ELE, CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY
ROME AND THE MEDITERRANEAN TO ples De.
THE CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY
SECOND EDITION
VOLUME VIII
Rome and the Mediterranean tO 133 B.C.
Edited by
A. E. ASTIN
Professor of Ancient History, The Queen's University, Belfast
F. W. WALBANK F.B.A.
Emeritus Professor, formerly Professor of Ancient History and Classical Archaeology, University of Liverpool
M. W. FREDERIKSEN R. M. OGILVIE
& CAMBRIDGE
» UNIVERSITY PRESS
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http://www.cambridge.org © Cambridge University Press 1989
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1930 Second edition 1989 Seventh printing 2006
Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge Library of Congress Card no. 75-85719 British Library Cataloguing in Publication data The Cambridge Ancient History - 2nd ed. Vol. 8, Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.c.
1. History, Ancient I. Astin, A.E. 930 D57
ISBN O §21 23448 4
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CONTENTS
List of maps
List of text-figures Preface
I
Sources by A. E. Astin, Professor of Ancient History, The Queen's University of Belfast 1 Introduction ut Historians ut Non-historical literature tv Non-literary evidence
The Carthaginians in Spain by H. H. SCULLARD, formerly Emeritus Professor of Ancient History, King’s College, London
1 Punic Spain before the Barcids 11 Hamilcar and Hasdrubal ut Hannibal and Saguntum
The Second Punic War by JOHN Briscok, Senior Lecturer in Greek and Latin, University of Manchester
1 The causes of the conflict
11 The war in Italy
ur Spain
Iv Sicily and Sardinia
v The final campaign in Africa vi The war at sea
vit The war and politics at Rome vit Manpower and finance
1x Subjects and allies
x Conclusion
Additional note: The elections for 216 B.c.
Vv
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CONTENTS
Rome and Greece to 205 B.c.
by R. M. ERRINGTON, Professor of Ancient History, Philipps- Universitat, Marburg
1 The earliest contacts 11 The Illyrian wars ut The First Macedonian War
Roman expansion in the west by W. V. Harris, Professor of History, Columbia University
1 Introduction
11 The subjugation of Cisalpine Gaul rt Spain 1v Rome and Carthage
Roman government and politics, 200-134 B.C. by A. E. ASTIN
1 The constitutional setting
ur The nature of Roman politics
ur Oligarchic stability (a) The politics of competition (b) Mores (c) Economy and society
1v Forces for change
v Conclusion
Rome and Italy in the second century B.c. by E. GasBa, Professor of Ancient History, University of Pavia 1 The extension of the ager publicus 11 The role of the Italian allies ut Migration and urbanization 1v Military obligations and economic interests v Roman intervention vi The transformation of agriculture vit Social consequences and attempted solutions
Rome against Philip and Antiochus by R. M. ERRINGTON 1 The east after the Peace of Phoenice 11 The Second Macedonian War 1 Antiochus the Great
Rome, the fall of Macedon and the sack of Corinth by P. S. DEROow, Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford
1 Rome, Philip and the Greeks after Apamea 11 Perseus 1 The end of Greek freedom
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107 107 118 142
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163 167 174 174 181 185 188 196
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197 207 212 221 225 232 239
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244 261
274
290
290 303 319
CONTENTS
10 The Seleucids and their rivals
by C. Hasicut, Professor in the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
1 Asia Minor, 188-158 B.c.
(a) The Attalid monarchy at its peak (b) Rome’s rebuff to Eumenes (c) Rhodes, 189-164 B.c.
m1 The Seleucid monarchy, 187-162 B.c. (a) Seleucus IV (b) The early years of Antiochus IV (c) The war with Egypt (d) Antiochus and the Jews (e) Antiochus in the east (f) Antiochus V
ur The decline of the Seleucids, 162~129 B.c. (a) Demetrius I (b) Kings and usurpers (c) The catastrophe of hellenism
iv Asia Minor, 158-129 B.C. (a) The last Attalids and the origin of Roman Asia (b) Rhodes after 164 B.c.
v Epilogue: Roman policy in the east, 189-129 B.C.
11 The Greeks of Bactria and India by A. K. Narain, Professor of History and South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin 1 Introduction i The early rulers m1 Menander tv Successors of Menander v Conclusion d Appendix I The Graeco-Bactrian and the Indo-Greek kings in chronological and genealogical group arrangements Appendix HI Territorial jurisdictions of the Graeco-Bactrian and Indo-Greek kings
12. Roman tradition and the Greek world by EvizaBETH Rawson, Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford
1 The Roman tradition u The Hannibalic War ur Contacts with the Greek world in the early second century tv Reaction and acceptance v From the battle of Pydna to the fall of Corinth vt Conclusion
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324 324 332 334 338 338 341 343 3.46 350 353 356 356 362 369 373 373 380 382
388
388 394 406 412 415 420
420
422
422 426 434 448 463 475
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CONTENTS
13. The transformation of Italy, 300-133 B.c. The evidence of archaeology
by JEAN~PauLt MoreEL, Professor at the Université de Provence (Alix en Provence), and Director of the Centre Camille Jullian
1 Before the Second Punic War (a) The first quarter of the third century i. Introduction ii. Production and trade iti. Art and architecture (b) From the surrender of Tarentum to the beginning of the Second Punic War, 272-218 B.C. i. Production and trade ii. Architecture and town planning iii. Art ir From the Second Punic War to the Gracchi, 218-133 B.C. (a) A new context (b) Production i. Agricultural production ii. Craft production (c) Architecture and art i. General observations ii. Architecture iii. Plastic arts
rr Conclusion
Three Hellenistic dynasties
Genealogical tables
Chronological table
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbreviations
A B
Cc
General studies and works of reference
Sources
eaooe
Commentaries and other works concerning ancient authors Epigraphy
Numismatics
Excavation reports and archaeological studies
Other.
