in the three Vedas (*trayi*). Grammar is a *smṛti* revealed by sages who possess superhuman powers of vision.

4. Contextual Meaning and Etymological Meaning

The meaning of a word depends on the words with which it is collocated syntactically by association or contrast. In the phrase "Rāma and Laksmana," "Rāma" means the son of Daśaratha; in "Rāma and Keśava" "Rāma" means Balarāma; and in "Rāma and Arjuna" Rāma means Parasurāma (Arjuna means Kārtaśtrīyārjuna).

The derivation of a word also has to be made to suit the context. "Vāsudeva" in the sense of "the son of Vāsudeva" has to be derived according to the rule applicable to the *kṣatriyas*. If it is in the sense of "God," the term "Vāsudeva" has to be derived as "vasanty asmin devāḥ." (It is in this sense that the word is used in the *sūtra* "Vāsudevārkṛtā bhyāmsun." )

5. Language and the External World

Grammar is not directly concerned with the nature of the external world. For grammar meaning is what the words present. Just as the existence of words like "heaven" (*svarga*), *apūrva*, and "god" (*devatā*) leads to the inference about the existence of things meant by them, the existence of words can also be inferred on the basis of the object available.
DURVINĪTA OR AVINĪTA

This writer has been identified as a seventh-century king of the western Gangetic area. He was traditionally held to be a patron of Bhāravi, author of the Kirātārjuniya, and of Dāmodara, ancestor of Daṇḍin. The title of his lost work on grammar is Šabdāvatāra.
Dharmapāla (530–561, or 625?), the Yogācāra teacher, is held to have composed a *vyrtti* on the *Prakīrṇa* (third) book of Bhartṛhari’s *Trikāṇḍi*, according to the Chinese tradition and I-tsing. The title of this commentary is given as *Prakīrṇavyrtti* by Durveka Miśra in his *Dharmottarapradīpa*. 
HARI VRSABHA OR VRSABHADEV A

Ashok Aklujkar

An author whom scholars date about A.D. 650, the son of Devayaśas and a protégé of King Viṣṇugupta, this author provides the first extant commentary on the Vākyapadiya or Trikāñ্ডi composed by someone other than Bhartṛhari. The title of the work is Vākyapadiyapaddhati.
MANDANA MISRA

For historical details on this author, see Advaita Vedanta up to Śaṅkara and His Pupils, volume III of this encyclopedia, pp. 346-347. Originally a Pūrvamīmāṃsaka, he is said to have been converted to Advaita, and is in any case the author of an Advaita work, the Brahmaśiddhi, as well as of several Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃśa works. The Sphoṭasiddhi is, as far as we know, his only work written from the Grammarian standpoint.

Although Bhartrhari provided the basic insights into the sphoṭa theory, it remained for Maṇḍana Mīśra to systematize Bhartrhari’s thinking for purposes of philosophic debate. This goal was brilliantly accomplished by Maṇḍana in his Sphoṭasiddhi. The main opponents of Bhartrhari’s sphoṭa theory were the Mīmāṃsakas. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, in his Ślokavārttika, skillfully argues against Bhartrhari’s ideas. Maṇḍana had this full debate before him as he wrote the Sphoṭasiddhi; his method is to summarize Kumārila’s position and to attack effectively from the strong base of his logical reordering of Bhartrhari’s position. A good example of this method is found in kārikās 2–15, where he debates the question of how language conveys meaning. Maṇḍana paraphrases the main arguments of Kumārila with supporting quotations from the Ślokavārttika and then rephrases Bhartrhari’s position in the form of a counterargument.

Maṇḍana made an important contribution in first stating that the sphoṭa is an empirical entity that can be directly perceived by the sense organs. This claim at once raised the sphoṭa from being merely a theoretical postulate (as stated by Kumārila) to the status of a verifiable fact; though what exactly the contents of the final cognition are, if not phonemes themselves, still remains vague, because Maṇḍana merely says that ultimately the cognitions of phonemes are sublated by that of the word. Maṇḍana’s insistence that every letter sound or phoneme can manifest the whole of the sphoṭa, his graphic description of the
process of perceiving the *sphoṭa*, and his polemical sharpness made him the greatest supporter of Bhārtṛhari’s *sphoṭa* theory.

Maṇḍana also clarifies some aspects that were not very clear in Bhārtṛhari’s treatment and had tended to veil the theory in some sort of mysticism. Maṇḍana made it crystal clear that the *sphoṭa* is not any entity over and above the word and sentence, but is the word and sentence themselves, which gave the *sphoṭa* a much-needed earthly character.

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*Sphoṭasiddhi*

G. B. Palsule, Harold G. Coward, and Karl H. Potter

References labelled *ET* are to the edition and translation by K. A. Subramania Iyer (Poona: Deccan College, 1966). References are by *kārikās*.

3 (*ET*2–7). What is this “word” (whose doctrine is being defended here)? It is the linguistic element (*śabda*). What is meant by “linguistic element”? Not the phonemes. Rather, a linguistic element is that which is the occasion for the arising of awareness of a thing (*arthāvasāyaprasânanimitta*).

**Objection:** If that were so, smoke, which is the occasion for the arising of the awareness of fire, would be a linguistic element. Furthermore, an item of speech would not be a linguistic element before understanding of its meaning arises, and would be one after that—so that “cow,” for example, would be both a linguistic element and not a linguistic element. The definition offered above is not right. The correct definition is rather that a linguistic element is anything that can be heard. It is the phonemes that satisfy this definition, and this fact accords with common usage, which also finds the phonemes to be linguistic elements.

**Answer:** Our definition fits what the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has said. In an experience involving the utterance of, say, “cow” many items figure, such as universal, substance, quality, phoneme, *sphoṭa*. Among them, asks the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, which is the linguistic element? Just so one might ask, which one among those in the hall is Devadatta? Now if one should answer the latter question by saying “(Devadatta is) the one wearing earrings,” we will not understand him to be speaking of someone outside the hall, nor will we require that Devadatta has to wear earrings all the time to continue to be Devadatta. Likewise, when we say that a linguistic element is the occasion for the arising of awareness of a thing, the context assures that we are speaking of heard sounds (and not of something like smoke), and furthermore,
a linguistic element continues to be one even during those times in which it is not occasioning the arising of awareness. Occasioning of the arising of awareness is an accidental indicator (upalaksana), and it is language qua meaningful expressions that is indicated as the subject matter of Grammar at the beginning of the Mahābhāṣya.

Merely being audible cannot be the correct definition of a linguistic element, for all sorts of things are audible, including universals—like existence, soundness, linguistic-elementness, phonemeness, all of which reside in sounds and are grasped by the auditory organ.

**Objection:** We mean that a linguistic element is only graspable by audition (universals are graspable by other means).

**Answer:** No, for phonemes (which are according to you the linguistic elements) can also be grasped by the internal organ.

**Objection:** We do not admit the existence of universals such as existence or phonemeness.

**Answer:** Then you should not admit any universals, because the basis for cognizing these two is as good as for any others. The only reason for postulating universals is our experience of kinds. We cognize cowness upon seeing Bāhuleya, having seen Šābaleya previously, and with no other information; likewise having heard *ka, ca, ta, pa* we cognize phonemeness.

4 (ET9–13). **Objection:** The phonemes are the occasions for understanding designation; when grouped they are called words.

**Answer:** No, a phoneme cannot singly produce an awareness. Furthermore, because phonemes occur one after another, they cannot coexist and so cannot collectively occasion cognition, and when uttered by different speakers or in different order they do not occasion understanding of a meaning.

**Objection:** Even so, the phonemes should be viewed as occasioning awareness of objects when in certain kinds of conditions—such as having an appropriate sequence—even though they are not causative by themselves, just as the seed is taken to be the cause of the sprout when accompanied by soil, moisture, and so on, even though by itself in the granary it does not produce a sprout.

**Answer:** But because each phoneme disappears immediately after it arises, at a certain moment the only thing present to occasion awareness is a single phoneme.

5 (ET13–15). **Mīmāṃsaka:** Ritual actions—sacrifices and the like—do not occur simultaneously, and yet they produce their result together. Likewise repetition of the Vedas, or for that matter the various subordinate acts in the activity of moving, have a collective result provided they are performed in the appropriate order and by the same agent, and so on. It is the same with the phonemes producing awareness.

**Answer:** The cases are not alike. In the case of the sacrifices the
actions produce *apūrvas* that last and eventually produce the final result; no result is produced from an act in isolation. As for the repetition of Vedic passages, the result—learning the passages by heart—is actually produced through the dispositional tendencies left by each repetition aided by those produced by previous recitations. As for the case of movement through space, the intermediary is the reaching of a point of space; this reaching becomes the cause of reaching the next point, and so on. But no such intermediary operates for the phonemes.

6 (*ET*16–17). *Mīmāṃsaka*: Yes. In the case of the *varṇas*, the earlier ones leave latent dispositions, which then cooperate in producing the result once the last one has been uttered.

*Answer*: No. A latent disposition produces the awareness of the thing that occasioned it, and not anything else. Therefore it is still unexplained how a phoneme can occasion awareness of an object.

7 (*ET*17–20). *Objection*: Because the result does not come from the phonemes individually and they cannot coexist, some other cause for occasioning awareness must be supposed. It cannot be *sphota*, for that would involve unnecessary complexity of supposition. After all, everyone admits latent dispositions to be present, so it is simpler to postulate the ability of the latent dispositions to produce awareness of objects other than the objects that caused them.

*Answer*: That would be to ascribe to a power—latent disposition—another power, or disposition, namely, expressive power, which would lead to infinite regress. Anyway, if the latent dispositions are cognized in a different order they too do not occasion awareness, so they cannot be the cause of the awareness in any case.

8 (*ET*20–24). *Objector*: Our view is that, though the latent dispositions do not directly produce understanding of the meaning, because they continue and thus all come to exist simultaneously they then produce a single awareness in which all the phonemes figure. So the *sphota* doctrine is unnecessary.

*Objection to the objector*: But the simultaneity is then a matter of memory, not of perception.

*Objector*: Fine. Construe the single awareness either as a memory pure and simple, or as a complex involving both perception and memory.

*Objection to the objector*: Things perceived in a sequence cannot be remembered all at the same time.

*Objector*: Surely they can. Everyone recognizes, for example, that having perceived twenty things one remembers that there were twenty.

*Māndana’s answer*: The later phonemes reveal all the previous ones simultaneously, and the previous awarenesses of previous *varṇas*, having ceased, do not affect this revelation.

*Objection*: The simultaneity is of the awareness, not of the things
cognized in it. The phonemes are sequential, but they are cognized in a single memory.

Answer: No, for the phonemes qua phonemes have no sequence, being eternal and all-pervasive. When we remember the entire word, we do not remember a sequence of phonemes. And furthermore, if the objector's position were correct we should understand the meaning of the word from the phonemes perceived in any order as long as they now figured in the final cognition produced by them all together. But we do not. Therefore we should conclude that it is something else (the sphoṭa) that is responsible for production of understanding of the meaning.

9 (ET25–29). It is generally said that we understand the meaning from the linguistic elements (expressing that meaning) (sabdādārtham pratipadyāmahe). Here the linguistic elements in question cannot be the phonemes (as per above). They cannot be the universals of those linguistic elements (sabdajāti), either, for linguistic elements qua universals cannot signify a collection (samudaya). Thus, for example, the words “cow” and “horse,” both being words, should indicate the same thing if all that counted were their wordness. A linguistic element indicates either the universal (for example, “cow” signifies cowness) or the individuals in which the universal inheres (the cows), but not a collection of individuals.

Objection: An utterance such as “the mango trees are a forest” (sahakārāḥ vanam) shows that the expression “mango tree,” which signifies a universal, also expresses a collection (the forest).

Answer: Not really. Otherwise the expression for “mango trees” (sahakārāḥ) would not be in the plural. Here the apposition proceeds through ignoring the distinction between the collection and the things that belong to it. This kind of apposition is not pertinent in the present case—the word “cow” (gauḥ) is not plural and not a collective compound of varnas. So, the popular saying (that we understand the meaning from the linguistic elements) is inexplicable without postulating a linguistic essence (sabdāṁa, that is sphoṭa).

Objection: So let it be inexplicable! Popular sayings are sometimes intelligible, sometimes not. One cannot draw any conclusion from inability to construe one.

Answer: But we understand the popular saying in question, so we must assume that it has an intelligible meaning. And in any case there is proof for a linguistic essence, because people do make this (popular) statement without doubting it or debating it.

10 (ET29–33). Objection: Then let the earlier view, according to which the last phoneme accompanied by the latent dispositions laid down by the previous phonemes expresses the meaning, stand, but let us understand by “latent disposition” something that operates analogo-
usly to the apūrva that explains how ritual acts can have results much later than their occurrence. The phonemes must have been produced in a certain order and by the same person. This view does not violate the (Mimāmsā) view about the eternality of the relation between word and meaning, nor does it imply that the previous phonemes are meaningless, for they assist the final phoneme in producing understanding. As such latent dispositions must in any case be admitted, the postulation of sphota in addition is unnecessary and cumbrous.

Answer: The believer in the phonemes as expressing meaning has to postulate something unseen (adṛṣṭa), namely apūrva, while we, the believers in sphota as expressing meaning, need only presume that kind of latent disposition (namely, vāsanā) which is evidently the cause of memories.

11 (ET33). Indeed, the believer in phonemes as expressing meaning has to postulate much more on the basis of scripture—the restriction of the results of a linguistic (or ritual) act to the same agent, the proper sequence, and the like—none of which we are required to postulate.

12 (ET35–36). The phonemes could only produce an additional result (in other words, express a meaning) if they were peculiarly suited to do so by their own nature or if they did so through association with others. They are not suited to do so by their own nature (because by themselves they do not produce understanding of word meaning). And because they are not simultaneous they cannot produce meaningfulness in association.

13 (ET37). Even the final phoneme is in itself without meaning.

Objection: Does this objection not equally apply to sphota?

Answer: No, for we shall show that (the sphota) is cognizable by sensory awareness.

Question: Why all this effort to produce inferential reasoning to support it?

Answer: To convince someone who, perversely, does not trust even perception.

15 (ET39–40). Is identity of the speaker of the phonemes constituting a meaningful expression a constituent (āṅga) of understanding or not? Because we sometimes understand meaning when we do not know (or wrongly assume) whether one or more speakers has spoken (for example, in a crowd) it cannot be a causal constituent, but at best an indicator (jñāpaka).

17 (ET41–42). Therefore, as singleness of speaker is not a causal condition, and as the latent dispositions produced by the phonemes are the same whether one or more speakers produced them, and yet we do not generally understand sounds randomly collected as significant of meaning, something else must be the cause of significance.
Objection: How does the postulation of *sphota* help avoid the difficulty?

\textit{Answer}: Because when there is more than one speaker the *sphota* is not perceived.

18 (\textit{ET}43–45). Our view is as follows. In the case of every significant utterance an effort, depending on specific desires of the utterer and perceptible in his mental activity, produces a distinction in the sound uttered. Each sound produced with such an effort (but not sounds not so produced) reveals the entire *sphota*. The earlier sounds figuring in the utterance of a word, when heard by a hearer without any particular dispositions already conditioning his understanding, sows the seed of the cognition of the meaning by producing a vague conception of the *sphota*, which lays down a disposition capable of helping produce a later clear understanding of the meaning. When the final sound involved in the word is heard, the clear understanding of the *sphota* ensues, caused by the dispositions left by the vague cognitions seeded by the previous sounds.

19 (\textit{ET}46–50). \textit{Objection}: This theory, as much as that of the believer in phonemes as expressing meaning, has to maintain that one kind of thing, a phoneme, when heard produces something entirely different, a cognition of word meaning, \textit{qua sphota}. But if one kind of thing can produce awareness of something else entirely, then any awareness might have anything whatever as its content. If latent dispositions are adduced to connect the hearing of the \textit{vāṇas} with the resultant understanding of meaning, then the theory attributes to the dispositions an ability they do not have, namely, to produce cognition of something other than what produced them. The theory is that hearing the phonemes, through the latent dispositions produced, produces an erroneous awareness of those phonemes appearing as a significant word. But an erroneous awareness must have a cause—and the theory does not explain what that cause could be. The cause cannot be the phonemes or the latent dispositions, for they serve to produce \textit{correct} apprehension (of the word itself). The theory also assumes that hearing the phonemes under appropriate circumstances will always and necessarily produce cognition of meaning, the erroneous awareness in question. But other errors are not so necessitated—for example, if one mistakenly cognizes a rope, one need not cognize it as a snake; one might see it as a stream, or something else. In any case, to call this awareness erroneous is to imply there is a later sublation—and there is not.

\textit{Answer}: We do find that a thing when first cognized vaguely sometimes appears different from what it really is. It would be wrong to suppose that, for example, the vague perception of a rope cognized as a snake is not produced by the rope. Now contact of the senses with one thing cannot cause cognition of something else. So it must be the
progressively clearer latent dispositions, which arise as our perceptions become clearer, that eventually are responsible for the clear awareness that, for example, it is a rope. Otherwise we would have had to have a clear cognition at the first glance.

*Objection:* Surely it is because we got closer and inspected the rope more carefully?

*Answer:* No, for it also arises for one who stays where he is and attends more carefully. And even those whose sense organs are quite normal sometimes misperceive at the outset and later get it right in this way. So the initial erroneous awareness is not due to a defect in the organs.

*Objection:* What happens is that first the bare essence (*svarūpamātra*) is perceived but is interpreted through its similarity as remembered from previous experiences.

*Answer:* One could say the same thing about the linguistic case as well—the bare essence of the *sphota* is first perceived but interpreted as constituted of phonemes and so on because of previous experience.

20 (ET51-52). In any case it is the sounds, which resemble one another, that are the cause of the erroneous awareness, as well as what causes eventual clarification. But because sounds are produced by different intentions, efforts, articulations, which nevertheless resemble one another, one naturally mistakes one thing (the *sphota*) for something else (the phoneme), as well as eventually getting it right on further consideration.

21 (ET53-56). The misinterpretation of *sphota* as phoneme is inevitable, as it always occurs through the same procedure. It is analogous to the case of cognition of a new (large) number—the cognition of the previous (nonexistent) numbers is the cause of its cognition in a fixed series leading to it. Here cognition of (nonexistent) phonemes is the cause of cognition of word meaning. Likewise, when a word is taught by one person to another there is inevitable misinterpretation of the word as phonemes, for there is no other way of teaching it. It has been said that the great sages, who did not learn language from others, apprehended the word essence without misconception and taught it directly as *mantras*; the rest of us, by learning the text of the Vedas and Vedāṅgas as we were incapable of receiving the *mantras*, at least understand the means of arriving at correct understanding.

22 (ET57-59). It has been remarked that to call something an erroneous awareness is to imply that there is a later sublation, which there is not in the case of the awareness of phonemes. But indeed there is a later sublation, that sublation being the clear realization of the *sphota*.

*Objection:* There is no incompatibility between a word's being a single *sphota* and its being composed of phonemes, for indeed we see that the idea of the word is cognized as mixed up with that of the phonemes. So the later realization is not a sublation of the earlier cognition.
Answer: Of course it is. Just as the face comes eventually to be known as single, though initially confusedly thought to be in the mirror, so the sphota is eventually known as single, though initially confusedly thought to be subject to distinctions of the phonemes.

23 (ET59-61). Only the sense organs are capable of apprehending an object more or less clearly or confusedly. The other instruments of knowledge either apprehend the object or not at all. Now the sphota is cognized through perception. We know that it is perceptually cognized because the clear cognition of the sphota, which is different from that of the phonemes, must have some supporting object (ālambana).

24 (ET61-64). Objection: There is such a clear cognition, but it does not have a different supporting object from the phonemes; they alone are the supporting object. In the final cognition they are cognized collectively, while in the preceding erroneous awarenesses they are cognized distributively.

Answer: Even though a cognition concerns one thing it does not follow that it may not have something else as its supporting object. For example, the awareness of a universal property, though it is mixed up with the form of the individual, still has the universal, not the individual, as its supporting object; likewise, the idea of a picture, despite its connection with the colors of its parts, is about the picture, not the parts.

25 (ET65). Objection: The unity of the phonemes is caused by their being cognized in a single mental act or by their serving collectively a single purpose.

Answer: Then there is no unity anywhere, for the same account can be invoked to question any case of supposed unity.

26 (ET66-67). Unless the nature of a word is known, its meaning cannot be understood; if that in turn depends on its cognition (as the previous objection would imply), there will be mutual dependence.

27 (ET68-77). That which appears to be different even though the phonemes are the same, and that which appears to be one even though the phonemes are different, is the word; it is that which is perceived (the sphota).

Objection (Kumārila, Sphota section, verse 131): “Phonemes and sounds do not manifest the sphota in words or sentences because they are revealers, like lamplight.”

Answer: Depending on precisely how this argument is interpreted, it either proves what is already established (because words and sentences are sphota according to the believer in sphota) or it commits fallacies of unknown qualificandness in its paksā and unestablished locus (āśrayāsiddha) in its hetu, as well as suffering from other faults.

Kumārila (Sphota section, verse 133): “Phonemes and sounds do not manifest the sphota of words or sentences, because they are manifesters (directly), like the light of a lamp.” Or (according to a different
reading), "Phonemes and sounds belonging to words or sentences do not manifest sp\textit{ho}ta, because they are manifesters, like the light of a lamp."

\textit{Answer:} According to the second reading, the argument commits the fault of proving what is already accepted, for words and sentences are themselves sp\textit{ho}tas. The first formulation involves the fallacy of unestablished locus, for the auditory sense and the internal organ manifest sp\textit{ho}tas but do not manifest meanings directly.

\textit{Kumārila} (\textit{Sp\textit{ho}ta} section, verse 134): "Phonemes and sounds do not manifest the sp\textit{ho}ta of words or sentences, because they exist, like the jar, and so on."

\textit{Answer:} This \textit{hetu} is inconclusive (\textit{anaikāntika}), for it has been shown that sp\textit{ho}tas are directly perceptible by the auditory sense. Further, a word that consists of just one phoneme is admitted by even the Mīmāṃsakas to be manifested by the sound that it consists of, so the thesis contradicts their own tenet.

\textit{Kumārila} (\textit{Sp\textit{ho}ta} section, verse 135): "The sp\textit{ho}ta is not expressive of meaning, because it is other than the phoneme, like a jar, and so on."

\textit{Answer:} Because the Mīmāṃsaka does not accept sp\textit{ho}ta, his reason is unestablished (\textit{sva\textit{to}siddha}). (Other reasons are also given.)

\textit{Kumārila} (\textit{Sp\textit{ho}ta} section, verse 136): "Whoever denies that phonemes are expressive of meaning denies what is perceived, just as one who denies that 'moon' denotes the thing having the hare on it."

\textit{Answer:} What is perceived is that \textit{words} are expressive of meaning, not the correct analysis of words.

\textit{Kumārila} (\textit{Sp\textit{ho}ta} section, verses 137-138): "Awareness of objects arises from phonemes, because it arises immediately following awareness of them, just as awareness of fire arises from awareness of smoke."

\textit{Answer:} The Mīmāṃsaka admits that the awareness of the word arises from the phonemes before the comprehension of meaning, so he cannot appeal to this argument.

(ET77–83). \textit{Buddhist objection:} There is no sentence apart from the phonemes, for no such thing is perceived.

\textit{Counterobjection:} We can infer some such different thing, because understanding requires a cause.

\textit{Buddhist:} Just the phonemes are the cause.

\textit{Counterobjector:} The same meaning does not arise from hearing \textit{jarā} as from hearing \textit{rāja}, so the meaning cannot come just from the phonemes.

\textit{Buddhist:} It has to be shown that the phonemes (in the two words) are not different.

\textit{Counterobjector:} That is shown through recognition.

\textit{Buddhist:} Recognition may be in error. Anyway, all objects are momentary and so different from one another.
Counterobjector: Because we know that the sentences (one with jara in it, the other with raja in it) are different we know that they mean different things.

Buddhist: It is wrong to attribute the difference to an imperceptible difference (among sentences) when there is a perceptible difference among the phonemes. Furthermore, the notion of a single sentence is problematic: does it have parts or not? If it has parts, are those parts meaningful or not? If meaningless, how can they constitute a sentence? If meaningful, do they have parts? If so, they are sentences, and the argument repeats indefinitely. If a sentence has no parts, it would be impossible to explain why one does not grasp the meaning of a sentence until its utterance is completed. (Other arguments are offered as well.)

28 (ET84–85). Answer: Just because phonemes figure in awareness of meaning, it does not follow that nothing else does.

29 (ET85). The believer in sphota holds that neither the sentence nor the word has parts. And we have already explained how grasping the meaning of a word or sentence is a gradual process.

30 (ET86). Even if phonemes are different each time they are produced, it is by virtue of their generic features, not of their newborn individuality, that they figure in the expression of meaning.

31 (ET87). What is “sequence” (krama, that is, the gradual understanding of the meaning)? Not merely the causal relation between the experiences of sounds or phonemes, for then understanding should arise even when the speakers of the sounds are known to be different.

32 (ET88–89). Indeed, the causal relation between the experiences of sounds cannot be what is called sequence; only when that causal relation is itself known can it produce understanding.

33 (ET89). A word is a unit. Analogously, scholars admit that an action, like raising a hand, is a unit manifested by different moments of activity.

34 (ET90–91). That the sphota is eternal follows from its unity.

35 (ET91–92). Objection: Because awareness of a word depends on something else (namely, the phonemes) it is a mere construction (kalpana).

Answer: Awareness of a universal property depends on awareness of the individual instances of it.

36–37 (ET92–93). Thus sphota is established.
This important commentator on Bhartṛhari tells us that he is the son of Bhūṭirāja and a descendant of a minister named Lakṣaṇa, or King Muktāpiṇḍa of Kashmir. Abhinavagupta, who flourished in 1014, appears to have studied with Bhūṭirāja as well as with a son of Bhūṭirāja whom Abhinavagupta calls “Indurāja.” It is clear that Abhinavagupta is referring to Helārāja in some passages, as he is credited with having written a grammatical work called Prakirṇakavivarana, which may have been a commentary on Helārāja’s Prakirṇakapraṇakāśa—at least the title strongly suggests Abhinavagupta’s awareness of Helārāja’s work. Thus we may place Helārāja’s date about A.D. 980.

Regarding his commentary on Bhartṛhari’s Trikāṇṭha, it seems clear that such a work was written covering the entire three chapters. There is some doubt about which portions of the work are available to us now. The commentary on book 3 is available in print. Aklujkar argues that its proper title is Prakirṇakapraṇakāśa, and that Helārāja’s commentary on book 1 was called Sabdāprabhā, while that on book 2 was Vākyakāṇḍātikā or Vākyapradīpa. Aklujkar further argues that the Tīkā on book 2, which is available in print and credited to Puṇyāraja, is in fact Helārāja’s work instead.

Helārāja tells us that he wrote at least three other works, none of which is now available. One was an explanation of Kätāyana’s vārttikas on Pāṇini, titled Vārttikomāṭa. Another work, called Kriyāviveka, is intended to establish that action (kriyā) is the main idea expressed by a sentence. A third, named Advayātīdhi, seems to have been a work on śabdādvaita or linguistic monism; Helārāja remarks that in it he “has shown that the ultimate manifests itself as the experiencer and the experienced and that all that is experienced rests in consciousness.”
Commentary on Bhartṛhari’s Trikāṇḍi

Survey of Philosophical Topics

1. On Universal Property

In the case of words abstracted from sentences Bhartṛhari tries to reconcile the universalist view of Vājapyāyana and the substantialist view of Vyādi. The meaning of a word is permanent, whether a universal or a substance. All words—nouns, verbs, prefixes, and postpositions—can be reduced to the category of universals. Every word primarily refers to the universal of its form—the word universal—which is then identified with the meaning universal through superimposition. According to Panini both the universal and the particular are primarily signified by words; and both are understood simultaneously, because they are so intrinsically interconnected that one cannot exist without the other. According to those who consider the primary meaning as the universal, its connection with action may be direct or indirect. In the sentence “one should not kill a Brāhmaṇa” the whole class is meant, but in “fetch a Brāhmaṇa” only the individual is meant.

Although Vaiśeṣikas do not accept a universal within a universal, the Grammarians accept a hierarchy of universals, like classes and subclasses: for example, the animal universal entails the universals of cowness and horsesness.

All nominal stems signify Being, which is eternal. Just as treeness is contained in the simśapā-ness, Being is found in everything. It is the all-comprehending universal. The status of the phenomenal universal depending on convention (samketa) is not affected by the great universal, mahāsamānya. Being itself becomes action when viewed as having a sequence of time.

Helarāja favored the metaphorical model of language rather than the crystal model. According to his model an object in the external world is given a name when the universal located in the name is superimposed upon a universal belonging to a particular bearer in the external world. The thing universals have an ontological separate existence. But language is independent of the world.

2. On Substance

Another view is that all words denote substance (dravya), the individual, the concrete, the particular. Substance is of two kinds, the real (pāramārthika) and the expressional (samvyavahārika). It is the second kind of substance that is dealt with in the supplementary section and is declared to be the meaning of all words by Vyādi. Through all these things with different forms, it is the same Ultimate Reality Brahmaṇ that is cognized. Words express these forms directly, and
through them the Ultimate Reality also. The many forms that we
cognize as the meanings of words are unreal, but the real runs through
them all. Although there are different gold ornaments, actually every-
thing is gold. Looking at a Jandscape through a tube, we are able to
perceive only a limited portion; similarly, every word expresses an
aspect of Reality.

3. On Relations
A word expresses the speaker's idea, the external object and the
word form. The word form is understood by all even without under­
standing the conventional meaning. The relation between a linguistic
form and its meaning is neither conjunction (ṣamyoga) nor inherence
(ṣamavāya). The meaning relation is the beginningless fitness (yogyatā),
like the fitness of sense organs for their contents. A word expresses only
its correct meaning; incorrect words convey meaning only by inference
the correct form.

What words convey can be called existence of a secondary nature
(upacārasattā). External objects are conveyed only in parts by words.

4. On Quality
A substance requires qualities for being expressed. Qualities help to
specify a substance in a finer way.

5. On Direction
Direction (dīk) is a power of Brahman, inferred from its effects.
those who believe that the whole manifestation of the external world
exists within the Supreme Consciousness hold that the manifestation is
not external, though it seems to be so. Everything is an inner mani­
festation of Brahman. Strictly there is no distinction between inner and
outer; there is only one Reality.

6. On the Means to Action (Sādhana)
The powers to produce various kinds of effects constitute the essential
nature of the objects in the world. A normal sentence expresses a
complex meaning of which the central meaning is some action, to
which the other elements contribute. The verb expresses the central
element and the nouns express the other elements. Sādhana, means to
action, is the name given to the concrete objects that help to accomplish
the action.

In the use of words the power of a thing is more important than the
thing itself, and the speaker's intention plays an important role in
deciding what type of kāraka is to be taken. "He cooks in the pot," "he
cooks with the pot," and "the pot cooks" are all correct. The sādhana
can be purely mental, as when a storyteller narrates the story of Kṛṣṇa
killing Kāṁsa. The means depends on the intention. In “he sees a pot” it is the dimension of the pot that is seen, but in “he sees the form,” it is the color. The Grammariian is interested in what the expression says.

7. On Action

The root is defined as something that expresses action (kriyā)—a particular behavior on the part of the accessories. Kriyā is different from the accessories that play a part, direct or indirect, in its accomplishment. It is not pratyakṣa (perceptible) but has to be inferred, and even in the case of “to exit” it is an action, the continued existence of sattā in time. Helārāja makes it clear that what is being discussed in grammar is not what action really is, but what action as presented by words is. There were conflicting views among early writers—whether it is a definite of action or the nature of the meaning conveyed by the verbal roots, and so on. The idea that action is a process is found in Yāśka. Helārāja says that a process is something that has parts arranged in a temporal sequence. How can the idea of a single action be conveyed, if the series of actions constituting it be not simultaneous? Unity is ascribed to the series of actions on the basis of the ultimate result. The unity is mental.

8. On Gender

The grammatical gender does not always correspond to the sex. Several attempts have been made to explain this inconsistency. Does gender depend on the form of words or on the meaning? Helārāja merely elucidates the views of Bhatṛhari and tries to correlate them with the views found in the Mahābhāṣya.

9. On Time

Helārāja summarizes Bhatṛhari’s view of time as follows. Time is an independent power of Brahmān. On the basis of this power, differentiation as the six transformations (birth and so on elaborated by Vārṣyāyaṇi) take place. The apparent sequence in the appearances of being is based on this time factor. Time is a creative power, not an eternal substance as the Vaiṣeṣikas hold. It is the svātantryaṣakti (power of complete freedom) of Brahmān. As the creative power time is responsible for the birth, continuity, and destruction of everything. The other special causes, such as the material cause, depend on time, which is the auxiliary cause. Time is compared to the stage manager (sūtradhāra) of a puppet show, who pulls the strings and makes the puppets move according to his wish. The appearance and the disappearance of things are based on the permissive power and the preventive power of time, respectively; the continuity of things is also based on the permissive power of time.
Time is measured by action, and action is determined or measured by time. Statements about an action being “slow” or “quick” are based on time. Although time is really one, it appears to be differentiated and in sequence. It is because of actions that distinctions such as past, present, and future are attributed to time. Action that is complete is given the name of past. The fact that things are remembered is a proof of the existence of time. All divisions of time into parts are artificial and based on actions that are brought about by it.

If external movements are not available for measuring time, one can use one’s own breathing movement for the purpose. The yogins actually use the movement of their breath to determine time.

Helārāja says that Bhartṛhari devoted a whole section on time not to discussing its philosophical aspects, but to explaining adequately the tenses in the language.

Brahman is true knowledge without any sequence, but under the influence of time (which is a power of Brahman) it is presented in a temporal sequence. Nescience (avidyā) is the cause of the phenomenal world, consisting of differentiation both temporal and spatial. Of the two, temporal differentiation comes first. Consciousness in the form of pāyanti is without any sequence, but in association with the prāna principle, it shines as though it had sequence. When true knowledge dawns, the division of sequence also disappears. The main function of time is to present phenomena in a temporal sequence.
The unknown author of a lost commentary on the \textit{Vākyapadiya} called \textit{Prameyasamgraha} must have flourished about A.D. 1000.
Two different commentaries on the *Trikāṇḍī* have been credited to this author, but in both cases the authorship has been questioned. For a long while the *jīkā* on Book 1, which had been published in the Benares Sanskrit Series in 1887, was credited to Puṇyarāja, though the colophon clearly mentions the author’s name as Hari Vṛṣabha. The mistake was pointed out by Haraprasad Shastri and again later by C. Kunhan Raja, as well as by K.A. Subramania Iyer.¹ In addition, as mentioned previously, Ashok Aklujkar has offered reasons to doubt Puṇyarāja’s authorship of the commentary on Book 2.
KAIYATA

Kaiyata, author of the *Pradipa* ("light") commentary on Patanjali's *Mahabhashya*, occupies a high position in the history of the Paninian school of Grammar, along with Bhartrhari and Nagesa Bhatta. He was the son of Jaiyata Upadhyaya and pupil of Maheśvara, and probably belonged to Kashmir. He generally followed the views of Bhartrhari, as stated in the beginning of the commentary, and was influenced by the *Kāśikā* of Vāmana and Jayāditya. He is assigned to the later half of the eleventh century.

A verse from Kaiyata's work (*bhāṣyāḥbhāṣyāḥ kvāṭśīmbhāṣyāḥ*) is quoted in Ruuyaka's *Alokaśarasarvasva*, composed between 1135 and 1150; another verse is quoted by Maheśvarasūri in the commentary on the *Anekārtha-samgraha* of his teacher Hemacandra (1088–1172). Puruṣottamadeva refers directly to Kaiyata in his *Bhāṣārthī* (about 1150). Kaiyata's work contains indirect references to Ṣeḷārāja's commentary on the *Vākyapada*ya.1 The generally accepted posteriority of Haradatta to Kaiyata is rejected by Peri, because Haradatta is mentioned by name in Dharmakirti's *Rūpavakāra* (before the tenth century). There is a tradition that Kaiyata was a younger brother of Mammaṇa.

The *Pradipa* is an elaborate and complete commentary on the *Mahabhashya*, elucidating the meanings of words and expressions in that work and discussing the different views held by scholars in the interpretation of particular passages. There is little scope for giving his own views about problems on the philosophy of Grammar; still, the importance of the *Pradipa* in elucidating the views of Patanjali and Bhartrhari is considerable.

*Pradipa on Patanjali's Mahabhashya*

S. R. Bannerjee and K. Kunjunni Raja

(1) *Śivasūtras*. About the arrangement of the alphabets of Sanskrit in
the Śivasūtras, Kaviyāta says that they are essential for pratyāhāra or selecting groups of them as used by Pāṇini, and the enunciation of the sūtras is not for explaining the proper pronunciation of the alphabets (svarūpakathana).

(2) Kaviyāta enunciates the principle that among the three great authorities on Sanskrit grammar—Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali—the later the sage, the greater the authoritativeness. Elsewhere he states that the authority rests with the three sages.

(3) On Patañjali's statement regarding scripture as a prayojana for the study of Grammar, Kaviyāta says that the term prayojana should be taken in the sense of motivating force (pravartaka). "A Brahmān shall learn and understand the Veda with its six ancillaries without any motive of gain."
Another Kashmiri author of a commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, now lost, was Jyeṣṭhakalāśa of Kauśika gotra (lineage), son of Rājakalāśa, grandson of Muktikalāśa, of the Konmukha village in Kashmir. One of his sons was Bilhaṇa, author of a *kāvyā* work titled *Vikramāṅkadeva-carita*. From Bilhaṇa’s date Yudhisthira Mimamsaka has calculated that Jyeṣṭhakalāśa must have lived between 1005 and 1082.
This Buddhist Grammarian in eastern India lived between 1092 and 1122, according to Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, who thinks he may have been a Bengali. In addition to works on Buddhist Grammar, including Dhatupradīpa, Durghāja-vṛtti, and a Tantrapradīpa on Jinendrabuddhi's Kāśikānyāsa (a fragmentary manuscript, which is listed as residing at the Asiatic Society Library in Calcutta), he appears to have written a tikā on the Mahābhāṣya, which has been lost.
During the later half of the twelfth century in Bengal, during the reign of Lakṣmanasena, a number of grammatical works were composed by this writer, who may have been a Buddhist. One of his works was a Prāṇāpana or Laghuavratti on the Mahābhāṣya, of which a fragment is available. Other works are Bhāṣāvrīṭti, Paribhāṣāvrīṭti, Gaṇavrīṭti, Jñāpakasūtra-ccaya, and a commentary on the Uṇādisūtras, as well as a number of lexicographical treatises.
Yudhisthira Mimamsaka places this writer at the beginning of the thirteenth century. In addition to a Prakriyāratnamāni, preserved in a single manuscript at Adyar, he also wrote a Cintāmaṇi on the Mahābhāṣya. He was apparently the teacher of Vopadeva, the famous Bengali Grammarian.
This well-known Pūrvamīmāṃsā writer flourished about 1410. He was a member of the important Payyur family of Bhattas and composed a commentary on Maṇḍana Miśra's Sphoṭasiddhi, called Gopālikā. In K. A. Subramania Iyer's translation of Sphoṭasiddhi use has been made of the Gopālikā, and a number of readings and explanations in his footnotes are based on Parameśvara’s commentary. A few of the most important are repeated in the following set of notes. References are by kārikās.

Sphoṭasiddhigopālikā
K. A. Subramania Iyer

2. It is the Gopālikā that identifies the opponents in question as Kumārila. Specifically Ślokavārttika, sphoṭa section 119, is cited.

7. Parameśvara says that the first sentence of Maṇḍana’s answer in this section summarizes an explanation of “dispositional tendency” provided by Kumārila in the Tantravārttika on Mimāṃsāsūtra 2.1.5., where Kumārila is specifically speaking about apiirva.

13. Although Maṇḍana’s text, in explaining why the final varṇa is without meaning, confines itself to showing how the latent disposition laid down by the previous phonemes is beyond the range of perception and inference, Parameśvara goes farther and shows that it is beyond the range of comparison and presumption as well.

10. The Gopālikā points out that all erroneous awarenesses are caused by things that are the causes of veridical awarenesses as well.

21. Parameśvara explains that the analogy of our cognition of a new large number is here predicated on the theory about number, that it is neither a separate category nor a quality (guṇa), a view different from the more commonly held Vaiśeṣika view that number is a quality.
22. The Gopalika points out that sublation may be by either a positive or a negative cognition. For example, when one discovers that "this is not silver," it is negative, but if the discovery is "this is shell," it is positive.

23. The sense organs referred to here include both external and internal ones.

27. Last sentence. The Gopalika explains why one does not grasp the meaning of a sentence until its utterance is completed. It is because the following stages take time: (1) understanding each phoneme; (2) recognition of each one as a stem or a suffix and thus the construction of a word; (3) understanding each word's meaning; (4) satisfying the requirements of mutual expectancy, fitness, and contiguity; (5) connecting the several word meanings; (6) understanding the sentence.
The Śeṣa family of Banaras is celebrated, and frequent attempts have been made to reconstruct its genealogy. According to New Catalogus Catalogorum, volume 4, p. 365b, this author was the grandson of Śeṣa Rāmacandra and the son of Śeṣa Nrṣiṇha, who was the author of the work on dharma entitled Govindāṇava. This Kṛṣṇa was also the elder brother of Śeṣa Cintāmaṇi, author of Rasamaṇjarīvyākhyā. His sons were Śeṣa Vireśvara, who was the guru of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, a very famous figure of those days, and (Śeṣa) Nārāyaṇa (Bhaṭṭa), author of the Sūktiratnākara (see below, author 23). The New Catalogus Catalogorum places Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa in the latter half of the sixteenth century, but if the preceding set of relationships is to be worked out consistently with the secure facts that are known, it would seem this date should be pushed back a bit—we suggest 1510 as the time in which he must have flourished.

He is said to have composed a work entitled Sabdāharana or Sabdālanākāra, which is lost. The New Catalogus also ascribes to him a small work on sphaṭa theory, entitled Sphaṭatattvaniṁiraṇa. A work with this title is available, though manuscripts do not identify its author.

Sphaṭatattvaniṁiraṇa

G. B. Palsule

This work is small, consisting of nineteen stanzas with the author's own commentary. The text has no pretensions to either original ideas or an exhaustive treatment of the topic, its aim apparently being to present the doctrine and the accompanying arguments in succinctly worded stanzas. It is worth mentioning that, though one of the late works, it is content with presenting the doctrine in its classical form and is free from such innovations as we find in the Sphaṭacandrikā.
Its Vedāntic bias is discernible when it speaks of the *sphoṭa* (= *sabda-brahman*) as a basis (*adhīṣṭhāna*), with the phoneme, word, and sentence as its illusory manifestation (*vivarta*), which are wrongly imposed (*adhyāsta*) on it.

The work is edited by M. G. Bakre in *Vadarthasamgraha* (Bombay, 1913), vol. I, pp. 1-15. Numbered references are to stanzas.

1. The first stanza salutes the *sabdabrahman*, the basis (*adhīṣṭhāna*) for the manifestations of phoneme, word, and sentence.
2. Previous authorities are named.
3. This stanza declares the inability of the phonemes in any way to convey meaning. *Sphoṭa* alone can do it. There are two kinds of *sphoṭa* (word and sentence). According to the view that *sphoṭa* is partless, sounds directly manifest *sphoṭa*. But if *sphoṭa* is accepted as having parts, then the sounds manifest phonemes, which in turn manifest *sphoṭa*. The author refutes the view that *sphoṭa* has parts.
4. Recognition of identity does not necessarily guarantee eternality for phonemes. Cognitions like “*g* is produced” can show the opposite.
5. Even if one accepts the eternality of phonemes, there cannot be a cognition of a simultaneous whole when they are screened by winds (that manifest them) or by sounds.
6. There cannot be any conveying of meaning by the accumulated dispositions in company with the final phoneme, because meaning-conveying is against the nature (*svabhāvasya viparyayat*) of the dispositions. Assumption of such an *ad hoc* power involves unnecessary assumption (*gaurava*).
7. No actual sequence is possible in the case of eternal and all-pervasive phonemes. Even in the final cognition sequence is impossible, because cognition is one.
8. The phonemes in the final memory cannot retain the sequence of their cognitions because they (previous cognitions) are not a subject of the final memory.
9. A single *sphoṭa* is clearly experienced in the cognitions “this is a word,” “this is a sentence,” “this is a phoneme.” So the *sphoṭa* is a fact of experience, it is not just a postulate, the commentary adds. The commentary also adds that because no change of meaning is there, even when the order of words in a sentence is changed, an indivisible sentence has to be accepted.
10. Neither as perishable nor as imperishable can phonemes be the parts of the sentence (= *sphoṭa*). They are only its illusory manifestations as the world of the Brahman.
11. The variety of appearance of a single *sphoṭa* is due to different sounds, like the variety of reflections of a single face in different reflections. This fact also explains the differences in meaning from utterance to utterance, the commentary adds.
12. Though different from the phonemes, the sphaṭa appears to be tinged by them, because of imposed identity.
13. This stanza describes the gradual perception of the sphaṭa, with the help of previous impressions, and provides the usual illustration of the inspection of a gem.
14. The cognition of the superimposed entity (here phonemes) is the cognition of the substratum (here sphaṭa) itself.
15. Erroneous cognitions can be a means of correct cognition. The usual illustration, a tree mistaken as an elephant, is offered.
16. In section 19 of Maṇḍana’s text the progressive clarity must be taken as referring to the perception of sphaṭa, not to the understanding of meaning (from phonemes), because this feature is peculiar to knowledge by direct perception (and the understanding of meaning is not an act of direct perception, adds the commentary).
17. In spite of the sameness of phonemes the sphaṭa differs in cases like nādi/dinda. So it must be different from the phonemes.
18–19. The unity of a word cannot be explained away as a secondary one (for example, because it conveys a single meaning), because the boundaries of a word are to be first understood before any meaning can be known. Moreover, such reasoning will amount to banishing all unity (and also the diversity based on it) from the face of the Earth.
Author of a *Laghuvivarana* on Kaiyata's *Mahabhasyapradipa*, this writer appears to have been the father of Iśvarānanda, who wrote a corresponding "Bṛhad" *Vivarana* on Kaiyata. As a manuscript of Iśvarānanda's work dated 1603 (=1551?) is extant, we must date his father to the first half of the sixteenth century.
A brother of Śesa Kṛṣṇa, so presumably contemporaneous (thus, early sixteenth century), he may have been the author of a commentary, Prakāśa, on Kātyāṇa’s Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa.¹
One of Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa's sons, he is mentioned in one or two grammatical works of later times and may be identical with a Vāṭeśvara also named. We know of no works authored by him. Annambhaṭṭa was a pupil of his.
Younger brother of Śeṣa Vīreśvara, this writer must have flourished about 1540 (though Yudhīsthira Mimamsaka gives a date half a century earlier). He is the author of a commentary on the Mahābhāṣya titled Sūktiratnākara, which appears to have been written at the instigation of a King Pirinda or Phirinda. A manuscript of this work exists in the India Office Library, London.
This writer's Kśirodara on the Mahābhāṣya appears to be lost. It is referred to by Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī and by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. Because the latter's date must be the late sixteenth century, Viṣṇumitra must have lived at least a few decades earlier, say about the middle of the sixteenth century at the latest.
The son of Satyananda (Ramacandra Sarasvatī, see above, author 20) and datable to about the middle of the sixteenth century on the basis of evidence in a manuscript of his work, Ishvarananda wrote a Brhat (large) Vivaraṇa on Kaiyata's Mahābhāṣyaprādīpa. One manuscript list cites another work by him, Śabdabodhataraṅgini.
Whereas Bharata Mīśra makes a clear-cut statement (not found in Bhartṛhari or Maṇḍana) that it is the sounds (dhvani) and not the phonemes (varna) (though he does not say how he differentiates the two) that manifest the sphota, his most original contributions are in reconciling the theories of sphota as universal (jāti) and of sphota as individual (vyakti), and of sphota as inner mental word (antahśabda). The universal theory takes division to be real and belonging to the individuals, the individual theory regards it as superimposed, really belonging to the manifesters. According to Bharata Mīśra the different views are meant for students at different levels. The whole idea seems to have been tacitly accepted by the later authors.

Maṇḍana’s influence on Bharata Mīśra is evident not only in the title of the work but also in many an argument. But Bharata Mīśra is by no means without originality. The progress in methodology can be seen in the three clear-cut sections that offer three independent proofs in support of the sphota. While the idea is not wholly new, Bharata Mīśra seems to have been the first to have developed Vedic authority as a full-fledged argument in favor of the sphota theory; the first section, however, carries forward Maṇḍana’s concept that sphota is auditorily perceptible.

The salutation to Bharata Mīśra in the anonymous Sphotasiddhinyāyavacāra and adoption there of many of Bharata Mīśra’s arguments and
methodological features (like the three sections) would indicate his position among the writers on sphota.

The work is divided into three sections: perception, pp. 1–16; meaning, pp. 16–27; and Vedic authority, pp. 27–42 in the edition by K. Sambasiva Sastri (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 89, Trivandrum, 1927). It is a prose work, but when each argument is over, it is summarized in a stanza (there are ten in all). E references are to Sastri’s edition. The summary here is by G. B. Palsule.