Rome and Carthage
D Rome, Greece and Macedonia
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479 479 479
479 481
483 484 487 491 493 493 495 495 498 502 502 503 511 515
517 518 523
$43 548
549 549 551 552 555 557
558 560
CONTENTS
E The Seleucids and their neighbours
a. Seleucids and the Seleucid kingdom
b. Antiochus the Great and the war with Rome c. The Attalid kingdom (including Aristonicus) d. Rhodes
e. Palestine and the Maccabees
f. Other
F The Greeks of Bactria and India The Romans in Spain
H_ Rome and Italy
Constitutional studies and the nature of Roman politics Political and public life
Biographical studies
Social life and institutions
Rome and the Italians
Cisalpine Gaul
Roman literature and culture: Greek influences
Roman and Italian culture: archaeological evidence Other
amo moadgeP,
I. Miscellaneous
Index
NOTE ON THE BIBLIOGRAPHY
ix
562 562 564 564 565 565 567
569 577
578 578 579 581 581 583 584 585 587 589
590
593
The bibliography is arranged in sections dealing with specific topics, which sometimes correspond to individual chapters but more often combine the contents of several chapters. References in the footnotes are to these sections (which are distinguished by capital letters) and within these sections each book or article has assigned to it a number which is quoted in the footnotes. In these, so as to provide a quick indication of the nature of the work referred to, the author’s name and the date of publication are also included in each reference. Thus ‘Gruen 1984, 1.40: (A 20)’ signifies ‘E. S. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (Berkeley, 1984), vol. 1, p.4o, to be found in Section a of the
bibliography as item 20’.
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Oo on Am RY KR
Hoe ew He He OH Om Aan Bw KN + OO
on As hw DN
CONTENTS
MAPS
Carthaginian Spain Italy and Sicily in the Second Punic War
Campania
Spain in the Second Punic War
North Africa
The Adriatic
Northern Italy
Spain in the second century B.c.
North Africa at the time of the Third Punic War
Carthage
Greece and Asia Minor
Macedonia and Greece
Asia Minor and Syria
The Greek lands of central and southern Asia Bactria and North-western India
Italy and Sicily
TEXT FIGURES
The inscription on the sarcophagus of L. Cornelius Scipio
Barbatus
Potters’ marks from Cales, third century B.c.
Potters’ marks on relief-ware from Cales
Profiles of ‘Greco-Italic’ amphoras Plan of the forum of Paestum Plan of the sanctuary at Pietrabbondante
Profiles of Dressel I amphoras
Typical profiles of thin-walled pottery of the Republican period
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82 108 120 144 158. 246 292 326 39° 392 478
page 483
486 487 488 489 490 497
5co
PREFACE
The span of time embraced by this volume is short. Some who could recall personal memories of its beginnings — perhaps the news of Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps, or of the disaster at Cannae — witnessed events not far from its close; such people witnessed also an astonishingly rapid and dramatic sequence of developments which gave Rome the visible and effective political mastery of the Mediterranean lands. The beginnings of this change lie far back in the history of the Romans and of other peoples, in events and institutions which are examined in other volumes in this series (especially in Volume vit.z); but the critical period of transition, profoundly affecting vast territories and numerous peo- ples, lasted little more than half a century. In one sense a single episode, it nonetheless comprised a multiplicity of episodes which varied greatly in scale and character and in the diversity of those who, whether by conflict, by alliance, or by the passive acceptance of new circumstances, passed under Roman domination. Furthermore, the Romans themselves experi- enced change, and not merely in the degree of power and surpemacy which they enjoyed. That power, along with the material fruits and practical demands of empire, brought consequences of great moment to their own internal political affairs, to relationships within their society and between them and their Italian neighbours, to their cultural life and to the physical expressions of that life.
It is this elaborate complex of fast-moving change which is examined, aspect by aspect, in the chapters of this volume. A survey of the sources of our information is followed by discussions of the Second Punic War and of the first involvements of the Roman state with people across the Adriatic Sea. There follows a chapter which examines Roman expansion in the West in the subsequent decades, looking successively at Cisalpine Gaul, Spain and Carthage, and concluding with the final destruction of that city in the Third Punic War. After two chapters devoted to the government and politics of Rome itself and to the interaction between Rome and her Italian neighbours, two more consider the contemporary expansion of Roman power in the East. The first of these deals with the great wars against Philip V of Macedon and the Seleucid king Antiochus
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III, the second with the overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom and the failure of the final efforts of some of the Greeks to assert a degree of independence, bringing with it the destruction of Corinth in the same year as Carthage. Yet, at least to the east of the Aegean Sea, Roman intervention, albeit on a growing scale, was still only one aspect of the vigorous and often volatile affairs of the diverse peoples of the eastern Mediterranean. The Seleucids and their rivals are discussed at length, in great measure from their own point of view rather than as a mere adjunct to Roman history, though the constantly expanding role of Rome looms ever larger. The Greeks of Bactria and India (upon whom the shadow of Rome never fell) were indeed rivals of the Seleucids but are discussed in a separate chapter which adopts the rather different approach required both by their unique history and by the exiguous and uneven source material. The volume concludes with two chapters which explore the interaction between Roman and Italian tradition on the one hand and the Greek world on the other. The first of these concerns itself mainly with intellectual and literary developments, the second with the material evidence for such interaction at many levels ranging from the basics of economic production to architecture and major works of art.
A few topics have been deliberately omitted from this volume with the aim of avoiding fragmentation and concentrating discussion in other volumes where these topics must occur in any event. Ptolemaic Egypt is examined at length in Volume vit.1 and later events in its history have been assigned to Volume rx, as has consideration of the Bosporan kingdom. Events in Italy between the First and Second Punic Wars are dealt with in Volume vit.2 in a context where they belong naturally, and are not rehearsed again in this volume. Some matters discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 of the present volume necessarily look forward to the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.c., but the full consideration of that episode, including a review of developments leading up to it, is reserved for Volume 1x. Similarly, while Chapter 12 discusses aspects of religion and of literature, the reader who seeks more extended treatment is referred for the former to the appropriate chapters of Volumes vi1.2z and rx and for the latter to The Cambridge History of Classical Literature. On the other hand the same policy has resulted in two chapters in the pres- ent volume having much wider chronological limits than the remainder. These are the chapters devoted respectively to the Greeks of Bactria and India and to the archaeological evidence for the transformation of Italy. In both cases the aim is to preserve the coherence of material which would lose much of its value, not to say its intelligibility, if it were divided.