Survey of Philosophical Topics

1. Perception

(El–9). An expression like “cow” (gauḥ), when heard, is directly perceived to be a single word-entity (padatattoa). But this cognition of unity is sought to be explained with four alternative possibilities (anyathāsiddhi) by the opponents so as to do away with the concept of a single word-entity. These possibilities are that the feeling of unity is due (1) to the phonemes appearing in a single cognition, (2) to their conveying a single meaning, (3) to the quickness of pronunciation, or (4) to a single power of the phonemes. They are contradicted as follows. (1) There being no sequence in a single cognition, there will be nothing to distinguish between the meanings of pika “a cuckoo” and kapi “a monkey,” which contain the same phonemes but in different sequences. (2) No meaning can be conveyed before a word is first grasped, because the word is the cause and the meaning its result. (3) Even in the case of long words like titau, there is a single perception. (4) Apart from other objections to this suggestion, the objection contained in (1) remains, that the phonemes cannot appear in a single cognition.

(El1–11). Bharata Miśra confirms this unitary word-entity in the context of the sentence “gośabdād artham pratipadyāmahe” (“we understand the meaning from the word “cow”). The opponent’s arguments, seeking to explain the unity of the word “cow” (go) on grounds other than the positing of sphota, are refuted practically on the same lines as in Maṇḍana’s Sphotasiddhi.

Bharata Miśra further points out that the statement concerned is not just figurative, nor erroneous, and that by the word go the final sound alone is not meant.

(El11–14). The perception of parts in a word is explained. According to the theory of sphota as universal, the division into parts belongs to the individuals; according to the theory of sphota as individual, the division into parts belongs to the manifesters (vyāhjaka) that are superimposed on the word. The universal theory takes the division into
phonemes to be real; the individual theory, by contrast, takes it to be erroneously imposed.

A parallel given for the unitariness of a word (and a sentence) despite apparent differentiation is that of the special vowel \textit{ai}, technically called \textit{vṛddhatalavya}, believed to be unitary by the opponent (\textit{Mīmāṃsaka}) himself (cf. \textit{Mīmāṃsāsūtras} 9.2.32–33). If he questions the unitariness of a word, he cannot logically hold the unitariness of this vowel.

2. Meaning

(\textit{E16–21}). In this section, which is meant to support the proof of direct perception in favor of the \textit{sphoṭa} by showing that otherwise the understanding of meaning cannot be accounted for (\textit{anyathānupapatti}), Bharata Miśra makes the following points.

(1) Phonemes in no way have the meaning-conveying capacity. (The arguments are much the same as in Maṇḍana's \textit{Sphoṭasiddhi}.)

(2) The case is similar for the dispositions. (Incidentally, Bharata Miśra defines power \textit{[sakti}, a disposition is a power\textit{]} as "extrasensory form restricted to bringing about a specific effect of an object" \textit{["kāryaviśayayayatam antīndriyam rūpam"]}.

(3) The first phoneme is without the benefit of a preceding dispositional trace. So the progressive imparting of excellence to phoneme cognitions is impossible, and, consequently, the dispositional trace cannot have the ad hoc power of conveying meaning.

(4) There is no compelling reason to assume a trace of the type of \textit{āpūrva}.

(5) The singleness of the speaker cannot be a cause of conveying the meaning.

(6) \textit{An important statement}: according to the Grammarians it is the sounds, and not phonemes, that manifest the \textit{sphoṭa}. The sounds in the word \textit{vṛṣa} are different from the first four in the word \textit{vṛṣabhā}.

(\textit{E22}). The indistinctness (\textit{anyaktā}) of the \textit{sphoṭa} is not of the nature of cognition-cum-noncognition (\textit{upalabdhatānupalabdhatātmikā}) but of that of relative distinctness (\textit{tāratamya}).

(\textit{E23}). The initial cognitions of phonemes constitute an \textit{anyathākhyāti} of the \textit{sphoṭa}. (Maṇḍana had used the word \textit{viparyāsa}.) (1) The sounds bringing about the error (of part perception) are different from, but similar to, the sounds that bring about the correct cognition of the word. (Maṇḍana, \textit{kārikā} 2, simply says that the same sounds are responsible for both of these results.)

(\textit{E23–24}). (2) Bharata Miśra shows how the sounds cause the erroneous cognition of parts in a sentence.

(\textit{E24–25}). (3) The threefold uniformity of error is justified. (These three kinds of \textit{niyatā} are already in Maṇḍana.)

(\textit{E25}). (4) The \textit{ṛṣis} perceive the partless \textit{sphoṭa} directly (cf. Maṇḍana,
p. 33). Only direct perception is capable of progressive clarity (see Maṇḍana, section 23).

(E25–26). This section states an important point. There is no conflict in the three theories about the *sphoṭa*, as universal (*jāti*), as an individual (*vyakti*), and as inner mental word (*śabdātattvā*). They are meant for different levels of students.

3. Vedic Authority

(E27–36). This section purports to establish the *sphoṭa* (actually the words used are *varṇātiriktaṃ vāktattvam*, “superphonemic speech-principle”) on the basis of scripture, by showing that this doctrine is tacitly admitted in certain Vedic texts.

(1) The first line of the celebrated Vedic stanza “*uta tvah paśyan*” (*Ṛg Veda* 10.71.4) is interpreted to mean that the common man, seeing with his eyes the physical world, does not recognize it as an effect (manifestation) of the language principle. Similarly, the second line is interpreted to mean that, being deluded by the physical speech sounds, he does not grasp the language principle that controls them.

(2) Bharata Miśra also quotes some passages from the Brāhmaṇas like “*saitam mantra m apaśyat*” (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 5.23) in which, he maintains, the clairvoyant perception of a *mantra* or other passage is possible only if a superphonemic word principle is accepted.

(3) It is also claimed that in the celebrated *Nirukta* passage (1.20) beginning “*sākṣātktadharmaṇa...*” the direct perception of *dharma* is meant to indicate that direct perception of word has preceded the perception of phonemes.

(E36–40). The reality at the basis of the whole word is *sphoṭa*, which can also be perceived directly. In a lengthy argument Bharata Miśra tries to show that the ultimate reality is existence, with its indescribable power and form, which descends to the level of the phenomenal world (“*advitiya sattaiśvārāsvaśaktirūpavargadvavatī vyavahārapatham avatāraḥ*”).

Two additional noteworthy points are made. First, like Maṇḍana, Bharata Miśra uses expressions such as “word above and beyond the phonemes” (*varṇātiriktaṃ padam*) or “speech principle” (*vāk tattvam*) or “language principle” (*śabdātattvam*) along with *sphoṭa*. Second, Bharata Miśra mentions (E1) Audumbarāyaṇa as the advocate of the *sphoṭa* theory and Upavarṣa as its opponent, but adds that there is no real difference of opinion between the two, because Upavarṣa’s purpose is only practical (E28).
This anonymous work is a good epitome of the usual arguments for and against the sphota, but otherwise there is little originality in it. It is considerably influenced by the Sphotasiddhi of Bharata Misra (to whom, along with others, an obeisance is made in the initial stanza); indeed, in a limited sense, the present work could be called a metrical recast of Bharata’s work.

One may in passing note that the author practically identifies, without expressly saying so, the individual sphota (vyaktisphota) with the language principle (Sabdatattva). Another interesting item is the scathing criticism of the notion of sequence (Jatra). The edition (E) is by T. Ganapati Sastri (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 54, Trivandrum, n.d.). References are by stanza.

1 (E1). Apart from the three Munis and Hari, the author mentions Bharata (and, of course, Manḍana) in the initial stanza.

2 (E2). The object of the work is to establish the superphonemic language principle (varnabhyo vyatirekena Sabdatattvam) on the strength of direct perception, presumption (arthapatti, the difficulty of explaining otherwise how we understand meaning), and scripture (āgama).

3 (E3–10). The distinct cognition of the word as a single entity apart from the phonemes is explained.

4 (E11–16). (a) This section elaborates the usual difficulties in the way of attributing meaningfulness to phonemes.

(E17–116). (b) Various suggestions are put forth by the opponent to show meaningfulness of phonemes and are refuted by the author: (1) excellence (viṣeṣa) imparted by phonemes to one another (17–29); (2) assigning a special power of conveying meaning, in the form of dispositions, to phonemes (30–49); (3) direct perception of the final phoneme combined with the memory of the preceding phonemes (49–53); (4) a simultaneous whole of the phonemes reflected in
the final memory (53-116). The arguments for rejecting these suggestions are the same as those in the Sphoṭasiddhis of Maṇḍana and Bharata. Stanzas 84-115 contain a long-drawn-out argument challenging the concept of sequence and its usefulness in assigning meaningfulness to the phonemes. So the author concludes that if sphoṭa be not accepted, we cannot account for the difference of meaning in words like sarah and rasah.

5 (E117-121). The popular saying “We understand meaning from word” (sabdād artham vijānimah) is explicable only by the sphoṭa theory, not by the phoneme theory.

6 (E121-131). Objections: There is no perception of any entity different from phonemes (as that of the thumb from other fingers); also, if such an entity existed, what would be its relation to the phonemes?

(E131-174). Answer: By the relationship of the manifester and the manifested, the sounds manifest either the words (as individuals manifest a universal)—sphoṭa as universal (136-144)—or a single word-principle, with illusion of parts (word, phoneme, sentence)—sphoṭa as individual (vyaktisphoṭa) (145-174). There are two kinds of sound, prākṛta and vaikṛta, and their functions are described (151-155). Sounds have a deceptive nature and hence produce an illusion (156-164). The final cognition of unity sublates the initial cognitions of plurality (165-174).

7 (E175-202). Sphoṭa manifests itself gradually.

8 (E203-205). Indistinct cognition is possible only in sense perception (which grasps sphoṭa), not in the understanding of meaning from word.

9 (E206-209). The three theories about sphoṭa (as universal, as individual, as inner mental word) are reconciled.

10 (E210-242). Sphoṭa is established as the authority of scripture (on the same lines as in Bharata’s Sphoṭasiddhi).

11 (E243-245). Conclusion.
This author, who flourished about 1560, is well known to students of Nyâya as the author of the most commonly studied introduction to the Nyâya system, the Tarkasamgraha, as well as of a commentary, Dipikâ, thereon. A native of the Telugu-speaking country, he identifies his father as “Tirumala Ācārya” of the family of Advaitavidyācārya Râghava Somayâji.¹ P.P.S. Sastri says the family of Râghava Somayâji resided in Garikapada, which was formerly in the possession of Nizam Ali.²

In addition to the Tarkasamgraha and several Nyâya commentaries, Annambhaṭṭa wrote a Mitâkṣara on the Brahmāsūtras, an Advaita commentary on Nṛśimhāśrama’s Tattvaviveka, and Pûrvamûṃśa commentaries on Kumārila’s Tantravârttika and Somesvara Bhaṭṭa’s Nyâyasudhâ. His works on grammar were a Mitâkṣara on Pâṇini’s Aṣṭādhyâyi, and an Uddyotana on Kaiyâta’s Mahâbhâsyapradîpa, which has been edited several times.

Annambhâṭṭa studied grammar with Śeṣa Viśēṣvara (see above, author 22), the son of Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa, while in Kâśi. In his Uddyotana commentary on Kaiyâta’s Pradîpa, Annambhaṭṭa says, “There is no reason to believe that only Sanskrit was created by God at the time of creation. When the Yâvânas, and so on, were created their language was also created. We do not have any evidence to show that the Yâvânas also first used Sanskrit and only later shifted to their own language.”
APPAYYA DĪKSITAI

The first and most famous of a number of members of the Bhāradvāja lineage that bear this name, this writer is responsible for a large number of treatises that range over topics in Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, Dharma, and Alāṃkāra śāstras, as well as a handful of grammatical works. He was the son of Raṅgarājādhvarīndra, a southern Brahmin, a grandson of Ācārya Dīksita, and an elder brother of Accān Dīksita, who in turn was the father of Nilakaṇṭha Dīksita, a famous kāvya author of more than one hundred works.

A good deal is known about Appayya’s life and times. Y. Mahalinga Sastri gives Appayya’s dates as 1520–1593. That he died in his seventy-second year is declared by Nilakaṇṭha Dīksita. He is known to have had several royal patrons, of whom the first was Chinna Timma of the Vijayanagara empire, who ruled until around 1550, and whom Appayya himself credits with having commissioned Appayya’s commentary on Vedānta Desika’s Vādavābhuyudaya. A second patron, Chinna Bomma, ruled at Vellore from 1549 to 1578, and Appayya mentions him more than once. Finally, Veṅkaṭapati of Pennugonda, whose rule began in 1585, is mentioned in Appayya Dīksita’s Vidhīrasāyana and Kuvalayānanda. There is an inscription at Adayapalam dated 1582 that refers to him as an author of a hundred works, as well as having been bathed in gold by Chinna Bomma. He is associated most closely with the town of Chūdambara, where he is held to have passed away.

Appayya Dīksita engaged in controversies with other Vedāntins, through whose relative chronology Appayya’s date can be further confirmed. Notable among them is Śrī Tātācārya (1508–1583), author of Pañcamatabhaṅjana, a critique of Appayya, who was influential at the Vijayanagara court in the middle of the sixteenth century between 1545 and 1585, during which time Appayya had apparently nothing to do with the Vijayanagara court. Mahācārya, another famous Viṣistādvaitin, wrote Chandamaruta in response to Appayya’s polemics. Another
important personality of the same period was Vijayindra Bhikṣu, the Dvaitin, who died in 1595 and is said to have written 104 works to rival the same number of Appayya's. Still another Dvaitin who responded to Appayya's arguments was Vādirāja, head of one of the Udipi maths (ashrams), who lived in this same period.

One of Appayya Dīkṣita's important pupils was Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, the author of *Siddhāntakaumudi*, who came from the north to study Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā and wrote *Śabdakaustubha* as a commemoration of his discipleship under Appayya. A story is told that Bhaṭṭoji found Appayya living unostentatiously in a village, belying widespread fame and royal patronage.

After Vācaspati Miśra I in the tenth century, Appayya Dīkṣita is the most outstanding instance of a writer who transcended the scholastic boundaries to write treatises that were and still are revered and read by followers of a variety of systems and indeed of a variety of sāstras. His works on Viśistadvaita and Dvaita, as well as, of course, on Advaita and Mīmāṃsā, are studied by proponents of those systems. He is the author of poetry, learned treatises on *Alamkāraśāstra*, literary criticism, and word derivations, as well as popular works on prayer and didactic works counseling how to live a fruitful life.

His works on Grammar are not in print. He wrote a commentary on Panini, a manuscript of which lies in the Adyar Library, according to the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*. Other grammatical treatises ascribed to him include the *Tiṇantaśesasamgraha* and *Kaumudiprakāśa*. 
This famous Grammarians flourished toward the end of the sixteenth century. He was a Brahmin of Maharashtra or Telugu country (uncertain), a member of an important family that comprises several other famous names among Grammar specialists. His father was Lakṣmi-dhara; his brother Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa, author of several Advaita works, who was himself the father of Kaunḍa Bhaṭṭa (see below, author 37). Bhaṭṭoji's own sons were Bhānuji Dīkṣita and Viśeṣvara, the father of Hari Dīkṣita (see below author 43). His teachers are also well known: they included the Mīmāṃsaka Saṁkara Bhaṭṭa, the polymath Appayya Dīkṣita (see above, author 29), and Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa (see above, author 19). Yuddisthira Mīmāṃsaka dates him from 1513 to 1593. He is held to have made his home in Varanasi, where he founded a school of Grammarians. He was roundly attacked by Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, a controversial figure.

Śabdakaustubha

E references in the following summary refer to the edition published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, no date given.

(E1–5). The correctness of a word depends on the meaning also; aśva, instead of aṭva, in the sense of a horse, is incorrect, but the term is correct if the intended meaning is "poor."

(E6–7). Division into stem and suffix in the study of words is only a means, it has no reality. Alternative division is also possible. Although grammar gives laṭ and the like as indicators of the tense, actually it is the form its and so on that are used (in, for example, pacati) to convey the meaning, for meaning is known through the usage of elders, and they use only the full words, never artificial symbols such as laṭ,
Although grammar gives the meaning of the artificial suffixes such as laṭ and then prescribes the actual form, such as ti, as substitutes for them, it is the substitutes that actually bear the meaning, for they are the forms used in the world.

(E8–11). Strictly speaking, meaningfulness is based on sphaṭa alone. There are several views: varṇasphoṭa; padasphoṭa; vākyasphoṭa; akhaṇḍa-padasphoṭa; and akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa are individual sphaṭas; there are three sphaṭa universals, varṇasphoṭa and vākyasphoṭa. (The arguments are the same as in the Sphoṭavāda of Nāgėśa.) Bhaṭṭoji says that all of the views have been suggested in Mahābhāṣya passages here and there; and also in Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapādiya. The experience as one word or one sentence is the basis for assuming padasphoṭa and vākyasphoṭa. The phonemes (varṇas) suggest the sphaṭa, which is the meaning bearer. Because the primary source for understanding the language is the elders’ statements, which are in the form of sentences, the sentence has to be taken as the primary unit of meaning.

(E12). The question of whether indeclinables are denotative or suggestive of meaning is valid only at the analytical level.
A great-grandson of Śeṣa Nārāyaṇa, Śeṣa Viṣṇu composed a Prakāśikā on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, a manuscript of which is held at a library in Bikaner. He must have flourished about 1605.
ŚIVARĀMENDRA SARASVATĪ

This author’s *Mahābhāṣyaratnaprakāśa* is published. Theodor Aufrecht cites him as having written a *ṭīkā* called *Ratnākara* on the *Siddhānta-kaumudi*. There is also a reference to a commentary on Pāṇini.¹
Cakrapāṇi was the grandson of Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa, the younger son and pupil of Vīresvara, and the younger brother of Śeṣa Puruṣottama, as well as the father of Śeṣa Gopinātha. This important scion of the great Śeṣa family of Varanasi wrote a critique of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita’s Praudha-manoramā, aptly named Khanaṇa. It is apparently the same work that is called Paramatakhaṇḍana, though Yudhisthira Mimamsaka believes then to be distinct works.¹ He is also credited with a Kārakatattvā or Kārakavicāra.²
MALLAYA YAJVAN

The author of a Tippani on Kaiyaṭa’s Mahābhāṣyapradipa, Mallaya was the father of Tirumala Yajvan (see below, author 40), the author of Darśapauṇamāsamantrabhāṣya. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka speculates that Tirumala was the father of Annambhaṭṭa, which would, of course, place Mallaya in the fifteenth century. There is no evidence to support this view, however, and it seems more likely that this author belongs to the seventeenth century, say, about 1630.
This Nīlakaṇṭha flourished between 1610 and 1670. A pupil of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, he wrote in 1637 a grammatical work titled Śabdaśobhā, as well as various works on rhetoric.¹
NĀRĀYĀṆA (ŚĀSTRIN)

In his *Vyāhyya* on Kaiyata’s *Mahābhāsyapradīpa*, Nārāyāna Śāstrin pays his respect to his guru, the famous Dharmarājādhvarīndra, author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* and other works. He is the father of Rāmakṛṣṇa Yavjan. His date must be about 1640.
The famous author of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana* was the son of Rāṅgoji Bhaṭṭa, the author of several Advaita manuals,¹ and the nephew of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (see above, author 30). Thus he must have flourished about 1650. He was a resident of Varanasi.

*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana and Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣanaśāra*

S.D. Joshi

The *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana* is a commentary on the verses of his uncle Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, which are known as *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana*.² On this commentary, which defends Grammrian views and refutes the theories of meaning found in Nyāya and Mīmāṃśā, Konda Bhaṭṭa also composed an abridgment known as *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣanaśāra*. He is also credited with a *Vaiyākaraṇaśiddhāntadīpikā*. In the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, volume 5, p. 92, he is also cited as having written works in the Bhaṭṭa tradition (*Bhaṭṭamatapradīpikā*), as well as in Nyāya (*Padārthadīpikā, Tarkapradīpa, Tarkaratna*).³

The *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣana* has been edited many times. Most of these editions also contain the text of the śāra. B references to the Bhūṣana edition are to the Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series edition of 1915, while S references are to the edition of the -śāra in the same volume. “Verse” indicates Bhaṭṭoji’s verses.

Section 1

(B2) verse 2. A verbal root denotes a result (*phala*) and an operation (*vyāpāra*). The personal endings of finite verbs denote either the agent of activity or the object in which the result appears. That is to say, in the active the personal endings denote the agent (*kartṛ*), and in the passive, the object (*karman*). The operation is syntactically predomi-
nant with respect to the result. The meanings "agent" and "object" are qualifiers of the operation and the result denoted by the verbal root, respectively.

The relation between the operation and the result is that of an accomplisher and the accomplished, for the activity produces the result.

(B3). The word "result" (phala) means a single effect of an action (kriya), produced by various operations conveyed by the root. For example, the root pac denotes any of the operations that go to make up the action of cooking, such as setting fire under the pot, fanning the fire, putting rice in the pot, and so on. Here, we see that all activities result in a single effect.

An action is a specific sort of activity, another name for which is productive operation (bhdoam, "bringing into being"), which is also called sudhya, "to be effected."

(B3–4). It is by these terms—sudhya, "to be effected," and siddha, "effected,"—that verbs are distinguished from nouns. Pacati, "he cooks," gives us the notion that the action of cooking is in progress, while pakā refers to an effected, completed action. The distinction between pacati, "he cooks," and pākah, "cooking," is that the first expression is complete in itself while the second is in expectation of some other action.

(B4–5). The root pac denotes in general any operation that leads to the result, namely, the softening of the food. In different instances the root pac refers to specific operations such as blowing, setting the fire under the pot, fanning it, putting the rice in the pot, and so on. These specific operations are limited by various properties such as "operation limited by blowing" (phutkāratvaocchinma-nyāpāra) and "operation limited by setting the fire below (the pot)" (samtapaocchinma-nyāpāra). In one instance, the root pac means blowing on the fire, while in another instance, it denotes the activity of setting the fire, because that is what is intended in these particular instances by the speaker. The singleness of denotation is determined by the speaker's intention.

(S271). When one uses the pronoun tad, "it," one may be referring to anything in the world. But this fact does not mean that tad has an infinite number of denotations. It has only one denotation, which may be limited by the speaker's intention.

(B5). In a majority of the cases pacati refers to the action of the main agent. But in kāsthām pacati, "the sticks of the firewood cook," pacati refers to the action of the firewood. In sthāli pacati, "the pot cooks" (that is, contains a particular quantity), it refers to the action of containing or holding. In this way pacati may refer to the action of other kārakas also.

The Mīmāṃsakas propose that the personal endings denote only the productive operation. But because an operation is inconceivable with-
out an operator, we may say that agent is implied. Finally, the Mimamsakas suggest that the notion of the agent can be furnished in the sentence not by the verb at all but by the word in the nominative case.

(B6). To this objection the Grammarians reply as follows: Panini 3.4-69 prescribes l-suffixes (finite verb endings) to denote the sense of object and agent.

*Mimamsaka’s objection:* Panini’s rule 3.4.69 means that l-suffixes denote karttva (agentness, volition, or productive operation) and karmatva (objectness, result). The number denoted by the personal endings is to be construed with the implied notion of the agent and the object.

*Answer:* The Mimamsakas maintain that the primary suffixes (krt) such as -dna, -at (the present and future participle endings), which are also substitutes of -l, denote the sense of agent, while the personal endings in pacati, pacatah, and so on which are also substitutes of -l, denote the sense of karttva (volition) and karmatva (result). This claim involves contradiction. The personal endings must denote the sense agent (or object) because we see syntactic agreement between the noun “Devadatta” and the verb “cooks” in devadattah pacati. Unless the meaning “agent” (or object) is denoted by the personal endings in verbs like pacati, no syntactic agreement (coreferentiality) would be possible between the nouns and verbs.

(B6-7). Moreover, the meaning “number” denoted by the personal endings cannot be connected with the implied meanings “agent” or “object,” because the rule, according to the Mimamsakas, is that two meanings (“number” and “productive operation”) denoted by the same word unit must be connected with each other. But it would be wrong to connect “number” with “productive operation.” Therefore, we must admit that the meaning “number” denoted by a personal ending should be connected with “agent” or “object.” Consequently, “agent” or “object” must also be the denoted meanings of the personal endings.

(B21–22). The personal endings denote agent or (grammatical) object, number, and time. Of them the agent is the qualifier of the activity and the (grammatical) object is the qualifier of the result. Number is a qualifier of the agent if the personal endings of the active voice are used, and it is a qualifier of the (grammatical) object if the passive endings are used. Time is a qualifier of an operation (action). If a time is construed with the agent or object then the idea of past, present, and future will depend on the state of the agent or object. As long as the agent or object exists, the usage will be “he cooks” or “it has been cooked” even if the action of cooking has ceased or not yet begun.

The semantic analysis of “caitraḥ tanḍulam pacati” (“Caitra cooks
rice") is as follows: an operation (action) of the present time, of which the agent is limited by singularity and is identical with (Caitra), which operation is favorable to (a result, namely) softening, residing in (an object) rice grains limited by singularity (generic singular). And the analysis of “tandulaḥ pacyate caitreṇa” ("rice is cooked by Caitra") is essentially the same: an operation of the present time favorable to (a result, namely) softening residing in (an object) which is identical with rice grain limited by singularity (generic singular), of which (operation) the agent is limited by singularity and is identical with Caitra.  

(B23). Although elsewhere it is accepted that of the meanings denoted by a base form and a suffix the meaning denoted by a suffix is syntactically predominant, it is accepted here that meanings denoted by a verbal base are syntactically predominant over the meanings "agent" and "object" denoted by the personal endings. This claim is made on the authority of the Nirukta, which states that a root presents the meaning “substance” as predominant.

(B24) verse 9. The finite endings of the passive voice, the passive vikarana suffix ya and the like, reveal the sense of object, and the present stem formants reveal the sense of agent. 

(B25). In the case of the reflexive passive (karmakartari), “pacyate odanah svayam eve” (“the rice boils itself”), the personal endings designate an object as an agent. Therefore, the personal endings have an active sense in the reflexive passive. An operation (vyāpāra) is a producing (bhāvanā), which is the same as bringing into being (utpādana) and as an action (kriya). Roots cannot denote action only, without any result, because in that case there would be no difference in denotation of the roots kṛṣṇ and yat. Both denote the action of exertion only. Consequently the root kṛṣṇ, like the root yat, would be intransitive.  

(B24-27). Naiyāyikas argue that effort (volition) is the denotation of personal endings on the basis of the fact that pacati, “cooks”, is explained as pākam karoṭi, “he makes a cooking”; karoṭi, according to Nyāya, can be applied only to sentient agent. When the root kṛṣṇ is used with reference to a nonsentient thing, it is used metaphorically, for instance, ratho gacchati, “the chariot moves.” According to Nyāya, the agent is not simply a substratum of activity, as the grammarians would have it. If we accept the Grammarians’ view then every kāraka can be an agent. Nyāya distinguishes (the sentient) agent from the other kārakas by its independence. The Naiyāyikas say that the meanings of the personal endings fall within the area of exertion (kṛtiṇa, a universal property).  

According to Grammarians the personal endings denote agent and object. The limiting property of these meanings will be karmatva (agent-ness) and karmatva (objectness). The karmatva or karmatva are properties that are present in all agents and objects and present in no other entity. These properties are nothing more than the actions and results residing
in agents and objects, respectively; and there will be many different actions and results, depending on differences in agents and objects. This situation involves complexity; but such complexity is no defect if it accords with the fact.

(B28-29). The result should be included in the denotation of the root. If it is not included in the root meaning, then the roots gam (to go) and tyaj (to leave) should be synonymous. The distinction between gam and tyaj lies only in their denoted result. Gam means an activity in the form of motion favorable to conjunction with a consequent point, while tyaj means an activity in the form of motion favorable to disjunction from a preceding point. The denoted activity in the form of motion is the same in both instances.

The ancient Naiyāyikas, who denied to verbal roots the denotation of result, said that the general idea of result is indicated by the accusative case ending, which contains the meaning of the roots gam and tyaj. One can say that the meaning of gam, when it is juxtaposition with an accusative, implies a result different from the result implied by tyaj, when it is connected with an accusative case ending. The Grammarians’ point is that without an accusative also, gacchati and tyajati indicate difference in meaning, therefore result should be included in the denotation of root.

(B31-32) verse 6. According to Grammarians, a root is transitive when the operation and result denoted by it have different loci. Thus, in pacati, “he cooks,” the operation resides in the cook, the result in rice. But such definitions are impossible unless the root denotes both operation and result.

According to Naiyāyikas, the result is not part of the denoted meaning of the root. But the general idea of result is denoted by the accusative case endings. Thus a verb is transitive when it denotes activity conditioned by result; the root’s denotation includes result in the broadest sense. In its specific form it is understood from an accusative.

Therefore, the roots kṛṇ and the like denote effect (and so on) connected with a result in the form of coming into being, and not an operation or result alone. So the reflexive passive construction (karmavadbhāva), as in “kriyate odanah svayam eva” (“the rice comes into being itself”), is allowed. This construction is permitted only with roots of which the denoted results are visible in their objects. If we deny to the root kṛṇ the denotation of result, it will be impossible to use it in such a reflexive construction.

(B32-33) verse 7. The reflexive passive construction is permitted when the object is producible or modifiable by the action of agent but not when the object is simply attainable.

The grammatical object is of three sorts: producible, modifiable, and attainable. An example of the first one is ghaṭam karoti, “he makes a
jar”; of the second one, somam sunoti, “he extracts the soma juice”; of the third one, rūpaṁ paśyati, “he sees color.” Attainability of an object means nonapprehensibility of a change brought about in the object by the action of the agent. By looking at an object (a village or pot) one cannot apprehend that this pot is cognized by someone or that this village has been visited by some. In the case of attainable objects the reflexive passive construction is not permitted.

(B42) verse 8. Therefore, the root kr explains the sense of the root (for example, pac) and not of the personal endings. The phrase pakvavān, “he has cooked,” is explained as pākaṁ kṛtavān, “he has done the cooking,” and the phrase kim kṛtam, “what has been done?” is answered by paksam, “it has been cooked.”

(B45). The Mimbāṣakas and the Grammarians agree that pacati may be explained as pākaṁ karoṭi. The Mimbāṣakas claim, however, that the word pākaṁ in the explanation denoting result explains the meaning of the root pac, while the word karoṭi, denoting activity, explains the meaning of the personal ending. The Grammarians oppose this claim by showing that the root kr is also used in explaining other forms that contain no personal endings. Pakvavān is explained as pākaṁ kṛtavān. The Grammarians’ assignment of meanings “result” and “activity” to a verbal root is based on the following analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORMS</th>
<th>MEANING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) pacatai (pac+personal ending)</td>
<td>result, activity, agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) pakvavan (pac+tavat)</td>
<td>result, activity, agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) pakvam (pac+vam)</td>
<td>result, activity, object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One morpheme and two meanings are common in these examples. Here the root morpheme denotes two meanings, “result” and “activity.”

(S308). If the root denotes the result alone, then we should have the notion that the village is possessed of going (gramo gamanaṁvān) because the village is the substratum of the result of conjunction (reaching). Likewise, when the result (namely), the softening of the rice, has not yet occurred even though the activity (favorable to softening) is in progress, we could not say pāko bhavati, “cooking comes into being.” When, by contrast, the operation (favorable to softening) has ceased and the result is present, we would say pāko vidyate, “the cooking continues.”

(B45). The denotation of the agent by the primary endings is necessary in order to establish the connection of the agent with number. Furthermore, in words like pakvavān, the denotation of action is just necessary in order to establish the connection (of the action) with the notion of kāraka. The meaning “number” can be construed only with
the meaning "agent." The meaning "time" can be construed only with the meaning "operation."

If the Mīmāṃsakas claim that the root $kṛ$ explains the sense of action denoted by the personal endings because $kim$ karoti, "what does he do?" is answered by $pacati$, "he cooks" ($pākaṃ$ karoti), then they will have to accept also that the root $kṛ$ explains the sense of nouns derived from the primary ($kṛt$) suffix. For instance, $kim$ kāryam, "what is to be done?" is answered by $pakvavan$, "cooking should be done." But the Mīmāṃsakas say that the root morpheme denotes the result, the personal ending denotes the productive operation, and the primary suffixes denote the agent and object and imply productive operation. Thus the Mīmāṃsakas' analysis violates the principle that the common meaning should correspond to the common element.

(545). verse 9. Furthermore, there can be no such thing as a root without denotation of activity. That verbal roots denote actions ($kṛyā$) has been accepted by Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali.

In the word kāryam, the primary suffix is used in the sense of karman (in the passive sense). In jyotiṣomayājī, "who has sacrificed with jyotiṣoma sacrifice," the primary suffix in denotes the sense of agent. The meaning of these suffixes must be connected with action, which proves that the operation must be denoted by the root. It is impossible to call something a kāraka if it is not related to the notion of action. It is, accordingly, impossible to use a suffix denoting a kāraka in the absence of a connection with the notion of action.

(B50–51). Objection: If verbal roots are supposed to denote action then the roots as (to be) and the like, which are not denotative of action, would not be termed roots, for when we say asti, "he is," the meaning "action" is not cognized.

Answer: Roots such as as also denote action. In the case of intransitive roots, because agent and object of action are the same, the action is not subservient to any other entity than the agent. Therefore, the distinction between the actor and the one acted on is lost. Consequently, the notion of action in the case of as is not immediately apparent. Further, we do cognize an action favorable to the result "existence" from as (to be) and similar roots. Suppose a man is on the verge of death and with reference to him someone asks "what is he doing?" the answer "he is," in other words, "he exists" is approved as meaningful by everyone. Here the answer refers to a particular activity (existing with great effort) on the part of the agent.

(B50–51) verse 12. And further, if actions were not denoted by roots like as, actions would not be specified as past, present, and future, which they are.

(B56) verse 13. When the operation and the result reside in the same
substratum a root is intransitive; and when they reside in different substrata the root is called transitive.

(B57) In “ātmā ātmānāṃ jānāti” (“the self knows the self”), the self limited by the adjunct body is the object, and it is the substratum of the result, knowledge, while the self limited by the adjunct mind is the agent, and it is the substratum of activity. Thus the activity and the result have different substrata.

(B59) verse 14. In the verb the root morpheme denotes sādhya (action), namely, action in progress or durative, and the finite verb ending denotes the sādhana (operator), which is capable of bringing the action into being. In a word like pāka, which ends in the primary suffix ghaṇ(a), the root morpheme denotes action in the process and the primary suffix denotes siddha (accomplished) action that has the characteristics of an operator (sādhana). An accomplished action behaves like a substance and is thus always capable of being used as an instrument of action in progress. Bhāṣāṇa explains this sense quite differently.

(B60) verse 15. In a noun ending in a suffix such as ghaṇ(a), a root portion denotes action in progress, while its frozen (accomplished) aspect is associated with suffix ghaṇ(a).

For this reason we have a distinction between the constructions stokah pākah, “a small amount of cooking”, and stokam pākah, “cooking to a small extent.” In the first case stoka is syntactically connected with the primary suffix ghaṇ(a), which denotes activity frozen (substantiated), and in the second case stoka is syntactically connected with the root pāc, which denotes the action in process. Durative activity is void of gender and number (asattvabhiñā).

(B64–68) verses 16–17. A word ending in the vocative case suffixes having the sense of kṛivas (counting of recurrences), the kārakas (instrumental in bringing about the action), the first suffix vat (Pāṇini 5.1.115: prescribed in the sense of what is similar is an activity), the suffixes, infinitives, and so on, prescribed under the governing section (Pāṇini 3.4.1), verbal particle of negation (that is, other than nominally bound negative), the locative absolute (Pāṇini 2.3.37) form proper construction only with durative action.

(B69). In stokam pākah the ending am is a formal constructional appendage because a substantive cannot be used without a case ending. Substantiated activity does possess, however, number and gender. Therefore, when stoka is constructed with the suffix ghaṇ it takes masculine gender and whatever number is appropriate.

(B69) verse 19. Just as the inseparable action (denoted by the root gam) in the word gata, “has gone,” is constructed with the object grāma in the phrase grāmaṇ gataḥ, so the activity (denoted by the root kr) in the phrase kṛtapūrvi kaṭam, “one who has made a mat before” is connected with the object kaṭam.
Even when the activity denoted by a root is subordinate to the agent or object denoted by a suffix, a kāraka denoted by a separate word with oblique case ending is still construed with the action and not with the denotatum of suffix. This fact holds true in cases like grāmam gatah, “he has gone to the village,” where the kāraka, grāmam, is construed with gam rather than with the suffix -ta. In kṛtapūrvi kaṭam, “he who has made a mat before,” and bhuktapūrvi odanam, “he who has already eaten rice,” kaṭa and odana are construed with kr and bhuj rather than with the suffix -in. In these cases, outside words grāmam, kaṭam, and odanam are indeed construed with the subordinate members gam, kr, and bhuj, respectively. Such constructions are allowable.

(B70) verse 21. Correctness has no invariable connection with communication. Even in the absence of correct forms, verbal knowledge is not denied by the Grammarians.

(B70–71). The Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas hold the view that whatever is denotative is correct. Corrupt words are not denotative, so they are incorrect. The corrupt words like gāvī appear to be denotative of the meaning “cow” because they remind us of the correct words like go. The Grammarians refute this view. If the corrupt words had no denotative function they would convey no meaning. It does not help us to say that the corrupt words remind us of correct words and through them they are denotative, because ignorant persons who do not know the correct words understand the meaning from incorrect ones. According to the Grammarians, the correct word go and the corrupt word gāvī are both denotative of the cow. The only difference is that the use of corrupt words leads to religious demerit, while the use of correct words leads to merit.

Section 2: The Meanings of Tenses and Moods (Lakārārthanīṃya)

(B73) verse 22. Lat and so on (the phrase stands for ten markers laṭ, liṭ, and so on, which do not occur in actual utterances; they represent the personal endings, ti, laś, and so on, that come in place of l- the common symbol for all the finite suffixes of tenses and moods) are to be understood in the following meanings: present, past not witnessed (by the speaker), what is going to happen tomorrow, future (simple), injunction, request, and so on.

(B73). Lat denotes the present. Presentness is defined as being (a time) that is characterized by an action that is begun but not ended or as the property of being a time other than the past or future.

(B73–75). The question is raised whether “time” is the denoted (vāya) or the cosignified (dyotya) meaning of l-suffixes (personal endings). According to the first view, time is the denoted meaning of the l-suffixes. A verbal root cannot denote all the specific aspects of action,
including specific time. In that case the denotative area of verbal roots will be too wide. It is simpler to say that a root denotes operation and result, and \( l \)-suffixes (personal endings) denote specific aspects of action, including time. Moreover, Panini's rules (Panini 3.2.123 and elsewhere) lay down that \( l \)-suffixes denote time and aspects (injunction and so on).

According to the second view, the \( l \)-suffixes are time-indicative suffixes and not independently denotative of time. These \( l \)-suffixes only single out the particular meaning that is to be adopted in a particular context. The verbal root already denotes all aspects of action, including time in general.

In this connection, the final view of the Bhūṣāṇa is that time is considered to be the measurer of an action. But in reality time is measured by action, for time cannot be divided without being associated with action. According to Grammarians, time and action are identical because time has no reference to anything outside the domain of an action. Thus the general notion of time is denoted by verbal roots, when it denotes action. But the specific aspect of time, such as presentness, is indicated by \( l \)-suffixes. Therefore, the second view appears to be correct.

(B75). Then a question is raised: how to account for the use of the present tense in such sentences as ātmā asti, “the self exists,” and parvatāḥ santi, “the mountains stand,” because existence and standing go on continuously without stopping? Therefore, continuous actions “existing” and “standing” cannot be associated with the three divisions of time.

The Bhūṣāṇa, following the Mahābhāṣya, answers that the existence of the self and the standing of the mountains are also differentiated as present or past with the aid of the contemporary actions of the kings belonging to different periods of time.

Li ś (perfect tense) expresses past action that happened at a definite time in the past, not witnessed by the speaker. Paroksattva, imperceptibility (being not witnessed by the speaker) means the property of not being the object of the knowledge that can be described as “I perceive,” which resides in the speaker. Imperceptibility either means imperceptibility of action or imperceptibility of kārakas engaged in an action. Although the action as a whole is always imperceptible, yet its parts are clearly perceptible. Thus the perfect is not to be used when some parts of the action as a whole are perceived by the narrator. The perfect in the first person is allowed when even one’s activity is not perceived by oneself due to one’s being absorbed in something or for some other reason.

(B76). Li ś (periphrastic future) expresses only future action, exclusive of today, that is, action that is going to take place at a definite time to come. Liś denotes any future action.
Let \( (\text{Vedic subjunctive}) \) denotes permission, injunction, command (Pāṇini 3.4.7), inquiry, and the like.

Lot \( (\text{imperative}) \) denotes command, permission, and the like. There is no sharp line of distinction between the imperative (Lot), the subjunctive (Let), and the optative (Liṅ).

Laṅ \( (\text{imperfect}) \) denotes a completed action that happened at a definite time in the past (anadyatane).

Liṅ \( (\text{optative}) \) expresses vidhī, injunction (including command); nimantrāṇa, summoning to do something; āmantrāṇa, invitation; adhiśṭa, respectful request; samprāśna, inquiry; and prārthana, request. The first four of these meanings can be reduced to one, namely, prompting or instigation \( (pravartanā) \). Pravartanā is defined as an activity on the part of the prompter that leads the prompted person to do something. The definition cannot be applicable to Vedic injunctions because the Vedas are not composed by any human being. Therefore, in connection with Vedic injunctions we assume that the optative forms in the Veda itself prompt someone to do the thing stated in the Veda.

\((B77-79)\). But what is the precise nature of pravartanā? The Bhāṣana mentions several views on this subject, as put forward by the Naiyāyikas, by the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas, and by Koṅḍa Bhāṭṭa himself.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the person to be prompted does not become inclined to act unless he knows the following three factors of action:

1. Feasibility \( (kṛtisādhyātva) \): the prompted person does not proceed to perform impossible tasks such as bringing down the peak of Mount Meru, bringing down the moon, and the like. Therefore, feasibility is the meaning of liṅ-suffixes.

2. Knowledge that this \( (iṣṭasādhanātājñāna) \): a person does not act unless he ascertains that this \( (\text{act}) \) will achieve something he desires. The person desiring satisfaction of his thirst does not thrash the water because he knows that this action will not bring him the desired result. Therefore, iṣṭasādhanatva is the meaning of the liṅ-suffixes.

3. The cognition of not entailing a greatly undesired result \( (balavādanistmanubandhitva) \). No one eats a food mixed with honey and poison. There is no inclination toward the eating of such a food because it leads to a greatly undesired result, namely, death.

Unless the person to be prompted knows these things beforehand he does not proceed to perform any act.

\((B79-82)\). According to the Prabhākaras, something new to be achieved \( (āpūrva) \) is the meaning of the injunctive sentence containing liṅ \( (\text{optative suffix}) \). Āpūrva is the same as kārya, the thing to be brought about by exertion \( (kṛti) \) or that toward which the activity is directed \( (kṛtyuddhēva) \). Āpūrva has been called prompting \( (niyoga) \) because it acts
as an incentive to the prompted person to perform the act prescribed. The sacrifice does not directly precede heaven. Because *apūrva* is the immediately preceding cause of heaven, it is cognized as the thing to be done (*kārya*) and it is the meaning of *-liṅ*.

The Prabhākāras deny the property of being the means to a desired result (*iṣṭasādhanatva*) as the meaning of the *liṅ*-suffixes (optative). The reason is that there are certain obligatory rites, the performance of which does not lead to any desired result. Thus in the obligatory rites the inclination to act is due to *apūrva*.

It is also not correct to say that a *liṅ*-suffix denotes the state of being an indirect cause of the desired result, if no operation (*vyāpāra*, that is, *apūrva*) be known. Therefore, it is better to suppose that *apūrva* is the direct cause that immediately precedes the result, heaven. Therefore, *apūrva* (the thing to be done) is the meaning of *-liṅ*. It is also our common experience that the knowledge “this act is to be done” acts as an instigator (prompter).

(582-96). According to Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, the *liṅ*-suffixes express *iṣṭasādhanatva* or *hitasādhanatva*, the property of being the means to a desired result. Here Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa follows the view of Maṇḍana Miśra, the author of the *Vidhīviveka*. The person to be prompted requires some incentive. There can be no inclination to activity unless one knows that it leads to a desired result. Thus it is a means to a desired result and the cause of the performance of the act in general.

Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, following Madhva (1197-1273), rejects feasibility as the meaning of *-liṅ*. If we accept that feasibility leads to an action, there will be inclination for prohibited things such as killing a brahmin, because killing is feasible. Further, the general rule is that only that meaning which cannot be obtained by any other means is accepted as verbal knowledge. There will be no inclination to act when the action involved is not feasible. Our common experience shows that the efforts toward nonfeasible acts are wasted, as they produce nothing. Then aversion is created in the mind of a prompted person, and accordingly he does not proceed to perform nonfeasible acts.

According to Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, the property of not entailing a greatly undesired result (*balavadaniṣṭānamubandhitva*) is also not the meaning of *liṅ*-suffixes. Noninclination toward disastrous acts can be caused by aversion, which prevents the agent from undertaking any activity. Moreover, there is no way to determine how much frustration will be a deterrent factor in the case of different acts and in the case of different individuals. For some persons, even a little trouble will be enough to remove the inclination to act. Therefore, it is aversion that should be accepted as the deterrent. Once it is accepted, the separate factor, *balavadaniṣṭānamubandhitva*, for inclination to act is not necessary.

Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa also rejects the view of the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas
According to him, there is no evidence for saying that the immediately preceding cause of a result (namely, the \textit{apūrva} accepted by the Prabhākaras) is a prompter or instigator. Moreover, what immediately precedes may not be necessarily the main cause of the effect. Further, \textit{apūrva} means something to be produced by effort (\textit{kārya}). This property of being something to be effected (\textit{kāryatā}) in fact belongs to the action denoted by the verbal root. So what is to be produced is sacrificing (\textit{yāga}) and not \textit{apūrva}, as accepted by the Prabhākaras. According to Prabhākaras, \textit{apūrva} is considered to be the denoted meaning of \textit{-liṅ}. But it is hard to grasp the relation of \textit{apūrva} and \textit{-liṅ}. Without first knowing \textit{apūrva} independently, how can one grasp the signifying association of \textit{apūrva} and \textit{-liṅ}? Konda Bhāṭṭa states that \textit{apūrva} cannot be a goal at all. The object of desire alone can be the goal of action. Therefore, \textit{apūrva} can be an intermediate link (as in, sacrifice-\textit{apūrva}-heaven), and \textit{apūrva} cannot be the object of desire.

\textit{Lū} (aorist) denotes the past in general.

\textit{Lṛṅ} (conditional) is used in the past or future value to indicate that something is going to happen without any effect.\textsuperscript{4}

**Section 3: Meanings of the Case Endings**

(\textit{Subarthanīrṇaya})

\textit{(B99)} verse 24. The substratum, the limit (of separation), the recipient, relation, or capacities (of these things) are considered to be the denotation of case endings on the authority of the \textit{Mahābhāṣya}.

The accusative, the instrumental, and the locative denote the meaning substratum. The accusative denotes the substratum of the result (\textit{phalaśraya}). The instrumental denotes the substratum of the operation, and the locative denotes the substratum of either operation or result through the medium of agent or object. The ablative case denotes the sense of limit from which the separation is to be effected. The dative case denotes the sense of recipient of the fruit of action (\textit{udāśya}). The genitive case denotes the relation \textit{ṣeṣa} between the meanings denoted by two nouns.

(\textit{S367}). The term \textit{karman} is defined (\textit{Pāṇini} 1.4.49) as that which is the most desired to be obtained (by the agent). The word \textit{karman} means the object that is the substratum of the result produced by the activity. It is only through the possession of the result produced by the activity that the object becomes the most desired to the agent.

In the sentence \textit{odanam pacati}, "he cooks the rice," \textit{odana} is the object, because it is the substratum of the result softening (of the rice grains). In the sentence \textit{ghaṭaṁ karoti}, "he makes a jar," the jar is the substratum of the result production. In the sentence \textit{ghaṭaṁ jāṅāti}, "he knows a jar," the jar is the object because it is the substratum of the result breaking of the veil (of ignorance) denoted by the root \textit{jñā}.  

\textit{Konḍa or Kaunḍa Bhāṭṭa} 267
(S369–370). **Objection:** While going to a village, the usage “caitraḥ caitraṃ gacchati” (“Caitra goes to Caitra”) would be correct, because Caitra is also the substratum of the result conjunction produced by the activity in the form of motion, like the object village, because conjunction is a property that resides in two things. Here it resides in the object grāma as well as in the agent Caitra. Similarly, in the sentence “prayāgāt kāśiṃ gacchati” (“he goes to Kāśi from Prayāga”) the apādāna-kāraka, namely,prayāga, would also be karman because it is the substratum of the result disjunction produced by the activity of motion. The action of motion produces invariably two results: conjunction and disjunction.

(S372). **Answer:** Although Caitra, like the village, is the substratum of the result, still the designation agent belonging to Caitra sets aside the designation object, following Pāṇini 1.4.1. Therefore, the usage “caitraḥ caitraṃ gacchati” is not allowed. The designation “object” to the word prayāga in the sentence “prayāgāt kāśiṃ gacchati” is ruled out because the word phala in phalāsraya is qualified by the phrase dhātvartha. The phrase dhātvartha debars the designation because the result disjunction is not denoted by the root gam. The root gam denotes the action of moving, producing invariably two results: conjunction with a consequent point and disjunction with a subsequent point. Out of these two results, the root gam denotes only the former one.

(B102–105). The Naiyāyikas claim, however, that the word kriyā in the definition “kriyājanyaphalāśrayam karma” is qualified by the phrase parasamavetatva, which serves to distinguish the object from the agent. The definition “parasamavetakriyājanyaphalāśrayam karma” means that X is the karmakāraka, if X is possessed of the result produced by the action that appears in anything other than X. If X stands for Caitra in the definition “caitra grāmaṃ gacchati,” the definition of the karmakāraka does not apply to Caitra because the action of going does not inhere in anything other than X. If X stands for a village (grāma) that is the substratum of the result conjunction, the definition applies to the village because the action of going inhere in Caitra, who is other than the village.

Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa does not agree with this definition given by the Naiyāyikas. The meaning parasamaveta, inherent in the other, and so on, is not the denoted meaning of the accusative because this assumption involves complexity. Moreover, this definition does not exclude the prompter agent (prayojaka) and reflexive agent (karmakārta) from the province of the karmakāraka. Therefore, the simple answer to exclude the agent from the province of the karmakāraka is to assume that the designation agent (kārta) prevails over the designation karman.

(B105–106). The karmakāraka is divided into seven categories. The ipsisitamakarman, the object most desired by the agent, is of three kinds:
(1) *Nirvartya*, the object to be produced, for instance, *ghaṭam karoti*, “he makes a jar.”

(2) *Vikārya*, the object to be modified. One kind of *vikāryakarman* is that which arises on account of the destruction of the material, as ashes from the firewood: *kāṭham bhasma karoti*, “he reduces firewood to ashes”; another kind is that which arises on account of the origination of new qualities, as a modification of gold: *swārmam kuṇḍalam karoti*, “he fashions an earring out of gold.”

(3) *Prāpya*, attainable. *Prāpyakarman* is that in which the effectuation of particular features due to action cannot be understood from perception of the object or from inference, for instance, *ghaṭam pāyati*, “he sees a jar.”

The object not positively desired to be reached by the agent (*anīpsitakarman*) is categorized into four types:

(1) *Uḍāsina*, indifferent, for instance, *graṁmaṁ gacchan trṇam* in “*graṁmaṁ gacchan trṇam sprṣati*” (“while going to the village he happens to touch the grass”).

(2) *Dvesya*, odious, for instance, *viṣam bhunkte*, “he eats poison.”

(3) *Anākhyaṭa*, unexpressed object. That is an unexpressed object (*akathita*) which is not intended to be otherwise expressed as *apādāna*, *adhikaraṇa*, and so on. In other words, that is a *kāraka* which can be expressed otherwise, but not expressed by way of any other *kāraka* relation. But if the speaker intends to express it as *apādāna*, *adhikaraṇa*, and so on, he is free to do so, for example, “*gām payo dogḍhi*” or “*goḥ payo dogḍhi*,” (“he milks the cow” or “he milks from the cow”).

(4) *Anyāpūrvaka*, an object that has been declared to be the *karma-kāraka* by the special rule in place of *sampraddāna*, and the like, for example, “*kruram abhikṛudhyati*,” (“he is angry with a cruel person”).

*B107–108.* The third case representing agent denotes substratum. A *kāraka* is invariably considered to be an agent provided that the action belonging to it be denoted by the verbal root. In the sentence “*devadattaḥ kāṭhaṁ sthālyaṁ odanaṁ pacati*” (“Devadatta cooks the rice in a pot with the help of firewood”), Devadatta functions as the agent who independently initiates the action and sets the other *kāraka* in motion. Normally, *pacati* refers to the action of the main agent; still, it may also refer to the activities of the other *kārakas*. For instance, if the speaker wants to convey the idea that firewood considerably facilitates the action of cooking, he will say *kāṭhaṁ ni pacanti*, “firewood cooks.” Here *pacanti* refers to the action of the firewood. In *sthālī pacati*, “the vessel cooks,” the verb *pacati* refers to the action of containing or holding.

*B108.* The *kary-kāraka* is divided into three types:

(1) *Suddhakārtā*, simple agent, for instance *devadatena* in “*devadatena hariḥ sevyaṭe*” (“Hari is worshiped by Devadatta”).

(2) *Prayojakākārtā*, prompter or causal agent, for instance *kāryate hariṇa*, “someone is made to do by Hari.”
Reflexive agent: when the object is transferred to the states of the agent it is called reflexive agent. For instance, “odanaḥ pacye svayam eva,” “the rice cooks itself.”

(B109). The instrumental case denotes the sense operation also. The most effective means of operation is called karana. The most effective means is nothing but possession of the most important operation that produces the (desired) result immediately.

The feature of being the most effective means for the accomplishment of an action is not fixed with regard to any specific kāraka. Whether a particular kāraka plays the role of karana is determined by the speaker’s intention. One can say sthālyāṃ pacati, “he cooks in the vessel,” sthālyā pacate, “(it) is cooked by means of the vessel,” kāṣṭhāiḥ pacati, “he cooks by means of firewood,” “or kāṣṭhāṃ pacanti, “the firewood cooks.”

The locative case also denotes the substratum of action through the medium of the agent or the object. The following are the varieties of the locative case:

1. Abhivyāpaka, coextensive or location of pervasion. For instance, tileṣu tailam, “oil in sesame seeds.”
2. Aupailesika, location of contact. When the superstratum (ādheya) forms its connection with only a part of substratum, the adhikarana is called aupailesika; for example, kate āste, “he sits on the mat.”
3. Vaiśayika, nonphysical location, as in mokṣe icchāsti, “he desires liberation.” The ablative case denotes the sense limit or fixed point (in connection with separation), which is called apādana.

Following Bharṭṛhari’s Vākyapādiya, Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa gives three varieties of the apādānakāraka:

1. Nīrdeśavaisya, in which apāya “separation” has been directly stated by the verbal base, for instance asvāt patati, “he falls down from the horse.”
2. Upāttavisya, in which the verbal base denotes its own meaning, which indirectly includes the notion of separation; for instance, balāhakad vidyotate, “(it) is lightning from the cloud.”
3. Apeksitakriya, in which the word denoting the action of separation is not stated at all, for instance, pāṭaliputraḥ, “(I came) from Pāṭaliputra.”

Following Pāṇini (1.4.32), Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa says that the dative case denotes the sampradāna kāraka. It is defined as that which is aimed at by the agent through the instrumentality of the object of action, for instance, “viprāya gāṃ dadāti” (“he gives a cow to the brahmin”). Here the brahmin is called sampradāna because brahmin is connected with the action of giving through the direct object cow.

According to Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, the dative denotes the sense uddeśya, the object for which the action is intended. Here Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa considers that the sampradāna kāraka is positionally predominant (although a
brahmin does not syntactically predominate over the cows that are
given to him). Therefore, the sampradāna is called by the Mīmāṃsakas
šeśin, positionally predominant, to which something is šēsa, subservient.

Then Kōnda Bhaṭṭa makes two points: first, the designation sampra-
dāna is not restricted in connection with the verbs having the sense of
giving. Further, the root dā does not imply transference of ownership.
To prove this point he quotes usages from the Mahābhāṣya: “na śūdra
matīṃ dadyāt” (“one should not impart instruction to a śūdra”),
“khaṇḍikopādhyāyah tasmāi capetāṃ dadāti” (“the khaṇḍika teacher
gives him a slap”). In these usages the dative is used in connection with
the root dā when there is no question of ownership. But, according to the
Kāśikāvṛtti, the genitive is used when the thing is not denoted. For
instance, “rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti” (“he gives his clothes to the
washerman”) is the correct usage, not “rajakāya vastraṃ dadāti.”

Following the Vākyapadīya, Kōnda Bhaṭṭa divides sampradāna into
three types:

(1) Sampradāna by not denying the offer (anirakartrr): “Sūryāya
arghyam dadāti” (“he offers the water to the Sun god”).

(2) Sampradāna by making a request (preraka): “Viprāya gām
dadāti” (“he gives a cow to the brahman”). Hence the receiver incites
the giver to give something to him.

(3) Sampradāna by giving one’s consent (anumantr): “Upādhyāyāya
gām dadāti” (“he gives a cow to his teacher”). Here the teacher per­
mits a donor to present a cow to him, though he does not request the
donor to do so.

(B113). The genitive case denotes a very general relationship. The
relation denoted by the genitive (šeśa) is not regarded as a kāraka. The
kāraṇakavibhaktis denote the relation between the noun and the verb,
while šēsa is the relation between two nouns.

(B114; S393). Then Kōnda Bhaṭṭa says that the relation between
the stem meaning and the case meaning is one of syntactic identity
The case endings stand for the possessors of properties (dharmin) rather
than for properties alone (dharma). For instance, the word tāṇḍulam,
ending in the accusative, denotes the sense tāṇḍulābhinnāśrayaka, substra-
tum (of the result, softening) not different from the (objects) rice
grains. The primary (krt) and secondary (taddhita) endings also denote
the sense dharmin instead of dharma, for instance, devadattāḥ paktā, “Deva-
datta a cook.” The syntactic agreement between Devadatta and a cook
cannot be maintained unless it is assumed that the suffix stands for the
concrete objects rather than for abstract properties. Therefore, the
accusative and so on denote the locus (āśraya) rather than locusness
(āśrayatva).

Finally, Kōnda Bhaṭṭa maintains that the direct denotation of the
case endings is dharma (in other words, the abstract property). Kōnda
Bhaṭṭa furnishes us with the support of the Mīmāṃsakas’ ṛktyadhikarana: a word always denotes primarily the meaning attribute (that is, the qualifier or viśeṣa or property or generic notion), while the meaning qualificand (viṣeṣya or vyakty or dharmin) is indicated by the secondary function of the words. Thus, the case terminations primarily denote the abstract property locuness (āṣrayatva), and the concrete idea of locus (āṣraya) can be obtained from nominal stems or it can be inferred from the fact that there is no dharma without dharmin.

(B115–116). Following Patañjali, Koṅḍa Bhaṭṭa states two alternative views with regard to the restriction of case endings and their meanings. These two views are restriction imposed on case endings (śabdaniyama or vibhaktiniyama) and restriction imposed on meanings conveyed by the case endings (arthaniyama). Pāṇini 4.1.2 introduces the case endings without specifying the meanings to be conveyed by them. Thus the accusative prescribed by Pāṇini 2.3.2 is available to convey kṛmaṇa and other syntactic meanings. Because the accusative is already available to convey the meaning kṛmaṇa from Pāṇini 4.1.2, the rule kṛmaṇi dvitiya (Pāṇini 3.4.2) does not add anything new to our knowledge. Therefore, it becomes restricted. The restriction can be imposed in two ways. The first is kṛmaṇi eva dvitiya (vibhaktiniyama or śabdaniyama): the accusative case ending is used to convey the sense of kṛmaṇa only. From this restriction it does not follow that the sense of kṛmaṇa is not bound to any specific case ending. The second is kṛmaṇi dvitiya eva (arthaniyama): to convey the sense of kṛmaṇa, the second (case ending) only is used. Here the sense of kṛmaṇa becomes bound to the accusative case ending only. But it does not follow that kṛmaṇa is the only sense conveyed by the accusative case ending. The accusative case ending may also convey the other syntactic meaning. Koṅḍa Bhaṭṭa does not show any preference for either of these alternatives; he simply says that both are useful.

Finally Koṅḍa Bhaṭṭa says that according to the modern Naiyāyikas the relation between the verbal activity and the kārakas cannot be determined by the logical definition of the different kārakas, but is decided according to the nature of verbal activity and the context. Therefore, in some cases the secondary function comes into play to convey the accurate sense of the case terminations when the general sense of the case termination is abstracted. By contrast, the Grammarians and the ancient Naiyāyikas think that the kārakas are rational and syntactic categories, and they have somewhat precise and consistent meanings in the majority of the cases.

Section 4: Nominal Meanings
(Nāmārthanirnaya)6

(B117) verse 25. First Koṅḍa Bhaṭṭa enumerates five different views
concerning nominal meanings. They can refer to (1) a generic property (alone) or an individual alone; (2) a generic property and an individual; (3) a generic property, an individual, and gender; (4) a generic property, an individual, gender, and number; or (5) a generic property, an individual, gender, number, and a kāraka. The following passages elaborate these views.

(B117–120). The first view (jātivāda) claims that a generic property alone is the primary meaning of nominal stems. This view was first propagated by the pre-Kātyāyana Grammarian Vājapeyāyana and was later upheld by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas.

According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, a generic property is cognized first, before an individual is cognized. Therefore, in the jātivāda the generic property alone is the primary meaning, and all the individuals possessing that generic property are regarded as secondary meanings. The individuals are infinite, and it would be practically impossible to grasp the relation of a word with each individual (ānantya). If a word denotes a specific individual (X) it would fail to convey many other individuals (other than X, that is, vyabhicāra). But in communication the individual object implied by the generic property is construed with an action in sentences such as “bring a bull.” Thus the primary meaning of a word is only a generic property, and the individual object is conveyed by implication (ākṣepa), secondary function (lakṣanā), inference (anumāna), or presumption (arthapatti).

(B118–120). Next Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa discusses the view that the primary meaning of a nominal stem is only an individual (vyaktivāda). This view is first proposed by Vyādi, a pre-Kātyāyana Grammarian, and followed later by some of the Navya-Nyāya school. According to this view, the specific individual is the primary meaning, and other individuals are indirect meanings through generic property. The unspoken generic property as an indicator (upalakṣanā) is accepted as the limiter of primary meaning, which explains the cognition of all individuals. The generic properties do not belong to the denotative area, yet their ontological existence helps us in cognizing all individuals belonging to a class. Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa (following Gaṅgeśa) criticizes the Prabhakara Mīmāṃsakas’ view that the primary function conveys reference to the individual objects. His argument is that the simultaneous operation of both of the functions, namely, primary and secondary, to convey the sense of generic property and the individual is regarded as a fault. The argument of infinity (ānanta) and deviation (vyabhicāra) launched against vyaktivāda can equally be launched against jātivāda. The reason is that, according to jātivāda, the individual is cognized through the secondary function of words, and consequently we are forced to accept an infinite number of secondary functions corresponding to the infinite number of individuals. Usage shows that the indi-
Individual objects are primary denotations of words because actions are not seen to be related to generic properties.

(B120–121). The second view is jātiṃśtyāvaktivāda. According to this view an individual qualified by the generic property is the meaning of a word, and both of these meanings figure in the meaning cognition. This view is presented in two versions. First, according to the Naiyāyikas' version, a cognition of a word's primary function produces the cognition of an individual qualified by the generic property. Therefore, it is necessary that the primary function of a word be grasped with respect to an individual qualified by a generic property, not just with respect to a generic property alone. The primary function bound with respect to a generic property will never cause a cognition of an individual qualified by a generic property.

Second, according to the Prābhākaras' version, the primary function of a word is grasped with respect to a generic property alone. The cognition of the primary meaning with respect to the generic property produces the verbal cognition of an individual qualified by the generic property. According to this view, the generic property is cognized from a word at first, but it can in turn produce the verbal cognition of an individual qualified by a generic property. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas do not accept that the denotative function of words causes the cognition in respect of the individual. The individual is cognized just by its inseparable existence (svārūpasat). The denotative function is the direct cause of cognition of the universal. The individual is grasped by its inseparable relation with the generic property.

(B121–122). The third view proposes that the primary meaning of a nominal stem includes gender as well as a generic property and an individual. Konda Bhaṭṭa also offers a number of views on the nature of gender.

1. Arthadharma: the gender is a property of objects signified by words. According to this, the naturalist view, the linguistic gender is an expression of physical sex (laukikalinga). One who has breasts and long hair is a woman. One who has hair on the body is a man. That which has neither is neuter. The primary function of words is grasped with respect to physical sex distinctions. The primary function of words like kumāra, "boy," chāga "goat," brāhmaṇa, "brahmin," is grasped with respect to the technical masculine gender qualified by the physical sex. Here the physical sex is also the primary meaning of words. While actually inanimate objects do not have any sex genders, this naturalist view assumes superimposition of physical sex on inanimate objects to explain gender distinctions in the words that stand for inanimate objects. The masculine gender of the word dārāh, which signifies the female sex, is explained by superimposing the masculine nature on the
object. This explanation, in reality, amounts to saying that words have no relation to physical sex.

(B122–123). (2) शब्दधर्म: this view maintains that the gender is a property of words and not of objects signified by word. This view can be further divided into two views: that gender as a property of words is of metaphysical nature; and that the gender of words is of purely formal linguistic nature.

Konḍa Bhaṭṭa states Patañjali’s philosophical conception of gender. Objects are composed of three elements: sattva, rajas, and tamas. The masculine object represents an increase of these elements, the feminine objects a decrease of these elements, the neuter gender merely represents the existence of these elements. But the proportion of these elements is constantly changing. Therefore, the objects of the world are never stable. The activities of increase and decrease of constituent elements are common to all objects, so the gender of the objects depends on the intention of the speaker. If the speaker intends to represent increase then he uses the word in masculine gender; decrease, in feminine gender; neither decrease nor increase, in neuter gender. The speaker decides the gender, and gender is considered to be located in words (शब्दधर्म).

Finally, Konḍa Bhaṭṭa says that there is nothing wrong in holding that the gender of words has no necessary connection with physical sex. Masculine and feminine words are used to signify members of the opposite sex or objects with no physical sex. For instance, the masculine gender signified by the word dārāḥ does not necessarily imply the physical sex of the object.

(B125). According to the fourth and fifth views, gender, number, and kārakas are also signified by the case suffixes on the basis of agreement (anuvaya) and difference (vyatireka). For instance, when the case suffix is dropped, the nominal stem itself signifies kāraka, gender, and number. In dāḍhi paṣya, “look at the curds,” where the accusative singular suffix -am is deleted, the nominal stem dāḍhi itself denotes all of the nominal meanings, including the karma kāraka. The neuter gender is also the meaning of the prātipadika because lexical (lingānuḥāsana) texts ascribe the meaning gender also to the nominal stem.

(B125–128). In certain cases the nominal stem signifies the sixth element, namely, the phonetic form of the word (svarūpa). The word iti in Sanskrit indicates that a word stands for its own form. Without the use of the word iti, sometimes words also stand for their own form. In normal usage, a word signifies its meaning as qualified by its own word form, while normally in grammar a word signifies its own form as qualified by its meaning. In normal usage a word with iti signifies the word form as qualified by its meaning, while in grammar a word with iti signifies its meaning as qualified by its word form.
With regard to a word form signified, Sanskrit Grammarians employ two terms: anukārya, "imitated word," and anukarana, "imitation word." Again anukarana is of two types: it may be of inarticulate sounds (avyakta) or of articulate sound (vyakta). The imitation word patai is an onomatopoetic imitation of inarticulate physical sound. By contrast, in the sentence "gauh iti ayam āha" ("he said the word gauh"), the expression gauh is imitation of the word gauh that occurs in such sentences as gauh tisthati, "a bull stands." The imitated word gauh signifies a bull, while the imitation word signifies a word form.

Then Konda Bhatta discusses the question of identity and difference between the imitation word and the imitated word. He states that according to grammarians the imitation word and the imitated word are identical because their phonetic shapes are not different. Difference in signification does not differentiate words.

As a general rule, imitation words are not meaningful words, and they are not nominal stems (prātipadika). But Pāṇini uses inflectional suffixes after meaningless imitation words for metalinguistic purposes. The phonetic form of a word may form part of verbal cognition, but it is not considered to be the meaning of a word. Thus a word signifies its phonetic form, and yet it is not regarded as a meaningful item. According to the grammarians the imitated word and the imitation words are identical as far as the phonetic forms are concerned.

Section 5: The Meaning of Compounds (Samāsārthanirnaya)

(B134) verse 28. Konda Bhatta gives a sixfold classification of compounds on the basis of the morphological structure of constituents without involving the primary and subordinate status of their meanings:

1. Supām supā, "combination of case-inflected words before entering into compounding," for instance rājasura, "a king man," which is derived from two case-inflected words, rājana puṣaḥ.

2. Supām tiṇā, "combination of case-inflected words with a verb form," for instance, paryabhāṣat, "he attended to," anuvyacalat, "he moved subsequently." This combination consists of the preverb as the first member and the verb as the second member. These forms become single finished words by compounding.

3. Supām nāmnā, "combination of case-inflected word with a nominal stem (krdanta)," for instance, kumbhakāra, "pot maker." Here the case-inflected word kumbham is compounded with the krdanta noun kāra before the case ending has been added to it. This compound is called the upapadasamāsa.

4. Supām dhātunā, "combination of case-inflected word with a verbal base," for instance, āyatastūḥ, "a panegyrist." Here the case-inflected word āyatam is compounded with a verbal base stu.
(5) *Tinān tinā*, "a combination of two finite forms," for instance, *khadatamodatā*, "eat and rejoice" (continual eating and rejoicing). Here two finite verb forms *khadata* and *modata* are compounded.

(6) *Tinām supa*, "a combination of a finite verb form with a case-inflected word," which consists of the verb as the first member and the case inflected word as the second member, for instance, *jahistambah*, constantly striking against the post."

*(B134–135*) verses 29–30. According to Panini, four broad categories of compounds are *avyayibhāva*, *tatpurusa* (with subdivisions *vibhaktitapatruṣa*, *karmadhāraya*, and *dvigu*), *dvandva* (with subdivisions *samāhāradya*, *dvandva*, and *itaratayogadvandva*), and *bahuṣrihi*. This fourfold classification cannot cover all cases of compounds. For instance, *bhūtapūra*, *iva-*compounds, *ayatasti*, and more do not come under any one of these categories.

Patañjali has defined these terms semantically. The *avyayibhāva* is a compound in which the meaning of the first member is predominant. The *tatpurusa* is a compound in which the last member is predominant. The *bahuṣrihi* is a compound in which the meaning of another word is predominant. Kölna Bhaṭṭa says that these semantic definitions work in the majority of cases, but not everywhere. For instance, in an *avyayibhāva* compound such as *ṣūpaṛatati*, "a small quantity of soup," the meaning of the second member is predominant. In the *avyayibhāva* compound *unmattagangam*, "the country where the Ganges flows impetuously," the additional meaning stands predominant. In the *tatpurusa* compound *ardhapippali*, "the half of a pepper," the first member stands predominant.

*(B135–140).* First Kölna Bhaṭṭa states Patañjali’s views on compound formation. Kātyāyana and Patañjali maintain that compound forms denote a single (integrated) meaning (*ekarthibhāva*). That is to say, meanings of the compound’s constituents are not presented separately, but they present their meanings as inseparably fused together.

Then Kātyāyana and Patañjali state another view, namely, *parasparavyapēkṣa*, mutual dependency, according to which the constituents of compounds present their meaning separately. This view maintains that the constituents of a compound present their meaning the same way that the constituents of the uncompounded word group present their meaning. So *rājapurusaḥ* and *raṅgaḥ puruṣaḥ* are syntactically equivalents.

*(B140–142).* Patañjali (under *vṛttika* 11 on Panini 2.1.1) mentions the *nityapakṣa* view: there is no need to formulate grammatical rules to explain the meaning of compounds, for compounds are not generated by grammatical rules. In this view a compound is a single word standing for a single meaning (*ekarthibhāva*). There cannot be mutual dependency (*vyapēkṣa*) because the constituents of a compound do not present their meanings separately.
The kāryaśabdavāda differs from the nityapākṣavāda in the explanation of the ekārthibhāvapakṣa view. According to this view the compounds and the corresponding word groups are derived according to the rules of grammar, and the underlying syntactic structures of a compound and the corresponding word group are identical. The unified sense of a compound is not intrinsic (svabhāvika), rather it is the result of applying grammatical rules. The kāryaśabdavāda uses the term vṛtti, “complex formation,” to explain how the compound is formed from the corresponding word group. Vṛtti means integration, which gives rise to the additional meaning.

(B135–142). But when the constituents are connected, what happens to the meaning of constituents? Patañjali mentions two theories: jahatsvārtha vṛtti, integration with loss of meanings of constituents, and ajahatsvārtha vṛtti, integration without abandoning the meaning of constituents.

According to the first view the constituents of a compound give up their own meaning. A compound as a whole conveys an integrated meaning, and in conveying that meaning the constituents have no separate function from the whole. It does not mean that constituents lose their meaning completely. Still, in a compounding, the meanings of the constituents are either related to each other (samsarga) or differentiated from each other (bheda) or both related and differentiated (ubhya). For instance, in the compound rājapurusa the meanings, king and servant, are related to each other (samsarga), excluding the servant, which is not related to a king (bheda). Bheda and samsarga, which are responsible for the syntax in the sentence, are also responsible for compounds.

According to the second view the first constituent retains its meaning as a qualificant to the meaning of the main member but does not independently denote its meaning.

These two views have a place in the nityapākṣa and the kāryaśabdavāda too to explain the role of the constituent meaning in the meaning of a compound. Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa refers to the several opinions stated in the Mahābhāṣya and then makes his own comments on their outcomes.

(B142–145). Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa states first Kaiyata’s view. Kaiyata summarizes the whole discussion of the Mahābhāṣya into three different views. First, the compound as a whole denotes a single indivisible meaning. The compound and the corresponding word group belong to two different domains. In the uncompounded word group, meanings are separately presented. This view of ekārthibhāva has been propagated by the nityapākṣavādin, who says that we do not require the grammatical rules to explain the specialized compound meaning. A compound is not to be derived; it is a natural element of language.

The second view says that a compound is derived from the corres-
ponding uncompounded word group. For the formation of a compound, mutual dependence of the constituents is required. But the derived compound conveys a single integrated meaning. The generation of compounds from the uncompounded word group is the view propagated by the kāryasabdavādin. In the kāryapākṣa there are two theories, namely, iḥatsvārtha and ajahatsvārtha, which decide the meaning of compounds. According to this second view the compound constituents give up their own meaning and assume one undivided meaning (jahatsvārtha).

The third view is that the compound and the corresponding uncompounded word group are syntactically and semantically equivalent. In both compound and uncompounded word group the constituents are mutually dependent. This view has been adopted by the kāryasabdavādin, and it adopts the ajahatsvārtthapakṣa.

Next Kōnda Bhaṭṭa refers to Haradatta’s theory. According to him ekārthibhāva implies that the principal member denotes its meaning as qualified by the meaning of the subordinate member, and the subordinate member denotes its meaning in a qualifying function, not as an independently signifying something. If the constituents of the compound are independently denotative of their meaning, the subordinate member could form a connection with the word lying outside of the compound.

Haradatta says that for compound formation mutual dependence is also equally necessary. Otherwise the compound could have been formed out of constituents semantically unrelated. He also makes the point that the jahatsvārtha vyrtti has no place in compound formation, because the constituents are related to each other without abandoning their meaning. If we assume that the constituents lose their meaning completely we will have to assign a special denotative function to the compound as a whole, which becomes a separate lexical item. But the assumption of such a denotative function is unnecessary because the compound’s meaning can be derived from the constituent’s meaning itself. Thus, Kōnda Bhaṭṭa remarks, according to Haradatta ekārthibhāva, vyapeksā, and ajahatsvārtha vyrtti are all necessary conditions for forming a compound.

Kōnda Bhaṭṭa disagrees with Kaiyāṭa and Haradatta and maintains that the whole discussion of Patañjali can be reduced to two points, namely, jahatsvārtha and ajahatsvārtha, which correspond to ekārthibhāva and vyapeksā, respectively. According to the jahatsvārtha view, when integration takes place the members of the compound do not express their meaning separately. Therefore, a compound as a whole denotes its meaning; for the denotation of single integrated meaning we have to assign an aggregate denotative function (samudayaṣakti) to the compound form as a whole. According to the vyapeksā view the meaning of the constituents are presented separately, and syntactic connection between them is denoted by the morphemic elements. So the vyapeksā
view is reduced to the *ajahatsvārtha* view, according to which constituents retain their meaning.

Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa criticizes Kaiyāṭa’s claim that according to Kaiyāṭa, in the *nityapakṣa* view *ekārthibhāva* amounts to indivisibility of the meaning of compound. But to Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa this goes against the logical interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. According to Patañjali, *samartha* means emergence of a single integrated meaning of constituents that present their meaning separately in the uncompounded word group. Kaiyāṭa’s interpretation of the *nityaśabdavāda*, which totally denies the relation between the constituent meanings and the compound as a whole, is not correct. If the *ekārthibhāva* claims that the compound is indivisible and the constituents in a compound do not have any meaning at all, then one could also extend this theory to the sentence and deny meaning to the constituents of the sentence, which would mean that the undivided sentence conveys undivided meaning. But this extended theory goes against the intention of Patañjali, who maintains the mutual dependence (*vyapeksā*) of the constituents in a sentence.

(B145–156). Similarly, Haradatta’s statement is also subject to criticism. Haradatta says that both *vyapeksā* and *ekārthibhāva* are the necessary conditions for the formation of compounds. But this claim also goes against the intention of Patañjali, who, according to Kaiyāṭa, maintains that single integrated meaning (*ekārthibhāva*) exists in a compound and that mutual dependence (*vyapeksā*) exists in a sentence. It is also incorrect to consider that the *jahatsvārtha* view has no place in a compound formation. Patañjali himself shows at length that in the *jahatsvārtha* view the subordinate member of the compound does not lose its meaning completely. The *jahatsvārtha* view is also necessary to explain the relation between the constituent meanings and the meaning of the compound as a whole.

Of these two views, *ekārthibhāva* and *vyapeksā*, the first one implies according to Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa that a compound, as a whole, denotes one single meaning and has a separate denotative function (*samudayaśakti*) through which it gives rise to the single meaning. The second view, however, states that each word in a compound has a separate denotative function, and a compound as a whole has no separate denotative function. Of these two views Bhaṭṭo ji, the author of the verse text, and Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa maintain that the *ekārthibhāva* is the only correct view. Just as in the case of the word *pankaja* its etymological meaning (growing in the mud) cannot explain the conventional meaning *lotus*, so it is assumed that a word as a whole denotes the conventional meaning. Similarly, the compound as a whole has the separate denotative function.

(B153). Moreover, the *ekārthibhāva* view has been adopted because the other view involves complexities (*gaurava*). It is necessary to formu-
late rules to account for the following special features of a compound: absence of inflectional suffixes after the constituent members of a compound; inseparability of the members of a compound by other words; the fixed order of the constituents; possession of a single accent; ambiguity as regards the number of the subordinate member; ambiguity as regards the syntactic relation between the compound members; inability to construe the subordinate word with a word outside the compound; absence of words such as *ca* "and," to indicate conjunction and other connections; the statement of option between compound and uncompounded word group.

(B153-157). In the following compounds—*niskausambiḥ*, "departed from Kauśambi (departed from)," *gorathaḥ*, "a chariot to which oxen have been yoked (to which have been yoked)," *ghṛtagathaḥ*, "a pot filled with *ghee* (*pūrna*, ‘filled with’)," *gudadhānāḥ*, "crisps made of barley mixed with brown sugar (mixed with)," *swarnaśamkāraḥ*, "gold produced ornament (produced)," *dvīdāṣṭa* “two times ten (times),” and *saptaparnāḥ*, "a tree having clusters of seven leaves”—(at each point), we understand the additional meanings not conveyed by constituents, namely, *krānta* (departed from), *yukta* (yoked), *pūrna* (filled), *misra* (mixed), *vikāra* (product), *saṃkhyā* (counting), *vīpā* (distribution). In the *nyāpekṣā* view every meaning element should occur in the analytical paraphrase. Therefore, the lexical items such as *krānta*, *pūrna*, and so on, should be supplied in the constituent analysis, which are subsequently to be deleted. For the deletion of these elements we will have to phrase new rules. But according to the ekārthibhāva view as explained by *Konda Bhatta* there is no question of deriving compounds from the uncompounded word groups to account for these meanings, for the compounds and the corresponding uncompounded word groups may differ a great deal as far as meaning is concerned. The compound as a whole conveys the specialized meaning, and we do not require special rules. Thus there is an advantage in adopting the ekārthibhāva view.

In other words, *Konda Bhatta* recognizes a separate denotative function for the compounds that is called *samudayaśakti*, aggregate denotative function, apart from that of constituents. He argues that the compound should be assigned a distinct function because it conveys a meaning that supersedes the meaning denoted by constituents. For instance, the *bahuvrihi* compound *citraugu* does not mean a brindle cow, which is the meaning of the constituents, but refers to a person who owns brindled cows. Similarly the compound *pānipādam* does not mean "hands, feet" but rather an aggregation of hands and feet. Many meanings like *krānta* (departed from), *pūrna* (filled with), and others are denoted by the compound as a whole but not by its constituents. Further, in the case of unanalyzed compounds (*nityasamāsa*) a formally corresponding compounded word group is lacking. In such cases
the meaning of a compound is determined by the compound form as a whole and not by the constituents themselves.

(B157, 168-170). The Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas hold that a compound is formed of its constituents, and the meanings of the constituents give rise to the qualified meaning denoted by the compound. They do not accept that there is a necessity to assign a separate denotative function (samudayaśakti) to a compound as a whole. Both the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas accept only mutual dependence (vya Peykṣā), not any vṛtti or ekārthibhāva, in a compound. Both the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas resort to secondary meaning (laksana) to explain any additional meaning that is denoted by the compound over and above the constituent meanings. For instance, in rājapuruṣaḥ the constituent rājan signifies the sense of relation by the secondary function along with its lexical meaning. In the case of karmadhūraya, laksanā need not be resorted to; rather, the constituents themselves can convey qualified sense. In the case of bahuwrihi, the Naiyāyikas adopt the padalaksana while the Mīmāṁsakas adopt the vākya laksana. So all these differences between a compound and corresponding uncompounded word groups, which are due to ekārthibhāva according to the Grammarians, are explained as caused by the nirūdha laksanā or “conventional function.”

(B182—183). Kumārila observes that denotative function assigned to the bahuwrihi as a whole conveys anyapadārtha, denotation of the meaning of another word. In a bahuwrihi the constituents express their own meaning but not anyapadārtha. The sense anyapadārtha cannot be brought out by the primary or secondary function of words because the primary meanings of the constituents are not given up at all. The reason is that the reference to a meaning other than what is denoted by the compound’s constituents is understood only when the outside word is used along with the bahuwrihi compound. Therefore, the anyapadārtha is the denoted meaning of a compound. The Mīmāṁsakas observe that the anyapadārtha is conveyed by the nirūdha laksanā through the primary meanings of the compound’s constituents. In bahuwrihi the Mīmāṁsakas postulate the vākya laksanā, where the vākya means a phrase as a whole. The semantic connection exists between citraguh (and) devadattah, “brindled cow (owner) Devadatta.” The question is how this meaning “owner” is arrived at; the answer, according to the later Mīmāṁsakas, is that this meaning “owner” is conveyed by the secondary function belonging to a sentence.

(B176—177). But, according to the Naiyāyikas, either the word citra or the word go conveys the additional meaning, in other words, reference to the anyapadārtha. But this view is untenable because the first member, citra, cannot be indicative of the meaning “the owner of the brindled cows.” Consequently, go cannot be connected with citra. The reason is that citra does not refer to the meaning “brindled” any longer. Simi-
larly, it is wrong to say that the word go indicates the sense of gosvāmin, owner of the cows, because in that case citra no longer forms connection with go. We cannot say either that both of the padas together convey the sense “owner of the brindled cows,” for even then it will be impossible to bring out the proper sense of the bahuvrhis like prāptodako grāmaḥ, “water-reached village.” In the analysis “prāptam udakāṃ yam,” udaka, “water” is the agent and the village is the object of the action of reaching. In prāpta the suffix kta has been added in the sense of agent. The sentence denotes primarily the agent of the action of reaching, while the compound denotes primarily the object of the action of reaching. Here reference to the object (the village) by a compound form cannot be explained by the secondary function (lakṣaṇa) because the constituents in the sentence stand in the syntactic agreement water, the agent of the action of reaching. If the secondary function indicates the sense of object (village), then the compound would mean the water, identical with the object of reaching. But this meaning is not the one intended by the compound. The other word, udaka, also cannot imply the sense of karman because the compound’s meaning cannot be judged without the proper understanding of the first member. To avoid all of these difficulties, Kṣṇa Bhāṭṭa advocates the aggregate denotative function on the basis of practical experience that a compound is one word. He puts forth the view that the compound meaning is understood even by children without knowing the grammatical or constitutional analysis of compounds.

(B157–158). The Naiyāyikas also advocate that the indeclinables in compounds are secondarily indicative (lakṣaṇa) of the sense of proximity and so on, as in upakumbham, “in the vicinity of a jar.” The sense of nearness is not included in the meaning of the second member of the compound. Therefore, it is held to be implied by the second member. Kṣṇa Bhāṭṭa argues that the indeclinables are suggestive (dyotaka) of the sense “nearness,” or whatever, but the sense of the compound as a whole, namely, “near a jar;” is denoted by the aggregate power of the compound.

(B137, 151). Kātyāyana proposes the view yugapadadhikaranyavacanaṇā for the formation of dvandva compounds. According to this view, each item in a dvandva compound, just as in the case of ekāṭaṇa, represents the meaning of the other item simultaneously. The ekāṭaṇa and dvandva items are not singly represented but always together with another item or other items. In the case of dvandva and ekāṭaṇa, we find joint representation of items.

But Patañjali rejects the view of joint representation and states that in a dvandva the items are separately presented and that meaning of conjunction comes from integration only. The joint representation of items in a dvandva or ekāṭaṇa is a result of ekārthibhāva (integration) only.
Konḍa Bhaṭṭa remarks that this view of simultaneous representation is formulated by the vyapeksāvādins, who maintain that constituent meanings are separately represented. This view (yugapadadhikarana-vacanatā) is especially necessary to maintain the joint representation of the two items in the constituent analysis. But this simultaneous representation, according to Konḍa Bhaṭṭa, cannot exist in the constituent analysis, because dual or plural is not added to each constituent in the analytical paraphrase. We have instances like dyāvāpyāṭhīvī in which items are separately represented in the dual. But these instances are Vedic usages, which are exceptions to the general rules. According to the theory of samudayaśakti or ekārthibhāva, a dvandva compound is a single word denoting an aggregate of several individuals.

(B158). In the case of dvandva the Naiyāyikas accept yugapadadhikarana-vacanatā in a different sense. They argue that there is a syntactic relation between the primary sense of the constituents and the dual number added to a compound. If each constituent is related to a dual, then the compound dhavakhadiraṇau would mean two dhavas and two khadiras. Therefore, to justify the dual number we must assume that the first constituent denotes association (sāhiya). Because this sense of association is not conveyed by the primary function of the constituents, the Naiyāyikas resort to secondary meaning to convey sāhiya, which indicates the joint representation of two objects, while number, dual or plural, represents the objects that have been associated. The sense association indicated by the first member in compounds like dhavakhadiraṇau does not mean two dhavas. It (dhava) does not mean dhava and khadira either, because dhava cannot mean khadira. The sense association or simultaneous representation is only through secondary meaning.

According to Konḍa Bhaṭṭa, the aggregate denotative function expresses the meaning of dvandva as in the case of other compounds. In the itaretarayoga, the aggregate denotative function expresses the items that are grouped together, which justifies reference to two or more items. In the case of samāhāra (group of items), the samudayaśakti (aggregate denotative function) denotes the aggregation or group, which justifies the singular number.

(B161). The Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas do not accept a separate denotative function with regard to a compound as a whole. The Grammarians argue that if an aggregate denotative function is not assigned to a compound as a whole, the compound form cannot be called a nominal stem (prātipadika) by Pāṇini 1.2.45, because the basic condition for the designation prātipadika is meaningfulness. We cannot apply the designation prātipadika by the next rule, Pāṇini 1.2.46, because the word samāsa in that rule is restrictive. The sūtra means that if the designation prātipadika is to be applied to a collection of words having a sense it must be restricted to a compound. It is not to be applied to a sentence.
Moreover, if the compound as a whole has no denotative function it cannot have a secondary meaning, which is based on the denotative function (abhidhā or śakti) of words.

(Bl74–175, 177). The Mīmāṃsakas hold that a genitive compound like rājapurusa must be analyzed as “rājā cāsau puruṣaś ca” and not as “rājīnāḥ puruṣaḥ.” The first analysis indicates that the relation of qualified and qualifier is dependent on the mutual expectancy of constituents and not on the case endings added to them. In the case of the genitive tatpurusa compounds, the sense of relation, namely, “servant and master,” is to be conveyed by the genitive suffix. But the compound rājapurusa does not refer to the relation between the two related; rather, rājan in rājapurusa denotes the meaning of purusa in the sense that rājan becomes a qualifier to purusa. The constituent analysis must convey the meaning of the compound. The constituent analysis “rājā cāsau puruṣaś ca” can convey the qualifier and qualified relation (abheda), but the analysis “rājīnāḥ puruṣaḥ” fails to point it out. Therefore, “rājā cāsau puruṣaś ca” is a proper analysis. Similarly, the bahuvrhi compound citraguh must be analyzed as “citrānāṃ gavām ayam” (“he, the owner of the brindled cows”) and not as “citrā gavo yasya” (“possessed of brindled cows”). In the case of bahuvrhi compounds, the constituent analysis must be such as can convey reference to the anyapadartha. If we assume the analysis “citrānāṃ gavām ayam,” it can point out reference to the anyapadartha. But the constituent analysis “citrā gavo yasya” primarily refers to the svapadartha “constituents’ own meaning.”

(Bl80–81, 186). Later Mīmāṃsakas do not accept the aggregate denotative function of the whole compound or secondary meaning in the case of a karmadhāraya compound. In nilaghaṭa, “a blue jar,” the words nila and “ghaṭa” are in apposition, and their coreferentiality is brought out by merely joining the stems nila and ghaṭa. But in a tatpurusa compound like rājapurusaḥ, “king’s man,” the servant-master relationship cannot be brought about by mere constituents. The syntactic relationship is dependent on the case ending; in the compound the case ending is not there. Therefore, this relationship is indicated by the secondary function. So in case of doubts, the karmadhāraya compound, which does not involve the secondary function, is preferred to the sāśhitatpurusa, which does. Consequently, the word nisādasthapati is taken to mean nisāḍaḥ sthapatiḥ, a chief who himself is a nisāḍa, rather than nisādānāṃ sthapatiḥ, a chief of the Niśāda tribe. But Konic Bhaṭṭa’s standpoint is that the aggregate denotative function belongs to all compounds, and there would be no difference between a tatpurusa and a karmadhāraya compound. Then it would go against the Mīmāṃsā doctrine, which proves that nisādasthapatiḥ must be taken as a karmadhāraya compound and not as sāśhitatpurusa for the sake of economy. To
avoid this difficulty, Konḍa Bhaṭṭa answers that when a compound word denotes various meanings, the speaker’s intention (tātparya) must be taken to decide the sense of the compound. If we took the compound niṣādasthapati in the context of ritual as a genitive tatpuruṣa compound, it would go against the interest of the author’s statement. Moreover, the true meaning of the compound is determined by its accent.

(B183–186). Konḍa Bhaṭṭa replies that the constituent analysis and the compound need not be semantically and syntactically equivalents. Therefore, we may find the reversion of the principal and subordinate relation in the meaning indicated by the constituent analysis and compound. Therefore, the analysis “citṛā gāvo yasya” for the compound citraguh and “rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ” for the compound rājapuruṣaḥ may not be objectionable.

Even the Mīmāṃsakas assume that productive operation (bhāvanā) stands as predominant with respect to the kārakas in the case of verbal forms, while in the case of kṛdanta words the kārakas stand predominant with respect to bhāvanā. Therefore, the constituent analysis may not be exactly equivalent to the compound meaning.

Section 6: The Relation Between a Word and Its Meaning (Saktiṇirṇaya)

(B188). The relation of a word with its meaning, according to Konḍa Bhaṭṭa, is power (sakti) or intrinsic fitness (yogatā). Following Bhartṛhari, Konḍa Bhaṭṭa states that semantic fitness (yogatā) is the relation between a word and its meaning. The natural or intrinsic capacity of words to convey any meaning is called yogatā. Just as the organs of perception (indriya) have a natural power to perceive objects, so words also have an innate capacity for conveying any meaning. The Grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas consider this power to be a separate category, while the Naiyāyikas assume that it is based on convention.

(S496–497). According to the Naiyāyikas the connection between the words and their meanings is not natural but rather based on convention (samketa), which is established by God’s desire. According to this view language is created by God. The words are capable of conveying a sense because God has so desired. In the case of proper names like Devadatta, however, the desire is that of Devadatta’s father. The later Naiyāyikas, however, maintain that this relation need not always be established by the will of God.

(B189–190). According to the Mīmāṃsakas the relation between words and their meanings is natural and eternal, not something brought about by convention of human beings. This relation between words and their meanings is without beginning. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Grammarians agree that the natural relationship is understood from the use of the elderly persons. This relation between the words and their
meanings cannot be the desire of God because the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists, who do not believe in the existence of God, also understand the meanings of words.

(B191). Kṣṇa Bhaṭṭa concludes that the nature of the power (sakti) of words is to convey meaning, the signifierness (bodhakatva) of the words. The primary function of the word ghāṭa ("pot") is its power or capacity to cause a cognition. This power of words is comparable to the power of the organs of sense to cause the cognition of objects. Kṣṇa Bhaṭṭa presents the view of the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa (an Advaita Vedānta text) to support his position.

In addition to power, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas assume a secondary function of words to convey their extended meaning. Kṣṇa Bhaṭṭa refuses to accept the secondary meaning even though he accepts suggestion (vyāñjanā) as a separate function to convey emotional overtones attached to words in literary writings. The argument for not accepting secondary meaning is that the power that is bodhakatva, the capacity of words to cause cognition of meaning is also the same in the case of extended meanings.

(B195-198). The Naiyāyikas maintain that the corrupt forms of words that are current express their meaning indirectly by recalling the correct forms. Kumārila, the Mīmāṃsaka, states that the corrupt words (mlecchaśabda) equally convey meaning. But the corrupt forms convey their meaning only through the original correct words, having brought them to our mind, whenever corresponding correct usage is available. The corrupt words that may convey their meaning indirectly cannot be regarded as synonyms for the original correct words. Thus, for instance, when the corrupt word gāvi is pronounced, it brings to our mind the correct Sanskrit word gauh.

The Grammarians do not accept the view of the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas that corrupt words have no denotative power. If corrupt words have no denotative power, they can convey no meaning. It will not be correct to say that incorrect words remind us of correct words and we therefore know the meanings from the incorrect words, because ignorant persons who do not know correct words know the meaning from corrupt words. As far as conveying of meaning is concerned, there is no difference between the correct and corrupt forms. But the main difference is that the use of correct forms leads to spiritual merit, while the use of incorrect forms leads to spiritual demerit. And grammar teaches us the correct forms of words. The words that are derived according to grammatical rules are considered to be correct.

(B197). The Grammarians insist that the corrupt forms derived from Sanskrit equally convey meaning. Thus in the case of languages like Marathi derived from Sanskrit, the meaning of words is understood not indirectly through the correct Sanskrit forms.
Following Bhartrhari, Kṣṇḍa Bhāṭṭa says that semantic fitness is understood from the usage of elderly persons (vyḍḍhayavyahāra). The denotative potency of words to convey any meaning is intrinsic and beginningless, but the use of elderly persons makes us acquainted with the natural capacity.

Section 7: The Meaning of the Negative Particle Naṇ (Naṇarthanirṇaya)

(B201). According to the first view proposed by Kṣṇḍa Bhāṭṭa (in connection with the negative tatpurusa compound), the reference of the compound is determined by the second member. The negative particle naṇ (na or a or an) suggests the sense of superimposition (āropitatva). The function of naṇ in abrāhmaṇa is to convey the secondary sense that the word abrāhmaṇa is used with reference to a kṣatriya. One superimposes brahminhood on a kṣatriya, on account of the fact that the kṣatriya shares a number of characteristics with a brahmin. To convey that the word abrāhmaṇa is used in the sense of kṣatriya, the speaker uses naṇ along with the word abrāhmaṇa.

If the negative particle stands for absence (abhāva), then abrāhmaṇa would mean a person not existing as a brahmin, according to which the first member would represent the main meaning. But this view is not correct because it involves various difficulties. In the negative tatpurusa compound asaḥ, “other than he,” the second member, saḥ (tat), will be subordinate. Therefore, it will not be called sarvanāman. So we cannot apply the operations prescribed for pronominal stems. The result is that the compound form will be atad instead of asaḥ. Therefore, this view should be discarded.

(S515). There are six meanings in which the negative particle naṇ (na or a) is used in compounds: similarity (sādṛṣya), as in abrāhmaṇaḥ, “like a brahmin”; absence (abhāva), as in apāpam, “absence of sin”; being other than something (tadanyayatvam, mutual absence), as in anāśvaḥ, “other than a horse”; smallness of something (tadālpata), as in anudarā kanyā, “a girl with a thin belly”; impropriety or unfitness (aprāśastya), as in apaśavaḥ, “unfit animals (for sacrifice)”; and contrariety (viroḍha), as in adharma, “contrary to dharma.” Of these six meanings only one is primarily denoted by naṇ, namely, absence. The rest are secondary to this primary meaning.