Two more points of editorial policy require mention. First no obliga- tion was placed upon contributors to conform to an overall interpret- ation or methodological approach, even in broad terms, though each was
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PREFACE xiil
asked to signal in text or notes major departures from views which are widely accepted. Second, although each contributor was given the same guidance about footnotes it was felt that differences not only of style but of subject matter, of evidence and of the state of scholarship made it impracticable to insist upon very close conformity toa single model. The resulting variations may not be ideal in aesthetic terms but to a consider- able degree they do reflect the requirements of different contributors and the varying character of their subject-matter.
During the preparation of this volume, which has been in train for some time, two events were the cause of especial sadness. Martin Frederiksen, who died in consequence of a road accident in 1980, was the member of the original editorial team who had accepted special responsibility for this volume. Its overall concept and plan and the particular briefs given to most of the contributors owed much to his insight, his care and his enthusiasm. It is a source of much regret that he did not live to nurture and bring to maturity a project which owes so much to his scholarship and wisdom. Less than two years later the grievous blow of Martin Frederiksen’s death was compounded by a second tragedy, in the sudden and equally untimely death of Robert Ogilvie. He too was one of the original editorial team and contributed substantially to the initial planning. Thereafter, though he had been less directly involved with this particular volume, it benefited from his general guidance and his perceptive comments on several contributions. Yet another loss which we record with deep regret is that of one of the contributors, Professor H. H. Scullard.
The editors wish to place on record their thanks to several persons, not least to contributors for their patience in the face of the delays attendant upon the completion of a composite work of this nature. Some contribu- tions were received as early as 1980, and the majority by 1984, when there was an opportunity for revision. A. K. Narain consented at a late stage to contribute Chapter 11, agreeing at uncomfortably short notice to add this to an already considerable burden of commitments. Chapter 7 was translated from the Italian by J. E. Powell; thanks are due also to Professor M. H. Crawford, from whose expertise this chapter has benefited greatly. Chapter 13 was translated from the French by Mrs Elizabeth Edwards. Chapter 10 was written in English but Professor C. Habicht acknowledges the assistance of Dr A. S. Bradford. The maps in this volume have been drawn by David Cox of Cox Cartographic Ltd. The index was compiled by Mrs Barbara Hird. Special thanks are due to our sub-editor, Ann Johnston, for her great care and vigilance, and to the staff of the Press for their patience and their unfailing support and encouragement throughout.
A.E.A. F.W.W.
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CHAPTER 1
SOURCES
A. E. ASTIN
I. INTRODUCTION
The period covered by this volume saw a vast expansion of Roman power, an expansion which extended Roman military and political domination over virtually the entire Mediterranean world, from west to east, from Spanish tribes to Hellenistic kingdoms. At the beginning of the period the cities, leagues and kingdoms of the Hellenistic world which lay to the east of the Adriatic lived a largely separate existence, as yet barely touched by Rome; by the end, although (except in Macedonia) the imposition of Roman administration still lay in the future, effective Roman political control was an established fact. This outcome had a profound influence upon the nature of the literary sources which yield both the framework and much of the detail of our knowledge; for the greater part of them have Romeat the centre of their interest and show us the rest of the Mediterranean peoples, both of the west and of the east, primarily in relationship to Rome. Thus although in the western lands there is much archaeological evidence, revealing military constructions, habitations, and a multitude of artifacts, the historical context to which this has to be related is almost entirely Roman. In the east, though the nature of the material is somewhat more complicated, it is still difficult to build up independently of Roman affairs a picture which has much coherence and detail, even for the early part of the period. Admittedly some help can be obtained here from the considerable body of numis- matic and of epigraphic evidence. The evidence of coins is particularly useful in resolving a number of chronological problems, especially in connection with some of the dynasts and usurpers whose reigns were short, while for certain of the more remote Hellenistic kingdoms it is fundamental; and the survival of numerous inscriptions, especially in- scriptions erected by Hellenistic cities, casts many shafts of light — usually narrow but often intense — upon matters of chronology, political alle- giance, administration and royal policies.! Nevertheless both coins and inscriptions acquire much of their value as evidence when they are
1 Section rv below.
I
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related to contexts which must be derived largely from literary sources; and for the Hellenistic world, particularly in affairs unrelated to Rome, these are sparse and often fragmented, and frequently permit the recon- struction of only a sketchy outline of events.
Aside from the accidents of loss, which, though erratic, grievously afflict the records of every period of Ancient History, there are two particular reasons for this state of affairs in relation to this period. Firstly, although the Hellenistic world was a world well acquainted with litera- ture and literary composition, and although in the third century it had had a number of distinguished historians of its own, there followed a long period, including the years covered by this volume, during which it produced little major historical writing apart from the work of Polybius, whose central interest was the growth of Roman power and who in several respects was clearly a special case. Admittedly a very large number of local histories and some other monographs on special topics were written in the Hellenistic age? and it is plausible to assume that some of them were written in the period now under discussion (all are lost and many cannot be dated); but by their nature these had very limited subject- matter and many probably had only a modest circulation. So apart from these local histories there did not exist for the use of later historians or for transmission to us a substantial body of contemporary historical writing concerned primarily with the Hellenistic world. Secondly, for writers of later generations, living ina Roman empire, it was entirely natural that in the main their concern with this period should revolve around the affairs of Rome.
A partial exception to this widespread practice of treating Hellenistic history simply as an aspect of Roman history is to be found in the work of Pompetus Trogus. Trogus, who in the time of Augustus wrote in Latina ‘universal history’ which he entitled ‘Historiae Philippicae’, dealt with the Hellenistic period in no less than twenty-eight of his forty-four books. The work is lost but is known in outline from surviving tables of contents (pro/ogs) of the individual books and from an epitome made by a certain Justin, probably in the third century a.p. Trogus himself, inevi- tably and properly, devoted several books to Rome’s wars in the east, but even when dealing with the second century B.c. he managed to devote a good deal of space to affairs of the Hellenistic powers in which Rome was not involved. Fora number of events these summaries of Trogus are the only evidence; more importantly their sketchy narrative plays a key part in establishing the overall framework of events.