(B201–202). According to the Naiyāyikas there are two primary meanings of naṇ, namely, absence, as in apāpam, “absence of sin,” and mutual absence (anyonyābhāva), as in asaḥ, “other than he.” But according to Kṣṇḍa Bhāṭṭa the basic meaning of naṇ is only absence.

(B203–204). Patañjali explains that the function of naṇ is to convey the sense nirvṛttapadārthaka, namely, bringing the absence of something to our notice. In other words, the function of naṇ is to convey the absence
of something in physical reality. Kaiyāṭa interprets this Bhāṣya to mean that a word like brāhmaṇa in abṛāhmaṇa is used in a secondary sense, namely, that of ksatriya, upon whom brahminhood has been superimposed. The function of naḥ in abṛāhmaṇa is only to bring to our notice that brāhmaṇa is used in the secondary sense.

Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa criticizes Kaiyāṭa’s view. In instances like ghato nāsti, “there is no jar,” and abṛāhmaṇa, “(he is) not a brahmin,” the particle (naḥ) does not have two different meanings of absence and superimposition (āropitavā). Rather, in both of these cases naḥ denotes the sense niyrtapadderthaka, which implies that naḥ brings to our notice the fact that something is absent. In other words, according to Patañjali naḥ denotes absence. He further argues that if superimposition were the meaning of naḥ, as Kaiyāṭa thinks, then naḥ would also denote the sense of similarity (sāḍrṣya). In that case there would be six different denotations, as stated earlier. This position involves complexity.

The negative particle naḥ expressing absence may be sometimes subject or qualificand (viśesya) and sometimes adjunct or qualifier (viśesana). In the forms asaḥ, “other than he,” atvam bhavasi, “(somebody) other than you become,” or anekam, “more than one,” the second member is principal. That explains the pronominal operations, the number, and the person, which are determined by the predominance of the second member. Thus the view of the meaning predominance of the second member (uttarapadarthapradhanya) explains these examples. But according to the other view, the particle naḥ denotes “absence,” which stands as a qualificand, so the meaning of naḥ is the main meaning. In the aforementioned special cases the predominance of the second member is retained by resorting to secondary meaning, which conveys the sense of difference or mutual absence. In such cases the negative particle denies the relation of identity in the form of denying reference to the meaning of the second member.

Section 8: The Meanings of Preverbs and Particles (Nipatārthanirnaya)

(B205). Grammarians and Naiyāyikas do not agree with each other about the nature of particles (nipāta). According to the Naiyāyikas the particles are directly denotative (vācaka). Particles belong to the category of independently significant words, but preverbs (upasarga) do not. The Grammarians disagree with this view.

(B205) verse 41. Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa following Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, maintains that both preverbs and particles are suggestive (dyotaka) and not independently denotative (vācaka). Preverbs and particles acquire meaning only in combination with other words. We find contrast in the meaning denoted by āste, “he sits,” and upāste, “he worships,” which does not spring from the meaning inherent in the preverb. The presence
and absence of upa signal this contrast, which is actually inherent in the root meaning. The root as- does not convey by itself the transitive meaning "to worship." The passive endings are added only to the transitive roots. Therefore, to explain the passive construction upāsyete hariharau, "Hari and Hara are worshiped," we have to assume that the root as- stands for the meaning "to worship."

(B205–206). In some cases the preverbs only enlarge the meaning of roots. For instance, when we say prajayati, "he wins well," the meaning of the preverb does not alter the meaning of the root ji. Sometimes preverbs determine the specific meaning of the following root. For instance, the root sthā denotes the sense to stop the movement. But when it is joined with the preverb pra it denotes altogether a different meaning, "to move forward."

For the proper application of a grammatical operation such as augmentation, it is necessary to separate a verbal root from a preverb. For instance, the augment at (that is, a in forms like anvabhavat) is inserted between a verbal root and a preverb. The finite verb form (abhavat) is formed first. Subsequently, the preverb is united with the verb to reveal its meaning. In such cases the preverbs are suggestive rather than denotative.

(B206) verse 42. Particles (cādi), like preverbs (prādi), are also suggestive of the meanings of forms to which they are attached. Unless we assume the suggestiveness of particles we cannot explain the passive voice sāksatkriyate, "it is perceived," alaṃkriyate, "it is adorned," or namaskriyate, "he is saluted." These passive voices could be explained if we assume that the root kr- denotes the sense of perceiving, adorning, and saluting that make the root kr- transitive.

(B207). The Naiyāyikas make a specific distinction between particles and preverbs. According to them, the particles are directly denotative, but the preverbs are suggestive. Preverbs such as pra have independently distinctive meanings of their own when they are disjoined from verbs. The preverbs suggest different meanings in connection with different verbs. Preverbs only disclose one of the several meanings of the verbal root that is to be adopted in a particular case. But particles like sāksat, "directly," and namas, "salutation," denote fixed meaning.

(B215) verse 46. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the meaningfulness of particles is established on the basis of agreement (anvaya) and difference (vyatireka). If we examine the pair vrksah ca, "also tree," and vrksah, "tree," we find that the particle ca reveals the contrast in meaning and expression. When we say vrksah, "tree," we do not understand the sense of conjunction (namely, also). Therefore, by the process of agreement and difference it is clear that the particles are denotative.

The Grammarians criticize the view of the Naiyāyikas. According to the Grammarians neither preverbs nor particles are capable of being
used independently of other words. For instance, we do not use the phrase bhūyān pra, "greater excellence," the way we use the phrase bhūyān prakṛśaḥ, "greater excellence." Similarly, we do not use the phrase sobhanaś ca, "beautiful collection," the way we use the phrase sobhanaḥ samuccayaḥ, "beautiful collection."

(BO8–209) verse 43. Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa further points out that the meaning of particles never stands in appositional relation with another nominal stem meaning. Take the instance ghatasya ca, "and jar." The meaning conjunction (namely, and) does not stand in appositional relation with the meaning "jar." But the semantic rule is that two nominal stem meanings are related to each other appositionally. No one understands, however, that the meaning "conjunction" stands in appositional relation with the meaning "jar." To remove this difficulty the Naiyāyikas have to make a special provision that the aforementioned semantic rule does not apply to the particles. The Grammarians do not have this difficulty. The particle ca, according to the Grammarians, does not convey the sense of conjunction independently. It only functions as the suggester of meaning. Therefore, "conjunction" is not regarded as nominal-stem-meaning (nāmārtha).

(B209–210) verse 44. In addition, Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa points out that if the particles are directly denotative of meaning we will have to assume the discontinuousness of meaningful elements. To illustrate this point he presents the phrase "usraḥ iva saraiḥ," ("by rays, similar, by arrows"). The phrase actually means: by rays (that are) like arrows. The phrase consists of the following meaningful elements: usra (ray), iva (similar), sarā (arrows), -ais (by). The instrumental ending ais added to the word usra does not convey the instrumentality of usra alone, rather that of usra-iva (by rays like). This sense is, however, not allowed by the grammatical theory, which insists that the case termination ais must be construed with the stem usra. One should not disturb the inseparable relation that exists between the stem and the suffix. Therefore, the analysis usra-iva-bhis (rays like by) goes against the principle of word formation. To avoid this difficulty, the Grammarians maintain that the base usra denotes the sense usrasadrśa (rays like). The following particle iva does not denote independently the meaning "similar," it only discloses the meaning of usra, "rays like," which is to be adopted in this particular context. Because in the phrase usraḥ iva, the stem usra denotes the sense usrasadrśa, "rays like," the meaning of the instrumental case ending "by" can be easily connected with it.

But according to the Naiyāyikas, the particle iva denotes the sense "similar." Therefore, to maintain the meaningful relation between the constituents of the phrase usraḥ iva the Naiyāyikas will have to assume the construction usra (rays), iva (similar), ais (by). This construction violates the principle that the case endings must be construed with the stems,
(B210–211) verse 45. An objection is raised by the Naiyāyikas. If particles are not independently denotative of meaning, then in the tatpurusā compound formed with the negative particle nafi, the first member, nafi (that is, a in the compounds like abrahmana, “other than a brahmin”), will be meaningless. If the first member is meaningless, the question of the second member’s predominance does not arise at all. Consequently, the definition of the tatpurusā compound (tatpurusā is a compound in which the meaning of the second member is predominant) will not be applicable. Similarly, particles and preverbs that are not independently meaningful will not be called nominal stems (prātipadi- kas) because the basic condition for the designation prātipadika (Pāṇini 1.2.45) is meaningfulness.

The Grammarans answer that particles and preverbs are suggestive of meaning, so they are not totally meaningless. If one takes into account the suggestive nature of particles and preverbs, the designations tatpurusā and prātipadika are applied.

(B215–216). Finally, Kṣṇa Bhaṭṭa points out that one should not insist on any one of the two alternatives, suggestiveness or denotativeness. Some preverbs and particles are suggestive and some are denotative. Nonetheless, he disagrees with the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas, who insist that particles are directly expressive, while preverbs are always suggestive of meaning.

Section 9: The Meaning of Suffixes Forming Abstract Nouns (Bhāavapratyayārthanirnaya)

(B217). In the case of a compound, a primary derivative (kṛt), or a secondary derivative (taddhita), the suffixes prescribed in the sense of bhāva, or abstract notion, convey a relation excluding the words that have a conventional sense (rūḍhi), adjectives (abhinnarūpa), and words expressing a relation that is inseparable. (The source of this statement quoted by Kṣṇa Bhaṭṭa is not known. Helārāja also quotes it in his commentary on the Vākyapadiya, kanda 3, chapter 5, verse 1.)

(B217–218). The addition of abstract suffixes to such compounds as rājavatam, “king’s servant,” denotes the sense of king’s relation to a servant, and the expression aupagavatva, “cowherd-sonness,” expresses the son’s relation to the father cowherd. The abstract noun pācakatva, “cookness,” stands for the actor-action relation.

This rule has three exceptions. The rūḍha word kṛṣnasarpa conventionally refers to a poisonous snake. The word sukl̄a, when it is adjectivally used, refers to a white thing, a substance. When we formulate the expression sukl̄atva, “white-thingness,” it means the quality “white color.” Sattā is an instance of the third type, inseparable relation. The word sat refers to an existing thing, and sattā denotes invariable relation to an existing thing. In other words, sattā cannot be separated from
sat. As opposed to this claim, the Māmāsakas maintain that in words like danṭi, "a person carrying a stick," the passive suffix -in denotes only a substance and not a relation of owner-owned. The idea of the relation between danḍa (a stick) and -in (that is, a person referred to by the possessive suffix) arises after the relation of qualifier (danḍa) and the qualified (in other words, a person qualified by danḍa) is comprehended. Therefore, danṭi does not denote a relation between danḍa (stick) and the person referred to by the taddhita suffix -in. Similarly, pācaka does not denote a relation between the stem meaning (action) and the suffix meaning (agent). The relation between pāka, the action of cooking, and kartr, agent (the meaning of the suffix) is neither the sense of the root nor that of the suffix. Thus the primary (kṛt) and the secondary (taddhita) derivatives do not denote any relation. But the abstract-noun-forming suffixes tva and tal in pācakatva and danḍitva denote the sense of relation. Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa criticizes this Māmāsaka view by pointing out that if the relation is not expressed by the words danḍin and pācaka, it will not be expressed by the words danḍitva and pācakatva. The Māmāsakas accept the principle halfway but not in its entirety.

(B219). Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa refers to Kātyāyana’s vārttika 5 on Pāṇini 5.1.119. Kātyāyana says that the suffixes tva and tal denote the quality due to the presence of which a word is applied to an object. The quality denoted by an abstract suffix is any characteristic that is dependent on the thing meant as its substratum. This characteristic (prakāra) or quality, which determines the meaning expressed by the stem, is denoted by the suffixes tva and tal. For instance, when the word śukla denotes a substance (white thing), the expression śuklatva denotes a white quality. But when the word śukla denotes white color, then the expression śuklatva stands for the universal common to white colors. Words like aṇu, "atomic," mahat, "big," or dirgha, "long," always stand for the objects that have these qualities. The expressions aṇutva, mahattva, or dirghatva stand for the qualities (such as size or length) that distinguish these objects from others. The expression pācakatva stands for the relation between the agent and the action (cooking). The expression ghafatva stands for the notion of a universal jar. Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, following Bhartṛhari, states that from the point of ultimate reality the different universals like ghafatva are nothing more than the mahāsattā, the highest universal. All words express the mahāsattā as it exists in all different things.

(B220-221). Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa quotes another vārttika on Pāṇini 5.1.119. Each word is employed to express a thing (artha) on some ground (pravṛttinimitta), and it is this ground that is expressed by the addition of the abstract suffixes tva and tal.

Kaiyata explains this view as follows. The expressions gotva, pācakatva, Śuklatva, and the like point to the thing (that is, the referent) through some property known as its ground for application (pravṛttinimitta). In
the case of the word go the expressed sense is a substance, while the
ground for the term’s application is gotva, the universal feature. In the
case of the word pācaka, the expressed sense is the agent of the action of
cooking, and the ground for the term’s application is the action of
cooking. In the compounds rājapurusaḥ, “king’s servant,” and so on, the
referent is the king’s servant and the ground for the term’s application
is the relation between a king and a servant. “Dīthā” refers to a person,
gīthatva refers to the ground for application, in other words, the name
that identifies the person called Dīthā. Thus, according to Kaiyāṭa,
the meaning of the suffix tva is pravṛt tinimitta, the ground for the appli-
cation of the term, which may be either a universal or action or relation
or name.

Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa explains the real implication of the vārttika as follows:
all words express their meaning on account of their ground for the
term’s application (pravṛt tinimitta). This pravṛt tinimitta in the case of
proper nouns is nothing but the word form. When we first learn to use
proper nouns like “Hari,” “Hara,” or “Nala” we know that someone
is expressed by these words. Here we do not have any property that
can be considered as ground for application of the term. The same
thing is true in case of medicinal herbs growing in a forest, which do not
convey any specific sense to persons living in cities. These names of
medicinal herbs refer to a substance, and the ground for application of
these terms is the name (word form) of these herbs. Then the abstract
expression like haratva refers to the word form or to the name.

Section 10: The Meaning of Suffixes Added to the Names
of Deities (Devatāpratvayārthānirnaya)

(B224). In ainḍram havīḥ, “an oblation presented to the god Indra,”
the taddhita suffix -an is added to the stem īndra- in the sense of sā; for
example, sya devatā (Pāṇini 4.2.24): “this is its deity.” Therefore the
sense of the taddhīta suffix -an and others like it is an oblation presented
to a particular deity. The meaning of the stem is construed with the
meaning “deity in relation of apposition (abhedaśambandha),” which is
a part of the suffix’s meaning. The meaning devatā stands syntactically
subordinate (that is, as the qualifier) with respect to the meaning deya,
an oblation. The meaning deya stands syntactically predominant
(that is, qualified) with respect to the meaning devatā. Thus the meaning
of the suffix is devatoddēśyakam deyam, an oblation to be presented that
is subservient to a deity.

Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa mentions the second view that the meaning devatā,
deity (of the rites), and deya, an oblation to be presented, are two
separate denotations of the taddhīta suffix. According to the first view,
however, these meanings are always presented together and not the
one separately without the other.
The third view stated by Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa is that the sense "deity" comes from the stem itself. The word īndra, in the context of the sacrificial rite, stands for the deity Indra, and it is an accepted popular usage (nirūḍhā lakṣaṇa). Because the sense "deity" is already expressed by the stem it need not be expressed again by the taddhita suffix.

Section 11: The Nondenotation of Number (by the Subordinate Constituent of Vṛtti or Complex Formation) (Abhedaikatvasaṃkhyā-nirṇaya)

Verse 54. In the case of a complex formation the question is whether the subordinate member of the formation conveys the idea of a particular number or of no number at all. In compounds like rājapuruṣah, "king servant," we do not know whether the man belongs to one king, two kings, or more than two kings. Following Bhaṭṭari, Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa answers that we apprehend abhedaikatvasaṃkhyā, singular number without differentiation, from the subordinate member of the complex formation.

The term abhedaikatvasaṃkhyā is interpreted in two ways. According to the first interpretation, from a subordinate member of a complex formation we apprehend singular number, which includes other numbers too. The notion of other numbers co-exists in the singular. From the singular one can understand any required number according to the fact of communication. In this view, the subordinate member expresses singular number, which is noncommittal and may represent any number. Just as the honey elixir represents an undifferentiated combination of the flavors of many medical herbs, so all three numbers have merged in the singular and become one.

The second interpretation is that abhedaikatvasaṃkhyā means the notion of numbers in general, without specification being made. In the same way, from a distance a person who cannot see the exact color of a thing tells us that it has some indistinct color without knowing any specific color, like white. The same is true of number conveyed by the subordinate member of the complex formation: it conveys some number without committing any specific one.

In some cases of compounds a particular number is clearly indicated, for instance, dviputraḥ, "having two sons," triputraḥ, "having three sons," and so on, where the meaning of the nominal item itself is a particular number. In the word formation tāvakīnāḥ, "belonging to you," māmakīnāḥ, "belonging to me," the substitutes tāvaka and māmaka indicate singular number (Pāṇini 4.3.3).

Verse 54. Kōṇḍa Bhaṭṭa refers to the example kapinjalān ālabheta, "one should kill (three partridges by immolating)" from the Pūrvaṁimāṃsā. Here from the plural kapinjalān only three partridges
are understood because the idea of three comes first. The idea of four and more includes the idea of three, but the idea of three can exclude the idea of four or more. There is no reason to abandon the idea of three. Therefore, the Mīmāṃsakas conclude that the scripture prescribes killing of three partridges only and not of more than three. Similarly, in complex formation, when there is nothing that gives us an idea of a particular number we understand the idea of singularity, which comes first (verse 54, Bṛhaspaṭī, p. 227).

Section 12: Intended and Unintended Denotation of Number
(Saṅkhyaśīlaśārthanaṁrityayāḥ)

(B229). Kṣṇḍa Bhāṭṭa refers to the Mīmāṃsā principle grahaikātva, singularity of cups (unintended). In the sentence grahaṁ sanmāṛṣṭi, “he cleans a cup” the singular number of the cup is not intended. By this sentence, cleaning with reference to a cup is prescribed. Here “cup” functions as the subject (uddeśya, in other words, that with reference to which something is prescribed) and “cleaning” functions as the predicate (vidheya, in other words, that which is prescribed with reference to something). The subject is guṇa, subsidiary, with regard to the predicate, and the predicate is pradhāna, principal, with regard to the subject. A subject phrase that figures as qualifier to a subject is avivaksita (not intentionally used). Therefore the number of the subject is not intentionally used, that is to say, no special significance is attached to it. So “cup” stands for any cup and not for one particular cup.

Again, the Mīmāṃsakas hold that whatever figures as a qualifier in the predicate phrase is vivaksita, intentionally used, for instance, paśunā yajeta, “one should bring about a sacrifice by means of an animal.” The sentence is interpreted to mean “yāgam uddīṣya paśur vidhiyate” (“with reference to a sacrifice an animal is enjoined”). In the predicate the qualifying number is intentionally used. Therefore, in paśunā, singular number is intentionally used. Accordingly, the sacrifice should be performed with one animal.

The Grammarians do not accept this view. Whether number is intentionally used or not intentionally used in subject and predicate words depends on particular instances. We cannot make it a rule just because the Mīmāṃsakas have done it. The Grammarians do not accept the view that a word that figures as the qualifier in the subject phrase is not significant or intentionally used. For instance, valāḍi, beginning with a consonant other than y, which figures as a qualifying condition with reference to the qualified ārdhadhātukasya in the subject phrase “valāḍeḥ ārdhadhātukasya” (Paṇini 7.2.35), is significant and intentionally used.

(B229–230). Similarly, the view of the Mīmāṃsakas that a work that figures as the qualifier in the predicate phrase is significant and inten-
tionally used is also not acceptable to the Grammarians. For instance, the singular number conveyed by the phrase naḥ (replaced by the phoneme n), which figures as the qualifier in the predicate phrase (Panini 8.4.1), is not significant. That is why mn has been substituted in bhīma for d and i in bhid-ta. Finally, Konda Bhaṭṭa accepts that whatever figures as a qualifier in the predicate phrase should be taken to be intentionally used.

Section 13: The Meaning of the Primary Suffixes Such as Ktvā (Kīvā prátyayādinām arthanīrṇayaḥ)

(B232). According to the Vārttikakāra (vārtti 3 on Panini 3.4.26), the suffixes ktvā (that is, tvā) and tumun (that is, tum) have the same meaning (namely, agent/object) as the finite verb. But according to Patañjali, tvā or tum (gerunds or continuatives) denote only bhāva (action).

Appayya Diksita in his Parimala maintains the view that in “paktvā odano bhujyate devadattenā” (“the rice is eaten by Devadatta after having cooked it”), the verb bhujyate along with the suffix tvā expresses the sense karman. Similarly, therefore, Panini 2.3.1 stops it from adding the accusative -am to the word odana by Panini 2.3.2. In “paktvā odanam bhūṅkte devadattaḥ” (“Devadatta eats rice after having cooked it”), the fact that Devadatta functions as the agent is abhihita, already expressed, by the verb ending -ti as well as by suffix -tvā. As the sense “agent” is abhihita we are not allowed to add the instrumental ending after the stem Devadatta, according to Panini 2.3.18.

(B232–235). Konda Bhaṭṭa disagrees with this view. According to him the suffix -tvā does not express the sense “agent.” Panini’s rule 3.4.21 means: (the suffix -tvā is added to a verbal root, which expresses) the prior action of two (verbal actions) that have the same agent. The rule only says that both actions have the same agent; it does not say that the suffixes -tvā and -tum denote the sense “agent.” Following Patañjali, Konda Bhaṭṭa maintains that the suffixes -tvā and -tum denote only bhāva, action. But this view does not mean that the object/agent of the action expressed by -tvā/-tum will be used in the accusative/instrumen-tal. Following Bhartrhari, he maintains that in the examples “paktvā odano bhujyate” and “paktvā odanam bhūṅkte devadattaḥ,” odana is the object of both actions (the action of eating, which is the principal one, and the action of cooking, which is the subordinate one), and Devadatta is the agent of both actions. In the first example the sense “object” (karman) is expressed by the finite verb but not by the suffix tvā. Similarly, in the second example the sense “agent” (kartr) is expressed by the finite verb but not by the gerund-forming suffix -tvā. When the sense “agent/object” is expressed by the main verb, the agent/object word is used in the nominative. The object/agent of the subordi-
nate action is always in consonance with those of the principal action. The fact is that the abhīhita/anabhīhita by the main verb determines which case endings are to be added to a nominal stem.

The expression bhuktva vrajati, "he goes away after eating," is regarded as one single sentence. Bhuktva and vrajati are not to be read in isolation but as connected with each other by the qualifier–qualified relation. The action denoted by the finite verb is the qualified one, and the action denoted by the gerund is the qualifier one.

This qualifier–qualified relation may be of four types: janyajanakabhāva, the producer–produced relation, as in, for instance, bhuktum pacati, "he cooks for eating," because eating cannot be undertaken without cooking; pūrvottarabhāva, the relation of preceding and succeeding, as in, for instance, bhuktva vrajati, "he goes after eating," where we find that the action of going follows the action of eating; sāmānādhikarāṇya, coreferentiality, as in, for instance, bhuktva vrajati, where both of the actions have the same agent, because we understand that the eater and the goer are the same person; and nyāpyatva, the relation of pervasion, as in, for instance, adhitya tisṭhāti, "while studying he stands," "or mukham vyāddaya svapitī, "while keeping his mouth open he sleeps." Here the action of studying is coextensive with the action of standing, and the action of keeping the mouth open is coextensive with the action of sleeping. The main actions, studying and sleeping, are regarded as coinciding with the actions of standing and keeping the mouth open.

Section 14: The Doctrine of Sphota (Sphōtanirnaya)

(B236–239). Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa classifies the sphota into eight different varieties: varṇavyaktisphota, the phoneme event is the conveyer of meaning; padanyaktisphota, the word event is the conveyer of meaning; vākvyakyaktisphota, the sentence event is the conveyer of meaning; akhandapadasphota, the finished word as an undivided linguistic unit is the conveyer of the meaning; akhandavākyasphota, the sentence as an undivided linguistic unit is the conveyer of meaning; varṇajātisphota, the phonemic type is the conveyer of meaning; padajātisphota, the word type is the conveyer of meaning; and vākvyajātisphota, the sentence type is the conveyer of meaning. The term varṇasphota does not mean that each single phoneme is regarded as sphota, but the phoneme or phonemes constituting either a stem or a suffix are regarded as such.

(B257) verses 60–69. Although the eight varieties of sphota are accepted by the Grammarians, it is the sentence sphota alone that represents the essential nature of the sphota doctrine.

(B236–237) verse 59. According to the Naiyāyikas fictional constituents, namely, sthānin, prototype, like the symbol -l-"el" and the like, are the conveyers of meaning. In opposition, the Grammarians maintain that the constituents that belong to the usable form of the
language, like -\(ti\) (in bhavati) or \(h\) (in r\(\text{\textipa{muh}}\)) are conveyers of meaning, not the fictional units such as -I "el" or -\(su\).

The Naiy\(\text{\textipa{y}}\)ikas argue that it is more reasonable to maintain that the prototypes are denotative of meaning than to assign the denotative function to the suffixes that are actually used. The reason is that compared to the prototype "el" -I, which stands for all verb endings, the substitutes -\(ti\), -\(tas\), -\(anti\), and so on are numerous. If the denotative functions were assigned to the substitutes it would lead to assumptions of endless denotative functions.

As an answer to the objection raised by the Naiy\(\text{\textipa{y}}\)ikas, K\(\text{\textipa{onda}}\) Bha\(\text{\textipa{tta}}\) argues that if the prototypes were denotative of meaning there would be some ambiguity, because different grammatical schools have chosen different prototypes. We find that the prototypes are variable, while the substitutes are of fixed character. Further, the Grammarians maintain that the substitutes that are actually heard by listeners are meaning-bearing units but that the prototypes, which are not actually used in the language, are not.

(3579). Some exponents of the phoneme sph\(\text{o\textipa{ta}}\) theory formulate a different point of view. According to them, the meaning is conveyed by the last phoneme only, and the impressions of the individual phone- mes constituting a word are helpful to produce only the simultaneous recollection of the phonemes heard. The last sound, helped by impressions left behind by the previous perceptions of sounds, reveals the meaning.

K\(\text{\textipa{onda}}\) Bha\(\text{\textipa{tta}}\) criticizes this claim on the ground that it becomes difficult to answer why the meaning is not understood, even if the phonemes are uttered in different periods of time.

**Padasph\(\text{o\textipa{ta}}\)**

(\(B\)239) verse 63. In such forms as g\(\text{ha\textipa{t}}\)\(\text{\textipa{ena}}\), "by a jar," it is very difficult to determine precisely which part of the word represents the stem and which, the suffix. There is no fixed criterion that would enable us to determine that g\(\text{ha\textipa{t}}\) is the base and \(n\text{a}\) is the suffix or that g\(\text{ha\textipa{t}}\) is the base and \(e\text{\textipa{na}}\) is the suffix. Similarly, it is very difficult to point out the division between the stem portion and the suffix in the accusative optional plural v\(\text{a\textipa{h}}\), n\(\text{a\textipa{h}}\) of the personal pronouns y\(\text{\textipa{us\textipa{mad}}}\) and a\(\text{\textipa{smad}}\). Therefore, the padasph\(\text{o\textipa{ta}}\) (word sp\(\text{k\textipa{ofa}}\)) maintains that the finished word as a unique entity conveys the meaning.

**V\(\text{\textipa{yk\textipa{y}}\text{\textipa{asph\textipa{o\textipa{ta}}}**

(\(B\)240–241) verse 64. The padasph\(\text{o\textipa{ta}}\) theory also presents a difficulty in analyzing a sentence such as hare'va, "Hari protect me," because the listener grasps the meaning even if he fails to recognize exactly the isolated constituents hare and ava, due to ignorance of the laws.
of euphonic combination. Because the listener grasps the meaning without understanding the division of the sentence, the Grammarians contend that the sentence should be considered as a single unit for the purpose of communication.

The Grammarians' vākyāṣakti theory assumes that the entire sentence is endowed with denotative function, and the sentence as a whole conveys one single meaning.

The Naiyāyikas claim that the meaning of a word is first remembered, and the relational meaning is cognized at the time of verbal knowledge. Thus according to the Naiyāyikas the sentence conveys some new meaning (apūrva). This additional meaning, over and above the word meaning, is the distinctive feature of the sentence meaning (vākyārtha), and it is conveyed by factors like syntactic expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), or relational seam, or the particular juxtaposition of words (samsarga-maryādā), or speaker's intention (tātparya). The Naiyāyikas raise the objection to the vākyāṣakti that according to the Grammarians the distinction between the meaning cognized through the denotative function and the meaning cognized through the verbal cognition (śabdabodha) can no longer remain because, according to the vākyāṣakti theory, the entire meaning of a sentence is known before the verbal cognition has taken place in the mind.

The Grammarians answer that the objection can be raised against the theory of denotation of meaning as related to the meanings of other words (anvitābhidhānavāda) maintained by the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā. The Prabhākaras contend that the relational meaning is also the denoted meaning of a word. According to this school, the relational meaning of words is also known in a general way, and the definite relationship between the meanings of words in their precise form is clearly brought out at the time of verbal knowledge. The Grammarians, arguing on the same lines maintain that the denotative function of a sentence denotes the meaning of the individual words distinctly and their relation along with the other word meanings in a general way. That is to say, the precise relation among the various word meanings is cognized at the time of verbal knowledge alone.

To prove that the sentence meaning is known through the sentence function, Kōḍa Bhaṭṭa cites the example "haridrāyām nadyām ghoṣah" ("a hamlet [is situated] on [the bank of] the river Haridrā"). When a person who has not heard the name of Haridrā previously hears this sentence, he understands the meaning of the word haridrā. He can guess the meaning of the word haridrā because he understands the meaning of the rest of the sentence, and then he is able to identify the meaning of the isolated words. The Prabhākaras claim that meaning exists in words that are fragments of a sentence. The procedure for understanding the meaning is to set side by side the sentences in which
only one word is different. The child understands the meaning of words by the method of avapodvāpa, agreement and contrast. According to the Prabhakaras, words first convey the meaning related to one another, and later on we comprehend the meaning from isolated words. This analytical approach claims that an individual word is endowed with meaning, not the sentence as a whole.

The Grammarians who are exponents of the vākyasaktivāda maintain that although a child in a later stage identifies and isolates the word in a sentence, still it understands first the meaning from a sentence. The division of a sentence into words is an analytical method. When one hears a sentence it is not taken into account in terms of a series of meaningful units but as a whole.

(B240–241) verse 65. Konda Bhatta points out that the Grammarians agree partially with the Bhatta school, for they maintain that a unified sentence meaning is verbal. According to the Bhatta school, the cognition of unified meaning becomes verbal (śābda) as it is conveyed by secondary meaning. According to the Grammarians, primary designation or denotative function (abhidhā) assigned to a sentence conveys a unified sentence meaning. But according to the Bhattas, the secondary function conveys syntactically unified meaning.

(B54–62). Konda Bhatta states that just as we comprehend the meaning of words from the words, so also do we comprehend the meaning of a sentence from the sentence. Consequently, just as the denotative function conveying the sense of words is assigned to the words, so the denotative function conveying the sense of a sentence should be assigned to the sentence. Thus the word sphaṭa and the sentence sphaṭa are established.

(B241–244). The Naiyāyikas hold that words primarily denote isolated meanings and the relational or syntactic meaning is communicated by the speaker’s intention or specific juxtaposition of the words. Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, the denotative function resides in isolated words. Now the Grammarians argue that if the denotative function resides in isolated words and not in the sentence, the layman might understand the meaning from the unconnected words: ghata, “jar,” karmatva, “objecthood,” ānayanam, “bringing,” and krtih, “effort,” as he understands the meaning from the sentence ghatam ānaya, “bring a jar,” because the amount of information furnished by the unconnected words is practically the same as that furnished by the parts of the sentence ghata+am, ā+nay+a. But it is experienced that a layman cannot grasp the meaning from unconnected words that do not form an organized sentence. Yet if it is held that the sentence as a whole is denotative of meaning, the difficulty does not arise, for the unconnected words mentioned above do not form an organized sentence. If the Naiyāyikas assume that the words convey the meaning only when they
are organized in a sentence form such as ghaṭam ānaya, then nothing but the theory of the vākyasphoṭa is established.

(B249) verse 66, taken from Vākyapādiya. There are no phonemes in the words, and (there are) no parts in the phonemes. There is no absolute and clear-cut separation of words from sentence. Konda Bhaṭṭa, on the basis of this statement, lays emphasis on the indivisible nature of the sphoṭa. The verse implies that the word is without any sequence of phonemes and that the sentence is bereft of the sequence of words, even if they are cognized as having the sequence of phonemes and words. Konda Bhaṭṭa argues that, as in the phonemes e, o, l, r, though the parts a, i, l, r are separately cognized, they are not regarded as separate parts of the phonemes, so in the same manner a word should not be considered to be divisible into stems and suffixes.

The diversity in knowledge such as "this is the phoneme k," "this is the phoneme j," can be justified simply by assuming a diversity in the delimiting property of production (utpatti) or revelation (abhiṣvyakti) of various phonemes, residing in the conjunction of the wind (generally), accepted as giving rise to the various sounds. It is clearly stated in the section dealing with the deities (devatā) in the Bhāmati (Vācaspati Miśra's commentary on the Śaṅkarabhāṣya) that the shrillness (and other qualities) residing in the wind are superimposed upon the phonemes. Konda Bhaṭṭa points out that breath wind comes into contact with the different vocal organs, and it assumes the form of different phonemes. The diversity belonging to the airwaves (vōyusān-yoga) that come into contact with the different articulatory points is superimposed upon sounds that are modifications of airy substances.

Thus the purva-pakṣin raises the following objection: instead of assuming that the phonemes are denotative, why do we not consider the sound-producing movements themselves to be denotative? Konda Bhaṭṭa answers by reasoning that the auditory perception of phonemes experienced by people cannot be ascribed to the sound-producing movements, which are beyond the sense organs. The speaker makes the sound-producing movements, and from them, the listener perceives the phonemes. The listener identifies the outer phonemes and not the inner sound-producing movements, which are beyond the reach of sense organs.

(B249-250). Konda Bhaṭṭa furnishes instances of recognition: it is the same phoneme g, it is the same word, it is the same sentence. The first instance points out that the phoneme sphoṭa remains the same, though it is distinctively revealed by the peculiarities of the individual speakers. The experience shows that the phonemic g is a single entity and gives a unitary character to the phoneme g. Similarly the experiences of one word and of one sentence cannot be attributed to the phonemes, or stems or suffixes or words, because the notion of unitari-
ness cannot present different objects as its contents. Konda Bhatṭa suggests that we cannot attribute this unitary perception to the collective notions of the phonemes in a single memory. The perceptive experience shows that the word *gauḥ* is a single entity, and it corresponds to the unity of meaning. It is not possible to argue that this unitary experience is based on the single memory of all phonemes combined together, because meaningless phonemes cannot give rise to a meaning even when they are put together in a single memory.

(B250–251). Konda Bhatṭa maintains the view that sounds perceived by the listeners are not different from the *sphota*. The *sphota* is cognized in the form of the distinctive sounds *g-h-a-t-a*. Konda Bhatṭa holds the view that the object of cognition is the indivisible word-*sphota*, but its form is nothing else than the phonemes auditorily perceived. The phoneme *g* manifested by sound is identified with the phoneme *g*, which appears to be the part of indivisible *sphota* word. Owing to this confusion, the *sphota*, which is partless, appears to have parts. In reality, the individual phonemes are not conceived to be different from the partless *sphota* progressively revealed by sounds.

(B252). The pūrvapāksin raises the question. Do the sound-producing airwaves reveal *sphota* individually or collectively? It cannot be held that the sound-producing airwaves reveal *sphota* individually, because if it were so, any particular sound-producing airwave would be enough to reveal *sphota*, and the remaining airwaves would be redundant. It cannot be argued that the sound-producing airwaves reveal the *sphota* collectively, because they are momentary, and each airwave perishes as soon as the succeeding one comes into existence.

Konda Bhatṭa meets this argument by saying that the sound-producing movements reveal *sphota* individually. A single airwave, for instance, in the word *gauḥ* reveals *sphota* through the medium of the sound *g*, another reveals *sphota* through the medium of the sound *au*; and the third one reveals *sphota* through the medium of *visarga* (*h*). Thus the *sphota* is more and more clearly revealed with each succeeding airwave. In this manner, Konda Bhatṭa says, the *sphota* word *gauḥ* is revealed by each individual wave through the medium of the order of sounds, *g*, *au*, *h*. The different sounds are considered to be nondifferent from the *sphota* word *gauḥ*.

(B262). The Naiyāyikas object that the relation of immediate sequence cannot be maintained between the two sounds, because the first has died out by the time the second has come into existence. The relation of priority and posteriority arises only when two things exist simultaneously. There cannot be any combination of what is nonexistent with what exists.

Konda Bhatṭa answers this objection by assuming that the combination of nonexisting things is possible in cognition. The combination
can be maintained between two sounds, because at the time of the knowledge of the *utpatti* (production), the knowledge of *sthiti* (duration) of the first sound has not died out.

*(B248, 252)*. Kaiyāta contends that the unity of word or sentence cannot be attributed to phonemes because one cannot account for the simultaneity of phonemes. The combination of phonemes itself is impossible, because each phoneme perishes as soon as it is uttered. There cannot be a combination of what exists with what has ceased to exist. Neither can the unity of the word be explained with reference to the collective recollection of the phonemes. In the collective recollection also, the phonemes do not figure in any sequence because the sequence of phonemes is an impossible task. Further, it would lead to the cognition of the same meaning from words that contain the same phonemes in a different order. The difference between the words *nadi* and *dina* and their meanings ("river" and "poor") would be unaccountable by the collective recollection of phonemes that constitute the words *nadi* (river) and *dina* (poor), because the constituent phonemes of the said words are the same. The impressions left by the phonemes will be the same even when the order is reversed. There is no sequence in the recollection because we cannot remember the objects in the same order as we have perceived them. Because the unitary experience "this is one word" cannot be explained with reference to the series of phonemes, and because the difference between the words *nadi* and *dina* and the like is otherwise unaccountable, the grammarians establish the existence of the *sphota* as an indivisible meaning-bearing unit.

Konḍa Bhaṭṭa disagrees with the Grammarians' view that the main justification of the *sphota* entity stems from the fact that the combination of the sequence of phonemes that constitute the word cannot be explained. Following the theory of association, he maintains that each succeeding phoneme progressively reveals the substructure of a word in the form of a certain sequence, and all of these substructures directly or indirectly reveal the word, which is an aggregate of phonemes *p, a, t, a*. Now at the time of perceiving the second phoneme, not only is the phoneme *a* cognized, but the substructure *pa* is also cognized through the impression of phonemes that is left on the mind of listener. In this manner, the whole structure *pata* is cognized at the time of perceiving the last phoneme *a*. Each subsequent sound reveals the substructure of the preceding and the succeeding sounds, and thus we can establish the coexistence of phonemes. Therefore, Konḍa Bhaṭṭa argues, the main reason for accepting the *sphota* theory is not unaccountability of the idea of sequence, but the experience that the word is single and unitary.

*(B251)*. (The question is raised in the Parimala commentary whether the *sphota* revealed by synonyms *ghata* and *kalaJa* [both mean "pot" ] are identical or different.) According to the Grammarian the *sphota*
word is indivisible, and it is something over and above the phonemes. Accordingly, the *sphota* words cannot be said to have phonetic shapes. Thus the *sphota* character of the word cannot be rendered different through the differences in the phonetic shape of words. The *sphota* character of synonyms like *ghaṭa* and *kalaśa* cannot be distinguished semantically either, because the meaning conveyed by these words is identical. If the *sphota* character of the synonyms *ghaṭa* and *kalaśa* is assumed to be identical, a man who is aware of the convention of the word *ghaṭa* but is ignorant of the convention of the word *kalaśa* will understand the meaning from the *sphota* word *kalaśa*, which is identical with the *sphota* word *ghaṭa*.

To get rid of this difficulty, the Grammarians maintain that the difference in the phonetic shape (in other words in the revealing sound of the *sphota*) causes the difference in the revealed *sphota*. The knowledge of the convention must be separately grasped in the case of the different *sphota*, though they may convey the same meaning. When this separation is maintained, the *sphota* word revealed by the phonetic shape *gh-a-t-a* becomes different from the *sphota* word revealed by the phonetic shape *k-a-l-a-t-a*. There remains no possibility of verbal cognition from the *sphota*-word *kalaśa* when one knows the convention of the word *ghaṭa* alone, because the two words are different.

*sphota* words are different, and the knowledge of the denotative function must be grasped separately, with reference to each *sphota* word. The Grammarians do not maintain a difference between two things: the difference in the *sphota* word and the difference in the phonetic shape.

*(B253–254)* verse 67. It is argued by the *pūrṇapakṣin* that if the Grammarians maintain that the *vākyasphota* alone is real, how can they be justified in analyzing the sentence into different words, and words into stems and suffixes? The Grammarians answer that acceptance of the *padasphota* and the *varnasphota* is undoubtedly a fiction, inasmuch as there is no separate existence of words apart from the sentence of which they are parts. This device, though unreal, is still helpful from the point of unreal reality to describe our mind. The study of the grammatical science enables us to realize the ultimate reality through the unreal or illusory analysis of words. Just as the knowledge of the five sheaths (*pañcakosa*) in the Vedānta is a means to attaining the knowledge of the ultimate reality, Brahmān, so also the teaching of eight divisions of *sphota* is a practical device for comprehending the ultimate knowledge of the real, partless sentence-*sphota* (*ākhaṇḍa-vākya-sphota*).

*(B257)* verse 69. The Mimāṃsakas maintain that the different attributes (*upādhi*) such as shortness (*hrasvatva*), longness (*dirghatva*), lowness (*anudattatva*), and the like, belong in reality to the sound-producing airwaves, though they are superimposed on the phonemes.
These superimposed qualities serve to distinguish one phoneme from the others. Arguing on the same lines, the Grammarians maintain that the k-ness (katva) and so on, which belong to the airwaves, appear to be superimposed on the phonemes revealed by the airwaves. Similarly, the production and destruction are properties of airwaves, but they are felt to be associated with the phonemes. In this manner the cognition "the phoneme k is produced" is justified.

(B255). The Grammarians maintain that the phoneme g in gapa and gati is the same and permanent, because we have the recognition so’yam gakārah, "this is the same phoneme g." The recognition referring to the sameness of individual phoneme g forces one to accept the permanency of phonemes. The Naiyāyikas disagree with the Grammarians, however, and maintain that the cognition so’yam gakārah, "this is the same phoneme g," does not follow from the identity of the individuals but from the sameness of the individuals’ universal character. The two phonemes g₁ and g₂ are different from each other, still they are considered to be the same and can be grouped under the universal character "g-ness."

The Grammarians say that the recognition "this is the same phoneme g" does not follow from the knowledge of the two individuals as related to the same class, but it refers to the sameness of the individual phoneme g pronounced at different times and by different individuals. The Naiyāyikas controvert the Grammarians’ theory by pointing out the fact that, if the phonemes are permanent, it cannot be justified to make a statement like gakāra utpannah because the phonemes are not subjected to the origination. The Grammarians respond that the cognition gakāra utpannah, "g is produced," refers to internal air issued forth from speaker’s mouth. This internal air, which appears and vanishes, is identified with the auditory image of the phoneme g.

By contrast, the Naiyāyikas maintain that the cognition so’yam gakārah, which points out the sameness of the phonemes g₁ and g₂, is considered erroneous as far as it refers to the sameness of individuals. According to the Naiyāyikas the cognition of appearance and disappearance is valid, while the cognition of identity between the two individuals is invalid or erroneous. Thus the controversial point between the Grammarians and the Naiyāyikas is whether the vocal organs produce a sound or make it manifest.

Jātisphota and Vyaktisphota

(B255) verse 69. The word gauḥ is a class that comprises varied utterances by different individuals. If the individual utterance gauḥ is regarded as denotative of meaning it would lead to the assumption of multiplicity of the denotive functions corresponding to the differences in the utterance of words. Therefore, it is assumed that the universal
word (jātisphoṭa), into which all the different spoken words with varied accents and tones are assembled, is denotative of meaning. This concept is called the class-character of the sphoṭa word.

The vyaktisphoṭa view maintains that there are no different individual words that might be grouped into a single class. The vyaktisphoṭa denies the plurality of individual words. The loudness, length, lowness, and so on are the properties of the articulate sound but not of the sphoṭa word. It is the articulate sound that usually appears to be long or short, but the sphoṭa word or manifested sound remains entirely unchanged. The varṇavyakti or padavyakti is one, but it appears divergent due to the variation in the articulated sound of different individuals.

The Phonemes and Sphoṭa

(B256–257). The phonemes and sphoṭa are intimately related to each other. In the cognition of the sphoṭa the phonemes are not irrelevant because they are not different from the sphoṭa. One cannot remain indifferent to the differences of phonemes when we think of the cognition of the word. We undoubtedly cognize the individual phonemes when we perceive or cognize the indivisible single sphoṭa. The phonemic entity (varṇavyakti) isolated from the other members of the class is distinct from the sphoṭa. The perception gatavān sphoṭa, “the sphoṭa word contains the phoneme ṛ,” is an illusory perception because the sphoṭa word as a whole is indivisible. When the indivisible word is manifested by the sounds, the phonemes appear to be cognized as a part of the word owing to the hearer’s incapacity to perceive the word without perceiving the sequence of phonemes. We undoubtedly cognize the individual phonemes, but they are not identical with sphoṭa word. The sphoṭa word is unitary, and it is taken as a single and indivisible meaning-bearing unit of the language. While phonemes are many they are not considered to be the meaning-bearing units. They only progressively reveal the sphoṭa word.

Revelation of the sphoṭa by the same phonemes but in a different order does not convey the same meaning. For instance, the words sarah and rasah, which contain the same phonemes, do not convey the same idea. The sequence of phonemes, which is the character of articulate sound, is left to be associated with the revealed sphoṭa. The difference in the sphoṭa words sarah and rasah, which have the same constituent sound units, is justified because the cognition of the sequence of phonemes appears in the sphoṭa word as its associative feature.

(B258–260) verse 70, taken from Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya 1.93. This verse supports the class sphoṭa (jātisphoṭa) theory. Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa interprets it to mean that phonetic entities such as p, a, t, a reveal the sphoṭa word pata. The word pata represents a class that comprises varied utterances made by different people. The universal sphoṭa is the con-
veyor of meaning because an expression uttered by different people
does not convey different meaning to the listeners. There is only one
class of all the particular events of the spoken word ghāṭa.

The idea of the varṇasphoṭa is not concerned with the meaning. The
varṇajātisphoṭa means that the phoneme p represents a class sound that
comprises varied utterances made by different people.

The second half of the verse 70, according to Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, denies
the distinction between varṇavyakti and dhvani as pointed out by other
Grammarians who maintain that the term varṇavyakti stands for the
individual auditory perception of the articulated sound, while the term
dhvani stands for the varied individual articulated sounds.

(B258–260) verse 71. There are two elements, real and unreal, in
every object. The unreal elements are regarded as particulars (vyakti).
The real element is known as the universal. The term jāti ultimately
refers to Brahma which essentially underlies all objects (verse 71).
Jāti, which is the essence of things, is equated with mahāsattā, the highest
universal.

(B258–260) verse 72. The Grammarians equate the term sabda with
the sphoṭa, which is again identical with Brahma. It is also called
the sabdatattva by the Grammarians. The word sphoṭa etymologically
means “from which meaning bursts forth” or “that which is revealed by
sounds.”
TĀRAKA BRAHMĀNANDA SARASVATĪ

A disciple of Gopālānanda Yati, and thus presumed to have flourished about 1650, this writer composed some notes on Grammar called Vyākaraṇakrodapatra.
COKKANĀTHA OR ŚOKANĀTHA DĪKSITA

The *New Catalogus Catalogorum* dates this writer to the middle of the seventeenth century and identifies him as the "son of Nārāyana, alias Dvādaśāhayājin of Kauśikagotra and preceptor and father-in-law of Rāmabhadra Dīksita (author of *Jānakiṇārapīṭānātaka*); preceptor of Sadasīva Dīksita (a. of *Gitasundara*) and father of Nalla Perumal Dīksita (a. of C. on *Sabdakaumudi*" (vol. 7, p. 85a). He is held to have composed at least two works, the *Sabdakaumudi* and a *Mahābhāṣyaratnāvali*. At the foregoing location in the *New Catalogus*, Cokkanātha is also said to have written a commentary on *Sabdakaumudi* entitled *Śabdikarakṣā*, but at vol. 10, p. 62b, the *Śabdikarakṣā* is ascribed to (Bālapatafijali) Dvādaśāhayājin, grandson of Nārāyana.
TIRUMALA YAJVAN

The son of Veṅkaṭeśa and grandson of Sarasvatī Makhin of the Śaḍdarśana family, this writer composed a Sumanorāma on the Siddhāntakaumudi (Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 355). He may also have been responsible for a commentary on the Mahābhāṣya titled Anupāta. He appears to have lived around 1660. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka¹ thinks he is the father of Annambhaṭṭa, but he would seem to have been a different Tirumala.
The New Catalogus Catalogorum (vol. 10, p. 85a) lists this writer, “of the Vandyaghaṭiya family” and flourishing in 1664, as author of Śuddhi (tattva) kārikā, Sāravali (and vṛtti in seven pādas), and possibly a Dhāturatnākara.
This Sadasiva, the author of a commentary, *Gūḍhārthadipani*, on the *Mahābhāṣya*, was a son of Nilakaṇṭha Dīkṣita and a pupil of Kamalākara Dīkṣita, who was in turn a pupil of Dattātreya.¹
Hari Diksita was the grandson of Bhattoji Diksita and the son of Viresvara, alias Bhānuji, also called Rāmāśrama. He taught Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. He is considered to have written two commentaries on Bhaṭṭoji’s Pratīyamanorāraṇa called Sabdaratna, a larger (Brhat) and a shorter (Laghu) one. Some scholars hold the opinion that Nāgeśa actually wrote the Brhatśabdaratna and ascribed it to his teacher Hari.

Students of Grammar regularly study the Laghuśabdaratna up to the end of the kāraka chapter along with the Prauḍhamanorāṇa after they have mastered the Siddhāntakośa. 
Rāmabhadrā Dīkṣita was the son of Yajñarāma Dīkṣita, student and son-in-law of Cokkanātha Dīkṣita (author of the Šabdakaumudi on Sanskrit grammar, protégé of King Śāhaji of Tanjore who ruled from 1684 to 1712 and belonged to Kaṇḍaramāṇikkam in Tamil Nadu. He was also a student and protégé of the great poet Nilakantha Dīkṣita. Among his works are the Jñānākīparīnaya Nāṭaka; several stotras on Rāma, Patañjalicarita, which is a Mahākavya on the life of Patañjali; and the following technical works: Ūṇādīmaṇidipikā an elaborate commentary on the Pāṇcapādi version of the Ūṇādisūtras; Šadārśinisiddhāntasamgraha; with a section on Grammar; and Šabdabhedanirūpaṇa.

\textit{Śadārśinisiddhāntasamgraha (Vyākaraṇa Section)}

\textit{K. Kunjunni Raja}

Sanskrit words may be classified into Vedic and classical (laukika). The former class consists of those occurring in the four Vedas, while the latter comprises words found in Sanskrit literature from the Vedāṅgas and Smṛtis to contemporary works.

Rejecting the view that correct or incorrect usage makes little difference as long as the intended meaning is understood by the listeners, because the purpose of language is communication, Rāmabhadrā points out that one has to be choosy and use only what is correct. The analogies of selecting proper food and of taking an eligible woman as wife are also mentioned.

\textit{Laukika} or common words are classified into four: jāti, guṇa, kriyā, and samjñā.

Regarding wrong usages (apaśabda), Rāmabhadrā points out that the term applies not only to words but also to sentences and expressions,
Not using the proper kārakas and case endings and not observing the rules of concordance between adjective and the noun qualified are also instances of apaśabda; for example, “bhavān gām ānaya” is wrong because the term bhavān requires the third person singular āntyatu. The correctness also depends on the intention or the context. Āsvam ānaya, “bring the poor man,” may be correct in itself, but is an apaśabda when the context requires āsvam ānaya, “bring a horse.”

Rāmabhadra Dikṣita accepts the view that among the three great sages, Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali, each preceding author is more authoritative than the next.

A brief analysis of the contents of the Aṣṭādhyayi is also given in the text.

Śabdabhedanirūpaṇa

K. Kunjunni Raja

Use of words in literature is divided into primary, secondary, and suggestive. Abhidhā is the primary meaning. Lakṣanā, secondary meaning, is resorted to when it is impossible to take the literal sense in the context (anvayāṇupapatti), but there is no incongruity with the speaker’s intention (tātparyāṇupapatti). Secondary meaning may be based on different relations between the primary and the actual referents. One is dhāryadhārakabhava, relation of the possessor and the possessed, for example, “the pāncajanya was heard.” Here pāncajanya, a conch, is used for the sound produced by it (hearing the bell for hearing the sound of the bell). The second relation is ādhārādheyabhāva, the locus for what is on it, for example, Lāṅkātaṅka, “anxiety of Lāṅkā.” Here “Lāṅkā” stands for the people of Lāṅkā, for anxiety is for the people. The third is sādrya, similarity, as in nagotsaṅga, “the lap of the mountain.” Here “lap” is used for the slope, through similarity. This third variety is also called gauni.
NÄGEŠA
(OR NÄGOJI) BHAṬṬA

Of all the great Grammarians of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries—indeed, of all those after Bhartrhari himself—perhaps none is more important for philosophical contributions than Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. He came from the family of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, who was his great-grandfather. Nāgeśa’s father was named Śiva Bhaṭṭa; his mother was Sati, of the Kale family of Maharashtra Brahmins. He was patronized by Rāmavarman of Śrṅgaverapura near Allahabad. He taught such illustrious followers as Gaṅgārāma, Vaidyanātha Payagūnda, and his own son, Bālaśarman. His literary activity extended between 1670 and 1750.1

Nāgeśa’s output was extensive and ranged widely. He wrote Padārtha-dīpikā and Tarkabhāṣāyuktimuktāvalī on Nyāya, a commentary (Laghu-vṛtti) on the Śāmkhyasūtras, another vṛtti on the Yogasūtras, and a work on Vedānta titled Vedāntabhāṣya-pradīpoddhyota. In Sanskrit grammar he is accepted as the final authority. Some fourteen works on Grammar are known to exist by his hand, and others are mentioned in the literature. In addition to the works that focus on philosophical grammatical theories, summarized below, Nāgeśa wrote a commentary, Śabdendu-śekhara, as well as a briefer version of the same (Laghusabdenduśekhara) on the Siddhāntakaumudi, and a number of independent treatises on various aspects of Grammar. The latter include the Paribhāṣenduśekhara, the definitive treatise on that subject, works on particular grammatical forms (Śabdānantasāgarasamuccaya, Suptiśnantasāgarasamuccaya, Śaṅkāsamādhāna), and commentaries on other grammatical works (Viṣampadī on Śabdakaustubha, Prabhākaracandra on Tattwadīpikā, and perhaps a Laghuśabdabratna based on his teacher Hari Dīkṣita’s larger Śabdabratna, though this ascription is controversial.

Nāgeśa wrote three works on the philosophy of Grammar titled Maṅjūsā, Laghusiddhāntamaṅjūsā, and Paramalaghumaṅjūsā. The last is an
abridgment of the second, which is in turn an abridgment of the first. Like Köṇḍa Bhaṭṭa’s Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa and -sāra, these works are comprehensive, establishing the view of the Grammarians after discussing and refuting the views of other schools, mainly the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. Nāgēśa has been influenced by Köṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, but in many cases he takes independent positions. As far as the sphota theory is concerned, he differs from Bhartrhari, though he does not say so, and he was influenced by Kashmir Śaivism and by Tantric works.

Paramalaghumaṇḍjaśā

K. Kunjunni Raja

E references are to the edition by Kalika Prasad Sukla (with the editor’s Ḟyotsmā commentary), published at Baroda in 1961.

Significative Power (Sakti)

(E1–13). Sphota can be classified into eight varieties: varnasphota, padasphota, vākyasphota (each divided into the universal or the particular), akhaṇḍa padasphota, and akhaṇḍa vākyasphota. Of these types the vākyasphota is the most important, for the sentence is the unit of speech in worldly usage. The division of the sentence into words, and further into the stems and suffixes, is only a grammatical device for analysis and has no reality.

(E15–32). Verbal testimony is accepted as a means of valid cognition; but it is defined as the statement of a reliable person. For understanding the statement a knowledge of the meanings of the words spoken is essential. One who does not know the meaning of a word in the utterance, or who has forgotten it, cannot understand the statement.

(E37). Meaning (vṛtti) is of three kinds, primary significative power (sakti), secondary meaning (laksanā), and suggestion (vyāñjanā). The Naiyāyikas consider the significative power to be conventional, having been established by the will of God; but according to the Grammarians it is a relation between a word and its meaning, the signifier-signified relationship. On the basis of the superimposition of one over the other, there is a sort of identity and one evokes the other.

(E40). This relationship exists both in words and in sentences. It is known through recollection (smṛti). Even though the relationship is there permanently, it becomes effective only when it is known.

(E41). The Naiyāyika view that the significative power is based on the convention set by the will of God is not acceptable. Meaning is known from words directly, without the intervention of God’s will.

(E43). The identity and the superimposition of word and meaning are in the mind. Strictly speaking, the existence of the meaning, as well
as that of the word, is only in the mind. The word is the integral sphota. The meaning is a vikalpa, a mental construct that comes along with the knowledge of the word and has nothing to do with the actual existence. Empty words like “the son of a barren woman” (vandhyāsuta) are meaningful, though there may not be any corresponding external object. But for meaningfulness, the nominal suffixes ordained for meaningful stems (prātipadika) cannot be applied to such empty words.

(E44). The Naiyāyika’s view that in “the hare’s horn” (ṣaṣṭrya there is only error in the horn’s belonging to the hare is not acceptable; for in the sentence “there is no hare’s horn,” there is no need to see such an animal, and the suffixes are possible if the stem is meaningful.

On the basis of the identity of a word and its meaning, it is accepted that when the meaning changes, the word also changes (in the case of homophones); the usage “the word has many meanings” is in the sense that the words are similar.

(E46–48). This significative power exists in correct words and corrupt words equally, for usage by the people, which is the best means of learning the meaning of words, works in the same way in both. On observing the behavior of elderly people, one may remember the meaning known in one’s previous birth. That is how children and animals understand the connected sense (of utterances).

Objection: The Naiyāyikas say that the meaning of corrupt words is known by recollecting the correct words.

Answer: This claim is false, for meaning is known (from corrupt words) even without recollecting the corresponding correct words. Otherwise one who does not know the corresponding correct word will not be able to understand the meaning.

One cannot say that meaning is got from corrupt words through an erroneous notion of the meaningfulness. Meaning is known without any doubt (from corrupt words), hence no confusion is to be assumed. That is why women, uneducated people, and children have to be told the corrupt words, when they have doubts on hearing the correct words. The Mahābhāṣya passage, “although meaning is known from correct as well as corrupt words, grammar gives the rules about meritorious usage,” and Bhartrhari’s line, “Although there is no difference in meaningfulness, the grammatical rules are for merit and demerit in usage,” are in favor of this view. The discussion regarding the Āryan and Mleccha usages in Mīmāṃsā also shows this view. This discussion itself shows that both the Āryan and the Mleccha usages are valid; the Āryan usage is preferred as far as the Vedic terms are concerned.

(E49–50). This significative power is of three kinds: conventional (ṛūḍhi), derivative (yoga), and conventional derivative (yogarūḍhi). When the whole word gives the meaning, which cannot be analyzed into its components through grammatical rules, it is conventional, as
in the case of words like mani and nūpura. If the meaning is analyzable into its components according to the rules of grammar, it is derivative, as in the case of words like pācaka, "cook" (from pāc, "to cook," and agent suffix aka). Conventional derivation is that significative power in which, along with the meaning determined through grammatical analysis, some special restriction is also present, as in paṅkaja (literally "mud-born," but restricted to the lotus). Sometimes on the basis of the intention (tātparya), the word can be used in the pure (yoga) derivational sense also, a usage called yaugikaraudha (derivative-cum-conventional). Examples are aśvagandhā ("a kind of herb" and "having the smell of horses").

(E51–53). In case of ambiguous expressions, the meaning is restricted by contextual factors. They are given by Bharṭhari (Vākyāpādīya 2.315–17): samyoga, mention of the accompaniment of an entity; viprayoga, mention of the absence of it; sāhacarya, mention of something that usually goes with it; virodhita, mention of its well-known adversary; artha, the purpose served; prakaranya, the situational context; liṅga, indication available (in a related sentence); anyādādasannidhī, the presence of another word in collocation; sāmārtha, "probability"; aucitya, propriety, the time, the place, the gender, and accent.

Secondary Meaning (Lakṣanā)

(E54–57). According to the Naiyāyikas, secondary meaning is a relation to the primary meaning. It is of two types: gauṇī, based on common quality, and śuddhā or pure, in which the relation is something other than similarity. It can be divided into two classes in another way: ajahatsvārthā, in which the primary meaning is not abandoned, and jahatsvārthā, in which the primary meaning is abandoned. The former takes some additional meaning along with its own; for instance, chaturino yānti, "people with umbrellas are going" (used for some people with umbrellas and some without), kākebhya vadā rakṣyatām, "protect the curd from crows" (used for protecting from crows and also non-crows, such as dogs). The latter abandons its primary meaning. "Teach the Bāhika bull"; here the bull cannot be taught, so the term gives up its meaning and is applied to the man who is dull (like the bull). The relation between the primary meaning and the actual meaning is given as the substratum, common quality, proximity, association, and purpose (for example, "the cats are crying," "he is a lion," "the village is on the Ganges," "bring the sticks" [for stick bearers], and "Indra" [used for the pole intended for Indra].

The actual basis of secondary meaning is the incompatibility of the primary meaning with the meaning intended in the context; the incompatibility could be removed in different ways by assuming secondary meanings for different words.
According to early authorities, there is also a variety of laksanā called jahadajahallaksanā, in which part of the primary meaning of a term is abandoned and part retained, as in pāto dagdhaḥ, “the cloth is burned” (when only part is burned). In tatvam asi, “That thou art,” both tat and tvam have to give up some of their primary sense to permit identification.

Some say that secondary meaning is the relation to what is conveyed by the expression, for instance, “the village is on the deep river.” Here the term “deep” cannot refer to the bank of the river; hence the connected meaning “deep river” is to be understood first and then the sense of bank is determined through secondary meaning. In dvirepha (“two rs”), referring first to the word bhramara and then to a bee, the term laksitalaksanā is used by some.

Again, secondary meaning can be of two types, intentional—used with a purpose in view—(prayojanavati) and conventional (rūdhā). In “the village is on the Ganges,” the purpose is to indicate the sanctity and coolness of the place.

The Grammarians reject secondary meaning per se. The Mahābhāṣya says that “every word has the capacity to express any meaning if there is the intention.” The significative power is of two kinds, well known and less known. The first is called primary and the second secondary. The tāṭparya (intention) can be that of God or the tradition of elders.

Suggestion (Vyākhyānā)

Suggestion is a kind of impression in the mind produced by a flash of insight (pratibhā) or similar event, on the basis of the contextual factors, which is independent of any incompatibility to the literal meaning and which may or may not be associated with the literal meaning.

Suggestion is acceptable to the Grammarians, for they consider nipātas as suggestors (dyotakas); the nipātas suggest the power existing in the words that are uttered along with them. The sphota is also accepted as suggested by the phonemes. This suggestive power is experienced in the phoneme, the literal meaning, the word, part of a word, the texture of the expression, and so on. Contextual factors are only helpful in revealing the suggestive power.

The Naiyāyikas reject suggestion, saying that it can be included in secondary meaning. This view is not acceptable, for secondary meaning requires incompatibility of the primary meaning and leads to a meaning somehow connected to it. Suggestion does not meet these criteria and cannot be included in secondary meaning.

Sphota

Now, what is the meaning-bearing element in an expression?
The Mīmāṃsaka view that it is the individual phonemes is not correct, for then the utterance of later phonemes (other than the first) will be superfluous and unnecessary. It cannot be the collection of phonemes, for simultaneity of the phonemes is impossible, as each phoneme disappears as soon as it is uttered. Revelation or production is an instantaneous one, and there is no time available for the phonemes or their group to be perceptible.

(E67). The Naiyāyikas say that even though the phonemes are impermanent, the word can be perceived on the basis of the last phoneme, together with the impressions of the experience of the previous phonemes in their specific order. Or it can be assumed that each earlier phoneme produces its own subtle echo, extending till the last phoneme is revealed, and hence the word can be considered perceptible. Or the meaning is understood from the last phoneme together with the impressions of the earlier phonemes.

None of these explanations is possible. In the first view sequence cannot be perceived, because one phoneme is lost and the next alone remains. In the second, meaning cannot be assigned to the word, because the word does not exist. In the third, the order of sequence cannot be retained, because in recollection of impressions there is no need for such sequence.

Then what is the meaningful element? It is sphaṭa.

(E68–69). There are four levels of speech (vāc): para, pañjanti, madhyama, and vaikhari. Of the, para vāc is sabdabrahman without any activity (spanda) of the form of bindu, originating (from Kundalini) in the mūlādārācakra, the spot inside the body between the anus and the sex organ. When it is raised by the internal air to the nābhi cakra (or svādhisthāna cakra in the navel region) and becomes perceptible to the mind, it is called pañjanti. These two are said to be realized by yogins in their nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka types of samādhi. Raised farther up by the same air to the anāhatacakra in the region of the heart, it is called madhyama, still too subtle to be comprehended by the sense organs, but in the form of sphaṭa, bearing the meaning, and comprehensible by the mind at the time of japa (concentrated, silent utterance). Then, coming to the vocal organs in the mouth and articulated, it becomes the vaikhari and is capable of being heard by others also.

(E71–72). For madhyama and vaikhari the sound is produced simultaneously; the former reveals the sphaṭa, the meaning bearer; the latter is just meaningless sound. The madhyama is subtle, can be realized internally at the time of japa, and so on. It reveals the permanent sabda sphaṭa identical with Brahman, the speech principle according to Bhartṛhari. Though integral and indivisible, the padasphaṭa or vākyasphaṭa appears as phonemes and the like on the basis of the adjuncts through which it is revealed. Strictly speaking, it has no parts.
The phonemes, which are factors of the sound (dhvani) that reveal the sphota, seem to be part of the sphota. The apparent multiplicity in the sphota is due to that of the dhvani that reveals it. According to the view that sphota can be analyzed, it is revealed by the last phoneme, the previous phonemes being helpful to indicate the intention.

Dhvani is of two kinds, präkṛta and vaikṛta. The former is the revealer of the sphota, the latter is produced from the former and keeps it (to be heard by the listener), and is responsible for such modifications of the sound as the speed of utterance (vyrtti).

When a man utters a sentence like “bring the pot”, the speech at the vaikhari-level is heard by the listener, reaches his mind through the sense organ, and reveals the meaning. The term sphota can be derived as that from which the meaning bursts forth. As far as the speaker is concerned, the sound is produced simultaneously by the madhyamā and the vaikhari. To the listener, the vaikhari helps in revealing the madhyamā that gives the sphota, the meaning bearer.

All eight varieties of sphota are based on their meaningfulness. Strictly, only the vākyasphota is meaningful, for in the word it is the complete utterance that reveals the meaning.

Accessory Conditions for Understanding Sentence Meaning

Expectancy (ākāṅkhā), consistency (yogyatā), contiguity (āsatti), and intention (tātparya) are the accessory conditions for understanding the sentence’s meaning. Expectancy is responsible for giving the unity of the sentence. It is the desire on the part of the listener on hearing a word in a sentence to know the idea that can be related to its meaning, in order to get a complete sense; though expectancy is on the listener’s part, it is figuratively attributed to the words and their meanings. It can be called incompleteness of the expression. Patañjali says (in 2.1.1) that sāmarthya is vyapeksā, or interdependence, which is not between words but between their meanings. In a sentence such as “See, the deer is running,” the word “see” requires an object, and hence the whole utterance becomes a complete sentence; in “Devadatta cooks rice,” the verb “cooks” requires the agent and object for completion of meaning, and thus there is unity of sentence. “The pot is the object, bringing is the action” is not a single sentence like “bring the pot,” for expectancy requires the relevant kārakas in the proper case endings.

Semantic fitness (yogyatā) is the competence for mutual connection. “He wets it with water” has fitness, because wetting requires a liquid and water is a liquid; but “he wets it with fire” has no fitness, because fire is not a liquid and has no competence for wetting, which can be done only with a liquid. The Naiyāyikas say that in such
cases (of incongruity) the words give their individual meanings, but there is no knowledge of the syntactic connection; this claim is wrong. The meaning being mental, there is no obstruction for a connected idea. Hence empty words like "the son of a barren woman" are meaningful. Bhartrhari has said that worlds convey meanings, even if they are nonexistent in the world. The knowledge of incongruity itself is based on the knowledge of the sentence meaning.

(E82–83). Contiguity (āsātti) is the absence of words unconducive to understanding the syntactical connection. It exists to help dull people to get the sentence meaning; intelligent persons can easily get it with the help of expectancy, even if there is no contiguity. Intervention of irrelevant words may stand in the way of understanding the meaning.

(E84–85). Intention (tātparya) is God's desire that a word or a sentence must be uttered to indicate its particular meaning. Although the Grammarians accept that any word can be capable of conveying a meaning, it only does so when there is tātparya; the word "pot" does not convey the meaning of a cloth, because there is no intention. In the case of ambiguous expressions the disambiguating intention is that of the speaker, and the intention is to be ascertained on the basis of contextual factors. In the case of Vedic sentences, God's intention is to be assumed.

If the significative power (śakti) can be regulated through contextual factors, what is the need for assuming intention? Our experience is that in ambiguous expressions we get both meanings through the power of the expressions themselves, and we feel uncertain regarding the intention.

Meaning of Verbal Roots (Ḍhātvartha)

(E85–87). The meaning of the verbal root is an operation (vyāpāra) conducive to the production of a result (phala) and accompanied by a volition or effort (yatna). The term "result" means the effect of the action indicated by the verbal root. And "operation" means the operation indicated by the root for producing the result. "Conducive" (anukūla) means the association (samsarga) of the action and the result.

(E88). The Nirukta statement "The verb has an operation as its predominant element, and the nouns have existence (sattva) as their predominant element" shows that the operation is the most important element in a verb. The verbal suffix indicates the number and the kāraka relationship; the time (tense) qualifies the activity.

(E89–90). Others say that a verbal root denotes both the result and the operation, and that the relation between the two is one of the accomplisher (uddeśya) and the accomplished (vidheya). The two meanings arise separately and are connected with difficulty. And it is cumbersome to assume two separate explanations for the same word. So they say
that the significative power of the verbal root is the operation delimited by the effect or the effect delimited by the operation.

(E92). The Mimāṇsakas (Maṇḍana Miśra) say that the meaning of the verbal root is the effect, and the meaning of the personal suffix is the operation. This view is against such a rule as Pāṇini’s “La is added in the sense of karman” and so on (3.4.69), where the personal suffix is not assigned the meaning of operation. Moreover, for words in different tenses—pacati, “cooks,” paksyati, “will cook,” and so on—the meaning of the operations of blowing the fire and the rest will have to be assigned to different suffixes, which is more cumbersome than assigning it to the single verbal root.

Again, if the suffix indicates the operations of blowing and so on, even in words like gacchati, “he goes,” the same operation will be meant, and to avoid that problem one will have to say that the suffix indicates the operations of blowing and so on, when used along with the root pac.

(E94). Moreover, the distinction between transitive and intransitive verbs will be affected, if such a view is taken.

(E95-96). Bhartrhari has stated that what is accomplished (siddha) or what is not accomplished (asiddha) is described as a durative process of bringing into being (sādhya). It is called a verb (kriyā). The various minor operations, subordinate to the main operation, taking place in an order of sequence, considered in the mind as integral are called a verb (kriyā). The various operations that form parts of the overall operation take place in a sequence, but together, considered as a single operation, they form the verb (kriyā). The unity of the various operations is only in the mind. Thus the term pacati, “he cooks,” can be applied for any one of the various operations involved in cooking.

(E98). Objection: In ghaṭaṃ karoti, “he makes a pot,” the noun ghaṭa, “pot,” seems to be sādhya or “to be accomplished”, hence seems to come under the classification of verb.

Answer: From the word ghaṭa it is the accomplished pot that is understood, along with the word karoti, “he makes.” The word may convey the idea that the pot is yet to be made.

Existence (sattā) is the meaning of the roots as, bhū, vṛt, and vid. They come under kriyā or activity because existence continues to operate in time, as a durative activity. “Existence” here means continuously having its own nature.

(E99). When the operation and the effect take place in different substrata, the verb is called transitive; and when the operation and the effect take place in the same substratum, the verb is called intransitive. It is intransitive when there is no question of effect, as in the case of the root as, “to be,” for which the meaning is only existence, and no effect is discernible. The Nīruktā explains it while interpreting the term asti in the six bhāva vikāras.
(E100). Strictly speaking, transitiveness is to be taken as the possibility of association with the meaning of what is karman (object) according to the rules of grammar. In the case of adhyāśita bhūmayaḥ, "the grounds have been occupied," adhyās is transitive, for bhūmi, "ground," though semantically a substratum (adhiśkaraya), is karman according to a special rule of Pāṇini, adhiśnsthāśām karma. In the verb jīvati, "lives," the idea of bearing life may be implied, still grammatically it is intransitive. In the verb jānāti, "he knows," knowledge is the effect, and the operation is the contact of the ātman and the mind; hence usages like mano jānāti, "the mind knows," ātmā ātmānam jānāti, "one knows oneself," and the like are acceptable, for the operation and the effect have different substrata, one self limited by the body and the other self limited by mind.

(E103). Naiyāyikas say that the effect and the operation form the meaning of the verbal root, and the personal endings indicate the effort or volition (kṛti). The meaning of the verbal root is subordinate to the meaning of the suffix, which is predominant, and the meaning of the personal endings is subordinate to that of the noun in the nominative case.

(E104). Naiyāyikas distinguish sentient agent from insentient beings; effort (yatna) can be applied only to a sentient agent. Caitraḥ pacati, "Caitra cooks," means Caitra whose effort is conducive to the operation favorable to the softening of food. In ratho gacchati, "the chariot goes," because the chariot is insentient and cannot have a volition, the usage is explained as secondary.

(E104–105). This view is not acceptable to the Grammarian; Pāṇini’s rule "yuṣmady upapade samānādhihikaraṇe...says that the second-person suffix in the present tense is to be used when the kāraka indicated by the suffix and the second person (you) have the same substratum. This rule is not possible according to the Naiyāyika view. Even in the case of present participles, which are also substitutes of la just like the personal endings, only the meaning of volition will be obtained. You cannot say that the participles have significative power toward the agent, for according to the Nyāya view the prototype la has expressive power, not its many substitutes such as the participles and personal endings.

(E107). Assumption of secondary meaning for explaining usages like "the chariot moves" is cumbersome.

Pāṇini’s rule kṛtyakaraṇayosttiya (2.3.12) comes under the general rule anabhihite (2.3.1); if the personal endings express only the volition (kṛti), as the Naiyāyika believes, the agent and the object (karman) being unexpressed, a sentence like Caitraḥ pacati, "Caitra cooks" will be impossible, because the word for the agent, Caitra, will have to be in the instrumental case.
(E108–109). The view that the meaning of the verbal root qualifies the meaning of the personal endings is also not correct. The general rule is that in a word the meaning of the stem and the meaning of the suffix go together to give the full meaning, and that the suffix meaning is predominant. Thus in pācaka, "cook", the meaning "agent" is predominant. Yāska's statement that the ākhyāta (verbal ending) has activity as the predominant meaning is an exception to that rule. Here bhāvapradhānam has to be taken as a bahuvrihi compound.

(E110–111). The Naiyāyikas believe that in a sentence the principal qualificand is what is denoted by a nominative form. According to this view, a sentence like "paśya mṛgo dāvati" ("see the deer is running") could be "paśya mṛgam dāvati" (which is wrong). But according to the Grammarians the activity of seeing (indicated by paśya) is the predominant sense. The running of the deer would be its object. Through mutual association (samsarga), the idea of karman is achieved. Even a verb can qualify another verb, the main verb.

Meaning of Particles (Nipāta)

(E113–114). In an expression like sukhām anubhūyate, "happiness is being experienced," happiness being the object of experience, the verb is transitive. But that meaning of experiencing cannot be in the root, for without the preverb it is not known; and it cannot be in the preverb, because the meaning of personal ending associates only with the meaning of the verbal root. Hence suggestive power has to be assigned to the preverb.

This suggestiveness (dyotakatva) is the capacity to reveal the meaning potentially present in the word along with which it is used. Sometimes the suggestiveness may modify the action; sometimes it may indicate a relationship, as in the case of karmaprawacaniya.

(E115). Naiyāyikas consider preverbs to be suggestive and the other indeclinables to be expressive, because lexicons give the meaning of indeclinables such as sākyāt and namaḥ. This view is improper because in both cases the understanding of the meaning is similar.

(E118–120). Even the meaningfulness of particles is based on their suggestive power. Verbal roots have several meanings; in pratisphate the less-known sense ("to move") of the root sthā, "to stand," is made clear by the preverb pra. The accepted position is that the root is first associated with its kārakas and then only with the preverb.

In candra iva mukham, "moonlike face," the word candra, "moon," gets the meaning "something like the moon" figuratively, and the word iva, "like", acts only to suggest that intended meaning.

(E122–128). Some say that the word iva has the meaning of similarity, so there is no need for secondary meaning here. This notion is not correct, for according to this view the words candra and mukha cannot
have the same substratum (and the genitive case ending may come for the word *candra*).

Some others consider the word *iva* to be suggesting the standard of comparison, indicating that both have the same qualities.

Negation is of two types, *paryudāsa* and *prasajyapratisedha* (the former is nominally bound and the latter is verbally bound). The negation in *paryudāsa* suggests some positive entity, for instance, *abrahmana* (non-Brahmin) indicates a *ksatriya*. The compound is *tatpuruṣa*, which normally requires predominance for the meaning of the second member. The suggestive nature of the negation is quite in keeping with it. Normally this *paryudāsa* negation applies to someone similar to the one negated. Bhartrhari says that the negative particle *naḥ* indicates five meanings: similarity (“nonhorse,” referring to a donkey), absence (“bring a nonhuman being”), littleness (“a girl without waistline,” *anudarā kanyā*), pejoration (“non-Brahmin” applied to a Brahmin), and opposition (*adharma*, “demerit”). Cases of mutual exclusion (as in “the pot is not a piece of cloth”) also come under this type; but normally examples of *paryudāsa* are compound words (of *naḥ-tatpuruṣa* type). *Prasajyapratisedha* (verbally bound negative) can be either in a compound or in an uncompounded expression: “There is no pot in the house”; *asūryampatyā rājadārāh*, “the king’s wives do not see the sun.” Examples like “no doubt” (*na sandehah*) come under this heading. *Prāgabhāva* (prior absence) and *pradhvamsabhāva* (posterior absence or destruction) are not suggested by the negative particle. *Atyantabhāva* (nonexistence) is syntactically connected with the verb, for instance, “There is no pot”.

(E130–131). *Objection:* Anything that exists cannot be negated; negation does not apply to a nonexistent thing; thus negation becomes meaningless.

*Answer:* Both the expression and the meaning exist in the mind; what exists in the mind can be negated outside in real life. The word “pot” gives the idea of the existence of the pot, while the negation is to remove it—this view of the Naiyāyikas (who do not consider the meaning of words to be purely mental) has no stand, for existence or negation cannot apply to the mind. According to the *Mahābhāṣya*, secondary meaning is not accepted, and particles are not considered to be meaningful.

(E132–138). The word *eva*, “only,” suggests the meanings of restriction and negation. Even without the use of the word, the meaning may be obtained. So they say that every word in a sentence has a restrictive sense. The restriction is of three kinds: when applied to a qualificand, it negates it in other places (for example, “Arjuna *alone* is a bowman”); when applied to an adjective, it emphasizes it (“the conch is white *alone*”); and when applied to a verb, it indicates absence of nonassociation *nilaṃ sarojam bhavaty eva*, “the blue lotus *does exist*”).

Sometimes *eva* is understood. What Mīmāṃsakas call *parisamkhya*
(for instance, pañca pañcanakha bhaksydh, “among five-nailed animals, five may be eaten”) is included by the Mahābhāṣya as nīyama or restriction.

Meaning of Verbal Endings (Tenses and Moods)

(E138–140). Although the Naiyāyikas discuss the meaning of the ten L-signs, the Grammarians accept meaningfulness only for what is actually spoken and therefore discuss the meaning of the substitutes, the actual verbal suffixes used in the world. Pāṇini gives meaning to laṭ and so on as a simpler mean for description.

The meanings of the L-substitutes are number, time (present, past, and future tenses), kārakas, and the action noun (bhava). Thus laṭ-substitutes express the present tense; along with class suffixes such as sap, the agent; and along with the suffixes yak and cīṇ, the action and the object.

Bhaṭṭoṭi Dīkṣita says that the verbal root denotes both the result and the activity and that the verbal suffixes denote the substratum (āśraya). In the active voice the activity is more important, and in the passive voice the result is more important. Together with the verbal suffixes, the verbal roots also indicate the number and the kāraka relationship.

(E141–143). The present tense is indicated by an activity that is started but not completed. Lit indicates the past tense earlier than today and also indirect information (in other words, information not directly perceived). In the case of auxiliary verbs kr, as, and bhū used along with other roots and the affix -am, they indicate only action in general (as in edham cakre).

(E143–145). Luṭ indicates future, other than today, in addition. Lṛṭ is used in simple future. Lṛṭ is used only in Vedic language and has the same sense as liṭ (injunction and so on). Loṭ has the same sense of injunction and so on. Laṇ indicates the past tense, other than today. Liṭ has various meanings: injunction (vidhi), a summoning to do something (nimantraṇa), an invitation to do something (āmantraṇa), respectful command (adhiśṭa), permission (sampraṇa), and request (prārthanā).

The first four meanings are different shades of prompting (pravartana) to action; this prompting is through the knowledge that the action will lead to a desired object, that the action is capable of performances, and that it is not associated with a strong undesirable result.

Luṅ indicates past tense in general, with past meaning prior to the present. Lṛṅ indicates the conditional sense, suggesting that the action is over, that if something had happened (which did not happen) another action (which also did not take place) would have taken place, for instance, “if fuel had been available, food would have been cooked.”

(E146–149). The Naiyāyika view is that there are ten L-suffixes. L-suffixes indicate the agent, time (tense and mood), and the number.
The Grammarians think that agent is inferred from the term \textit{ca}, “and” in Panini’s rule \textit{lah karmani ca}. Bhatta Mimamsakas consider that operation (\textit{ny\ddot{a}p\ddot{a}ra}) is meant instead. The Naiyayikas take volition or effort to be the meaning, as it is simpler; they consider that \textit{L}-suffixes indicate the meaning, not \textit{L}-substitutes, which are many. In the passive sentence “maitre\textit{\ddot{n}}a gamyate gr\textit{\dot{a}}ma\textit{\ddot{h}}” (“the village is reached by Maitra”), the \textit{L}-suffixes indicate volition (given in the instrumental case) and the \textit{\ddot{a}tmanepada} indicates the result (the village). The main idea in the comprehension of the sentence meaning is the noun in the nominative case.

(E149-151). \textit{La} indicates the present tense; \textit{l\ddot{a}n}, \textit{lun}, and \textit{li} indicate the past tense; and \textit{lo} and \textit{ler} indicate the future. \textit{L\ddot{a}n}, \textit{lo}, and \textit{ler} indicate injunction. The number is also indicated by the suffixes. \textit{L\ddot{a}} is used only in the Veda. The tenses, such as the present, are for the activity. \textit{La} directly expresses the present tense and through secondary meaning indicates the substratum (\textit{\ddot{a}d\ddot{r}aya}). Time (past or future) that is very near the present may also be indicated by \textit{la}.

(E152-154). According to the Grammarians and the Bhatta Mimamsakas the meaning obtained from the verbal suffixes has an operation as its main factor; according to the former an operation is the meaning of the verbal root, and according to the latter it is the mental activity (\textit{bh\ddot{a}van\ddot{a}}) and is conveyed by the verbal suffixes. “Caitra ta\textit{\ddot{n}}dula\textit{\ddot{m}} pacati” (“Caitra cooks rice”) means to the Grammarians “the activity of cooking that has Caitra as the agent and rice as the object.” To the Mimamsakas it means “the mental activity toward the action of cooking that has Caitra as its agent and rice as its object.” The Naiyayika insists that the meaning of the sentence has the noun in the nominative case as the main element, “Caitra who has a volition conducive to the action of cooking that has rice as the object.”

(E157-158). \textit{La} has the meanings injunction and benediction. \textit{Lo} can mean injunction or permission. The Bhatta Mimamsakas explain \textit{vidhi} (injunction) as \textit{pravartana} or prompting. On hearing a \textit{la} from the teacher the student has the knowledge that the teacher wants him to do something; this view is not correct. There is no authority to consider such knowledge as the cause for action on the student’s part. It is the knowledge that the action will lead to some desired result that prompts action.

(E159-164). The Prabhakara Mimamsakas say that the injunction means something should be done. \textit{Svargak\ddot{a}mo yajeta}, “one desirous of heaven should perform the sacrifice” means (1) something should be done regarding sacrifice by heaven seeker; (2) something should be done, which is the means for heaven, and which is about sacrifice by one who is qualified; (3) sacrifice should be performed by heaven seeker, who is the person qualified to do it; (4) the performer of sacrifice is the
heaven seeker; (5) I am a heaven seeker, therefore the sacrifice can be performed by my effort.

Naiyāyikas consider three powers for \textit{liṅ}, meaning the knowledge of prompting. First, it is capable of being performed by effort; second, it will lead to a desirable result; and third, it will not be associated with a very bad effect. The power is not in all three together, but separately.

In the case of \textit{liṅ} there is an argument based on the influence involved, as in “if there had been no fire, there would have been no smoke.”

\textit{Kārakas}

(E164–168). The six \textit{kārakas} are \textit{kartr}, agent; \textit{karma}, object; \textit{karana}, instrument; \textit{sampradāna}, recipient; \textit{apādāna}, the fixed point from which splitting takes place; and \textit{adhikarana}, substratum. \textit{Kārakas} such as the agent bring about the action. \textit{Kartr}, agent, is the substratum of the operation indicated by the verbal root in the context. Thus in the example “he cooks with fire,” burning may be an operation of fire but not of the contextual action, cooking, so fire is not the agent. When this operation is expressed by the verbal root, the agent will be in the nominative case; according to Pāṇini’s view the nominative case indicates the \textit{prātipadika} stem, and the \textit{kārakas} are expressed by specific suffixes. In \textit{Caitra bhavati}, “Caitra exists,” Caitra is the agent (\textit{kartr}); although that \textit{karaka} (\textit{kartr}) is already expressed by the verbal suffix, the nominative case also indicates the same. In “Caitreṇa grāmaṃ gamyate” (“the village is reached by Caitra”), the meaning understood is “the contact with the village is a result of the action whose agent is Caitra.”

The vocative (\textit{sambodhana}) is also a \textit{kāraka} because it is syntactically connected with “you” (understood from the context) and thereby with the action to be performed.

(E169–170). The definition of \textit{kāraka} as the cause of action (\textit{kriyānimitam}) is not correct, for it will apply even to the genitive case in “Caitrasaṭa taṇḍulaṃ pacati” (“he cooks Caitra’s food”), because Caitra is indirectly responsible for the cooking. The definition “those bringing about the action” is better; direct connection with the operation indicated by the verb is necessary. That is why the meaning of the genitive case, as well as of the nouns directly connected with other words (\textit{upapada}), is not considered by the Grammarians to be \textit{kāraka}. If the expectancy is not resolved, necessary words have to be taken as understood to explain the elliptical sentence.

(E169–170). The Naiyāyika view that the agent (\textit{kartr}) is the \textit{kāraka} that prompts all the other \textit{kārakas} (to bring about the action) is not correct, for in cases like \textit{sthiṃ pacati}, “the vessel cooks,” and \textit{asṭhi chinattā}, “the sword cuts,” there is no prompting on the part of the vessel or the sword.
(E171–178). *Karma*, object, is that (*kāraka*) which is intended to have the same substratum as the effect of the action meant by the relevant verbal root and prompted by its main activity. It is the meaning of *ipsitama*, “intended most” in Pāṇini’s rule on *karma*. In “kāśiṁ gacchan pathī mṛtaḥ” (“going to Kāśi, he died on the way”), though he does not reach Kāśi, the intention was there, hence Kāśi is *karma kāraka*.

(E178–179). *Karana*, instrument, is that *kāraka* the activity of which immediately brings about the action (meant by the verb). In “Rāmeṇa bāṇena hato bāli” (“Bāli was killed by Rāma with an arrow”), the activity of the arrow is the immediate cause for the death, though Rāma’s activity may have begun earlier. Hence *bāna* is the instrument and Rāma the agent (*karta*).

(E180–183). *Sampradāna*, recipient, is that *kāraka* for whom the operation meant by the verb is taking place. In “brāhmaṇaṁ gāṁ dadāti” (“he gives the Brahmin a cow”), the Brahmin is the recipient. The view that the gift meant is not to be returned is not valid. For giving clothes to the laundry man *sampradāna* is also possible: “rajaṁ vastraṁ dadāti” and “rajakesaṁ vastraṁ dadāti” are both correct. Patañjali gives the example “the teacher gave the student a thrashing.” *Sampradāna*, used in the dative case, means the person to whom the action is intended. “Maitrāya vārttaṁ kathayati” (“he tells the news to Maitra”) means the operation of telling that has the news as object and Maitra as the person for whom the operation is intended. In an intransitive verb also, as in *patye Sete*, “she lies down for her husband,” it is similar, it means she is lying down for the sake of her husband.

(E183–187). *Apādana* is the substratum of the point of departure indicated by the contextual verb, and it is the same as the limit. The departure can be real or mentally conceived. In “vṛkṣam tyajati khagah” (“the bird abandons the tree”), separation is not the meaning of the root *tyaj*, hence *vṛkṣa* does not become *apādana*. By limit is meant only the relatively fixed point as far as the relevant action is concerned. Hence we get “dhāvataḥ aśvat patati” (“falls from the running horse”), for as far as falling is concerned, the horse is the fixed point, though it is also running. The meaning of the ablative case is the limit. “Vṛkṣat parṇam patati” (“the leaf falls from the tree”) means the falling that has the leaf as the agent and the limit (or the fixed point from which the separation takes place) as the tree.

(E187–189). *Adhikarana*, substratum, is where the activity takes place, either through the agent or through the object. In “stālyām odanaṁ grhe pacati” (“he cooks food in a vessel in the house”), the vessel is the place in which the object is affected by the action, and the house is the place of the agent’s activity. This *adhikarana* is of three types. The first is *abhiwāpaka*, all-compre-
hensive, as in “tileṣu tailam asti” (“there is oil in the sesame”). The second is āupaśeṣika, proximity, as in Pāṇini’s śūtra “iko yaṇ aci” (“i, u, r, l change to y, o, r, and l, respectively in the proximity of [when followed by ] a vowel”). Kaiyāṭa’s example kaṭe āste, “he sits on the mat,” is not happy. (It means he sits on a part of the mat.) The third type is “vaiṣayika kaṭe āste.”

(E190). Relations, like that of master and servant, which are different from the kāraka relations are indicated by the genitive case, as in rāṇaḥ puruṣaḥ, “the king’s servant.”

Meaning of Nouns

(E192–196). The Mīmāṃśakas say that words denote the universal; the particulars are innumerable and it is cumbersome to assign the meaning to the particulars. Even though the word directly means the universal, the particulars are known through secondary meaning. If one particular is given as the meaning of a word (like “cow”), it will not be possible to associate the word with another particular.

Answer: Although particulars are innumerable, a particular can be an indication (upaḷaṇa) of the universal, and there is no need to assume innumerable powers to refer to the individuals. Among the means of understanding the meaning of words, the most important—namely, the usage of elders—will give the meaning as applied to the particular. As Patañjali has said, even to one who takes the universal to be the meaning of a word, the particular does not cease to be the meaning.

(E197). The gender is also the meaning of a noun; the suffixes only suggest. The gender of many Sanskrit words, such as khaṭvā, “a cot” (feminine), has nothing to do with sex. One formal way of distinguishing the genders is the following: whatever can be put in apposition with “he” is masculine, with “she” is feminine, and with “it” is neuter.

(E198–203). The number is also the meaning of a noun. The nominal suffixes only suggest number; it is the stem that actually expresses it. The kāraka is also the meaning of nominal stem. Thus the nominal stem indicates five things—the universal, the particular, gender, number, and kārakas. Sometimes the expression itself can be the meaning of the word, as in referring to a name, in imitating sounds, and similar instances.

Meaning of Compound Words

(E203–204). The meaning of compounds is of two kinds: jahatsvārtha, giving up their own meaning, and ajahatsvārtha, without giving up their original meaning. The word suṭrūṣa, “serving,” has given up the derivative meaning, “desire to hear”. In rāṇapuruṣa, “the king’s servant,” the parts do not give up their meaning completely. In all five vṛttis accepted by the Grammarians—kṛt, taddhita, samāṣa, ekaṣeṣa, and oḍkya—the
meaningfulness is in the whole, not in parts, because something more than the sum of the meanings of the parts is conveyed by them.

(E211–212). Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, who accept vyāpokṣa (mutual expectancy or association) in compound words and the like, say that there is no special power for the compound word. In a compound like rājapuruṣa, "the king's servant," the word rāja can mean related to rājan through secondary meaning. In an example like ghanaśyāma, "cloud-black," the meaning of similarity (black like the cloud) can be obtained through secondary meaning. Understanding the meaning of the components is essential for determining the meaning of the compound.

Answer: If a special meaning is not accepted for the compound word as a whole, the stem will not be a prātipadika, so nominal suffixes cannot be applied. The rule kṛttaddhitasamāśaṇa is not to make the compound a prātipadika, but to restrict the term prātipadika to compounds alone (and not to a sentence).

Objection: If unity of meaning (ekarthibhava) is accepted for compounds, the components will be meaningless, and syntactic connection will be difficult.

Answer: The special meaning comes only after the componential meanings have been understood and connected.

(E213–216). When the componential meaning is against the accepted popular usage, the individual meanings are rejected, and the component will be jahatsvārtha.

MAHĀBHĀṢYA PRADĪPÓDHYOTA

V. K. S. N. Raghavan

This work is a commentary by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa on Kaiyātā's Pradīpa. In it Nāgeśa explains the views of Patañjali following Kaiyātā for the most part though sometimes he differs from him. E references are to the edition of the work in five volumes by Vedavrata, published by the Haryana Sahitya Samsthana, Gurukula Jhajjhar, Rohtak, 1969. A small section (2.1.2–2.1.49) has been translated by Shivaram Dattatreya Joshi (Centre for Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, Poona, 1969: G627), and references labeled ET are to this publication. The numbers refer to philosophical points made in the text.

Summary of Philosophical Topics

1 (ET16–17). Explaining the Mahābhāṣya passage "catvāri padajātāṇi, nāmākhyātopasarganipatāṣaṇa" ("there are four types of words, noun, verb, preverb, and indeclinables also"), Nāgeśa says that the
word *ca*, "also", suggests the fourfold classification of speech (*vāc*): *parā, paṭyaṇṭi, madhyama*, and *vaikharī*.

2 Referring to the two heads of the bull (of *vāc*) mentioned in the Vedic stanza, Patañjali’s explanation that they were the permanent (*niṣṭya*) and the produced (*kārya*) was interpreted by Kātyāṭa to mean the suggested (*vyāṅgya*) and the suggestor (*vyāṅjaka*). Nāgēsa elucidates this interpretation by saying that the suggested is the *madhyama* type and the suggestor the *vaikhari* type of speech.

3 (ET18). *Rg Veda* 1.164.45, quoted by Patanjali, says: *Vāc* has been divided into four levels, which the learned Brahmins know; the first three are kept (hidden) in the cave; people speak only the fourth. Nāgēsa gives two explanations: first, each of the four parts of speech—noun, verb, preverb, and indeclinable—has only one-fourth in the speech of common people; and, second, the first three parts of speech (namely, *parā, paṭyaṇṭi*, and *madhyama*) are hidden.

4 He quotes *Vākyapadīya* 1.143 "(*Vaiṅkhāryā madhyamāyāśca... trayaṇaḥ vācaḥ param padam*) and explains: *vaikhari* is the audible speech; *madhyama* is the speech in the mind of the speaker, and cannot be perceived (by the listener), but is the cause of the speech utterance. *Paṭyaṇṭi* is beyond the scope of worldly parlance (being undifferentiated), but the yogins are able to visualize it and even analyze it. At the *parā* stage, speech is beyond the reach even of yogic perception.

Nāgēsa gives another quotation in support of his view. "Svarūpajyotir evāntaḥ parā vāg anapāyini tasyāṁ dṛṣṭasvarūpāyam adhikāro nivatate" ("The supreme speech [*parā vāk*] is imperishable and is of intrinsic brilliance; if one realizes the exact nature of the eternal resplendent luster, the (karmic) bondage or avidyā-karman retracts from one").

Just as Vedāntins hold the supreme being to be Absolute, Nāgēsa considers the supreme speech (*parā vāk*) to be Absolute, the realization of which leads one to release from karmic bonds.

5 (E19). While commenting on the *Rg Vedic* stanza "saktum iva" (10.71.2), quoted in the *Mahābhāṣya*, Nāgēsa identifies *vāc* with Supreme Brahman. Those persons who have an adequate knowledge and capacity to think deeply with regard to Vedic grammar achieve union (sāyujya) with Śabda Brahman. First they acquire deep knowledge by correctly understanding the unique import of words.