2 It is reasonable to bracket with these the concluding sections of the history of Phylarchus and the memoirs of Aratus, both of which were concerned with European Greece down to 2208.C. Both were drawn upon by Polybius for his introductory material in books t and 11, which covered events to that year.
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HISTORIANS 3
There is another notable exception to the general pattern of evidence for the period. The uprising of the Jews under the Hasmonaeans against Seleucid domination is an episode of Hellenistic history which is almost entirely outside the orbit of Roman history but which is recorded at some length and in considerable detail. It is the subject of the first two books of Maccabees and is also dealt with in the writings of Josephus. Yet even the First Book of Maccabees, which was probably written by a Palestinian Jew ¢. 100 B.C. and is much the more valuable of the two, covers only the years 175-135, while the later, more derivative Second Book of Maccabees con- fines itself to 176-161. Thus although these works provide coherent and fairly detailed accounts (and also throw some incidental light on other aspects of Seleucid history), their subject-matter is limited in time as well as in place, and is a reflection of the importance of the uprising in the Jewish tradition rather than a more general Hellenistic historical record. Much the same may be said of Josephus’ accounts of the episode in the introduction to his Jewish War and, at greater length, in his Antiquities, both written in the Flavian period and both dependent in considerable measure upon I Maccabees.
The fact remains, despite these special cases, that the greater part of the evidence for the Hellenistic world in this period is derived from authors who deal also with Roman history and for whom, even in the context of ‘universal history’, Rome is the true focus of their interest. That is neither surprising nor wholly misleading, for as the period proceeds this point of view approximates more closely to the actual situation which was developing. The history of the Hellenistic world was becoming steadily less distinct and independent, Rome impinged more and more upon it, and the interaction between the two became one of the major political and historical realities of the time, to be superseded by the reality of unchallengeable Roman domination of the whole. All this was to find early expression in both the person and the writings of Polybius, who played a major role in the collection and transmission of much of the information that has reached us.
II. HISTORIANS
Polybius of Megalopolis,3 born c. 200, was one of the thousand leading men of Achaea who were deported to Italy after the battle of Pydna in 168; he was released only in 150—asalso were the others who survived so long. Polybius himself, however, had become well acquainted with P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus and Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, both of whom were sons of the victorious Roman general at Pydna, L.
3 Polybius, like all the authors named in this chapter, is the subject of a special article in PW. See also Walbank 1972: (B 39), and, for detailed commentary, Walbank 1957-79: (B 38).
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Aemilius Paullus. When the other detainees were assigned to various Italian towns these influential young men arranged that Polybius should remain in Rome itself, and before long his relationship with Scipio in particular developed into a close and enduring friendship (Polyb. XXXI.23.1-25.1). Thus he found himself living in the city, at the heart of the state which within his own lifetime — and he was still only in his thirties — had spectacularly changed the power-structure of the world from which he came; and he was in close touch with men who were likely to be well informed about affairs there and elsewhere. He was stimulated to ask himself how in the short space of time from 220 to 167 Rome had come to dominate the whole Mediterranean world, and he determined to answer this question by writing a history. Although the greater part of that history is now lost, it is, directly and indirectly, a major source of our knowledge and understanding of the period, while for Rome’s relations with the Hellenistic states it is the principal source.
The first two books of the history outlined events from 264 to 220 as an introductory background. Sketchy though these are by comparison with the main body of the work, they are invaluable to the modern scholar because of the loss of so much other work dealing with events prior to 220. Polybius’ original plan was to write thirty books in all, but some time after he had started he decided to add a further ten books and to take his account down to 146 (Polyb. 111.4). The reason given for this change of plan is that he wished to show how the victors used the power they had won, but the surviving passages from the later books do not seem to reflect this intention particularly well and it has often been viewed witha degree of scepticism. There must be a suspicion that he was motivated in part by a desire to include events with which he himself had been closely associated, for in 151 he accompanied Scipio Aemilianus on a campaign in Spain, and shortly after his formal release from detention he was summoned to assist the Romans during the siege of Carthage. Moreover after the disastrous folly of the Achaean war against Rome in 146, which led to the destruction of Corinth, Polybius played a role of great prominence, first as a mediator between the Achaeans and the Romans and then in regulating relationships among the Achaean cities following the withdrawal of Roman troops. Whatever his true motives for the extension, however, the whole history undoubtedly constituted a monumental work which must have taken many years to compile and compose. Indeed the final books were probably published only after his death, the date of which is not known but which may have been as late as 118.
Polybius brought to his history two key concepts, both of which contribute substantially to the value of his work as a source for the period and both of which were facilitated by the circumstances in which he
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HISTORIANS 5
found himself. The first is that though history may be entertaining it is above all a practical, utilitarian matter, intended for the instruction and enlightenment of statesmen and men of office. There is thus a bias (not quite totally sustained) against dramatization and towards solid reliabil- ity, with information gleaned as directly and as accurately as possible from actual participants in events. The second is that Polybius’ principal theme — the unifying of his world through the imposition of Roman power — required ‘universal’ history, in other words the recording of events at every stage in all the areas which were to have this unity of domination imposed upon them. It is no surprise that fulfilment of this ambitious objective was uneven or that it was applied most extensively to Greece and the major Hellenistic kingdoms. Nevertheless it did mean that Polybius was seeking out and recording a broad range of informa- tion much of which would otherwise not have been passed down. Moreover for both these aspects of his task — indeed for the task as a whole-—he was peculiarly well situated. His detention placed him close to the centre of world power; he was in’ touch with men who were exceptionally well informed about current events and who often were leading participants in them, and after his release he maintained these contacts; in some events he himself had participated ina significant way; he had opportunity to talk with many who had played leading roles earlier in his period; he had access to at least some memoirs, treaties, and other documents, in addition to the earliest histories written by Romans — Q. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincius Alimentus (both of whom wrote in Greek) — and monographs devoted to the Punic wars; and he could meet and talk with many of the envoys, including many Greeks, who now streamed to Rome as the ultimate source of authority and assistance.