In the case of word conveying the meaning of Brahman, there is the knowledge of the identity between the word and its meaning. Persons of extraordinary wisdom achieve sāyujya or identity with the Supreme Speech because the blessed goddess Lakṣmī, with self-brilliance and Brahman’s form, resides in every articulated speech of those well-versed Grammarians.

6 (E8). Explaining Patañjali’s explanation of *śabda* (word) as “the sound that conventionally conveys a particular sense,” Nāgēsa says:
"The term pratitapadarthaka refers to a word that is well known among the people as capable of indicating precisely a certain object." It is the word that is made up of sounds (in the form of articulated sound syllables) that are audible to the sense of hearing. It is also necessary that a word must have a precise meaning well known in the world. The grammatical text analyzes such words into their components and explains them.

7 Explaining the terms dhvani and sphota used in the Mahābhāṣya, Nāgęśa says that sphota refers to the madhyamā type of vāk, while dhvani refers to the vaikhri type.

8 Among the uses of Grammar, Patañjali gives the first place to the protection of the Vedas; Kaiyaṭa explains it as gaining the puruṣārthas. Elaborating this notion, Nāgęśa says that puruṣārtha means dharma and mokṣa here. Grammar is useful for obtaining a correct understanding of the forms and meanings of Vedic texts, so it forms part of the means for the achievement of dharma and mokṣa. The study of Grammar results in understanding the correct sense of Vedic passages, enabling one thereby to perform the ordained rituals, hence causing the enjoyment of heavenly bliss (svarga). Grammar is also useful for correctly understanding the meaning of Upaniṣadic passages, thereby causing the attainment of supreme bliss (mokṣa). A study of Grammar is essential for understanding the Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts correctly, enabling one to perform one’s duties properly and to have a correct knowledge of reality.

SPHOTAVĀDA

K. Kunjunni Raja

Sphotavāda is an independent work by Nāgęśa Bhaṭṭa on the sphaṭa theory. According to Nāgęśa, the founder of the theory was the sage Sphoṭāyana, mentioned by Pāṇini in formulating one of his rules. This tradition is unknown to Bhartṛhari, who considers Audumberāyana (mentioned by Yāska) as having held a view similar to the sphaṭa theory. Nāgęśa differs considerably from Bhartṛhari and shows the influence of Kashmir Śaivism and the Tantric tradition. Minor differences can be seen between the views given in this work and those offered in the sphaṭa section of the Paramalaghumaṇjūśā (see above).

The edition (E) referred to is that by V. Krishnamacharya (Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1946). Numbers refer to philosophical points made in the text.

Summary

(E1). According to the Grammarians there are eight kinds of sphaṭa: phoneme (varṇa) sphaṭa (particular and universal forms), indi-
visible-word (akhandapada) sphota, word (pada) sphota (particular and universal forms), indivisible-sentence (akhandavākya) sphota, and sentence (vākya) sphota (particular and universal forms).

(E5–6). The term sphota means that from which the meaning bursts out, that is, the signifier. The eight types of sphota are all designating (vācaka) linguistic signs. The letters actually heard, along with the order of sequence, bear the meaning, not the prototype (sthānin), the grammatical technical term (like la in bhavati). It may seem simpler to assume that the meaning-bearing capacity belongs to the single technical term la, instead of to its substitutes like ti; but the common man (who is not a Grammarian) will not understand the meaning from la and the like. Even though Pāṇini’s Grammar may be an accessory to the Vedas (Vedāṅga), terms like la (for verbal endings) have no meaning bearing power. Even secondary meaning cannot apply to them.

Objection: One who has learned the various substitutes for different technical terms may get confused and have difficulty understanding the meaning.

Answer: As in the case of the scripts reminding the phonemes, here also it is possible. All of the items are needed to help the recollection.

(E7). Moreover, worldly usage, the most important among the means of understanding the meaning of words, applies only to the words used, not to the artificial technical term, such as l-suffixes.

(E9). It may be noted that the meaning-bearing capacity is only for the phonemes when they are together (in a particular sequence), not for them individually. Otherwise, each phoneme will be a nominal (pratipadika) stem and get nominal suffixes.

(E10). Thus meaningfulness is only for the actual expressions used in language, not for the artificially assumed prototype. The word ghatena has ghaṭa as the stem and -ena as the instrumental singular suffix; only the grammarian knows it, not the ordinary man who uses the language, to whom the splitting is artificial. Hence the whole word ghaṭena must be assumed to convey the full meaning.

Similarly in the sentences hare'va, “Oh Hari! protect (us)” and viṣṇo'va, “O Visnu! protect (us),” the same argument shows that the whole sentence has to be taken as the meaning-bearing unit. Thus word sphota and sentence sphota have to be accepted.

(E11). The sentence meaning, which is of the form of the association (of word meanings), is something new, and therefore here the significative power is the relationship.

Objection: The primary meaning of words is understood from the behavior of elderly people. Still, after the individual meanings of words have been understood from the words, the mind with the knowledge of their mutual expectancy understands the sentence meaning; there is no need for a special power.
**Answer**: The understanding of the word meanings from the words is impossible if the words are not understood clearly; mutual expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) is the same as the sentence power (vākyāsakti).

**Objection** by a Mīmāṃsaka: The mutual association of the word meanings is known as the object of intention (tātparya). Intention is desire to convey the particular meanings; in the absence of such an intention or in the presence of another intention, the proper meaning will not be understood. Instead of taking these last two cases as obstructions to the knowledge of the sentence meaning, it is simpler to take the knowledge of intention as one of the positive conditions for understanding the sentence meaning.

(E12–13). **Answer**: The novelty (apūrvatva) of the sentence meaning cannot be the object of intention, and even from the primary meanings of the words the sentence meaning can be obtained (without the help of intention). In the case of words uttered by a parrot, the meaning of the utterance is understood, even though it is certain that there is no intention on the part of the parrot. Hence intention is not essential for understanding the sentence meaning. God's intention also cannot be assumed, for it can be known only through the effect. Mīmāṃsakas who do not accept the existence of God understand the meaning (without the help of intention); and Vedic sentences will be meaningless if intention is necessary (for there is no intention of the speaker or God there). Even the intention of the teacher cannot be assumed for the Veda, for the teacher may be a fool or a wise man. "Two meanings appear from the sentence, we do not know which one will suit the context—such general experience is also against assuming intention as a cause for the understanding of the sentence's meaning.

(E15–17). In ambiguous cases it is the context that helps in deciding the meaning, not the intention. Thus in a sentence like "bring the pot" the sentence meaning, which is of the nature of the mutual association of the word meanings, is determined from the sentence itself. From worldly experience it is known that the sentence gives the connected sentence meaning; but through the method of substitution the words are also assumed to have their individual meanings. Hence the sentence meaning can be considered to be mutual association (samsarga) of word meanings, which is obtained from the sentence as a whole (vākyāsakti).

(E17–18). **Naiyāyika objection**: What is the need for assuming a significative power for the sentence, if the mutual association (samsarga) can be obtained from the word meanings themselves with the help of mutual expectancy and so on? Mutual expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) is the desire to understand the word syntactically related to the other words in the sentence in order to bring out the intended connected meaning. The sentence "bring the pot" will be understood by the ordinary man, but
not the statement "bringing is the activity and the pot is the object"; the latter may be understood by the Nyāya scholar, to whom the morphemes ghata (pot), -am (the accusative singular suffix indicative of the object), and so on are separate words (pāda).

(E18–21). Answer: You cannot say that because the intention of God is fixed (this word must give this particular meaning), a special new sense in the sentence meaning cannot be obtained, for I can accept God's intention for the sentence meaning as well (Let this sentence give this particular meaning). You cannot say that a special power should be assumed to convey the special added meaning in the sentence, for assumption of a special power involves complexity. The view that a pāda is a meaningful item is not affected, for it is not the pāda but its knowledge that leads to the sentence meaning. Thus what the Grammarians call the significative power of the sentence (vākyasaṅkhyā) is the same as what the Naiyāyikas call mutual expectancy (ākāṅkṣā). Hence it is said that the sentence meaning is the mutual association of the word meanings (samsarga vākyarthah). And that is why the Mahābhāṣya says that Pāṇini's rule kṛttaddhitasamāsāśca uses the term samāsa to exclude the sentence.

(E24–27). Some others say that meaningfulness is located only in the sentence and not in its parts, the words. People understand the meaning only from the behavior of elders, and that is with reference to sentences. The meaning of words is understood separately through the substitution method; but that does not make the sentence meaning unreal. And in cases like hare'va, "O Hari! protect," it is necessary to take the sentence as a whole. With the help of the knowledge of word meanings one can get the sentence meaning; but then without the help of word meanings also the sentence meaning can be understood directly (through observing the behavior of elders).

(E28–29). This view is not accepted by some others. The word ghata indicates the meaning of the pot and its being the object; hence there is no need to accept a collective power for the sentence. Knowledge of meaning is based on the way it is learned.

(E29–30). Even among those who accept significative power for the sentence, some may get the knowledge of sentence meaning directly, others after understanding the kārakas, and some by other means. But the sentence meaning is based on the mutual association of the individual word meanings.

(E30–31). Objection: Knowledge of word meaning is the cause for the knowledge of the connected sentence meaning, for on hearing a new sentence one who knows the word meanings does have the knowledge of the sentence's meaning.

Answer: Without knowing the significative power of the sentence, one does not know the sentence's meaning. People who are able to
understand the meaning from a sentence sometimes find it difficult to identify the words and other parts, if they have no grammatical knowledge. And acceptance of significative power for words does not involve complexity, because it is valid in worldly usage.

(E31–53). Question: Just as words convey word meanings, why should the sentence not also convey the sentence meaning? And just as the word meanings are remembered, why should the sentence meaning not also be remembered? The sentence meaning itself is the \textit{śabdabodha}, the meaning arrived at for the sentence.

Answer: The sentence meaning is not directly experienced. The words produce their individual meanings through recollection, but the sentence does not. The words convey their meaning to the listener through recollection; then with the help of the sentence's significative power, the knowledge of the sentence meaning is determined, consisting of the word meanings and their mutual association.

(E54–55). The Mīmāṃsakas say that it is not proper to assume a special power for the sentence, because secondary meaning is sufficient. The sentence meaning is not something new. On hearing the sentence “the village is on the river Haridrā,” even a person who does not know such a river will know that it is the name of a river because of the use of the word “river” accompanying it in the sentence; similarly, when the words have conveyed their individual meanings, it is possible to understand the sentence meaning with the help of the knowledge of mutual expectancy. To make it a verbal knowledge, secondary meaning is assumed. The secondary meaning gives the meaning related to what is conveyed by the primary meaning. It does not affect the authoritativeness of the Vedas, even though the sentence meaning is conveyed, not directly, but by secondary meaning from the word meanings on the basis of expectancy and so on.

Answer: This view is not acceptable. Secondary meaning operates when there is some incompatibility with the literal sense. We cannot say that the condition for secondary meaning is the incompatibility with the speaker's intention, for that does not work everywhere; and we have to assume an intention. It is simpler to assume a power to the sentence than to assume an intention.

In fact, secondary meaning is the relation to the literal meaning, not the relation to what is understood; according to the Vedas it is not possible to assume secondary meaning here.

(E56–58). Objection: by Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas: The sentence has no special power to convey the sentence meaning. By contrast, the words have the power to convey the connected meaning. When it can be explained by the significative power of words, there is no valid reason for assuming a power to the sentence. The understanding of the sentence meaning is not possible unless it becomes the object of the significative
power. It is simpler to assume it for the words instead of assuming a separate power (to the sentence). So each word gives the syntactic connection also (along with its own meaning) on the basis of mutual expectancy and so on and the fact that the words have been uttered together (as one group). Moreover, on hearing a word there is always a desire to know its syntactic position, and that desire can be satisfied only from words. It is not something new, for the syntactic relation of each word is known in a general way. The view that the power of a word is to give its meaning as syntactically connected with that of other words is not correct. The meaning of the other words can be obtained only from those words. The impression that a word like ghata, "a pot," gives only its isolated meaning is erroneous.

(E59). Answer: This view is not acceptable, for even though you assume that the words have a power to indicate the syntactic relationship, its exact nature is known only by the other words uttered, and the utterance together (samabhivyāhāra) of the words has to be assumed as a cause for knowing it, which is more complex.

(E60–61). You have to assume that the words give the syntactic relation in a general way and that the specific relation is understood through inference. Then that inference itself can give the syntactic relation (samsarga). The experience is that the sentence's meaning is determined from the sentence itself, not that it is determined from inference or perception.

(E66–68). Objection: The cause of understanding the sentence meaning is the word meanings or their recollection, not the knowledge of words. On seeing a vague white form and hearing the sound of hooves and neighing, one gets the idea that a white horse is running. Here there is no syntactic relation between the seeing of the white form and the hearing of the neighing.

Answer: Such a knowledge can be obtained even from inference. If the knowledge is to be verbal, it must be from words.

(E68–69). Objection: Knowledge of a word or a sentence is impossible, because sequence is part of the utterance, and the phonemes are never together.

Answer: Each phoneme is received as associated with the previous ones; that is why there is difference between sara and rasa, where the same phonemes appear in different sequence. The view that the word is grasped through the perception of the last phoneme and the recollection of the earlier phonemes is not acceptable, because there is no rule regarding the sequence between what is heard and what is recollected. There is no rule that recollection of past experience is always in the same order.

(E69–70). The three types of sphota discussed (phoneme, word, and sentence) are differentiated on the basis of the listener. Some understand
the distinct meanings of the stem and the suffix, some get the meaning from the words, and some others from the sentence as a whole. The meaning is understood from the whole.

Akhandaśphota

(E71–74). On the basis of the experience “it is a single word” and “it is a single sentence,” it is necessary to assume an indivisible word (ṣphota) and an indivisible sentence (ṣphota) free from the distinctions of phonemes, stems, and suffixes. It is not like the idea of “forest” for a collection of trees. Otherwise even a phoneme could be divided like r, split into r and vowel bits.

(E74–75). Objection: There is no evidence for the existence of the phonemes. It is the articulated sounds that are heard, and the sphaṭa can directly be suggested by these sounds, even without the assumption of a phoneme between them.

Answer: Let the articulated sounds be identical with the phonemes. But mere sounds may not be able to reveal the sphaṭa. The phonemes are the revealers of sphaṭa.

This sphaṭa is the designator (vācaka), because we have the experience “This meaning is obtained from this word or sentence.” According to some, the sphaṭas are innumerable (each word or sentence having a separate sphaṭa). Others say that it is simpler to assume that there is only one sphaṭa and that it appears to be many on the basis of the differences in the phonemes that suggest it.

(E76). It is to be noted that the meaning is understood from the sphaṭa revealed by the phonemes in a specific sequential order. In the case of synonyms, the sphaṭas are to be taken as different (the synonyms ghaṭa and kalaṭa, both meaning a pot, are different sphaṭas).

(E80–83). Others say that there is only one phoneme. It appears to be many on the basis of the differences in the place of articulation, in the effort taken, and so on. Recognition of the same phoneme or word is on the basis of the differences in the revealing medium. This view is not acceptable.

(E92–94). The sphaṭa theory that claims the word or the sentence as indivisible does not take away the validity of the science of Grammar, which is concerned with the linguistic analysis of words into stem and suffixes. Just as the discussion of the five sheaths (paticakośa) in the Upaniṣads is to lead the seeker after truth step by step to the knowledge of Brahman, so linguistic analysis of words is a step in the right direction. Even if the division into stem and suffixes may be artificial, it is useful as a means for arriving at the ultimate truth.

(E95–96). Some say that “phoneme sphaṭa” means those monophonemic words found in lexicons: “sakhaṇḍa word sphaṭa” means that a word indicates its meaning when its derivation is also known; so also the
sentence *sphota* is the sentence understood along with its further analysis. The indivisible word and the indivisible sentence are not understood in a way that involves knowledge of their derivations.

**Sphota-Universal (Jatisphota)**

*(E96–101).* Some say it is reasonable to assume meaningfulness of the universal word or sentence rather than of the individuals. This universal is revealed by the phonemes in the specific order of sequence. Although *sphota*, being a universal, is eternal, the meaning is understood only when it is known. The universal is identical with existence (*sattā*), identical with Brahman. Thus both the signifier *sphota* and the signified meaning (*sattā* existence) are identical with Brahman.

*(E102).* The Grammarian Nāgęṣa has revised and explained the *sphota* theory of the ancient seer Sphoṭāyana.
JÑĀNENDRA SARASVATĪ

This writer appears to have flourished about 1730. He was the teacher of Nilakaṇṭha Dīkṣita and himself a pupil of Vāmanendrasvāmin. He composed a Tattvabodhini on the Siddhāntakaumudi, which he was apparently unable to complete; it was completed by Jayakṛṣṇa Maunin as Subodhini (see below, summary 51).
Gopālakṛṣṇa is the author of Śābdikacintāmaṇi, on the Mahābhāṣya. His father's name was Vaidyanātha, and he identifies his guru as Rāma-bhadra Adhvarin. The *New Catalogus Catalogorum* tells us that Gopālakṛṣṇa was a classmate of Sadasivendra Brahmendra (who flourished about 1720) and the spiritual teacher of King Vijaya Raghunātha Tondaiian I of Pudukottah (1730–1769), as well as the teacher of the Appayya Dīkṣita who composed *Pāṇiniyasūtraprakāśa*. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka infers from all this information that his dates fall between 1597 and 1647, but he is probably about a century early, and a date approximating 1725 would be preferable. Gopālakṛṣṇa also composed a commentary on the *Uṇādisūtras*. 
The *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, vol. 9, p. 237b, cites a work on Grammar called *Bodhapaddhati*, composed in 1730 by Dharaṇīdhara, son of Jvalānanda of Tikṣṇajñatiya.
Vaidyanātha Payagūṇḍa

Vaidyanātha, the son of Veṇī and Mahādeva, was a direct disciple of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, so he should have flourished about 1735. He hailed from Kāśi, that is, Varanasi, where he prepared a line of pupils. The name Bālaṃbhaṭṭa is given as the author of some of his works, such as the Kalā on Nāgeśa’s Laghmāṇjūśā, but his son, who wrote a Mitāksara-vṛtti, was known as Bālaṃbhaṭṭa.

Vaidyanātha wrote a number of commentaries, including Prabhā on Bhaṭṭoji’s Sabdakaustubha, Bhāvaprakāśikā on Hari Dīkṣita’s Śabdaraṅga, a Chāyā on Nāgeśa’s Pradīpoddhyota, Kalā on Nāgeśa’s Laghmāṇjūśā, and Bhāvaprakāśa on Bhaṭṭoji’s Praudhamanorāma. The last two works have been edited. He also wrote a Bhāvaprakāśikā on the Bṛhatśabdenduskekhara, a Cidasthimala on the Laghuśabdenduskekhara (which has been edited), and a Kāśikā or Gādā on Paribhāṣenduskekhara, in addition to a short independent treatise called Rapratyāhārakhaṇḍana. He seems to have been the most important of Nāgeśa’s commentators, and probably the premier Grammarian after Nāgeśa.
This writer composed a *Vivarana* on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka gives *samvat* 1764–1801 (1711–1748) as his dates.
Jayakṛṣṇa was the elder brother of Śrī Kṛṣṇa Maunin, the son of Raghunātha Bhaṭṭa and Jānaki, and grandson of Govardhana Bhaṭṭa. He wrote a number of independent works in the grammatical tradition, including (Śabdārtha) Sāramaṇjari, Śabdārthatarkāmṛta, Śuddhicandrīkā, Vibhaktyarthanirṇaya, Vṛtīdiśīkā, and an Arthaniṇṇaya on Raghunātha Siromaṇi’s Ākhyātavāda. He also completed Jñānendra Sarasvati’s Tattvabodhini on Bhaṭṭoji’s Siddhāntakaumudi (see above, number 46). He is sometimes credited with authorship of the Sphoṭacandrīkā (see introduction to the section on Śrīkṛṣṇa Maunin, below, number 54).
HARIVALLABHA

According to V. Krsnamacarya, this writer was the son of Vallabha Utprabatiya, author of a Vedānta work called Vinodamañjari (cf. volume 1 of this encyclopedia [2d ed.], p. 585). Harivallabha flourished in 1747. He is the author of a Darpana on Konda Bhaṭṭa’s Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣasāra (Adyār D, vol. 6, no. 574), which has been edited.
Vāsudeva is known to Mīmāṃsakas as the author of the *Kutūhalavṛtti* on Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, edited several times (cf. volume 1 of this encyclopedia [2d ed.], p. 466). He was the son of Annapūrṇāmbā and Mahādeva Dīkṣita and the younger brother of Viśveśvara Dīkṣita. He seems to have lived about the middle of the eighteenth century. His *Bālamanorāṇa* on *Siddhāntakaumudi* has been published.
Śrīkṛṣṇa was apparently Jayakṛṣṇa’s younger brother, though there is a suspicion that the two may be the same person. He wrote a series of works on grammatical topics, the most important of which is perhaps the Sphoṭacandrika, summarized below. In addition, he produced the Tarkacandrika, “a set of Krodapatras on grammatical works of recent times” (Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 457), such as Kaiyaṭa’s Pradīpa, the Siddhāntakaumudi, Prauḍhamanorāmā, Laṅguṣabdaratna, and Laṅguṣabden-duṣekhara. His Vṛttidīpikā has been twice published; it deals with the powers of words. In addition, he is credited in the New Catalogus Catalogorum with a commentary on Raghunātha’s Ākhyāta called Arthacandrika (nirṛya), and a Lakārārthanirṛya.

**Sphoṭacandrika**

G.B. Palsule

The Sphoṭacandrika is one of those late works on sphoṭa doctrine which gives it something of a final form and which betrays considerable influence of standard texts such as the Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣṇa. While on the one hand this text shows a certain staunchness and a penchant for hair-splitting polemics, on the other hand it also shows a spirit of accommodation and realism. The form of the sphoṭa doctrine here is considerably different from its classical form—indeed, there is a revolutionary change in some respects. The transitoriness of the phonemes or their incapacity to form a simultaneous whole is no longer the reason for accepting the sphoṭa theory: phonemes can be permanent, or, alternatively, even transient phonemes can form a simultaneous whole in memory. The reason is only tactical: it achieves simplicity of procedure (laghava). Similarly, sphoṭa need not now be necessarily over and above the
phonemes; it can consist of the phonemes themselves. Altogether, one is not quite sure that, while successful in preserving the name sphota in their grim fight against the Naiyāyikas, these texts have not lost some of the old soul of sphota. But at the same time, in optionally equating an indivisible (akhaṇḍa) word sphota with an unanalyzable (rūḍha) word, or a divisible (sakhaṇḍa) word sphota with a partly (yogarūḍha) or wholly analyzable (yaugika) word, the author displays a robust realism that serves to bring down the sphota theory from its mystic heights to a solid earthly footing.

E references are to the edition by M. G. Bakre in Vādārthasamgraha (Bombay, 1913), vol. 1, pp. 1–16. The references are to philosophical points made in the text.

Summary

1 (E1). Sphota is a yogarūḍha (conveying a partly etymological and partly conventional meaning) word, so called because the meaning bursts out (sphuṭati) from it. The name sphota attaches either to the individual words or to the universals inhering in them.

2 In all, eight kinds of sphota are recognized: the five individual (vyakta) sphotas, namely, phoneme (vāṇa), word (pada), sentence (vākya), indivisible word (akhaṇḍapada), and indivisible sentence (akhaṇḍavākya) sphotas; and the three universal (jāti) sphotas, namely, phoneme, word, and sentence sphotas, all three of which, by the very nature of the universal, are indivisible (akhaṇḍa). By implication, padaspoha and vākya sphota are divisible (sakhaṇḍa).

3 Only the indivisible sentence is the real sphota. The designation sphota for the others (phonemes, and the like) is a fiction resorted to as a convenient means of analysis. It is like the designation “Brahman” given to sheaths like the annamaya (1.13–19).

Phoneme Sphota

4 (E1–6). This term refers to single phonemes or phoneme complexes that form grammatically significant elements, such as stems and suffixes (like pac-, ti (P), and the like). It is clear that in the cases of suffixes the term applies to those actually used, and not to their prototypes (like-.snapshot), which appear only in the system.

Śrīkṛṣṇa refutes the Naiyāyikas’ definition of a word, saktaṃ padam, and of the four varieties of words, conventional (rūḍha), derivative (or etymological, yaugika), derivative and conventional (yogarūḍha), and derivative or conventional (yaugikarūḍha).

Another view of phoneme sphota is that it consists of all single letters to which meaning has been assigned by the lexicons of words consisting of single letters (ekākṣarakoṣa).
Śrīkṛṣṇa criticizes Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa’s Bhūṣaṇa, which regards the word sphota as purely etymological (kevala yaugika).

There follows a lengthy discussion of what constitutes denotative power (sakti), whether it be one or many, whether it resides in incorrect words also, and so on. The author’s view is that despite their meaningfulness, incorrect words do not get the designation sphota because such words are not accepted by Grammar.

Word Sphota

5 (E6–9). More internal (antaraṅga) to the sentence because it directly forms a constituent of the sentence in the word sphota. A phoneme is only an indirect constituent in that it builds the direct constituents of the sentence, namely, the words (pada).

What is called a divisible word sphota (sakhaṇḍapadasphota) by the Grammarians (pac | ati; rāmaḥ) is the vākyasphota of the Naiyāyikas.

The indivisible word sphota (akhaṇḍapadasphota) is the one in which the whole word is manifested by all the phonemes.

Śrīkṛṣṇa refutes the objections against sphota by the Naiyāyikas and Vedāntins, taking a remarkable position (partly following the Bhūṣaṇa), in contrast to the classical sphota doctrine, that phonemes are not transitory and that even if they were they could form a whole in memory.

Still the sphota (as an entity over and above phonemes) is accepted for the sake of economy of process, in that here the physical speech sounds (dhoani) are regarded as directly revealing the sphota (thus doing away with the phonemes). This sphota is identified with the ṣabdabrahman.

Next he presents a variation of the indivisible word sphota. Here the sphota is not regarded as over and above the phonemes. The idea is that what the Naiyāyikas call derivative (yaugika) and derivative-conventional (yogarūḍha, wholly or partly analyzable) words are regarded here as divisible word sphotas, while conventional (rūḍha) words are regarded here as indivisible word sphotas. (A grammatically ignorant person accepts the individual word sphota even in the case of derivative words.)

According to this view of the indivisible and divisible word sphotas, the difference between the Grammarians and the Naiyāyikas boils down to a quarrel over the name, as the author remarks.

He closes this part with an incidental refutation of some doctrines of the Tārkikas (which have nothing to do with linguistic theory).

Sentence Sphota

6 (E9–11). The basis of the sentence sphota is the actual communication, which consists of sentences and from which later one learns a language.
Sentence *sphotas* are of two kinds: divisible and indivisible. The latter is revealed by the indivisible words and is distinct from them. It alone is meaningful. It is accepted for the purpose of economy of process.

The indivisible sentence *sphota*, further, is of two kinds, either over and above the phonemes, or not (where the physical speech sounds directly reveal the sentence).

A variation of the indivisible sentence *sphota* is accepted only in cases like *Hare'va*, "Save me, O Hari," where word boundaries cannot be distinguished. In those cases in which word boundaries are clear (such as *ghaṭam ānaya*, "bring a jar"), one accepts the divisible word *sphota*.

7 (E11–12). This section discusses whether the import of a sentence is predominantly nominal (*prathamāntavīşeyakaḥ śābadabodhaḥ*) and similar topics (such as whether the sentence meaning is the grammatical object in such sentences as "paśya, mrgo dhāvati?" ["See, a deer is running"]). Śrīkṛṣṇa also refutes the *Vyūpattivaṇḍa*.

8 (E12–13). This section treats the application of divisibility and indivisibility in certain other types of sentences. A proposal is considered for a secondary sentence *sphota* in the case of the statement "tat ātām asi" ("that thou art"). Ultimately it is rejected, and the designative sentence *sphota* (*vācaśaśeyasphota*) is accepted. The type of secondary meaning posited by Advaitins, *jahadajahallakṣaṇa*, is refuted.

9 (E13–14). So far the discussion has concerned a sentence that is not poetic (*kāvyātmaka*). Now the poetic sentence is considered. Mammaṭa’s definition is justified against the attacks of Jāgannātha.

10 (E14–15). Śrīkṛṣṇa discusses some figurative sentences (such as *vahṇinā siṅcati*, "sprinkles with fire") and establishes sentence *sphota* in such cases.

11 (E15–16). What is the indivisible sentence *sphota*? It is a single phoneme (*ekoparṇaḥ*), auditorily perceived (*śravaṇa*). It is like the *citra rūpa* of the Nyāya or the composite vowels accepted by Grammarians. It is this indivisible sentence *sphota*, consisting of a single phoneme, that is designative (*vācaka*). It is identical with *śabdabrahman*. 
This author was responsible for several Advaita works (cf. volume 1 of this encyclopedia [2d ed.], p. 465) as well as a work on Grammar, \textit{P\={a}ṇin\=īyavā\=dānakaśatramālā}. Of a Vellala family, he was the son of Veṅka-ṭārya of the Mokṣaṇḍa family; a pupil of Akṣayasūri; and himself the guru of Kavikuṇḍara, author of \textit{Śabharāṇijanātakā}. He flourished about 1750.
The grandson of Rāmabhadra Dīksita and a pupil of Jñānendra Sarasvatī, Nilakanṭha was patronized by Puratam Tirumal Devanarayana of Ambalappuzha. His father was Varadeśvara Dīksita, who studied with the son of some Appayya Dīksita and died at Varanasi as an ascetic. He had an elder brother called Sundaresvara Yajvan, who composed a work titled *Pāṇinipradīpa*. Although Yudhīsthira Mimamsaka attributes his works to Nilakanṭha Vājapeyin of the sixteenth century, it seems more likely this author flourished about the middle of the eighteenth century.

This Nilakanṭha’s works include a *Paribhāṣāvṛtti*, a *Tattvaviveka* on the *Mahābhāṣya*, *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* on his teacher Jñānendra’s *Tattvabodhīni*, and a *Laghuśabdakāustubha*. 
Asadhara was a pupil of Dharaṇidhara and should be dated to about 1770. U. P. Shah has published a note on his life and works.¹ His (Śabda) Trivenikā, a short treatise on the three powers of a word, has been edited twice. In addition, he wrote a Padasamjñānicāra, as well as work known under various titles, such as Pūrṇapakṣapraśnottari or mañjugā or mañjari. He also seems to have composed an Advaita work, Advaitaviveka (cf. volume 1 of this encyclopedia [2d ed.], p. 471).
RĀMASEVAKA

This writer is the author of a Vyākhyā on Kaiyata's Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa. He was the father of Krṣṇamitrācārya (or Durbalācārya), a prolific grammatical writer of various commentaries (cf. below, number 60).
The *New Catalogus Catalogorum* tells us that Indradatta of the Garga gotra (lineage) was the son of Lālamaṇi Upādhyāya and Kṣemavatī Devi, the grandson of Mohana Lāla, and the great-grandson of Murali-dhara. A manuscript of Indradatta’s *Śabdatattvāprakāśa* exists that was copied in 1820. The work is based on Nāgeśa.
One of the most prolific writers on Indian philosophy that ever lived, Kṛṣṇamitrācārya contributed extensively to the literature on Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, and Grammar. His father was Rāmasevaka of Lakṣmapura (see above, number 58), his grandfather Devidatta. Only two of his works to my knowledge have been published so far, the *Tattvamīmāṁsā*, a Sāṃkhya treatise, and a *Kuṇicā* on Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa's *Vaiyākaraṇalaghumāṇijūsā*. In Grammar he also wrote a commentary on the *Parībhāṣendukṣekhara*, *Bhāvakrīḍā* on Bhaṭṭoji's *Śabdakaustubha*, *Kalpalatā* on the *Praudhāmanoranād*, *Ratnārṇava* on *Siddhāntakaumudī*, and a commentary on the *Vaiyākaraṇabhāṣya*. He must have flourished at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Haribhaṭṭa flourished in 1801, and was the author of *Darbana* on the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*. 
This Dharaṇidhara was patronized by Thomas Henry of Calcutta, and he wrote his *Vaiyākaraṇasaṃsvaṇa* in 1809.
MANNUDEVA or MANYUDEVA
or GOPĀLADEVA

Mannudeva was the son of Durgā and Śambhu, the younger brother of Kṛṣṇadeva, and a pupil of Pāyaguṇḍa Bālakṛṣṇa, who was in turn the son of Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa (see above, summary 49), a direct disciple of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. He wrote Laghubhūṣāṇasārakānti on the Vaiyakaranabhūṣānasāra, Doṣoddhāra on the Laghusabdendusekhara. The New Catalogus Catalogorum also attributes to him an Arthavatsūtravāda.
Bhairava was the son of Bhavadeva Misra of the Agastya family, who wrote a commentary on Hari Dikšita’s Šabdaratna. M.S. Bhat dates Bhairava “circa 1780–1840.” He wrote the following works, all of which are in print: Sphota-parikṣā, Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣanasa-Parikṣā, Candrakalā on the Laghu-sabdendusēkhaṇa, a commentary on Paribhāṣendu-śekkara, and a commentary on the Šabdaratna (which appears not to be the same as his father’s).
This writer composed a Pārijātām Nāţakam on the Mahābhāṣya. He appears to have lived in the early nineteenth century, about 1825.
Author of several grammatical works, this Maharashtrian was the pupil of Nilakaṇṭha Vyāsa, who died in 1853, according to B.N.K. Sharma, following Theodor Aufrecht. His works are Candrikā on Nāgeśa’s Laghuśabdenduśekhara, Tripathagā on Nāgeśa’s Paribhāṣenduśekhara, Prabhā on Bhaṭṭoji’s Śabdakaustubha, Śabdaratnaprabhā, and Tipāṭhaga on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (uncertain attribution).
GAṅGĀDHARA KAVIRĀJA

Gaṅgādhara was a Vaidya of Bengal, born at Jessore. His life covered the period from 1798 to 1885. Some of his works are partly published in Gaṅgādharamaniṣṭā (Calcutta, 1911). Two works are on Grammar: Trikōṇḍasabdāśāsana and Trisūtravāyukaraṇa, both in verse.
TĀRĀNĀTHA TARKAVĀCASPATI

A well-known master pandit, whose expertise led him to contribute works in Nyāya, Śāṁkhyā, and Advaita as well as in grammar (listed in volume 1 of this encyclopedia, 2nd ed.). He lived from about 1840 to 1900. His works on Grammar included Tarkaratnamālā and a Saralā on the Siddhāntakaumudi.
KHUDDI JHĀ (SARMAN)

A widely celebrated pandit who flourished at the beginning of the twentieth century. He was a Maithila of Varanasi. His notes on the Laghusabdendusakhara, titled Nagesoktiprakāśa, were published at Varanasi in 1899. He also wrote a Tīnarthavādasāra on the Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣanāsāra.
Nityānanda flourished about 1925. Two works of his are published, a commentary on the Paramalaghumaṅjūṣā, and Dipika on Laghuśabdenduśekhara.
This writer's Pratyekārtha-prakāśikā on the first book of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadiya or Trikāṇḍī was published at Vrindavan in 1926.
Another commentary on book 1 of the Vākyapādiya, entitled Bhavaprādipa, was composed by this author and published initially in 1937. He also wrote on other systems.
GOPALÁ ŚĀSTRĪ NENE

This scholar was active during the first half of the twentieth century. He has written a Saralā on the Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣānasāra.
P.S. ANANTANĀRĀYĀNA ŚĀSTRĪ

A recognized scholar who wrote a work on Grammar titled Ṭākyatattva. His dates are 1885–1947.
Brahmadeva wrote his \textit{Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntamañjūśa} in 1943
Master savant, leader in many scholarly activities in and around Madras, Kṛṣṇamācārya composed a *Sphoṭavāda-Upodghāta*, which was published as Adyar Library Series 55 in 1946.
Sadasiva Sastrl wrote an *Arthadipika* on the *Paramalaghumañjûṣa*, published in 1946.
BĀLA KṚṢṆA PAṆCOLĪ

His Prabhā on Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣanāsāra was printed in 1947.
RĀMA PRASĀDA TRIPĀTHĪ

A Subodhini on the Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra was published in 1952.
He published a *Jyotsnā* on the *Paralaghumañjūṣā* (1961).
Śabhāpati Śarman Upādhyāya wrote a *Ratnaprabhā* on *Paramalaghumañ-jūśā*, published in 1963.
Rāmājñā Pāndeya

His Vyākaraṇadarśanapratimā was published at Varanasi in 1979.
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GRAMMAR
(VYĀKARĀNA)

No bibliography is entirely exhaustive. In the present case it is important to understand what the list is intended to cover and what it is not. Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and the writings of other darśanas on grammatical philosophy are listed in volume I of this encyclopedia, Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, and are not to be found here. The present bibliography is an effort to list publications that deal with the Indian science of vyākaraṇa, but not in all languages. While the primary sources, Sanskrit texts, are covered, secondary materials in Indian languages, including Sanskrit, are not. Secondary materials in European languages that pertain to vyākaraṇa should be listed here, but closely related sciences, such as nirukta, are not covered. Furthermore, papers and monographs on Indian linguistics that concentrate on specific words or syllables have not been listed here. The primary literature in Sanskrit is exclusively dealt with; Pali writers are omitted.

The general plan followed resembles that utilized in volume I of the encyclopedia. Part I deals in chronological order with the Sanskrit authors whose dates are roughly known. Part 2 lists classical writers on vyākaraṇa (grammar) and others whose dates are not known. Part 3 lists secondary materials that are not specifically related to a particular work or author. This bibliography was prepared by the general editor of the encyclopedia, Karl H. Potter.

ABBREVIATIONS FOR GRAMMAR BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABORI—Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Poona)
ACIL—see PICL
Acta Asiatica—Acta Asiatica (Tokyo)
ActOD—Acta Orientalia (Copenhagen)
ActOP—Acta Orientalia (Bucharest)
ACUT—Acta et Communicationes Universitatis Turunensis (Finland)
Adyar D—A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library, compiled by V. Krishnamacharya, Adyar, Madras
AG—Acyuta Granthamala (Varanasi)
AK—Aus Indiens Kultur : Festschrift Richard von Garbe, Erlangen, 1927
AION LI—Annali, Istituto Orientale di Napoli, sezione linguistica
AIPHOS—Annuaire de l' Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves (Brussels)
AJF—American Journal of Philology (Baltimore)
AKM—Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes
ALB—Adyar Library Bulletin (-Brahmavidya)
ALS—Adyar Library Series
AMG G—Abhandlungen der Marburger Gelehrten Gesellschaft
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ao</td>
<td>Archiv Orientalni (Prague)</td>
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<td>AoR</td>
<td>Annals of Oriental Research (Madras)</td>
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<td>AoSE</td>
<td>American Oriental Series Essay</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Aryan Path (Bombay)</td>
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<td>AsP</td>
<td>Asian Profile (Hong Kong)</td>
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<td>AsS</td>
<td>Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series (Poona)</td>
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<td>AsVoi</td>
<td>Annals of the Śrī Venkateshwara Oriental Institute (Tirupati)</td>
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<td>Auj</td>
<td>Annamalai University Journal (Annamalainagar)</td>
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<td>Aus</td>
<td>Allahabad University Sanskrit Series</td>
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<td>Aust</td>
<td>Allahabad University Studies</td>
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<td>Bb</td>
<td>(Bezzenbergs') Beiträge zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprachen (Göttingen)</td>
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<td>Bclv</td>
<td>D. R. Bhandarkar et al., eds., B. C. Law Volume, 2 volumes, Calcutta, 1945</td>
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<td>BDCRI</td>
<td>Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute (Poona)</td>
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<td>BeFEO</td>
<td>Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient (Paris)</td>
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<td>BePHE</td>
<td>Bulletin de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études (Paris)</td>
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<td>BenSS</td>
<td>Benares Sanskrit Series</td>
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DNSFV — Dr. D. N. Shastri Felicitation Volume, Keshav Ram Pal, ed., Ghaziabad, 1982
DRBV — D. R. Bhandarkar Volume, ed. B. C. Law, Calcutta, 1940
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FL — Foundations of Language
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FRSD — see Festschrift Rajeswar Sastri Dravid
FVSKB — Felicitation Volume Presented to Professor Sripad Krishna Belvalkar, Varanasi, 1957
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GBS — Govind Book Series
GOS — Gaekwad’s Oriental Series
GOSBORI — Government Oriental Series, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, classes A to G
GSAP — Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana (Florence)
GSPM — Grantha-saṃsodhana-prakāśana-māndala
GSS — Gurukula Sanskrit Series
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<td>Louis Renou and Jean Filliozat, L’Inde classique; manuel des études indiennes, volume 2, with Paul Demiéville, Olivier Lacombe, and Pierre Meile, Paris, 1953</td>
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a — article
b — book
d — dissertation
e — edition
t — translation

PART 1: AUTHORS WHOSE DATES ARE (MORE OR LESS) KNOWN

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(Gardona, p. 150; Belvalkar, p. 9;
NCat 3. 90)

?Indravyakarana


G3 : Edited by E. Sieg, SBAW 1907-1908.


ENCyclopedia of INDIan PHILOSOPHIES


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ŚAKALYA (pre-Pāṇini)

AUDUMBARĀYANA (pre-Pāṇini?)


ĀPIŚĀLI (pre-Pāṇini?)

?Āpiśāliśīkṣā


KĀSYAPA (pre-Pāṇini?)

(NCat 4. 144; G1624, p. 84)

?Dhātuvṛtti

(NCat 4. 144)

GĀRGYA (pre-Pāṇini?)

(NCat 6. 17; G1624, p. 80)

GĀLAVA (pre-Pāṇini?)

(NCat 6. 19; G1624, p. 67; VM 1. 150)

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(G1624, p. 99)

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(G1624, p. 95)

ŚAKTAṬĀYANA (pre-Pāṇini?)

(the traditional author of the Unādisūtras; Cardona, p. 149; Belvalkar, P. 21; G1624, pp. 69. 254)


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See 497.


VYĀDI (pre-Kātyāyana)

(G1624, pp. 130, 216; Belvalkar, p. 9)

Sanggraha


Paribhāṣā

General


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BHIMASENA (550)

DHARMAPĀLA (625)
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VIMALAMATI (648)
(Cardona, p. 284)
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(HARI) VRŚABHADEVĀ (650)
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See e650, e674.

Purnagandra (950)
(NCat 9.290)
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Durgā (Sīmha) or Durgādāsa (950?)
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UGRABHŪTI (1000)
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Śīyahītanāsa in five hundred verses in Āryā metre; known in Tibet

PUNYARĀJA (1000?)
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Commentary on Vararuci’s Kārakacakra or Prayagamukha

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DAYAPĀLA (MUNI) (1025)
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(NCat 9.291)
HEMACANDRA (1150)
(Belvalkar, p. 60)
Sabdänusäsana and Bhadortti thereon, with (abridgment) Laghuvr̥tti
(NCat 9.289)
Sec e37.

General
SĀRIPUTTA or SĀGARAMATI of Polonnaruva (12th century)
Commentary on Ratnamati’s Tikā on Candragomin’s Sūtras
(NCat 7.19)

UTPĀLA (1170?)
(Belvalkar, p. 64; oos 134, 1961, 80; NCat 2.316)
?Liṅgānuśūsanaṃvṛtti
(NCat 2.316)
(MUNI) PRADYUMNA SURI (1170?)
Durgāśiṁhakātantraṇavṛttiṅgiśā
cat.9.76

ŚARANĀDEVA (1172)
(Cardona, p. 282; G1624, p. 209)

Durgāṭavṛtti on Pāṇini’s Āstādhyāyi (revised by Sarvarakṣita)
G967 : ——, “Index of Remarkable Words and Forms in the Durghāṭa-

vṛtti of Śaraṇādeva,” Vai 1, 1951, 19-37.

PURUṢOTTAMĀDEVA (1175)
(Cardona, p. 282; G1624, p. 209)

Prāṇāpana or Laghuṇāṭtī on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya

Bhāṣāvṛtti on Pāṇini’s Āstādhyāyi
G969 : Edited, with Śrīṣṭidharaśārya’s Commentary, by Girisaçandra Vedanta-
tīrtha. tr 209. Calcutta, 1912.
G972 : Louis Renou, “List of Remarkable Words (or Meanings) from Āryabha-

G974 : Paribhāṣā section edited in Paribhāṣāsaṅgṛaha, pp. 112-160.
Sec e269.

Jhāpaśakasamuccayabhāṣya
(Cat.7.350)

UDAYAÇANDRA (1180)
(Belvalkar, p. 66)

Nyāsa on Hemacandra’s Bhāḍavṛtti
(Cat.2.326)

KUŚALĀ (1200?)
(Belvalkar, p. 74)

Pradīpa on Trilocanadāsa’s Pañjikā
(Cat.3.311, 4.256)

KĀŚYAPA (1200)
(a Candra writer)

Bālāvabodha

DEVA (1200?)
(Cat.9.100, 169)

Dāiva (on Sanskrit roots)
Trivandrum, 1905.
G977 : Edited, with Kṛṣṇalīlaśukā’s Puruṣakāra, by Yudhisthira Mīmanṣaka.
SPLC 27, 1974, 228-229,
DEVENDRAŚURI (1210)  
(Belvalkar, p. 66)  
_Laghunyāsa on Hemacandra’s Šabdānuśāsana_  
(NCat 9.160)  

GUÑACANDRA (1210)  
(NCat 3.318)  
_Tattvapraṇāśikā on the Kātantra-vihūraṇa (sūtras)_  
G979 : Edited by Shravak Pandit Hargovinddas and Shravak Pandit Bechardas.  
vjo 34. Varanasi, 1913.  

KANAKAPRAŚHA (1240)  
_Nyāsāsāra on Hemacandra’s Šabdānuśāsana_  
(NCat 3.142)  

AMARACANDRA (1250)  
(Belvalkar, p. 67)  
_Syādisamuccaya_  
?Sātākāralakṣaṇa or Kārakānirūpaṇa  
(NCat 1.332, 3.375)  

BHAVASENA TRAIVIDYEŚA (1250)  
_Kātantra-rūpamālā_  
See e650.  
_Laghuvrīti on Kātantra-sūtras_  
(NCat 3.313-314)  

DHANEŚVARA (1250)  
_Cintāmaṇi on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya_  
Prakāriyāratnāmāni  
(MS at Adyar)  

SIRADEVĀ (1250)  
(G1624, p. 226; NCat 11.223)  
_Parībhāṣāgīṛti_  
See a972.  

SOMADEVA (1250)  
(Belvalkar, p. 55; NCat 8.307)  
_Šabdārṇava-candrikā_ on Pūjyapāda’s Jaimindra-vaikaraṇa  

VANAŚEṆA (1250)  
(NCat 2.10)  
_Akṣhaya-vikaraṇa or Dhāturīpi_  

ANUBHUTI SVARUPĀCĀRYA (1270)  
(Belvalkar, p. 80; NCat 1.208)  
_Sārasvatopraṇāśiyā_  
G986 : Edited Varanasi, 1852.  
G988 : Edited, with Rāmacandrāśrama’s _Siddhāntacandrikā_ and Sadānanda’s  
_Subodhinī_. Varanasi, 1864, 1885; Lahore, 1869; Bombay, 1881, 1885, 1888.  
G989 : Edited, with Vāsudeva Bhaṭṭa’s _Sārasvatoprasāda_. Meerut, 1867, 1874,  
1876; Calcutta, 1882.
G990 : Edited Amritsar, 1867.
G992 : Edited with Rāmacandrāṣṭrama’s Siddhāntacandrikā. Lucknow, 1875; Bombay, 1884, 1888, 1914.
G994 : Edited Patna, 1882.
G995 : Edited Bombay, 1883, 1885, 1886, 1887, 1888, 1889, 1890, 1891, 1898.
G996 : Edited with Mādhava Bhaṭṭa’s Siddhāntaratnāvali and editor’s Mādhavi, by Madhava. Varanasi, 1887, 1911.
G998 : Edited with Lokeśvara Śrāman Śukla’s Siddhāntaratnāvali. Lucknow, 1890, 1894.
G999 : Edited with Candracīrti’s Subodhikā. Bombay, 1890.

MAHĀDEVA (1270)
(Belvalkar, p. 74) (a Kātantra author)
Sabdasiddhi
(NCat 3.312)

VOPADEVA GOSVĀMIN (1275)
(Belvalkar, p. 87)
Mugdhabodha (of which the Dhātupāṭha is called Kaṭikalpadruma)
G1008 : Edited Shrīrampore, 1807.
G1009 : Edited Calcutta, 1826, 1845, 1866, 1868, 1876, 1884.
G1011 : Edited Kashipur, 1841, 1853.
G1012 : Edited with Nandakīśora’s Parīśīṭa and Gaṅgādhara’s Setusamgraha. Calcutta, 1843.
G1017 : Edited with Durgādāsa’s Subodhā and Rāma Tarkavāgiśa’s Kāraṇa, Samāsa, and Taddhīta sections of his Pramodajanan. Calcutta, 1861.

G1021: *Kavikalpadruma* edited, with Durgādāsa’s *Paribhāṣātikā*, by Baradaprasada Majumdra. Calcutta, 1876, 1879.


G1028: Edited, with Rāma Tarkavāgiśa’s *Pramodajanani* and editor’s Parimala, by Harendranarayan Devasarma. Berhampur, 1912.


G1030: Edited with Durgādāsa’s *Subodhā* and Rāma Tarkavāgiśa’s *Pramodajanani*. Calcutta, 1914.


**SAMGRĀMASIMHĀ (1279)**

*Bālaśīkṣā* on Sarvavarman’s *Kātantrasūtras*

See e663.

**JINAPRĀBHĀ (Sūrī) or LEŚAPRABODHA (1280)**

(NCat 7.259)

*Durgā(ādā)pabodhā* on Trilocana’s *Kātantra-vṛttiṭīpaṭṭikā*

(NCat 3.311, 7.259)

**KRŚNALĪLĀŚUKA (1280)**

(NCat 9.100, 169)

Paruśakāra on Deva’s Daiva

See e976; e977.

**MALAYAGIRI (1280)**

(Belvalkar, p. 67)

*Vṛtti* on Hemacandra’s *Śabdānuśāsana*

(NCat 9.290)


**VIMALA SARASVATĪ (1300)**

(Belvalkar, pp. 22, 36; G1624, p. 267)

**Rūpamālā**


**NARENDRAPURI or PRAJNĀNASVARUPĀ (1300)**

*Dhātupāṭha*, a Sārasvata work

(NCat 9.370)
ABHAYACANDRA (ĀCĀRYA) (1329)
(Belvalkar, p. 60; NCat 1.273) (a Śāktaśāya author)
Prakriyāsāmangraha
See e881.
MANDANA, pupil of Narendrapuri (1330)
(Belvalkar, p. 82)
Saṁdhīprakaraṇa on Anubhūti's Sārasvataprakrīyā
(NCat 2.374)
ĀNANDAPŪRNA VIDYĀŚĀGARA (1350)
(NCat 3.118)
Prakṛīyāmaṭṭha on Vāmana/Jayāditya's Kāśikā
(NCat 2.108, 3.118)
BHIMASENA (ĀCĀRYA) (14th century)
(G1624, p. 255)
Commentary on a Dhātupāṭha
(NCat 9.288)
JAGADHARA of Kashmir (last half of 14th century)
(NCat 7.317)
Bālabodhiṇī on the Kashmiri recension of the Kātantrasūtras
(NCat 3.317)
Apaṭābanirākaraṇa
(NCat 7.131)
Īṭkā on Bhojadeva’s Sarvasvātakaṇṭhabharana
See e918; e921.
SĀYĀNA or MĀDHAVA (?) (14th century)
(Cardona, p. 288; Belvalkar, p. 43; G1624; pp. 240, 255)
Mādhavāyadhātuṛṣṭti on Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī-Dhātupāṭha
See e35.
G1037 : Nāmadhātuṛṣṭti (an appendix) edited by Damodara Sastrī. Pan n. s. 19, 1897.
G1038 : Edited by Ananta Sastrī Phadke and Sadasiva Sarma Sastrī Joshi. KSS 103. Varanasi, 1934.
MOKŚEŚVARA (1350?)
Commentary on Durgasimha’s Kātantraṇṛṣṭti
(NCat 3.313, 4.281)
JUMARANANDIN (1350?)
(Belvalkar, p. 91; COS 134, 1961, 162; YM 1.625)
(Revision of Kramadīśvara’s) Saṁkṣiptarasāra and Rasāvati thereon
See e912.
UJJVALADATTA, alias JĀJALI (14th century? but NCat 2.257 says 1250)
(G1624, p. 233)
Uṇāṭḍīśūtraṛṣṭti
(NCat 2.294)
PADMANĀBHADATTA (1375)
(Belvalkar, p. 93; NCat 1.128)
Śyāpāma
G1042 : Uṇāṭḍī section published in Vidyodaya (Calcutta) 26-27 (1874, etc.),


KAVIDARPANA RĀGHAVA (1375?)

Paṇiniyamadadarpana


MERUTUNGA (1888)

Bālavabodha on Durgasimha’s *Kātantra-vṛtti*

(NCat 3.31)

KULAMANDANA SURI (1394)

(Auktika or *Mugdhabālavabodha*

(NCat 3.97, 4.238)

DHARANĪDHARA (1397)

(NCat 9.237)

Pañjikā on Paṇini’s (?) *Pāṇiniyāśiṣṭā*


NANDAKIṢORA SARMAN BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA CAKRAVARTIN (1398)

(Parīṣiṣṭa to Vopadeva’s *Mugdhabodha* See e1012; e1024.

MĀNDANA KAVI (1400?)

*Kavikālpadrumaskandha Upasargamanḍana*

(NCat’ 2.374, 3.270)

MEGHARATNA (1400?)

(Deepika, p. 83)

Sārasvatī-Vyākaranapadhapāṇḍitā or Dipikā

GOYICANDRA or GOPICANDA (1400?)

(Belvalkar, p. 92; cos 134, 1961, 145)

*Viśvarṇa on Kramadīśvara’s Saṃkṣiptasāra*

(NCat 6.158, 159)


Commentary on Jumaranandin’s *Taddhitaparīṣṭa*

(NCat 6.158)

RĀMACANDRA (1400)

(Cardona, p. 286; Belvalkar, p. 37; G1624, p. 268)

Prakṛtyākaumudi on Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī*


G1051 : Surjit Kumar Mukhopadhyaya, “Tibetan Translations of *Prakṛtyākaumudi* and the mention of *Śiddhānta-kaumudi* Therein,” mṛq 20, 1944, 63–69.


(RŚIPUTRA) PARAMEŚVARA II (1410)

(NCat 11.191)
**Gopālikā** on Maṇḍana Miśra’s *Sphoṭasiddhi*
See e870.

**GUṆṆARATNA SŪRI** (1411)
(Belvalkar, p. 67; NCat 6.51) (Hemacandra writer)

*Kriyāratnasamuccaya*

**NARAPATI MAḤĀMISRA** (1425)
(VM 1.510)

*(Vyākaraṇa)* Prakāśa on Jinendrabuddhi’s *Nyāsa*
(NCat 4.119)

**ŚUBHAŚILA GAṆI** (1425)

*uḍāḍināmamalā*
(NCat 2.243)

**KRṢṆĀGĀRYA II** (1430)

*Upasargārthasamgraha* and autocommentary
(NCat 2.376)

**(ARRA or ERRA)** MĀḌHAVĀ BHAṬṭA (1450)

*Tripāṭadāyotint*
(NCat 1.393, 8.235)

**ŚRĪPĀṬIDATTĀ** (1450?)
(Belvalkar, p. 75; Abhyankar, p. 396)

*Pariśiṣṭa* to the *Kātantrasūtras*
See e649; e653.

**JONARĀJĀ or JOGARĀJĀ** (1450)

*Padapraṇarasamgraha*, topical analysis of the *Kātantrasūtras*

**ŚṬIKAṆṬHA** (15th century)

*Nyāsa* on Jagaddhara’s *Kātantrabālabodhini*
(NCat 3.317)

**UDAYADHARMA or DHARMASŪRI** (1451)
(NCat 3.97)

*Aukti ka or Vākṣyatprakāśa*
(NCat 2.326, 3.97, 9.274)

**HEMAḤAMŚAVIṆAYAGĀNI** (1457)
(Belvalkar, p. 67)

*Nyāyasamgraha* with *Nyāyārthamaṭṭijāśa* thereon (Hemacandra work)
G1056 : Edited Varanasi, 1911.

**JINASĀGAṆA** (1460?)
(Belvalkar, p. 65)

*Dīṣikā* (or Dhuṇḍhikā?) on Hemacandra’s *Śabdānuśasana*
(NCat 7.272)

**VIṬṬHĀLĀ** (1460)
(Cardona, p. 283; Belvalkar, p. 37; G1624, p. 270)

*Prakṛtyāprasāda* on Rāmacandra’s *Prakṛtyākaumudi*
See e1050.

**KUMĀRAPĀLĀ** (1461)

*Gaṇadarpāṇa*
(cf. VM 2.404)

**PUṆṆARĀJĀ** (1485)
(Belvalkar, p. 81)

Commentary on Anubhūti’s *Sārasvataprakṛtyā*

RĀMAKĀNTA or RĀMACANDRA or KAVICANDRA (1489)
Dhātusādhana
(NCat 9.295)
AMRṬABHĀRATĪ (1490)
(Belvarkar, p. 81; NCat 1.350)
Subodhikā on Anubhūti’s Sārasvataprakriyā
(NCat 1.350)
ABHIRĀMA VIDYĀLĀMKĀRA (1500?)
(oos 134, 1961, 37)
Kauṇudī on Goyicandra’s Saṃkṣiptasāraṭṭikā-Kārakaṇḍa
(NCat 1.310, 5.110)
AUTHOR UNKNOWN (1500)
Mukhabhāṣaṇa
KĀŚINĀTHA BHĀṬṬA (1500?)
(Belvarkar, p. 83; VM 1.633)
Bhāya on Anubhūti’s Sārasvataprakriyā
(NCat 4.127)
SATYĀNANDA or RĀMACANDRA SARASVATI (1500)
(Mukhabhāṣaṇa)
Laghuvivaraṇa on Kaiyaṭa’s Mahābhāṣyapradīpī
DHANEŚVARA BHĀṬṬA (1510)
(Belvarkar, p. 83)
Pradīpa on Anubhūti’s Sārasvataprakriyā
(NCat 9.226)
APPAN NAINĀRYA (1510)
(VM 1.485)
Prakriyādīpikā
(NCat 1.258)
KARMADHARA (1510)
Prakāśa on Durgasimha’s Kātantraṭīti
(NCat 3.310)
MĀDHAVA BHĀṬṬA (1520?)
(Belvarkar, p. 82)
Śiddhāntaratanāvalī on Anubhūti’s Sārasvataprakriyā
See e996.
PUNDARIKĀKṢA VIDYĀŚĀGARA BHĀṬṬĀGĀRYA (1520)
Pradīpa on Durgasimha’s Kātantraṭīti
See e656.
Vaktavyaviveka on a Kātantraparāśīṭa
(NCat 3.316)
Tīkā on Jayādītya/Vāmana’s Kāśikā (lost)
KŚEMENDRA (1525)
Commentary on Rāmacandra's Sārasvatapraṇāyā
Commentary on Narendrapuri's (Sārasvata) Dhātupātha
(Belvalkar, p. 81; NCat 5.169)

Dhānacandra or Jinasāgara or Nandasundara and Udaya-Saubhāgya (1533)
(Belvalkar, p. 65)
Dhruddhikā on Hemacandra's Bṛhadārtti
Avacārikā on Hemacandra's Laghuśrīttī
cat. 9.216)

Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa (1540)
(ncat 4.365)

Śphaṭatattvanirūpana


Śabdāharapa or Sabdāltanakāra (lost)
Padacandrīkā with Keśapakautūhula thereon
(ncat 4.365)

Gūḍhābhāvavṛti or Prakāśa on Rāmacandra's Prakriyākaumudī
(ncat 4.365)

(SEṣa) Nārāyana (Bhāṭṭa) (1546)
(ym 1.405)
Śūkritratnakara on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya
(ncat 10.89)

Rāmanātha Sarmān (Rāyi) (1546)
(ncat 3.315)

Manoramā on Kātantra-Dhātupātha
See e654.

Vīśṇumitra (1547)
(ym 1.410)

Keśrodara on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (lost)

Bhārata Mīśra (16th century)
Śphaṭāstidhi
G1062: Edited by K. Sambasiva Sastri. tss 89. Trivandrum, 1927.

Vimalakīrtti (1550?)
(gos 194, 1961, 359)
Padavyavasthā (sūtra)kārikā
(ncat 11.102)

Gopinātha Tarkācārya (1550)
(Belvalkar, p. 75; NCat 3.316)
Prabodha on a Kātantraparitīṣṭa
G1063: Edited Calcutta, 1890.
Parībhāṣāvṛti
(ncat 6.163)

Īśvarananda or Īśvarīdatta (1550)
(ncat 2.280)

Vivaraṇa on Kaiyaṭa’s Mahābhāṣyaprādiṣṭa
See e1059.
Śādabodhataranīnī
cat. 2.280)

Nārāyana Nyāyapaṇcānana (1550)
(ncat 10.74)
Commentary on Kṛdanta section of Goyicandra’s commentary on Sāṃkhṣiptasāra
(NCat 4.281, 10.74)
Ganaprakāśa on Sāṃkhṣiptasāra-Ganapātha
(NCat 5.256, 10.74)
See e913.

RĀMA TARKAVĀGĪSA (1550?)
(Belvalkar, p. 90; Gos 134, 1961, 324)
Pranamājananatī on Vopadeva’s Mūgadhodha
(NCat 2.203)
See e1017; e1022; e1026; e1028; e1029; e1030; e1031.
Commentary on the Kātantrasūtras
(NCat 3.314)

KULACANDRA (1550?)
(Belvalkar, p. 75)
Durgavākyaprabodha on Durgasimha’s Kātantravṛtti
See e656; e657.

KĀŚĪŚVARA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA (1550?)
(Belvalkar, p. 90; YM 1.637–638)
Commentary on Vopadeva’s Mūgadhodha
(NCat 4.141)
Mūgadhodhaparāśāṭa
(NCat 4.141)
Śabdaratnākara
(NCat 4.141)

MĀDHAVA SARASVATĪ (1550?)
Prakṛityaśudhā on Rāmacandra’s Prakṛityaumādita
G1064: M. S. Bhat, “An Incomplete Manuscript of Mādhavasarasvatī’s Prakṛitya-

AUTHOR UNKNOWN (16th century?)
Sphoṭasiddhiyāvivācāra

SARVEŚVARA or SOMAYĀJIN DĪKŚITA (1555)
(SM 2.416)
Sphūrti on Kaiyata’s Mahābhāṣyaprādīpa
(MS listed in Adyar D, vol. 6, nos. 107–109)

CINTĀMANI (1557)
(NCat 7.58; YM 2.418)
Prakāśa on Kaiyata’s Mahābhāṣyaprādīpa
(NCat 7.58)

HARṢĀKULAGĀNI (1557)
(NCat 3.97)
Commentary on Udayadharma’s Auktiṣa
(NCat 3.97)
Versification of Hemacandra’s Kavikalpadrūma-Dhātupāṭha

ANNAMBHAṬṬA (1540? 1560?)
(NCat 1.237)
Udāyotana on Kaiyata’s Mahābhāṣyaprādīpa
See e587; e590; e1059.
Mitākṣara on Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhvyāṣa
VĀSUDEVA BHAṬṬA (1567)
( Belvalkar, p. 82)
Sarasvataprasāda on Anubhūti’s Sārasvataprakriyā
See e989; e991.

PURUṢOTTAMA VIDYĀVĀGĪṢA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA or NĀRĀṆĀṆYA (1568)
Prayoga (uttama) ratnamālā
(NCat 6.94)
G1068 : Edited Kuch Bihar, 1890-1903.

CARITRASIMHA (GĀṆI) (1569)
Avacūrī on Kātantra ( nibhrama) sūtras
(NCat 3, 318; 7, 23)

APPAYYA DĪKṢITA I (1580)
Vādanakṣatramālā on Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyi
(NCat 1.265)

GUNARATNA (1585)
Commentary on Narendrapuri’s Sārasvataprakriyā-Dhātupāṭha

HARṢĀKIRTI (1586)
(Delvalkar, pp. 82, 86; NCat 1.197)
Dhātupāṭha and Tārāṅgīṇi thereon
(NCat 9.289)

CIDRŪPĀŚRAMA or CIDRŪPĀŚRAMIN (1587)
Vyākaranadīpa or Dīpavākaranā
(NCat 7, 55, 9, 66)
?Viṣami on a Paribhāṣendusēkhara
(NCat 7, 55, 11, 226)

GOPALA BHAṬṬA (1590)
(ooś 134, 1961)
Viṣamapādirāhadiśipikā or Gopālabhaṭṭī on Anubhūti’s Sārasvataprakriyā
(NCat 6.146)

BHĀṬṬOJI DĪKṢITA (1590)
(G1624, p. 273; Cardona, p. 283)
Siddhāntakaumudā on Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyi
G1072 : Edited by Babu Rama in MS form. Kidderpur, 1811.
G1073 : Edited Madras, 1858, 1866, 1886, 1887.
G1075 : Edited with editor’s Saralā by Taranatha Tarkavacapsati. 2 volumes. Calcutta, 1863-1864.
See e30.
G1076 : Liṅgānapāṭana section edited Calcutta; 1868.
G1078 : Edited Varanasi, 1873, 1880.
See e37.
See a78.
G1099: G. B. Palsule, "Discussion of a Reading in the *Siddhāntakaumudi*," *SPAIOC* 20, 1957, 72.
G1107: S. Venkitasubramonia Iyer, "The Difference Between Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and

See d863 (1971).


See e321; b864.


See d863.


See d866.

Pradhanarāmanonā on his own *Siddhāntakaumudi*

G1113 : Edited Varanasi, 1868, 1886.


Śabdakaustubha

G1124 : Edited Varanasi, 1876.


?Kriyāniḥgaṇṭu


*Vaiyākaraṇaśāstra* or *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā* Printed in many editions of Kṛṇḍabhaṭṭa’s *Vaiyākaraṇabhaṭṭaṇa* and sāra.

See e555.
General


(Seśa) Cakrapanī (1595).

(NCat 6.255)

Paramā (Kharadana) on Bhattoji's PraushamanaUma


Kārañjatattva or Kārañjavidra

(NCat 3.375)

Prakriyāpradīpika (lost)

Triśocana (1600?)

(Belvarkar, p. 75)

Uttara-prārthiṣṭā on Kātantra-sūtras

(NCat 3.316, 3.262)

Bhārata Mālīka (1600?)

Ekavarṇārthasamgraha


Śivarama Cakravartī (1600?)

(Belvarkar, p. 75)

Śiddhāntaratnakara on Kātantra-prārthiṣṭa

(NCat 3.316)

Rāmadāsa Cakravartī (1600?)

Vṛkṣyāśāra or Candrika on Kātantra

(NCat 3.314)

Candrika on a Kātantra-prārthiṣṭa

(NCat 3.316) (see e632 for extracts)

Rāmagandrāśrama (1600?)

(Belvarkar, p. 85; VM 2.249)

(Vaiyakarana) Śiddhāntacandrika on Sārasvatasiṣṭasūtras

(NCat 6.379)

See e988; e992.

G1133: Edited, with editor's commentary, by Sadasiva Sastri Joshi. HSS 17. Varanasi, 1931.


Kavigandhara (Datta) (1600)

(NCat 3.274)

Dhātusandhikā

Dhātusādhana

(NCat 3.274)

Sāralaharī (of Saṃkṣiptasāra school)

(NCat 3.274)

Nīlakanṭha VājaPeYīn (1605)

(VM 2.411–412)

Pāṣinīyadīpikā

Sukhobodhini on Bhattoji's Siddhāntakaumudi
SEṢA VIṢNU (1605)
Prakāśikā on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya

Dhātuvataprakāśa or -mañjari
(NCat 9.292)

CANDRAKĪRTI (1607)
( Belvalkar, p. 82)
Subodhikā or Dipikā on Anubhūti’s Sārvasvataprakriyā
See e960; e999; e1001.


ŚRIVALLABHĀVAGANĀ ĀGĀRYA (1607)
( Belvalkar, p. 67)
Durgāpada-prabodha on Hemacandra’s Liṅgāṇūṭāsana

AGYUTA PIṢAROTI (1610)
Pravēṣaka


TARKATILAKA BHĀṬṬĀGĀRYA (1614)
( Belvalkar p. 85)
Vṛtti on Sārvasvatāsūtras
(NCat 8.114)
Sabdabhāskara
(NCat 8.114)

GANGĀDHARA DIKŚITA (1617)
Prabhā on Cidrūpāsrama’s Vyākaranadīpa
(NCat 5.203, 9.66)

VARADARĀJA (1620)
( Belvalkar, p. 42; Cardona, p. 287)
Sārasiddhāntakaumudi


Mādhyasiddhāntakaumudi


G1140 : Edited by Ganesha Datta Sastri. Lahore, 1899.


G1143 : Edited by Sadasiva Sastri Joshi and Rama Candra Jha, with the former’s Sudhā. HSS 213, Varanasi, 1960.


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G1145 : Edited Calcutta, 1827, 1874, 1877, 1883.

G1146 : Edited Agra, 1848.

G1147 : Edited Delhi, 1849, 1869.


G1149 : Edited with editor’s Tīkā by Rupacandra. Lahore, 1853.

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Dhātukārikāvalī


General


RAGHUNĀTHA (1620)
( Belvarkar, p. 86)

Laghūbhāṣya on the Sārasvatatitrās

SAHAJAKĪRTI (1623)
Sārasvataprakṛtyāśārtikā

SĀDHUSUNDARA GANI (1624)

Dhēturātanākara
(NCat, 9.293)

KONDA or KAUNDA BHATTĀ (1630)
(NCat 5.92; G1624, p. 285)

Vaiyākaraṇaprabhūṣana on Bhaṭṭoji Diksita’s Vaiyākaraṇamatanmajjana, and -sāra thereon
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G1182 : Edited, with Śrīkṛṣṇa’s Sphoṭacandrīkā and Bhairava Miśra’s Sphoṭaparīkṣā by the Anandastrama pandits. asa 43, Poona, 1901.
G1187 : Edited, with Harivallabha’s Darpaṇa, by Ananta Sastri Phadke. kSS 23. Varanasi, 1924.
G1188 : Edited, with Harivallabha’s Darpaṇa, Bhairava Miśra’s Parīkṣā and Kṛṣṇa Miṭra’s commentary, with Khuddi Jhā Śarmā’s Tīnārthavātāsāra, by Sadasiva Sastri Joshi. kSS 133. Varanasi, 1939.

ABHINAVA NRSTIMHĀSRAMA, pupil of Rāmacandrāśrama (1630?)
(NCat 1.304)
Nāmaśāntiśīla, a Sārasvata work
(NCat 1.304)

MALLAYA YAJVAN, father of Tirumala Yajvan (1630)
(ym 2.419–420)
Tiṃpani on Kaiyaṭa’s Mahābhāṣyaapradīpa
JINAVIJAYA, pupil of Kirtivijaya (1637)
Vākyaprākāśavārtta on Udayadharma's Auktika
(NCat 3.97)

NILAKANTIKA ŚUKLA (1637) (pupil of Bhaṭṭoṣi Dikṣita)
Śabdaṇḍābha
(NCat 7.152; 10.173, 177)

RĀMAKRŚNA DIKŚITA, son of Govardhana Dikṣita (1638)
Ganapāṭha
(NCat 5.255)

GANDRĀŚEKHARA (1638?)
Commentary on Puruṣottama's Prayogaratnamalā
(NCat 6.368)

DURGĀDĀSA VĪDAṆGĪṢA or VĀGASPTI (1639)
Dhātudhipā or Parībhāṣāṭīkā on Vopadeva's Kalikāpadrūma
See e1010; e1014; e1020; e1021; e1023; e1027.
Sūbhodā on Vopadeva's Mūgdhābodha
(NCat 9.78)
See e1015; e1017; e1022; e1024; e1030; e1031.

NĀRĀYANA BHĀṬṬATIRI or VAINATEYA of Kerala (1640)
(ACat 10.72)
Aparuniyapramāṇātā or Paraṇaṇaṇakhaṇḍa
G1201 : Edited by E.V. Raman Namputri. Trivandrum, 1942.

Prakriyāśarasva

Dhātukāvyā

General
See a1107.

AUTHOR UNKNOWN (1640)
Bhōja Vyākaraṇa

KAMALĀKARA BHĀṬṬA (1640?)
(NCat 3.165)

?Commentary on Rāmacandra's Prakriyākaumudi
(NCat 3.160)

Vibhaktyaṭhāprakāśa
(NCat 3.165)
Vyākhyaśāstra on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya
(NCat 3.165)

Nārāyaṇa (Śastrin) (1640) (disciple of Dharmarājādhvarin, father of Rāma-
krṣṇa Yajvan
(NCat 10.87)

Vyākhya or Kāthinaprakāśika on Kātyāyaṇa’s Mahābhāṣyaprādīpa
See e1059.

Commentary on Haradatta’s Padamaṇḍjari
Dīpaprabhā on Praiṣa
(NCat 10.87)

Dīpaprabhā on Kātyāyaṇa’s Vārttikas or Vararucāsamgraha
See e505.

Krṣṇa (1645)
Laghubodha, an elementary grammar
(NCat 4.294)

Jñānatilaka (1646)
(Belvalkar, p. 86)
Siddhāntacandrika on the Sārasvatāsūtras

BhavaDeva (1649)
Taddhāhitakōṣa
(NCat 8.85)

Tāraka Brahmatanda Sarvavatī (1650)
Vyākaraṇaṇakrodapuṣṭra
(NCat 8.151)

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(NCat 8.151)

Rāganāṭha Dīkṣita (1650)
(NCat 4.120)
Makaranaṇḍa or Parimala on Haradatta’s Padamaṇḍjari
(NCat 4.120)

Rāmabhaṭṭa (1650)
(Belvalkar, p. 84)
Vidyaprabodhīnta or Rāmabhaṭṭa

Nṛśimha (1650)
Prakṛtiṇātapavallārī on Dharmakirti’s Rāpavatara
(NCat 10.190)

Keśava (1650)
(NCat 5.60)
Manoramākhaṇḍana (vs. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita)
(NCat 5.60)

Rāmanāṭha Vidyāvāgaspati (1650?)
(gos 134, 1961, 324)
Rakahsa or Tīkā on Kātaṇtra
(NCat 5.314, 318)

Jayanta (1650)
(Belvalkar, p. 51)
Tattvacandra on Rāmacandra’s Prakṛtiṇākamudī
g
(NCat 7.180)

Cokkanāṭha Dīkṣita (1650)
(NCat 7.85)
Śabdakamudī
g
(NCat 7.85)
Ratnavali on Patañjali's Mahâbhâṣya
(NCat 7.85, 9.293)
G1212: Dhâtu section edited jsml 27, 1975, 1–16.

ĀPADEVA (1650)
Śphoṭanirūpāna
(NCat 2.125)

HAMŚAVIJAYAGANI (1650)
(Belvælkar, p. 84)
Śabdârtkacandrikā on Anubhūti's Sārasvatapraṇāya

JAGANNĀTHA PANḌITARĀJA TAILINGA (1650)
(NCat 7.137; G1624, p. 280)
Praṇâdhmanoramâkucamardana (vs. Bhaṭṭoṭi Dikṣita)
(NCat 7.138)
Śabdâkustubhâkhaṇḍana (vs. Bhaṭṭoṭi; lost?)

General
See a1127

VINAYAVIJAYAGANI (1652)
(Belvælkar, p. 66)
Haîmalaghupraṇāya

K ŚEMĀṆKARA (1653)
(Belvælkar, p. 83)
Pratyâyopâdhatâpaddhati
(NCat 5.162)

UDAYAKÎRTI, pupil of Sādhusundara (1654)
Vîrûti on Vînâlakîrti's Padâvayasthâkârikā
(NCat 11.102)

LAKŚMĪNİRŚHMA (1660)
Vîlāśa on Bhaṭṭoṭi's Siddhântakaumudi
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TIRUMALA YAJVAN or DVĀDAŚAHAĐHVARIN (1660)
(NCat 8.182; YM 2.413)
Sumanoramā on Bhaṭṭoṭi's Siddhântakaumudi
(MS listed in Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 355)

?Anuvâta on Patañjali's Mahâbhâṣya (cf. ALB 3.1, 1939, 28)

ŚĪVARĀMENDRA SARASVATĪ (1660)
Siddhântaratnapraṇâśa on Patañjali's Mahâbhâṣya
See e1059.

Ratnâkaraṭīkā on Bhaṭṭoṭi's Siddhântakaumudi
(RĀMA) NĀRĀYĀNA (ŚRAMAN) (VANDYOPĀDHHYAYA) (1664)
(NCat 10.85)
Śūddhi (tattva)kârikā
(NCat 10.85)
Sārāvalī and Vṛtti thereon
(NCat 10.94)
Dhâtuṭalnâkara
(NCat 10.85)

Kārikâvalī
(NCat 3.384)

VIDYĀVĀGĪṢA BHÂṬṬÃGÂRYA (1665)
Vivrti on Vararuci's (= Katyayana's?) Yrdhatyasavrtti
(NCat 4.281)

NARAYANA (SADHU) of Didwana in Marwar (1667)
Nirnaya or Anuvrttiyavabodhaka on the Sarasvatasutras
(NCat 10.94)

APPAYYA DIKSHITA III or GINNA APPAYYA (1670)
Prasiddhasabdasamskara
(NCat 1.267)

HARI DIKSHITA, grandson of Bhattoji, teacher of Nagesa (1670)
(G1624, p. 284; Cardona, p. 287)
Bhurat Sabdaratna on Bhattoji Dikshita's Praudhamanoram
See e1118; e1129.
G1215 : Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar, "Date and Authorship of the Sabdaratna and the Bhurat Sabdaratna," ABORI 32, 1951, 258-262.
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See e1114; e1115; e1116; e1117; e1118.
See e1119; e1120.

General

JAGAN MOHANA PANDITA (1670?)
(NCat 7.144; jbrs 4, 1918, 14ff.)
Prabodhacandrika
(NCat 7.144)

SADASIYa (1670?)
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Gadhdhridhipati on Patañjali's Mahabhāsya
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SUDHANANDASURIISHYA (1671)
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Arthadipika on Kramadīvara's Sanāksiptasāra
(NCat 6.137)
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(NCat 10.172)

HARI BHASKARA AGNIHOTRA (1677)
(VM 2.295) (NCat 11.221)
Paribhāṣābhāskara

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Sābdikarākaṇ on Cokkanātha’s Sābdakaumudi
(NCat 9.20)

LOKEŚAKĀRA (1683)
(Belvalkar, p. 86)
Tattwaṭhikā on Rāmāśrama’s Siddhāntacandrikā
See el1133.

RĀMACANDRA VIDYĀBHŪṆĀNA (1688)
(Belvalkar, p. 90)
Paribhāṣāvṛtti, a Mugdhabodha work
(NCat 2.294)

RĀMACANDRA PĀNĪTĀ (1690)
Sesaraṭhakriyā and autocommentary

RĀMAKṚṢṆA BHAṬṬA (1690)
Siddhāntaratnakāra on Bhaṭṭoji’s Siddhāntakaumudi
(NCat 1.430)

RĀMABHĀḌRA DĪKṢITA (1692)
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G1224: Edited by A. Thiruvengadathan as part of his doctoral dissertation.

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See el1224.

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(NCat 11.224)

Prabhāvalī

“Tarapatamaṭapa gho” sūtravidhāra
(NCat 8.110)

MAHĀDEVIVA VEDĀNTIN (1694)
(NCat 2.292)

Uṇḍidīkaṇā

RĀMAPRASĀDA (1694)
Ṭīkā on Rāmanārāyaṇa’s Kārikāvalī

DHINGDIRĀJĀ (1700)
Girvāṇapadamanāṭjarī

Girvāṇapavanāṭjarī
See el1227.

DHARMASŪRI (1700)
(VM 2.311; NCat 2.387)
Paribhāṣāṭhapiṇḍikā
(NCat 9.221, 274)

RĀMAGANDRA (1700?)
Kalpatattvabodhinī on Trilocana's Kātantravārttikopanājikā
(NCat 3.312, 316)

MEHĀVĪJAYA (1700)
(NCat 6.362) (Belvalkar, p. 66)
Haimakaumudī or Candraprabhāvyākaraṇa
Sec c921.
Śrabdacandrikā on Hemacandra's Śabdānusāsana
(NCat 4.283)

VAIDYANĀTHA DIKṢITĀ or ŚASTRIN (1705)
Vyākhyā on Cokkanātha’s Śabdakaumudī (ms
listed in Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 177)
Paribhāṣārthasamgraha or Paribhāṣārthitvyākhyā
(NCat 11.222)
Paribhāṣāpanāyasā (lost)

NĀGESA or NĀGOJI BHAṬṬA (1714)
(Cardona, p. 287; G1624, p. 290)
(Bṛhat) Śabdendushekharā on Bhāṭṭoji Dīkṣita’s Siddhāntakaumudī

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*Uddyota* on Kalyâta's *Mahâbhâṣyapradîpa*

See e521.

See e524; e550.


See e552; e574; e582; e598; e611; e622.

*Paribhâśenduśekhara*

Gl 249 : Edited Varanasi, 1854.


See a972.


*Visamapadi* on Bhaṭṭoja Dikṣita’s *Śabdakaustubha* (NCat 10.21)

*Vaiyākaraṇaḥakârikā* (NCat 10.22)

*Śabdānantasāgarasamuccaya* (NCat 10.22)
Suśțitīnantasāgarasamuccaya
(NCat 10.22)
Prabhākaraacandra on a Tattvadīpikā
(NCat 8.48)
Sphoṭavāda
Jñābākasambhaga
General
ŚRĪVALLABHAVĀCĀKA or ŚRĪVALLABHAVĀCĀRYA (1718)
(gos 134, 1961, 198; NCat 9.75; Belvalkar, p. 66)
Durgaprābodha on Hemacandra’s Līṅgaṅuṇāsana
(NCat 9.75)
(MAHĀBHAṢYA) GOPĀLA KRŚNA ŚĀSTRIN (1720)
(NCat 6.136, 1.259)
Śāṅdkācintāmaṇi on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (mss available)
Commentary on Unādisūtras
Lalita on Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita’s Siddhāntakavumudī, completed by his son Anantanārāyaṇa
(NCat 6.136)
TIRUMALA BUKKAPATTANAM ŚRĪNIVĀṢĀCĀRYA (1720)
Gajāsūtravāda
(NCat 5.231)
VEŃKAṬEŚVARA (1722)
Uṇḍīghaṭṭu
(NCat 2.293)
KAŚINĀTHA (1725)
Dhātumahājåtā
G1274 : Edited by Charles Wilkins. 1815.
APPA SURI or SUDHI (1730)
(NCat 1.270)
Śāṅdoratnāvali
Vyākhyā on Vaidyanātha Śāstrin’s Paribhāṣārtkasamgraha.
(NCat 11.222)
Paribhāṣāratna
(Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 480)
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(Cardona, p. 286; G1624, p. 278)
Tattvabodhini on Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita’s Siddhāntakaumudi, completed by Jayakṛṣṇa Maunin as Subodhini
See e1074; e1082; e1083; e1100.

DHARANĪDHARA (1730)
(NCat 9.237)
Bodhapaddhati mss (available)

KĀŚĪVARA ŚARMA (1739)
Jñānāṃṛta
(NCat 4.142)

SVAYAMPRAKĀŚĀNANDA (1740)
Canurīkā on Vaidyanātha Śāstrin’s Paribhāṣārthasaṃgraha
(NCat 6.378, 11.222)

VAIDYANĀTHA PAIYAGUNDA or BALAMBHAṬṬA (1740)
(NCat 1.389)
Arthasaṃgraha
(NCat 1.389)

Prabhā on Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita’s Śabdakaustubha
Bhāva-prakāśikā on Nāgēśa Bhāṭṭa’s Bhāṣabhāsabodhendushekha
Cidāsthimalā on Nāgēśa Bhāṭṭa’s Laghusabdushekha
See e1236.

Kāśikā on Gadā on Nāgēśa Bhāṭṭa’s Paribhāṣāsendushekha
See e1257.

Bhāva-prakāśikā on Hari Dikṣita’s Śabdaratna
Chāyā on Nāgēśa’s Mahābhāṣyaprātiprādyota
See e622.

Kalā on Nāgēśa Bhāṭṭa’s Vaiyakaraṇasiddhāntamaṇḍūtā
See e1238.

Bhāva-prakāśa on Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita’s Pravṛtthamanaramā
See e1120.

RĀMACANDRA (1744)
(oos 134, 1961, 323)
Vṛttiyaṅgāraha on Pāṇini’s Astādhyāyī
(NCat 1.472)

SATYAPRIYA TĪRTHA SVĀMIN (1745)
Vibhāraṇa on Patanjali’s Mahābhāṣya (mss available)

JAYAKRŚNA MAUNIN (1745)
Śāramāṇijari or Śākdabdopādpikāsa
(NCat 7.169)
Śabdārthatārkāṃṛta
(NCat 7.160)

Subodhinī, completion of Jñānendrā Sarasvati’s Tattvabodhīnī on Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita’s Siddhāntakaumudī
See e1074; e1082; e1083.

Ṭīkā on Varadarāja’s Madhyasiddhāntakaumudī
(NCat 7.169)
Ṭīkā on Varadarāja’s Laghusiddhāntakaumudī
(NCat 7.169)
(Sphoṭa-candrikā: this work actually by Jayakṛṣṇa’s brother Śrīkṛṣṇa. See below.)

HARI VALLABHA (1747)
Darpaṇa on Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa’s Vaiyakaraṇabhaṣāpāsāra
See el179; el187; el188; el189.

ŚIVARĀMA TRIPĀTHIN (1750)

Vidyāvīlasa on Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita’s Siddhāntakaumudī


Unāḍikoda or Laṃśmīnīdvāśabhidhāna

G1276: Edited Varanasi, 1873.

ŚRĪKRŚNA (BHAṬṬA) (MAUNIN) (1750)

Sphoṭacandrikā

See el125; el182.

Tarkacandrikā

(NCat 8.112)

Vyātītipiṇḍa


Ākhyādārthacandrikā (nīrṇāya)

(NCat 2.11)

Kāraṇavāda or Vibhaṅgyarthanirṇāya

G1279: Edited Bombay.

Lakārārthanirṇāya

(NCat 4.292)

Prakāśa on Rāmacandra’s Prakriyākaumudī

See el053.

(VARKHEDI) TIMMAṆĀGĀRYA (1750)

Pratyāhārasbṛtavacara

(NCat 8.180)

VĀSUIDEVA DĪKṢITA (1750)

(Cardona, p. 286; G1624, p. 279)

Bālamanorāna on Bhāṭṭoji Dikṣita’s Siddhāntakaumudī

See el080; el087; el095; G1100; G1101.

(RĀJA ŚRĪ) VENĪMĀDHAVA (ŚUKLA) (1750)

Kaumudikālopañātikā


Bṛhadāsāstrārthaḥkalā on Nāgesa Bhāṭṭa’s Paribhāṣendusēkhara

See el261.

NILAKАНṬHA DĪKṢITA (1750?)

(NCat 10.179)

Paribhāṣāvṛtti


Tattvavāeṣa on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya

(NCat 10.179)

Gāḍhārthadīpikā on Jñānendrā’s Tattvabodhini

(Adyar D, vol. 6, p. 117)

Laghusāndakausṭubha

(Adyar D, vol. 6, p. 117)

Kṛṣṭprakāśa

(NCat 4.273)

Vyākhyā on Rāmacandra’s Prakriyāsarvasva

(NCat 10.379)
ABHINAVA KALIDASA or UMAMAHESVARA (1750)

Punjivyavacakaranamal 
(NCat 1.298, 9.317)

SESADRISUDHI (1750)
  (gos 134, 1961, 394; NCat 11.22)
Paribhasabhaskara

KUPPU SASTRIN (1750)
  (gos 134, 1961, 126)
Critique of a Paribhasabhaskara
  (NCat 4.197)

ANANTANARAYANA SASTRIN (1750)
  Continuation of Gopalakrsna Sastrin's Mahabhavya-Sabdikacintamaani
    (NCat 6.136)
  Continuation of Gopalakrsna Sastrin's Siddhantakaumudilalita
    (NCat 6.136)

LAKSHMINRISHMHA (1750)
  Trisikha on Nagesha Bhatta's Paribhasenduskhara
    (NCat 11.227)

NARAYANA (SUDHI) (1750)
  Pradipa or Sabdabhasana on Punini's Astadhyayi
    (NCat 10.75)
  Sabdabhedanirupana
    (NCat 10.75)
  Sabdamaatjari
    (NCat 10.75)

PERUSURI (1755)
  (NCat 3.98)
Auipidakapadapravas on Upodisutras

APPAYYA DIKSHA, pupil of Gopalakrsna Sastrin (1760)
  (NCat 1.259, 269)
Puniniyasutraprakasa
  (NCat 1.471)

RADHAKRISHNA SARMAN (1764) (probably of the Jumara school)
  (NCat 9.293)
Dhaturatnatvali
  (NCat 9.293)

ASADHARA BHATTA (1770?)
  (NCat 2.19; 8.268)
Purapakshaprasnoti or -maatjari
  (NCat 2.19; 8.268)
Padasanijjalavidara
  Sabdatriottikas
General
  G1287 : Umakant P. Shah, "A Note on Asadhara Bhatta and His Works," VRfv
    1975, 351-359.

RAMASEVAKA (1770)
  (vam 2.423)
Vyakhyaa on Kaiyata's Mahabhavyapradipa (mss. available)
SAMKARA BHATTA (1770)
Tika on Nagesa Bhatta's Laghusabdendusekharas
(Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 347)
Vyakhya on Samkar on Nagesa Bhatta's Paribhaendusekharas
(NCat 11.228)
NAGOBA PANDITA (1775)
Sadbhapabentarapadar (NCat 10.23)
SADASIVA BHATTA (1780)
Commentary on Nagesa Bhatta's Paribhaendusekharas
(NCat 11.228)
Sadasivabhath on Nagesa Bhatta's Laghusabdusekharas
See el236.
KRISHNA MISRA (1780)
Krpanamitraapakriya
(NCat 4.344)
SIVARAMENDRA YATI (1780)
Commentary on Panini's Astadhyaya 1.3.67 (= Gajasutra)
(NCat 5.231)
VENKATADASA or VENKATAGARYA III (1780)
Gajasutravada or Neranavatisutravyakhya
G1288 : Edited by R.V. Krishnamachariar. 1909.
KALYANA SARASVATI (1790)
(Gajavarta, p. 86)
Laghusarasvata
(NCat 3.259)
BHIMAGARYA GALAGALI (1796)
Arthamafljari on Nagesa Bhatta's Paribhaendusekharas
(NCat 110.222, 227)
HARIRAMA KALA (1797)
Kasika on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyakarapabhufaprasa (lost?)
KULAMUNI (1800)
Samadarsana
(NCat 4.239)
INDRADATTA UPADHYAYA (1800)
Sabdatattvaprabha (ms available)
Sabdakaustubhagupta (lost)
Gadgadhakikaprabha on Bhattoji Diksita's Siddhanta kaumudita
G1289 : Edited by Indra Dutt Sharma. ksa 47. Varanasi, 1906.
GOPALAGARYA or SRIRAMAGARYA or GOPALADEVA VIDYAVAGISA (1800)
Kantimala on Purusottama Vidyavagisa's Prayogaratnamalata
(NCat 6.155)
DURBALAGARYA or KRISHNA MITRA (ACARYA) (1800)
Kunikaka on Nagesa Bhatta's Vaiyakarapasadhdantafljast
See el238.
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See e1188.

Commentary on Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa’s Paribhāṣenduṣṭekhara (mss available)

Bhāvapradīpa on Bhaṭṭoji Diksita’s Śabdakaustubha
(Adyar D, vol. 6, nos. 133-136)

Kalpalata on Bhaṭṭoji Diksita’s Prawdhamanoramā

Ratnāravava on Bhaṭṭoji Diksita’s Siddhāntakavumādi
(NCat 4.344)

Tuktiratnākara
(NCat 4.343)

Vādacāḍāmaṇī
cf. 47x443

KĀRTTIKEYA SIDDHĀNTA BHAṬṬĀGĀRYA (1800?)

Subodhā on the Mugdhabodha
(NCat 4.7)

GANGĀDHARA (1800?)
(NCat 5.198)

Induprakāśa on Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa’s Laghusabdenduṣṭekhara
(NCat 5.198)

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(NCat 5.198)

DHARANIDHARA (1809)
(NCat 1.472, 9.237)

Vaiyakaranasravasna on Panini’s Asfddhyayi, completed by Kāśinātha
See e26.

SĪVABHAṬṬA (1810)
(ocs 134, 1961, 391)

Kusumadikāsa on Haradatta’s Padamaṇjadi
(NCat 4.120)

MANNU or MANYU or GOPĀLA DEVA (1815)
(NCat 6.142)

Laghubhaṭṭasrāvakānti on Konda Bhaṭṭa’s Vaiyakaranabhūṣanastāra
(NCat 6.142)

Dosoddhāra on Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa’s Laghusabdenduṣṭekhara
(NCat 6.142)

Arthavatsūtraṇāda
(NCat 1.386)

Gajātrataṇādārtha or -vitāra
(NCat 5.231)

Kāṣṭakoddhāra or Dosoddhāra on Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa’s Paribhāṣenduṣṭekhara
(NCat 5.231, 6.142, 11.227)

UDAYAṆKARA NĀNAPĀTHAKA (1800)
(NCat 8.377)

Jyotsnā on Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa’s Śabdenduṣṭekhara
See e1236.

Anekamanyopadārthasūtraṇāda
(NCat 2.326)

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(NCat 2.326)

Paribhāṣopradīpārcis
(NCat 2.326; 11.220)
Bahurukhyarvavidra
(NCat 2.326)
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Completion of Dharaṇīdhara’s Vaiyākaraṇasaṁsāra
See e26.
Bhairava Miśra (1824)
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See e1182; e1188.
Candrakalā on Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa’s Laghušabdentudākhara
See e1229; e1231; e1233.
Gadā on Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa’s Paribhāṣenduśekhara
See e1253; e1258.
Bhairavī on Hari Dīkṣita’s Śabdaratna
See e1118; e1120.
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Phakkikadarpaṇa
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Dhātupāihakārikā
Artha-prakāśikā on Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita’s Siddhāntakaumudi
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(ym 2.415)
Pārījatam Nātakam on Patañjali’s Mahābhashya (mss available)
Govinda Bhaṛadvāja Sāstrin (1835)
Ambākartri on Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa’s Paribhāṣenduśekhara
See e1252A.
Bhārata Malliķa or Bhārata Sena Malliśena (1836? But NCat 3,379
says 1750)
Upāsaragōtī
c(NCat 2.375)
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G1293: Edited by Suresh Chandra Banerji. iss 36, 1960, 29, 34.
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(NCat 5.256)
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(ym 1.496)
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c(NCat 1.472, 6.110)
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(ym 2.417; BNK Sarma 2.358; NCat 3,379, 10.166)
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(mss at 594)
Tripathagā on Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa’s, Paribhāṣenduśekhara
(NCat 11.227)
Prabā on Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita’s Śabdakaustubha
Tripathagā on Patañjali’s Mahābhashya (mss available)
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VIPRAJENDRA (1845)
Maṇḍarāṭa-prabhā on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya
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VIŚVANĀTHA DANIDIBHĀṬṬA (1850?)
(ōs 134, 1961, 363)
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(NCat 6.178, 11.228)

LĀLĀ VIHĀRIN (1850)
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HARIRĀMA (1850?)
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Taddhita-candrikā
(NCat 13.85)
Commentary on Haribhāṣa-kara’s Paribhāṣābhāṣkara
(NCat 11.221)

HARINĀTHA DVIVEDIN (1850)
(ʻAbhyankar, p. 444)
Akādaṭāyḍava on Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa’s Paribhāṣenduṣṭekhara

DAYĀNANDA (SVĀMIN) SARASVATĪ (1850)
(ōs 134, 1961, 196)
Bhāṣya on Pāṇini’s Āṣṭādhyāyī
See e63.
See a121, a125, e241.

Bhāṣya on Pāṇini’s Uṇāḍīśūtras
See e416, e420.

Commentary on Pāṇini’s (?) Pāṇinīyaśikṣā
See e429.

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G1297: Edited Ajmer, 1919.

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G1298: Published in Vedangaprakasā 6. Allahabad, 1891.

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See e522; e547.

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(ʻAbhyankar, p. 427)
Sūrdūṣṭārviveka on Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa’s Paribhāṣenduṣṭekhara
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See e997.

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See e1254.

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See e652.

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(NGat 2.98)
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G1313 : Published Dacca, 1910, 1925; Calcutta, 1915, 1918.

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See e1157.

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Śāraṇaśabdārthavādiśāra


RĀMAKRŚNA ŚARMĀ TRIPĀTHĪ (1907)

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See e1183.

DURGAĐĀSA VİDYĀVĀGIŚA ŚRĪRĀMA TARKAVĀGIŚA (1908)

Tīkā on Vopadeva’s Mugḥabodha

See e1024.

BĀLAGANDRA ŚĀSTRIN (1908)

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See e1086.

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See e1159.

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See e1002.

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See e1025.

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G1315 : Published Varanasi, 1899.

See e1237.

Tiṇarthavādaśāra on Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa’s Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣanāsāra

See e1188.

KĀLURĀMA ŚĀSTRIN (1910)

Aavyāyarthāntāmāṇśā

G1316 : Published Allahabad, 1910.

HARENDRANĀRĀYANA DEVĀŚARMAN (1912)

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See e1028.

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G1317 : Published Lahore, 1914.

ŚIVADATTA ŚARMAN (1914)

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See e1090.

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See e1160.

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G1318 : Dacca, 1915; Calcutta, 1916.

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See e1916.

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Dīṭikā on Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa's Laghusabdenduśekhara
See e1232; e1234.

Commentary on Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa's Paramalaghumāṇjūśā
See e1242; e1244.