Polybius thus had both incentive and opportunity to be well informed and reliable over a broad range of material; and in general his reputation in these respects stands high so far as factual matters are concerned, though inevitably a few particulars are questionable or demonstrably incorrect. The reliability of his judgements and assessments, however, has been the subject of greater debate. First, there is unmistakable evidence of partisanship, apparent for example in the obviously favourable view taken of the Achaeans and the equally obvious dislike of the Aetolians. One instance of a glaring distortion induced by partisan- ship is the absurd assertion that fear and cowardice were the motives which in 152 induced M. Claudius Marcellus to recommend acceptance ofa peace settlement with the Celtiberians. Marcellus, thrice a consul and twice a ¢riumphator, was one of the ablest generals of the day; but among the many who disapproved of his conciliatory policy towards the Celtiberians was Polybius’ friend and patron Scipio Aemilianus (Polyb. XXXV.3.4, XXXV.4.3 and 8). Once it is recognized, however, that at least in
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6 SOURCES
matters very close to him Polybius’ judgement may be affected by vigorous partisanship it is not difficult to exercise the necessary caution. More controversial has been Polybius’ pervading view that the expan- sion of Roman power was the product of a conscious desire on the part of the Romans to extend their domination over other peoples, and that on certain occasions decisions were taken specifically towards that end. By and large, however, what isin dispute is not whether Polybius held that view but whether it is a correct interpretation and accords with factual information which he himself provides; it is a question about the nature of Roman imperialism rather than about the value of Polybius’ work as source-material, and as such it is discussed elsewhere in this volume.
In another sense, however, this is but one facet of another question: whether this Greek ever really understood the character, the motivation, the ethos of the Romans. Inhis sixth book, a substantial portion of which survives, he described and evaluated Roman institutions, including in this his famous analysis of the Roman constitution as a ‘mixed’ constitu- tion. Many features of this analysis have prompted discussion and argument, but however they may be interpreted it remains evident that the realities of Roman political and constitutional behaviour differed significantly from the models set out by Polybius in this account. Partly because Polybius directs attention to formal powers and institutions rather than to actual behaviour, the highly effective oligarchic manipu- lation of both executive office and ‘popular’ organs is lost to sight behind an appealing picture of a neatly balanced combination of monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements, each contributing their own strengths and checking undesirable tendencies in the others. It is a picture which conveys little of the actualities of Roman aristocratic government. Yet it would be unwise to infer too readily from this constitutional section that Polybius did not understand the nature of Roman politics and government, or that his assessments elsewhere of Romans and Roman motives are to be suspected of having been distorted by Greek preconceptions. He would not be the last writer by a long way to have created a theoretical model in which his own enthusiasm and abstractions were allowed to override realities which in day-to-day life he understood perfectly well. It would be surprising if Polybius were never mistaken, if he always understood Romans correctly; but for very many years he lived not just in Rome but in close touch with aristocratic and political circles. It seems reasonable to treat his judgements with con- siderable respect.
Only a relatively small part of Polybius’ great history has survived. Apart from fragments of lost books, we have much of book vi, with Polybius’ discussion of Roman political and military institutions, and the whole of books r-v. The introductory nature and the special value of the
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first two books has been mentioned already; books 111-v deal with events from 220 to 216, including a great deal of Greek and Hellenistic material which otherwise would be unknown to us. The breaking-off of this continuous narrative in 216 (approximately with the battle of Cannae) results in a sharp change in the precision and detail of our knowledge thereafter, especially in respect of the Hellenistic world. (The record of Roman affairs is much less seriously affected until Livy’s narrative also breaks off with 167.) Nevertheless a significant amount of Polybius’ material from book vu onwards has survived. This material takes the form either of fragments — extracts and quotations — directly ascribed to Polybius or of passages, some of them of considerable length, in authors who are known to have drawn heavily upon Polybius for certain sections of their own writings, though these two types of Polybian material are not always sharply distinct from one another. The majority of the fragments are derived from sets of extracts from Polybius (and from other historians) made in the Byzantine period, in several cases in order to illustrate a particular theme, such as ‘Virtues and Vices’, ‘Plots against Kings’, and ‘Embassies’. Such extracts are by their nature isolated and many of them are deficient in indications of context and chronology; on the other hand within each set they are normally in the order in which they occurred in the original text, and the main substance of each extract tends to preserve the wording of the original more exactly than ancient custom regarding quotation would normally require.4 These sets are therefore a major source for the recovery of material lost from Polybius — and indeed from many other historians who wrote in Greek.
Other fragments are really quotations from Polybius which survive in the works of subsequent writers. Such quotations tend to be less exact than the Byzantine extracts, but they are often related to a definite context and they are fairly numerous, for later writers drew heavily on Polybius’ material, especially those who were writing in Greek or were concerned with Hellenistic affairs. Among the Greek writers were Diodorus of Sicily, who in the first century B.c. wrote a World History, and Dio Cassius, a Roman senator from Bithynia who in the Severan age wrote a vast history of Rome down to his own day. It happens that for the period covered by this volume the text of both these works is lost, so we are dependent upon quotations and Byzantine extracts, mostly very similar to those which we have for Polybius himself. Not surprisingly there is a considerable duplication of material which is found also in fragments of Polybius or in Livy, or in both; but there is some informa-
4 These points can be demonstrated by an examination of extracts taken from books which are still extant, both of Polybius and of other authors. For the corpus of surviving extracts: Boissevain and others, 1903-10: (B 1).
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tion which has not survived elsewhere, especially for the years after 167, when Livy’s text breaks off.
Another Greek writer who preserves quotations from Polybius is Plutarch, who in the late first century a.p. wrote his ‘Parallel Lives’ of Greeks and Romans. Six of the ‘Lives’, five Roman and one Greek, are relevant to this volume.> Plutarch’s principal interest is in the moral characteristics and the personality of each of his famous men. Deeds and sayings are narrated to exemplify these qualities, but he is less concerned with achievements as such, and scarcely at all with policies, political analysis or specific military activity. This is reflected in his choice of material, in the manner in which it is presented, and in the relative importance he assigns to various items. To the frustration of the modern enquirer — especially the political historian — he provides a good deal of minor personal information and anecdote, while other matters are treated with a disappointing vagueness and lack of detail. He usually follows broadly the main sequence of his subject’s career but otherwise has no interest in time and date; consequently he provides few chronological indicators and scarcely any which are at all precise. Yet Plutarch is not to be despised. He records a great deal of information, by no means all of which is mere duplication of what can be found elsewhere; and his wide reading enabled him to draw upon many sources. At the same time, in the six ‘Lives’ presently in question a substantial proportion of his material, including most of that which concerns affairs east of the Adriatic, undoubtedly goes back directly or indirectly to Polybius.