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Mitabhaśīṇī on Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's Siddhāntakaumudī
See e1091.

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Prabhā on Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's Praudhamanorāṇa
See e1117.

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See e639.

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(NCat 1.159)
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LAKŚMIDHARA, son of Nṛsiṁhodgātr, lived in Puri
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LAKŚMĪKARA or LAKŚMIŚRI of Nepal
(Candra) Trikanta
(Cordier 3.460)

LAKŚMĪNARAYANA VYĀSA
Aṣṭādhyāyīsūtrakoṣa
(NCat 1.471)

LOKEŚVARA ŚARMA ŚUKLA
Siddhāntaratnāvali on Anubhūti’s Sārasvataprakriyā
See e998.

MAHĀLINGA ŚASTRIN
Uṇādirūpāvali
(NCat 2.293)

MAHESAJHA
Dhātuparīṣṣyamaṇimālā
(NCat 9.286)

MĀNALUR VIRARĀGHAVĀCĀRYA
Commentary on Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī
(ŚRĪ) MĀNASARMAN of Campahatti, son of Lakṣmipati
Vijaya on Śrīdeva’s Paribhāṣāvṛtti

MAṆGARASA
(Belvalkar, p. 60)
Pratipāda on Yāksavarman’s Cintāmaṇi

MĀNIKYADEVA
(Belvalkar, p. 45; gos 134, 1961, 306)
Vṛtti or Īṣṭapadi on (Jain) Uṇādisūtras
(NCat 8.345)

MAUNIṢEKHARA, pupil of Rājaśekhara
Commentary on Kātantra
(NCat 3.224)

NANDAKĪRTI
Tyāḍyantasya prakriyāpadārohaṇa
(NCat 8.227)

NANDANA MIṢRA or NYĀYAVĀGĪSA, son of Bāneśvara Miṣra
Tantra-pratipadādīpana on Jīnendrabuddhi’s Nyāsa
(NCat 4.119, 9.327)

NARAHARI
Prabodha on Trilocana’s Kātantraviṭṭhipañjikā
(NCat 3.311, 9.367)
NARAHARI, disciple of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha
(Belvalkar, p. 97; vm 1.639)
Bala (ka)bodha
(NCat 9.368)

NARAIN DATTA TRIPĀṬHIN
Prakāśa on Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadiya, Book I
See e662.

NARASIMHA SURI, son of Rudrācārya of Kaunḍinya gotra
Saptasvarasindhu or Svaramañjari
(NCat 9.364)

NĀRĀYĀṆA BHĀRATI
(Belvalkar, p. 85)
Sarasvatāsārasaṅgraha
(NCat 10.94)

NĀRĀYĀṆA
(NCat 3.374)
Karacakacakra-Dipaprabhā
G1343 : Edited trs 33, 1913.

NĀRĀYĀṆA of Kerala
Prakṛipaśāra
(NCat 10.86)

NĀRĀYĀṆA of Govindapura
Pradīpta or Śabdabhūṣaṇa on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī
(NCat 1.472)

NAROTTAMA VIDYĀLAMKĀRA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA
Samāksiptāsārakārika
(NCat 9.372)

NAYASUNDARA, pupil of Dhanaratna
Rāparatnamālā or Sārasvatyanākarāpa
(NCat 9.350)

NILĀMBARA MIŚRA
Manoramācandrikā
(NCat 10.184)

NRSIMHA (more than one?)
Sūktārpanākara on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya
(NCat 10.190)
Rūpaṇālā
(NCat 10.190)

NRSIMHA TARKAPAṬAMDANANA
Gopāmārtanād on Saṃkṣiptaśāra-Dhātupāṭha
(NCat 9.290, 10.195)

ORAM BHĀṬṬA
Vyākaranadipākā on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī

PADMADHARA
Indirā
(NCat 11.153)
(RĀJA) PADMANĀRĀYĀṆA
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Śīṣubodha
(NCat 11.131)

PADMASUNDARA
Uḍādisādhana or Sundaropakāśaśabdārṇava
(NCat 2.293)

PAṆČĀNANA KANDALI
Chandraka Bhāṣya on Ratnamālā
(NCat 11.72)

VARṇavīśeka
(NCat 11.72)

PAṢUPATI of Rādhā
Kārakāparikṣā
(NCat 3.375)

PITĀMBARA VIDYĀBHŪṢANA
Kātantra-Dhātusātraḥpātrikā or Kavirājapātrikā
See e656.

PRAVARTAKOPĀDHĪYĀYA
(Abhyankar, p. 271; YM 1.428)
Prakāśa or Prakāśikā on Kāiyāta's Mahābhāṣyaprādiṣṭāṇa
(NCat 5.76)

PRAYOGAVĀNKAṬĀDRI
(YM 1.415)
Vidyāmukhabhūṣaṇa or -Maṇḍana on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (MS at Adyar Library)

PRTHVĪCANDRA or PRTHVIDHARA
Daurgasimhavṛtti on Durgasimha’s Kātantravṛtti
(NCat 3.313)

PRTHVĪŚVARA
Sarvalakṣaṇa on Harṣavardhana’s Liṅgānuśāsana
See e818.

PUNYASUNDARAGANI
(Belvalkar, p. 66)
Dhātupāṭha (Hemacandra school)
(NCat 9.290)

PŪRNAGANDRA
Dhātupāṭha

RĀDHĀKRṢNA GOSVĀMIN
Astavārtha
(NCat 1.431)

RĀGHAVA JHĀ
Kārakārthavīcāra
(NCat 3.379)
Dvandvaikālasvadda
(NCat 9.189)

RĀGHAVA SŪRI (YM 2.329)
Arthopakāśikā on Kātyāyana’s Vārttiṣa (MS in Madras)

RĀGHĀVENDRĀGĀRYA
Candrikā on Nāgēśa Bhāṭṭa’s Laghuśabdenduśkhara
(NCat 6.379)

RAGHUNANDA ŚIROMANI
(Belvalkar, p. 71)
Kālāntratattvārṇava or Kalāpatattvārṇava
See e653.

RAGHUNĀTHA ŚĀSTRĪ VAIYĀKARĀṆA
Lagñhīkā on Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa’s Pariḥṣenduṣekhara
See e1134.

RĀJARĀMA DĪKṢITA
Commentary on Hari Bhāskara’s Pariḥṣabhāskara
(NCat 11.22)

RĀJIVA SĀRMAN or VIŚVANĀTHA CAKRĀVARTIN or RĀMADEVA SĀRMAN
?Acaksanaviveka
(NCat 2.21)

RĀMACANDRA, son of Viśvanatha and disciple of Kṛṣṇa Pāṇḍita
Kriyākosa, abridgment of Bhaṭṭamalla’s Ākhyaṭacandrikā
G1346: Edited Varanasi, 1876.

RĀMACANDRA
Kārakacandrikā
(NCat 3.374)

RĀMACARĀṆA
Kartṛśiddhāntamaṇḍārjāri
(NCat 3.187)

RĀMACARITRA TRIFĀTHIN
Phakkikā Saralārthā
Pakṣasamāśya
(NCat 11.60)

RĀMĀJΝĀ PĀΝDEYA
Vyākaraṇadārānacārabhumī

RĀMA KΙΝΚARA SΆRASVΆTI
(gos 134, 1961, 323; YM 1.639)
Āśubodha
(NCat 2.198)

RĀMAKUΜĀRA NYĀYABHUSĀṆA, son of Rāmagati Vācaspati
(NCat 3.225)
Kalāpaspāra (based on Mugdabodha, Sārasvata, and Kṛtānta systems)
(NCat 3.225)

RĀMADEVA MΙŚRA
Vṛttiprayāṇa on Jayāditya/Vāmana’s Kāśikā
(NCat 4.119)

RĀMĀNANDA TĪRHṬA
Kalāpaśangpraha, a brief exposition of Kṛtānta
(NCat 3.225)

RĀMĀNĀYĀṆA SΆRMAN
Bhāṣya on Anubhūti’s Sārasvatapraṇāya
See e1004.

RĀMĀNĀTHA CAKRĀVARTIN
Śabdaratnāvali or Kṛtāntaśrutītriprabodha or Śabdāsādhyaprabodhitī
(NCat 3.314)

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See e1002.

RĀMĀRSI
Ayavāyārthamaṅkari on an Ayavāyārthakośa
(NCat 1.431)

RĀMASĪMHA (more than one?)
Commentary on Haradatta’s Padamaṅkari
See e918.

Dhāturaṇamaṅkari
(NCat 9.292)

RAMEŚVARA TARKAVĀGASPATI BHAṬṬAḤĀRYA
Kārakamalāṭikā on a Ratnālāla
(NCat 3.376)

RATIDEVA SIDDHĀNTAVAGOŚA, son of Gaṅgādharācārya of the Catta family of Bengal
Kṛṣṇarāja
(NCat 4.273)

RATNAMATI
Ṭīkā on Candragomin’s sūtras
(NCat 7.19)

RATNAPĀṆI
(Ṣat).Kārakaviṭaṭṭāna
(NCat 3.377)

RATNEŚVARA
Commentary on Haradatta’s Padamaṅkari
See e917; e918.

RŪPARĀMA NYĀYAPAṆGĀNAṆA
Kārakaraḥasya, a Saupadma work
(NCat 3.376)

ŚABARASVĀMIN
(Belvalkar, p. 44; cos 134, 1961, 383; YM 2.264)
Sarvārthaḥasya on Harsavardhana’s commentary on Hemacandra’s Liṅgānātaśāstra
See e817.

SABHĀPATI ŚARMA UPĀDHYĀYA
Lakṣmi on Bhaṭṭoji Diksita’s Siddhāntakaumudi
See e1017; G1104.

SAGGIDĀNANDA
Taddhitaṃgapiṭṭāna
(NCat 8.85)

SADĀNANDA
Subodhini on Anubhūti’s Saravatīpraṇāśāstra
See e988; e1134.
Subodhini on Rāmacandraśrama’s Siddhāntacandrika
See e1041.

SAMANTABHADRA
(Belvalkar, p. 60)
Ṭīṭhapi on Yakṣavarman’s Cintāmāni

ŚAMKARA
Ṭīkā on Puruṣottamadeva’s Mahābhāṣyālaghaurī
tyi
(YM 2.403)

ŚAMKARA ŚARMAN
Kātantraparīśiṣṭaprabodhaprakāśikā
(NCat 3.316)

SANĀTANA TARKĀCĀRYA
(YM 1.509)

Tippani on Panini's Aṣṭādhyāyī
(NCat 1.472)

Prabhā on Ṣīnendrabuddhi's Nyāsa (or Maitreyarakṣita's Tantrapradīpa)
(NCat 4.119, 8.90)

SARVADHARA UPĀDHHYAYA
Commentary on (Kātantra) Unāḍīśūtras
(NCat 2.295)

Vanmayaprādiṣṭa on Durgāsinha's Kātantravṛtti
(NCat 3.313)

Tyādayantasyaprakṛiti or Kalapatyādbhivṛtti
(NCat 8.227)

ṢAṢṬHĪDĀSA, son of Jayakṛṣṇa Tarkavāgīsa
Dhātumālā
g1350: Edited. Kuch Bihar, 1890–1903.

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SIDDHĀNĀTHA VIDYĀVĀGIŚA
Commentary on Samśīptasāra Unāḍīśūtras
See e658.

SIVADĀSA or ŚIVARĀMA ŚARMAN (VĀGASPATI)
Kṛṣṇaṅjarī with auto-commentary
G1351: Edited Dacca, 1886.
See e647

SIVADĀSA CAKRAVARTIN
Commentary on Samśīptasāra Unāḍīśūtras
(NCat 2.296)

SIVĀNANDA GOSVĀMIN or ŚIROMANI BHAṬṬA, a southerner who visited
Bikaner during the reign of Anup Singh
Kāraṇakāśa or Vibhaktyaṛthavivarana
(NCat 3.372) (See KRPV, p. 363.)

SIVĀNANDA PĀNDEYA
Ratnadīpikā on Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa's Paramalaghumaṅjūśā
See e1122.

SIVANĀRAYANA ŚIROMANI
Tippani on Vopadeva's Mugdhabodha
See e1916.

SIVA PANDITA
Kusumavikāsa on Haradatta's Padamaṅjarī
(NCat 4.120)
SOMANĀTHA
Bṛhatī Candrikā
(NCat 6.380)

SOMAPRABHĀ, a Jain
Auktika
(NCat 3.97)

ŚRĪDEVA PANḌITA
Arthasamgraha
(NCat 1.389)

ŚRĪKĀNTA MIṢRA
Candrikā
(NCat 6.380)

ŚRĪKRŚNA ŚARMAṆ
Tiḥam Śaktiḥ or Tiṇivicāra?
(NCat 8.166)

ŚRĪNĀTHA ŚIROMAṆI
Manoramā on Śarvarman’s Kātantrasūtras
See e655.

ŚRĪNIVĀSA
Commentary on Haribhaṣṭakara’s Paribhāṣābhāskara
(NCat 11.22)

ŚRĪPRABHĀ SŪRI
Kārakoktiṃsvuccaya
(NCat 3.379)

ŚRṬIDHARĀCĀRYA
Commentary on Puruṣottamaṇḍeva’s Bhaṣāūrtti
See e938.

ŚRUTASĀGARA, pupil of Vidyānanda
Dhāṭupārāyaṇa
(NCat 9.290)

SUDARŚANĀCĀRYA
Kārakārthaphadipīkā
(NCat 3.379)

SUDARŚANA DEVA
Pradīpa on Santanava’s Phīśūtras
See e644.

SUSENA KAVIRĀJA MIṢRA, son of Miṣra Mahidhara
Candra or Vyaṅghyāśāra on Trilocaṇa’s Kātantrasūṭtipañjikā
G1355 : “Akhyātavirāja” portion edited Dacca, 1890.
See e656.

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Vṛṣṭi on Uṇḍāsūtras
G1354 : Edited by T.R. Chintamani, MUS 7.1, 1933.

TALADEVASUDHĪ
Dhāṭupratyayapāṇikācākā
t(NCat 9.291)

TĀRĀNĀTHA, son of Kālidāsa of Vatsa family
Śabdārtharatna
G1355 : Edited Calcutta, 1931.

TĀRĀPAṆA NYĀYARATNA
Karakacandrikā
G1356: Edited Calcutta, 1902.
TARKĀLĀMKĀRA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

Dhatucandrikā
(NCat 8.133)
TEKNĀTHA (?)
Paribhāṣārthaṭṭīṭikā
(NCat 8.3)

ṬHAKKURADĀSA NYĀYAPAṄGĀNANA, son of Mṛtyuṅjaya Sarasvati
Dhatucandrikā
(NCat 8.5)

TILAKA
Ṭikā on Kṣirasvāmin’s Nipātāvyayopasargaṇṭī

TRILOCANA (more than one?)
Avayavaśībdaṇṭī
do
Dhatupārīṇyāgra
(NCat 8.261)
Vaiyākaraṇakotōṭīṭtra
(NCat 8.262)

TRILOKANĀTHA, son of Vaidyānātha
Kāraṇakārthāniprāṇya or Śaṅkāraṇāniprāṇya
(NCat 3.378, 8.259)
UTSAVAKĪRTI, SĀRAṆGA UPĀDHYĀYA
Padāśīrtyapṛakṛiti (Kātantra work)
(NCat 2.322, 3.309, 11.103)

VAIJALADEVA
Prabodhacandrikā

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(NCat 11.227)

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VARENDRA CAMPAHATTIYA MĀNAŚARMA, son of Lakṣmipati
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do
Anuvyāyasāraṇa
(NCat 1.203)
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(NCat 5.111)

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(NCat 3.270)
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(NCat 9.285)
VĪSANĀTHA ŚASTRĪ
Prabhākara on Varadarāja’s Mādhyasiddhāntakumudī
See e1048.
VĪŚEVŚARA SURI
(Vyākaraṇa) Siddhāntasudhāṇidhi
VĪŚEVŚARA TARKĀGĀRYA, a Kātantra writer
(NCat 2.10)
Ākhātavīśākhyāna or -bodha (MSS available)
Commentary on Trilocana’s Kātantravrīttipraiṣṭīkā
(NCat 3.312)
VRAJARĀJA
Unādisūtra
(NCat 2.294)
VURAMIŚRA, son of Harighala
Dhātudarpaṇa, composed in the city of Amritsar
(NCat 9.285)
YAŚOBHŪTI
Laghuśrutī or Śisyahīta on Kashmiri recension of Kātantra (Tibetan translation exists in Tanjur; see JASP 1907, 125.)
YATĪŚA
Anayārthapradīpikā
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See e1116.

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SabdarUpavāali

AUTHOR UNKNOWN
Samāśanāṅkha

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1: Historical Resume

5. Gautama, Nyāyasūtra 2.2.65.
6. Pāṇini, Aṣṭādiyayā 2.1.1: "samarthah padavidhiḥ." See Kunjunni Raja (G1556), pp. 154–156.
7. Yāska, Nirukta 1.1: "indriyanityam vacanam audumbarāyaṇah." See also Brough (G).
8. Yāska, Nirukta 1.2. The six stages are "a thing comes into existence, exists, changes, grows, decays, and ceases to exist."
12. Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa, Śphoṭavāda, concluding verse. See part two, summary, 45 on Śphoṭavāda.
13. Thieme (G458), pp. 23–24.
16. See Gode (G1128).
17. Also called Vaiyākaraṇamatanmaṇjadiṇī. It is quoted under that title in Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa's Śphoṭavāda.
20. See Jagadiśa’s Saṅgaśaktiprakāśikā.
21. This subsection was written by Shoryu Katsura.
25. Pramāṇasamuccayavārttī 169a2–4 = 83a6–8; See also Iyengar (G795), pp. 147–149.
26. Apodhāre padasyāyāṃ vākyād artho vivecitaḥ / Vākyārthaḥ pratibhākyo yaṁ tenādāv upajanyate."


2: METAPHYSICS

3. See, for example, the critique of modern language theories by Klaus Klostermaier in “Man Carries the Power of All Things in His Mouth,” in *Revelation in Indian Thought*, ed. H. Coward and K. Sivaraman (Emeryville, Calif., 1977), p. 8.
7. *Ṛg Veda* 1.164.35 “brahmāyaṃ vācaḥ paramaṁ vyomaḥ.”
12. See Frauwallner (RB12160).
13. See part two, summary 3, of Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, śūtras 1.1.21, 1.1.65.
14. See, for example, the fine critical survey of modern biblical scholarship presented by Harvey McArthur in his introduction to *In Search of the Historical Jesus* (New York, 1969). The survey of form criticism is found on pp. 6-7. Although this analysis focuses on biblical studies, the same points would generally apply to all modern western literary criticism.
15. The Vedas also offer their own speculations regarding time. Time is described in one hymn as the first god, existing in many forms. Time generates the sky and sets in motion the past, the present, and the future. Time is the lord of all and the father of Prajāpati. The universe is set in motion and sustained by time. Indeed, in the *Ātharva Veda* 19: 53 and 54, time (*kāla*) is celebrated as the primordial power and unifying principle of the universe. In *kāla* lie the worlds and the sun. By *kāla* was the universe urged forth. *Kāla* is Brahma. “Time contains and conquers all, and still continues onward” (W. Norman Brown, “Veda and Religion,” in *India and Indology*, ed. R. Rocher [Delhi, 1978], p. 45). But the high place accorded *kāla* in the *Ātharva Veda* is seldom repeated in the Upaniṣads, and in the *Svetātmāvatara* the view that everything came out of time is regarded as a heretical doctrine (S.N. Dasgupta [RB11488, ] 66). In the *Maitri Upaniṣad*, though, time is given the same high status as in the *Ātharva Veda*. In *Maitri* 6: 15 we read:

There are, assuredly, two forms of Brahma: Time and the Timeless. That which is prior to the sun is the Timeless (*akāla*), without parts (*akāla*). But that which begins with the sun is Time, which has parts. Verily, the form of that which has parts is the year. From the year, in truth, are these creatures produced. Through the year, verily, after having been produced, do they grow. In the year they disappear. Therefore the year, verily, is Prajāpati, is Time, is food, is the Brahma-abode, and is Ātman. For thus has it been said:

Tis Time that cooks created things,
All things, indeed, in the Great Soul (*mahātmān*)
In what, however, Time is cooked—
Who knows that, he the Veda knows.
As in the Atharva Veda, time is here given the highest status of being identified with Prajāpati, but now also with Brahman and Ātman. Verse sixteen goes on to describe embodied Time as the great ocean of creatures, planets, and all things.

16. As translated by Peri Sarveswara Sharma (G738), p. 42.
17. Sastri (G706).
18. Subramania Iyer (G734).
22. RB5466, p. 229.
23. An English translation of Helârâja’s Tīka has been included by Peri Sarvesvara Sharma in G738. The date indicated is the one proposed by Sharma, p. 12.
24. Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya 3.9.62. See the translations in G738 and G748A.
27. Ibid. 3.9.4. Translated by Subramania Iyer (G748A).
28. Ibid. 3.9.5.
29. Ibid. 3.9.23.
30. Ibid. 3.9.24. This balance, says Helârâja in his comment on 3.26, is Bhartṛhari’s meaning of the term vivarta, which appears in Vākyapadīya 1.1 and 3.3.81.
31. Ibid. 3.9.74.
32. Ibid. 3.9.37.
33. Ibid. 3.9.41.
34. Ibid. 3.9.45, and Tīka thereon.
35. Ibid. 3.9.46.
36. Ibid. 3.9.52.
38. Vākyapadīya 3.9.52.
39. Ibid. 3.9.53.
40. Ibid. 3.9.74.
41. Patañjali, Mahabhāṣya 4.2.3.
42. See introduction to G738, p. 37.
43. Potter (RB9446), pp. 91–93.
44. Ibid.
45. See introduction to G738, p. 19.
46. See Subramania Iyer (G719), pp. 112–113.
47. svav, p. 242.
49. Sastri (G1428), 1980 ed., p. 82.
50. Vākyapadīya 3.9.46.
51. Ibid. 3.9.4.
52. Ibid. 3.9.74.
53. For a full analysis of the function of time see Coward (G777).
54. Cf. Klaus Klostermaier, cited in n. 3 above.
55. Subramania Iyer (G721), p. 119.
57. Vākyapadīya 1.142 with vr̥tti.
58. Ibid. 1.143, vr̥tti. See also ibid. 1.14.
3. Epistemology

1. See, for example, Russell Fraser, *The Language of Adam* (New York, 1977), especially chap. 4, “Mysticism and the Scientific Doom.”
5. Ibid., p. 322.
7. See Sāṃkhya-kārikā 4, Sāṃkhya-sūtras 1.88, and Yogasūtras 1.7.
8. See Ganganatha Jha (RB9473), p. 80. Prabhākara accepts only five pramāṇas.
10. In Subramania Iyer (G721), p. 45.
11. Translation in Murti (G1643), p. 325.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 326.
14. Ibid.
15. The following discussion regarding the Platonic parallel with vyākaraṇa is based on Murti (G1643), p. 327.
17. Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 163.
18. Subramania Iyer (G872), karikā 19. Similar arguments are offered to show how the progressively clearer perception cannot be attributed to defects of the senses or memory through resemblance, p. 49.
20. Sastri (G706), p. 50.
22. G872, sūtra 20, pp. 51–52; and *Vākyapādiya* 1.88 and vṛtti.
23. Ibid.
24. G872, sūtra 24, p. 64. See also Subramania Iyer (G1445), in which he makes clear that from the sphota viewpoint whatever distinction of degree or part is made in an object must be done through a guṇa (quality or particular). For the grammarians it is the guṇa and never the universal that serves to express degrees in objects. It should also be noted that of the many possible ways of interpreting the universal, Bhartrhari prefers the following. A movement like lifting the hand consists of a series of movements. As these movements are transitory they cannot coexist and form a whole of which they would be the parts and in which the universal of the movement of lifting the hand would inhere. Now such a universal is more specific than the wider universal...
of movement in general. Although it inheres in each moment of movement, it is not
cognizable in them alone due to too much similarity between moments of lifting and
those of the moments of each movement, such as turning the hand. The moments of
each movement are the result of a special effort to make that movement, and they
are the substrata of the universal of that movement. But that universal cannot be
cognized until a series of moments has been cognized. One or two moments of move-
ment are not enough, but after a series of moments is cognized the cognition of the
universal inherent in each movement becomes clear. Lifting, for example, may be
identified, and other movements such as turning excluded. The process is similar in
the manifestation of sphações. Each is manifested by a series of special efforts to utter
letters. One or two utterances of the series are not enough to eliminate other words
with similar sounds. But as the complete series of letters is cognized, the cognition of
the sphaṭa or universal of the particular word is clearly perceived, and meaningful
usage of it in speech becomes possible. (Vākyapadīya 2.20-21 as interpreted by
Subramania Iyer [G734], pp. 168-169.)
25. Ibid.
26. Vākyapadīya, 1.52.
27. Moving beyond Sanskrit itself and into the world of languages, I would take
the universal error as referring to the necessity of going from the differentiated letters
(the error) to the whole sphaṭa (meaning or ultimate reality). The fixed sequence
and form of differentiation for a particular word-sphaṭa would only be a constant error
within each language (such as Sanskrit).
29. Sphoṭasiddhi, sūtra 22.
32. Vākyapadīya 1.78-84. Among the analogies offered to explain the process,
Bhartrhari’s favorite seems to be that the sounds leave impression seeds (samskāra,
hāvanā, or bija), which, as they mature in the mind, are conducive to an increasingly
clear perception of the sphaṭa—to which they finally offer a perfect “fitness” or identity.
A literal rendering of yogyatā could be “to fit in a frame”—the “fit” of the “matured”
series of letters into the “frame” of the sphaṭa. See also the vṛtti on Vākyapadīya 3.1.8.
33. The phrase “function of the mind” here is intended to indicate that pratibhā
is not a function of the ordinary senses of the buddhi stage of consciousness, but is
characteristic of the pre-buddhi or sabdatattva stage.
34. It should be clearly understood here that perfect perception of pratibhā, how-
ever valid in itself, remains outside the realm of pramāṇa (which is characterized by
sensory perception and discursive cognition). With regard to language, therefore, it is
sphaṭa when manifested as speech that is pramāṇa (and not sphaṭa at the unified level
of pratibhā). The point made above, however, still stands. The cognition of sphaṭa at
the level of either sabda pramāṇa or pratibhā is via direct perception, not via inference.
35. Sphoṭasiddhi, sūtra 23, as translated by Subramania Iyer (G872), p. 60.
37. Vākyapadīya 1.142.
38. Ibid., 1.123.
39. The following summary depends mainly on Subramania Iyer’s presentation
of Bhartrhari’s position in G734, pp. 144-146.
40. Patañjali, Togasūtra 2.53.
41. There is considerable debate in current scholarship over whether there should
or should not be a fourth level of language, para vāk. Bhartrhari himself seems to leave
open that possibility. The vṛtti on Vākyapadīya 1.142 does quote among numerous other
passages Rg Veda 1.164.45, which refers to four levels of vāc. Cardona, p. 302, seems to
contradict himself, suggesting four levels in the main text—*paṭyantī* being divided into two aspects—but in the footnote observing “that Bhartṛhari did not recognize an absolute fourth level called *parā vāc* ‘supreme speech,’ which was recognized by later thinkers, especially in the Kashmir Śaiva school of thought” (p. 369).

4: Word Meaning

3. See Chakravarti (G1402).
7. Ibid.
8. See Chakravarti (G1402), p. 100.
9. *Vākyapādiya* 1.44.
10. Ibid. 1.45–46.
11. Ibid. 1.47.
12. Ibid. 1.49.
14. *Vākyapādiya* 1.1 and *vṛtti*.
16. Ibid., p. 3.
18. A summary of part of Maṇḍana’s answer to Kumārila in Maṇḍana’s *Sphoṭa-siddhi, kārīkā* 3, as presented by Gaurinath Sastri in G706, p. 105.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Unlike the subsequent discussion, the preceding debate assumes no invisible trace or *samskāra*. Kumārila holds that the last phoneme, helped by the more visible going before of the other phonemes in the word, causes the understanding of meaning.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., *kārīkā* 6, G872, p. 16.
27. Ibid., G872, pp. 17-18.
29. Ibid., G872, p. 31.
30. Ibid., *kārīkā* 11, G872, p. 34.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., *kārīkā* 18, G872, p. 44.
34. Subramania Iyer’s introduction to G872, p. 13.
35. Ibid., *kārīkā* 20, and *Vākyapādiya* 1.88 with *vṛtti*.
36. It should be noted that no less a person than Śaṅkara argued against the *sphoṭa* theory (in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1.3.28). See also the recent analysis of Śaṅkara’s objection *sphoṭa* in Herman (G1549). Śaṅkara and Kumārila both base their criticism on *acārya* Upāvarṣa, and their objections are somewhat different from the debate between Vācaspati and Maṇḍana.
37. This passage and the following ones are taken from the translation by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri in G1414, reprinted in Collected Papers of S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras, 1961), p. 296.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 301.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 293.
43. See Subramania Iyer's introduction to G872, p. 17.
44. Sphoṭasiddhi, kārikā 24, G872, p. 64. See also Subramania Iyer (G1445), in which he makes clear that from the sphoṭa viewpoint whatever distinction of degree or part is made in an object must be done through a guṇa (quality of particular).
45. Vākyāpadiya 1.85. For more on this topic see chapter 3 part 2 of this introduction.

5. Sentence Meaning

1. Sphoṭasiddhi, kārikā 23.
2. For detailed discussion see Kunjunni Raja (G355).
3. See Kunjunni Raja (G1556), pp. 154–156.
5. See K. Kunjunni Raja, “The Role of Tatparya in Understanding the Sentence,” in Ancient Indian Theories on Sentence Meaning (Poona, 1980).

NOTES TO SURVEY

1. Philosophical Elements in Vedic Literature

1. Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa has interpreted this verse as referring to the fourfold manifestation of vāc into pārā, paṣyanti, madhyamā, and vaikhari.

2. Philosophical Element in Yāska’s Nirukta

1. See B. Bhattacharya, Yāska’s Nirukta and the Science of Etymology (Calcutta, 1952); Siddheswar Varma, The Etymology of Yāska (Hoshiarpur, 1953); Kunjunni Raja (G696).
2. Thieme (G458), pp. 23–24.
4. “Bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam, sattvapradhānāni nāmāni.”
5. “Sad bhāvavikara, bhavantī vārśāyaṇīr jāyate ’sti vipariṇāmate vardhate pakṣīyate vinaśyati.”
6. “Prāptakrama viśeṣu kriyā saivaḥ bhūdhīyate kramārūpaśya sanmāre tataḥ tattvam iti kathyate,” Vākyāpadiya 3.1.35.
7. “Pūrvaparibhūtam bhāvam ākhyātenācaste.”
8. “Kṛdabhūhito bhāva dravyavad bhavati.”
10. Cf. Brough (G8).
12. “Bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam, sattvapradhānāni nāmāni.”
3. PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN PĀNINI'S ĀŚṬĀDHYAṬI

1. Generally taken to be later than Yāska; but Thieme takes him to be earlier. See the extended discussion summarized in Cardona.
2. "Śīṣṭāḥ śabdeṣu pramāṇam.,"
3. "Lokaviśjñānāt siddham,," see śūtras 1.1.21, 1.1.65.
5. "Avyuttapan prātipadika." See also the discussion in Yāska's Nirukta.
8. See Kunjunni Raja (G355); also Devasthali (G327), pp. 206–215.
10. Nāgĕsa Bṛhaṭa discusses lakṣanā at length in his Maṇḍūṣa and says in the Parama-laghumaṭṭṭa that according to the grammarians there is no necessity to accept lakṣanā as a separate function of words.

4. PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN PATAṆJALI'S MAHĀBHĀṢYA

1. The Mīmāṃsakas take śabda to be the sound only, while to the grammarians meaningfulness is an essential feature of a linguistic sign. See Manḍana Miśra’s Sphoṭasiddhi, verse 3: "a śabda is the cause for creating the understanding of the meaning" ("arthāvayaśyaprasavanmittaṁ śabda iṣyate").
2. Mahābhāṣya 1.1.
3. Kumārila, Ślokaśārttikā, sphoṭavāda section, verse 5.
4. See the discussion in chapter 5 of Bhartrhari. Among the followers of Pāṇini, Vājaṇyaṇa considered the meaning to be ākṛti or jāti, while Vyāci took it to be the individual or draavya. Among other scholars of philosophy, the Mīmāṃsakas took ākṛti to be synonymous with jāti, while the Nyāya school took it to be the structural form, as distinct from the universal. Cf. Gautama, Nyāyasūtra, "Jātyākṛtyāvakyaktaas tu padārthaḥ.
5. Vārttika 1: "śiddhe śabdārthaśambandhe lokataḥ . . . ."
6. Mahābhāṣya 1: "arthavanto varṇāḥ . . . ."
7. Kāṭyāyana’s vārttika on 1.2.64: "dravyābhidhanaṁ vyādhiḥ" and "ākṛtya-bhidhānād vaikāṁ vibhaktau Vājaṇyaṇaḥ."
8. "Jātyākhyāyāṁ aksmin bahuvacanam anyatarasayam."
10. Mahābhāṣya 1.
11. "Pāṇinidārsane jātidrayau śabdenābhidhīyete."
12. "Yasya guṇāntareśvapi prādurbhavatu tatvatvam na vihanyate tad dravyam" (on 5.1.119).
14. Mahābhāṣya 1.35.5.
15. Buddhau kṛtvā sarvaś ca eṣṭaṁ kartā dhīras tanvannītiḥ. Šabdenārthānvacyān dṛṣṭvā buddhau kuryāt paurvāparyam."
16. "Dhavanīṁ sphoṭaḥ ca sadbāṇaṁ dhvanis tu khalo lakṣyate Alpo mahāṁś ca keśāntaṁ ubhāyam tat svabhāvataḥ." Also: "sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ dhvanīṁ śabdagnūṁḥ."
17. "Varṇasya grahaṇe hetuḥ prākṛto dhvanir iṣyate. Vṛttibhede nimittatvaṁ vaikṛtāḥ samapadyate."

18. "Avasthītā varṇā vaktuś cīrācīravacād vṛttaye viśiṣyante."


22. "Na vaiyākaraṇaṁ sākyam laukikam liṅgam āstātum."

23. "Samstyaṅnavivaksāyaṁ stri, prasavavivaksāyaṁ pumān ubhayavivaksāyaṁ napumṣakam."

5. BHARTRHARI


2. The title *Vākyopadīya* could have referred originally to the second of the three *kāṇḍas* (chapters or books) that make up the work. It is definite that about A.D. 1000 *Vākyopadīya* was generally regarded as applying only to the first two books; *Trikāṇḍi* was the term that included all three books. The use of the title *Vākyopadīya* to speak of even the third book, the *Padaṅkāṇa* or the *Prakīnaṇa* (Miscellany) seems to be no older than the sixteenth century (cf. Aklujkar [G733], pp. 547–555). It is this use that is most common at present. The first two books, according to one manuscript tradition, consist of verses (*kārikās*) as well as a prose commentary (*vṛtti*). The other manuscript traditions have only the *kārikās*, or *kārikās* accompanied by a prose commentary (*iṭkā*) evidently authored by someone other than the *kārikā* author. A long line of writers in the Sanskrit tradition has consistently held that the *Vṛtti* too is Bhartrhari's work and is an integral part of the *Vākyopadīya* (cf. Aklujkar [G743]). In their understanding the reference of the title *Vākyopadīya* is not confined to the *kārikās*. For many modern students of Bhartrhari's works, however, that title stands for the *kārikās*, primarily as well as exclusively. The *Vṛtti* is not generally viewed as included when references such as "*Vākyopadīya* 1.5" are made.

3. The word *nitya* is not intended here in the sense "eternal" (as in "God is eternal"). Even as signifying "permanent" it has two or three shades of meaning, depending on the theoretical context. See Aklujkar (G735), p. 82.

4. See the preceding note.


6. When an expression is mentioned, as distinct from when it is used, it is thought to convey its own form as meaning. A theoretical distinction is made between an expression and its own form in cases of mention, and the former is said to be the signifier and the latter the signified; that is, when self-referring or quoted expressions are compared with the expressions having an external reference, the distinction is not seen in the mode of employment ("use-mention") of the two, but in what they convey—what the outcome is.

7. The concept *varnasphota*, as understood by the Pāṇiniyas, differs from "phoneme" as generally understood by linguists in one important respect. *A, a, and a*—that is, short (*hrasva*), long (*dirgha*), and prolonged (*pluta*) *a*—are regarded as different realizations of *varnasphota* *a*; in other words, the *varnasphota* here is an abstracted or generalized common factor form.

8. The implication is that linguistic units are assumed to be individuals or particulars in the discussion summarized in the preceding paragraph. One of Bhartrhari's commentators (Punyaraja/ Helaraja, at 2.1–2, 19, 39–40) systematizes the *sphota* view of linguistic expressions as follows: (a) *bāhya sphota*: individuals (*syūkti*) and universals
(jāti); (b) abhyantara sphoṭa: śabdatattva. This systematization is confirmed by the sequence of statements in 1.84–97.

9. The foregoing interpretation of 1.148–154 is conjectural, for the passages do not contain an explicit statement to this effect: "The following/preceding is the justification of the claim that knowledge or āstra-based use of grammatical expressions can lead to merit." I have assumed that such a statement was intended by Bhartṛhari, because the context (1.144–147 and 1.158–174) is one of pointing out the importance of grammar and because the immediately following verses (1.155–157) are concerned with the relation between sādhu śabda and dharma. It is, however, possible that 1.148–157 are not at their original place in the Brahmakāṇḍa.

10. Anvitabhidhāna-vādins of the later works.

11. The last three correspond, respectively, to madhyāmā, paśyanti, and parāpaśyanti-rūpa. Speech (vaikhari) is marked by an observable presence of breath and sequence in both its upāmsu and non-upāmsu varieties.

12. As will be apparent from this summary, the link among verses 112–115 is not clear.

13. There is some overlap in the list that follows by the very nature of the matter involved and because the list evolved through the efforts of generations of thinkers. For the latter reason, there is also an element of variation in the understanding or definition of terms involved. For example, prakāraṇa and sāmarthya obviously had wider meanings in addition to their specific meanings determined on the basis of other factors included in the list(s).

14. The Vaiyākāraṇas understand dravya in two senses: first, the everlasting substance that underlies all transient physical shapes; and, second, what a demonstrative pronoun (equivalent to "variable" of modern logic) can refer to. The second chapter, a summary of which begins at this point, expands on the first sense. The second sense is given in chapter 4.

15. In the first chapter of the third book, all expressions are said to refer, in the final analysis, to Existence. This Existence is then viewed as a universal pervading everything. Here in the second chapter a similar conclusion is reached, but the Existence is said to be a particular. Thus, there are two currents of thought, roughly corresponding to ontological reduction (a) to classes or (b) to individuals in recent western philosophy.

16. Most, if not all, common sentences would be logically problematic (internally inconsistent) if the words in them were viewed as referring to actually existing entities (for example, in the case of "sprout is born," one could ask: How is the sprout said to be born when it existed?). Explanations of how these sentences are possible vary. One involves distinction between reference and sense (or meaning). Another advocates acceptance of another kind of (verbal or linguistic) existence. The third rests on the observation that words cannot refer to entities in their entirety—in all of their aspects—or purely in themselves. The following summary alludes to this variety of explanations.

17. The intention behind calling the arising of an effect a miracle could be of two sorts: either the becoming of the effect cannot be expressed without giving rise to unintended implications—without realizing the inadequacy of language, as in the description of a miracle—or we cannot determine the point of transition—the exact moment or phase in which the cause ceases to exist and the effect comes into being. The transition seems to take place in a flash like a miracle. Hēlaṛāja (3.3.81) is aware of both interpretations, and there is contextual support for both. Verses 3.3.78–80 and 82–86 suggest that Bhartṛhari located the logical problems of cause-and-effect relationship in the expression of that relationship and in being not aware of general truths about language's relation to reality in understanding that expression. In other words, he seems to have dissolved the problems rather than solved them. Thus, the first
interpretation is contextually justified. Support for the second interpretation can be seen in the adjectives ablāgām, “partless,” and akramam “sequenceless,” which are used in 3.3.81.

18. The entity need not be explicitly qualified. All that is necessary is a presupposition that \( x \) can be qualified if necessary (bhādayatvam vivakṣīta). Second, qualification is to be understood as including predication, even of the simple type such as “\( x \) is/exists.” The present definition allows us to view universals and the like as particulars and permits characterization of all word meanings as particulars or individuals. Thus, all words are said to refer to draṇya in two ways: the one stated in chapter 3.2 (see the preceding note) and the one stated here in chapter 3.4.

19. This excelling can also be in such negative respects as being disliked, being despised, and so on (for example, kusītātara, “more censured of the two”).

20. The intended characterization of sādhana or kāraka should be clear from the summary of the following chapter. The important points to remember are, first, that they are viewed as supports of the action as expressed in the sentence; second, that their actual relation to the action as seen in the physical world does not matter—what matters is the capacities in which the speaker places them—and, third, that the action mentioned in this context is not necessarily physical, observable action characterized by a series of moments; even the meaning of “is” or “exists” is action.

21. As Helarāja (p. 209.12–13) observes here, while the definitions of sādhana, kriya, and so on, like those of the preceding draṇya and guṇa, are established by studying Pāṇinian rules, the characterization of space, time, and so on is a result of a direct attempt to understand their nature; the rules do not provide clues as in the other cases. For Bhartṛhari, akāśa does not seem to be any positive, physical entity. It is nowhere distinguished from dīṣ in his writings. He seems to have used the word conventionally in the sense “visible, perceptible space,” which, in view of his final rejection of space as an actually existing entity, ultimately comes to mean “space that is generally thought to be perceptible.”

22. Vaiśeṣikas, according to Helarāja, pp. 239.3–4, 243.9.

23. (a) Helarāja (p. 315.18) labels this view in verse 107 as svasiddhānta, “Bhartṛhari’s own thesis,” according to the available editions. But the view in verse 109 is also svasiddhānta, according to Helarāja (p. 316.12). (b) There are no words such as atha va, keśāṇeṣṭcit, or anyesaṃ, indicating paksāntara, in verses 108 and 109. That these verses express views different from the one contained in 106–107 is something one has to accept on the authority of Helarāja, who, in turn, seems to have (rightly) noticed that the wording of 108–109 indicates different philosophical assumptions.

24. The assumption here is that an agent must really exist to appear as an agent in a sentence. In the view expressed in verse 105, real existence is not held to be necessary; a tentative, imagined existence is held to be sufficient. Among the thinkers advocating necessity of “real existence” there are two groups: one (probably Śāṁkhyya) locates such real existence in the cause, maintaining that cause and effect are essentially identical; the second explains real existence as existence as a universal, clearly implying that the universals are real (as in the Nyāya view) and beyond question (which, of course, is not the case, as the questions of Buddhist logicians show). Although Bhartṛhari can accommodate these views (three in all: buddhyavasthānībandhana or vivakṣāṇībandhana, existence; satkārya; and jātisākṣipti) as well as the upacārasattā (secondary, derivative existence) view expressed in 3.3.45, his first preference is the sabdārtha *'rtha view, expressed in 3.7.109 110. Meaning (sabdārtha) and reference (vastuvartha or bāhyārtha) are to be distinguished. In understanding usage, attention to what is reflected in language is sufficient. Whether the entity spoken of actually exists (a worthwhile concern if the purpose of inquiry is something else) need not be considered to account for usage, such as “As sprout comes into being.” For words carrying out denotation in
sentences like this, all existent entities are no different from nonexistent entities. To put the point differently, it is improper to see contradictions in a sentence by asking questions like: "Did the sprout exist before coming into being? If it did, how can it newly come into being? If it did not, how can it perform the action of coming into being?" The use of the word "sprout" is in no way predicated on there being an actual sprout or a referent. The sentence with "sprout" as the subject can proceed as long as there is meaning or sense (śabdartha) for "sprout."

25. In the original, verses 109-110, the observation about language (specifically, denotation) is said to hold good also in the case of prejñā or buddhi, "intellect" (specifically, a cognition reflecting an entity). Just as denotation implies acceptance of (some kind of) existence, cognition implies conceding (some kind of) existence. I have left out this mention of intellect and cognition here in order not to obscure the present discussion and also because language and intellect turn out to be ultimately identical in Bhartṛhari's philosophy.

26. (a) Actions such as putting the pot on the stove, pouring water into the pot, adding rice to the water, lighting the stove, and more, are subsumed under the one action denoted by "cooks." See summary of the eighth chapter (Kriyāsamuddeśa). (b) Helarāja points out that this way of accounting for "A sprout comes into being" differs from the first way (a), in that here the identity of cause and effect is based on a feature of usage called upacára ("extended application" of a verbal root like "cook" to cover subsidiary actions leading to cooking), while in (a) the identity of cause and effect is held to be factual (vastava).

27. The examples indicated by Bhartṛhari are: "yavāgūmūtrāya sampadyate," "suvarṇāpindāh kundale bhavataḥ," "brāhmaṇāḥ saṃgho bhavati," "brāhmaṇāḥ saṃghibhavanti," "tvad-bhavasi," and "rājan arāja samāpadyase/bhavasi." To them Helarāja adds: "kṣīraṃ tadhi sampadyate," "bijād añkuro jāyate," "yavāgāvāmūtrān jāyate," "mahādbhūtāśa candramāḥ," and "mahādbhūta brahmāṇi." The discussion of these examples is determined to some extent by the peculiarities of the Sanskrit language. For this reason, as well as to indicate the relationship of the point here with the preceding, I have preferred simpler examples.

28. At the beginning of this section, a verse giving the definition of apādāna is expected, as in the case of sections on other kārakas in this Samuḍdeśa. But the first statement we see at present in it deals with the varieties of apādāna. It seems, therefore, that at least one verse has been lost in the known manuscripts. The form of the lost verse is likely to have been "apañye yad udāsinām ca laṃ vā yadi vā ca laṃ / dhruvam evatadāvesat tad apādānam ucyate," that is, essentially the same as the verse quoted by Bhōja (Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, chapter 4), Haradatta (Padminījārt 1.4.24), Bhāṭṭoji Dīkṣita (Śabdakaustubha 1.4.24), and others.

29. As the last example indicates, the action of moving away associated with the concept of apādāna is not necessarily the actual or physical action of moving away. In conformity with the Vaiṣyākaraṇas Sāda (conceptual or semantic, as distinct from artha, actual, physical) concept of action (see summary of the Kriyāsamuddeśa, book 3, section 8 instances in which the movement is only imagined or intellectually entertained are also relevant here.

30. Cf. Joshi (G1194) pp. 29, 39-40, etc.
31. Swaminathan (G780), pp. 3-4.
33. Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 171.
34. Swaminathan (G780), p. 28; also Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 74.
35. "Sākṣāt pratipatter anumānāpratipattir gariyasi."
9. Mandana Misra

1. In this logical argument, it seems clear that Kumārila’s attempt to identify sabda with the uttered phonemes is effectively discredited by the reasoning of Mandana, who at the same time has vindicated the identification of sabda with spha. Although the logical groundwork has largely been completed, Mandana still has to describe in detail exactly how sabda as spha may be comprehended using only ordinary memory traces of the phonemes to reveal the spha. He must also show the spha to be not a mere postulation but a perceivable reality, otherwise much of his logical argument simply collapses. These tasks he undertakes in karikas 18–19 of the Sphotasiddhi.

10. Helarāja

3. Aklujkar (G750), pp. 165–188.
4. Ibid.

12. Punyarāja


13. Kaiyāta

2. “Yathottaram muninām prāmānyam” sūtra 1.1.29.
4. Kaiyāta’s views on different problems connected with language are found scattered in different parts of the commentary. Many of them have been noted and discussed in Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa’s Bhāṣāna (sāra).

21. Seṣa Cintāmanī


28. Annambhatta

1. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Sanskṛta vyākaraṇa-sāstra kā itihāsa (Sonipat, 1973), vol. 1, p. 422.
2. P.P.S. Sastri’s introduction to G587.

32. Siśarāmendra Sarasvatī

1. Theodor Aufrecht, Catalogus Catalogorum: An Alphabetical Register of Sanskrit Works and Authors, 3 pts. (Wiesbaden, 1962), pt. 1, pp. 718, 440,
33. (Seśa) Čakrapāṇi (Datta)


35. Nilakaṇṭha Śukla


37. Koṇḍa (or Kaṇḍa) Bhatta

1. See volume 1 of this encyclopedia, Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, 2d ed., p. 387.
3. Volume 1 of this encyclopedia, Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, 2d ed., p. 422.
4. The summary of this section was prepared through consultation of the dissertation of Gune (G1197).
5. The summary of this section is based on the unpublished dissertation of Deshpande (G1196).

40. Tirumala Yajvan

1. See Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Saṃskṛta vyākaraṇa-tāstra kā itihāsa (Sonipat, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 413ff.

42. Sadāśiva


45. Nāgṛjā (or Nāgoji Bhatta)

1. For a relative chronology of his works see Gode, (RB6813); also P.V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra Volume One (Poona 1930), 453–456.

57. Āśādhara Bhatta

1. Shah, RB4735.

66. Satārā Raṅgavendrācārya GajendraGadakar

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- a = article
- b = book
- d = dissertation
- e = edition
- t = translation

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