Ancient authors, not sharing the modern horror of plagiarism, by no means always named predecessors upon whom they were drawing, whether for specific statements or for substantial bodies of material. Diodorus, Dio and Plutarch, and others, al! have considerable amounts of material which they or intermediaries have taken from Polybius without ascription to him. In some cases this can be established because such a passage has been taken from a section of Polybius which happens to survive, and in this way itis possible to form some idea of the extent of a writer’s debt to Polybius and of the manner in which he used Polybian material. By far the most important surviving work which is indebted to Polybius in this way is Livy’s history of Rome, surviving books of which include those dealing with the years 219-167. Comparison with passages of Polybius leaves no doubt that the latter was Livy’s main source for eastern affairs, that for a very large amount of material concerning Rome’s relationships and activities east of the Adriatic he drew directly, extensively, and principally upon Polybius. Moreover, although Livy’s
5 Fabius Maxintus, Marcellus, Cato the Elder, Flamininus, Aemilins Paullus, Philopoemen.
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version is not an exact translation of the Greek into Latin, he normally remains close to the content and general structure of his original, despite the touches of vividness and vigour imparted by his own artistry. Thus very substantial amounts of material in Livy dealing with eastern affairs, though not acknowledged to be Polybian, do preserve fairly accurately Polybius’ version of events; and, while inevitably there are sections of which the ascription is disputed, the Polybian origin of a great deal of this material can be assumed with considerable confidence. Thus much of Livy’s information on these matters goes back to an unusually well- informed writer of the second century B.c. who was a contemporary or near-contemporary of many of the events he describes; and the value of Polybius as a source extends well beyond the actual books and fragments which have survived.¢
Livy’s massive history of Rome from its origins to his own day was almost literally a lifetime’s work.’ So far as is known Livy did not engage in public affairs but devoted himself entirely to literary matters, above all to the writing of his history which is known to have occupied him for virtually the whole of the reign of Augustus. Arranged ona year-by-year, annalistic scheme, it grew in scale as it progressed and ultimately comprised no less than one hundred and forty-two books, of which thirty-five survive. These extant books are I—x, which take the history of 292 B.c., and xxI-xLv, which deal with 219-167 and therefore with a major part of the period covered by this volume. Indeed, since they deal with the Second Punic War and with Rome’s major wars against the Hellenistic powers — the very period which Polybius initially took as his subject — they are of exceptional importance, the more so since they are the principal vehicle for much of Polybius’ own account. From the lost books (of which xx and xLvi-Lvti are relevant to this volume) there are only a small number of fragments, but there are epitomes. One of these epitomes, generally known as ‘the Periochae’, is a very brief summary of the main items (as they seemed to the compiler) in each book; the result is longer but not a great deal longer than a table of contents might be expected to be, and precise chronological indications are usually lacking. Nevertheless these summaries exist for all 142 books except Cxxxvi and CxXXvil. Portions of a different epitome, similar in type but somewhat briefer, were found in a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus. Though much damaged, this included summaries of books xxxvu—xt (which are extant) and of books xiviti—Lv. In addition several other short historical works are derived from Livy to such an extent that they are not far
6 Nissen 1863: (B 23) is the foundation study of this relationship between Polybius and Livy.
7 Klotz 1940-1: (B 13); Walsh 1961: (B 40); Ogilvie 1965, 1-22: (B 25); Luce 1977: (B 15)- Commentaries relevant to this period: Weissenborn-Miller 1880—1911: (B 43); Briscoe 1973: (B 3) and 1981: (B 4) (books xxxi-xxxiu and XxxIV-xxxvi).
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removed themselves from being epitomes. These include the relevant parts of Eutropius’ Breviarium and of Orosius’ Historiae adversum Paganos, and the biographical De Viris I/ustribus attributed to Aurelius Victor.
Livy’s principal intention and achievement was artistic — the creation of a grand design and its realization in a lively, polished and often powerful narrative. Only rarely did he engage in the primary research which his modern counterparts regard as an essential function of a historian. His method for any particular episode was to follow one account selected from those available to him, with only occasional mentions of variants found in other accounts. Generally he seems to have followed his chosen account quite closely, but to have re-written it in his own accomplished style and to have given it some vivid and dramatic expression — as he did with Polybius. For the period of this volume he used especially (apart from Polybius) two of the so-called ‘Sullan annalists’ of the early first century B.c., Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius, though there are traces of other sources, such as the account of the military campaign of Cato in Spain in 195 which certainly goes back to Cato himself. Since Valerius and Claudius were both prone to exaggeration and elaboration (not to mention cavalier alteration) in the interests of dramatic effect, family glory, or Roman chauvinism, there has been a tendency to treat with scepticism any material in Livy which does not come from Polybius, and in some extreme cases to discount completely all such material. It is more realistic, however, while maintaining a sensible degree of caution about such details as casualty figures and highly dramatic battle scenes, to recognize that Valerius and Claudius were themselves drawing upon a great body of second-century material, much of it well informed and derived from contemporary accounts and records. The broad framework can be taken to be generally sound, and so can much of the detail. Year by year, for example, Livy reports elections, the allocation of provinces, recruitment and assign- ment of troops, triumphs, donatives, booty, dedications of temples, and prodigies and their expiation. Much of this is probably derived from the annales maximi, the public record made by the Pontifex Maximus, the archive of which was probably written up and published in the later second century.
Livy’s twenty-five books are not, of course, the only source of information for the great age of Roman expansion. Apart from the fragments of Polybius and such authors as Diodorus, Dio and Plutarch, there are other minor historical works and, scattered through a great variety of literature, a substantial number of anecdotes. Nevertheless the role played by Livy’s account in the work of the modern historian of that period is central, indeed it is fundamental. Its importance is well brought out by comparing the periods before and after Livy’s text breaks off.
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After 167 there is no continuous narrative, except for the Third Punic War and some wars in Spain, nor is it possible to reconstruct such a narrative or even a truly coherent picture of events. Information is particularly thin and fragmentary for the years between 167 and 154, and there are many uncertainties of sequence and chronology. Some im- provement in chronology and structure is evident from about 154 because of Rome’s record of warfare. From that date until 133 Rome was engaged in an almost unbroken sequence of wars in Spain, and from 149 to 146 she was committed also to her final war against Carthage, the Third Punic War. We have narratives of these wars written by Appian. Appian, a Greek of the second century a.D., wrote accounts of Rome’s wars, arranging them on a geographical or ethnic basis (Italian, Samnite, Macedonian and Illyrian, Syrian, etc.). Although much of his work is lost some books and a number of fragments survive, including the Iberica and Libyca. For the years prior to 167 he has little of value which is not also in Livy or Polybius, but his narratives of these later wars provide both a valuable framework and much useful detail. Although his treatment of the Spanish wars fluctuates in scale and detail it does seem to be in the main reliable and chronologically accurate, while his account of the Third Punic War is close to that which was given by Polybius, from which it is almost certainly derived through an intermediate source. Apart from Appian, the outline of events after 167 is derived largely from the epitomes of Livy, already mentioned, and such brief histories as those of Eutropius and Orosius, which themselves are based largely upon Livy’s work. Thus even for the years after 167 such record as has come down to us is still strongly influenced by Polybius and Livy, even though the actual text of each is lost.
HII. NON-HISTORICAL LITERATURE
The sources considered so far have been largely the historical literary works which constitute the principal basis for the political and military history to which the greater part of this volume is devoted. However, the volume also contains substantial sections dealing with the social, eco- nomic and cultural history of Rome and Italy,’ and even for political and military history not all the sources are literary and not all the literary sources are historical. Naturally historical and narrative works contrib- ute much information regarding social, economic and cultural matters, just as non-historical works of all types and of all periods contain numerous anecdotes and incidental details relating to the political and military affairs of this period; but the contemporary non-historical
® Aspects of social and economic history in the Hellenistic world are discussed in CAH? vit.i.
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Roman literature does require some separate mention, even though it receives extended treatment in Chapter 12.
In the later third and second centuries B.c. Rome experienced a literary awakening and a cultural transformation of very considerable magni- tude. This resulted in a substantial output of Roman literary composi- tions, the bulk of which are now lost except in so far as there are quotations and comments in writings from the late Republic onwards. This included many historical works, beginning with the histories in Greek written by Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus, and proceeding a generation later to Cato’s Origines which initiated a vigorous and fast- expanding historical tradition in Latin; but there was also a great output of verse and drama, most notably from the versatile genius of Quintus Ennius, and the first steps in non-historical prose literature, including published speeches and various handbooks. All this historical writing, all the verse, much of the drama, and nearly all the other prose writings are known to us only in fragments or at second-hand; of complete works we have only twenty-one comedies by Plautus, six comedies by Terence, and a handbook concerned with agricultural matters by Cato. Yet the total volume of what survives, whether complete, in fragments, or by way of comment, though only a small fraction of what once existed, is quite considerable and constitutes an acceptable basis for studying the literary and intellectual aspects of Roman cultural history in the period.
How far these sources contribute to our knowledge of social and economic history is more debatable. On the one hand the fragments offer little in their substance and frequently lack adequate context (many survive as quotations only because they illustrate interesting points of vocabulary or grammar). On the other hand Cato’s agricultural hand- book illuminates many aspects of the organization and practice of agriculture, and also of economic and social attitudes, though it must always be kept in mind that it is a work with limited purposes and markedly particularist tendencies which leaves quite untouched many more aspects of agriculture as well as of social and economic life.!° The value of the comedies in this respect, however, is the subject of perpetual controversy. They are all known to be adaptations of Greek originals; how much ‘Romanization’ has there been, then, in the portrayal of details of everyday affairs, of life-styles, of economic transactions and resources, and, above all, of social relationships? Some modification there certainly was, if only in consequence of the use of the Latin vocabulary with its own connotations, but whether the resulting picture is reliable remains highly debatable. Indeed it may be asked how far it is realistic to expect even a moderately faithful reflection of contemporary Roman life in
° Peter, HRRe/. 12: (B 27), and ORF*: (p 16) for fragments of historical works and speeches respectively. 10 White 1970 passim: (H 120); Astin 1978, chapters 9 and tr: (H 68).
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comedy of the type presented by Plautus and Terence. The fact is that the greater part of the literary material for Roman social and economic history of the period is found in the historical works discussed in the first two sections of this chapter, or in anecdotes and incidental items in the main body of Latin literature from the Ciceronian age onwards; and this is supplemented by the non-literary evidence.
IV. NON-LITERARY EVIDENCE
The main categories of non-literary evidence available to the historian of the ancient world are documents written on papyrus, coins, inscriptions, and the enormous range of material remains, from great buildings to tiny domestic articles, which are recorded and studied by archaeologists. Papyrus documents, which survive almost exclusively in Egypt, are of relatively little importance for this volume and may be passed over here.!! Similarly, not a great deal need be said here concerning the material evidence supplied by archaeology — though for very different reasons. By its nature it is found everywhere, exists in vast quantities, and varies enormously in kind, physical magnitude and state of preservation. It can illuminate numerous facets of history: economic conditions, means of production and cultivation, trade, social organization, urbanization, prosperity (or otherwise) reflected in the scale and type of public buildings, military methods as reflected in equipment and constructions, and even the working of political institutions as reflected in their physical setting. However, this type of evidence is not always as easy to interpret and apply as might be expected at first sight. Frequently there are problems of dating, of a sequence of building, of identification of context, of establishing the relationship between items from the one site or from adjacent or similar sites; accurate record-keeping is not easy and has not always been as assiduous or sustained as might be wished; and usually such evidence cannot supply its own historical setting but yields its full evidential value only when it can be related to contexts supplied from literary sources.
Coins, too, are found almost everywhere.!2 They were issued by all the major states of the Mediterranean world and by many of the minor ones; and they can yield a variety of information which is of interest to the historian, though to determine it with sufficient reliability often requires a great deal of specialized and complex study. They can play an important role in resolving problems of chronology. In many instances, a careful
't For discussion of papyrus as evidence in the Hellenistic period see CAH? vir.i.16-18 and 118-19.
12, Coinage of the Roman Republic: Crawford, 1974: (B 88). Hellenistic coinage is poorly served in consolidated publications but there are numerous specialized studies of particular aspects: see the Bibliography, esp. section a(c).
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examination of die-marks, mint-marks and stylistic features has enabled numismatists to determine the correct sequence of issues, and when these results are combined with the evidence of associated finds, whether of other coins in hoards or of other datable articles, at least approximate dates and sometimes quite precise dates can usually be determined. A minority of Hellenistic coins actually have a particular year indicated on them, by reference to a local era. Coins whose actual or approximate dates have been determined can then be used to fix ¢ermini for the dates of other objects found with or over them; or sometimes they yield even more direct information, such as the date of the death of a ruler or the length of his reign. The designs used on coins are often useful testimony to special concerns or ideals, whether political, religious or general ethos, of the issuing states, and in the case of an autocratic ruler the choice of symbols is often a guide to aspects of his policy or to the ‘image’ of himself that he wishes to promote among his subjects. All these aspects of coinage are particularly relevant to many events discussed in Chapters 1o and 11 below. The volume of a particular coinage, provenance, variations in the magnitude of issues, and changes in the production or even the structure of a coinage can all be reflections of important economic or political developments. Thus the radical restructuring of Roman coinage in the late third century is in great measure a response to the pressures and demands created by the Second Punic War. Neverthe- less, numismatic evidence has to be used with considerable caution and is fraught with uncertainties and controversies. Interpretations which relate the results to a historical context often have substantial subjective and conjectural elements, and frequently the historical evidence is illumi- nating the numismatic at least as much as vice versa.
Lastly there are inscriptions, writing which was displayed on wood, stone or metal, though naturally most of those which survive are on stone or metal.!3 Metal, in the form of bronze sheets, was more often used in ltaly than in the east, especially for the publication of formal state or city documents; which is one reason why comparatively few such documents survive in the west, whereas they are common in the Greek- speaking world. However, there was almost certainly a more fundamen- tal difference in practice in this period, for we have only quite a small number of inscriptions of any kind from Rome and Italy until the late Republic, and it is under the Principate that they really proliferate. The contrast clearly represents something more than an incidental difference
3. CIL 1 collects Latin inscriptions of the Republican period; JLLKP is the most important selection of these. New publications are listed in L’ Année épigraphique. For Greek inscriptions 1G and IG? include Europe only. OGIS is a basic collection of eastern inscriptions, but many Hellenistic documents are most accessible in collections for particular localities: see Bibliography, esp. section
B(b).
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in survival rate (often related to the extent and nature of re-use in more recent times) or in intensity of exploration, though these are certainly relevant to some of the differences in numbers of inscriptions we have from various towns and areas in the Hellenistic lands.
The numerous inscriptions surviving from the Hellenistic areas, though only a small part of what once existed, throw much light on both private and public affairs. There are many types. Some were erected by individuals — epitaphs, dedications, thank-offerings; others by public authorities, which usually means city authorities (even in the kingdoms) — dedications, public notices and regulations, decrees and resolutions (including those honouring distinguished persons), treaties, and in some cases even communications and instructions received from rulers. This last group, which began with letters from kings,!4 came in time to include also letters and edicts from Roman magistrates and decrees of the Roman Senate, with the paradoxical result that most of the surviving examples of documents of this kind from the period of the Republic are Greek translations.!5 These contribute substantially to the understanding of Roman attitudes and policies in the east, and also of Roman institutional procedures. The range of topics illustrated or illuminated by other inscriptions is extremely wide: technical points of chronology, city organization, royal interference, taxation, trade, prices, social ideals and values, relationships between cities, political allegiances, and policies of kings and dynasts — all from contemporary documentation undistorted by literary adaptation or by transmission at the hands of a succession of copyists.
Like every other class of evidence, inscriptions have their limitations and often require the application of special expertise. Many are not closely dated; lettering is often worn and difficult to read; and most are damaged with resulting loss of part of the text, sometimes a substantial part, not infrequently leaving many or most of the surviving lines of writing incomplete. Such problems are eased by the expert’s familiarity with the language, conventions and style used in inscriptions, and with the stereotyped phraseology that constantly recurs and enables many gaps to be filled by ‘restoration’; but the damage remains considerable, and in any case by far the greater part of the inscriptional documentation that once existed has been lost totally. Furthermore, almost all inscrip- tions, especially public inscriptions, are in a sense isolated documents. We hardly ever have other documents to fill out the particular chain of action or the detailed circumstances to which they belong, and if literary sources supply a context at all it is nearly always a broad context, lacking specific detail to which to relate the particular document and by which its
4 Collected and studied by Welles 1934: (B 74). 15 Sherk 1969: (B 73).
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full significance might be identified. This is why it was said earlier in this chapter that the shafts of light cast by inscriptions are usually narrow but often intense. In that intensity, however, lies their particular value. They afford glimpses of detail which are scarcely ever provided by the literary sources and which often afford a closer insight into organization and into prevailing attitudes and motivation. Inscriptions figure extensively in several chapters of this volume and it will quickly be seen that their contribution is both important and distinctive.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN!
H. H. SCULLARD
I. PUNIC SPAIN BEFORE THE BARCIDS
The story of the expanding and often conflicting interests of Phoeni- cians, Carthaginians, Greeks and Etruscans in the western Mediterra- nean has been told in earlier volumes. With the decline of Tyre the string of trading posts, which the Phoenicians founded from Gades on the Atlantic shore of Spain round to Malaca, Sexi and Abdera along the south-west Mediterranean coast, gradually passed into Carthaginian hands. The process was apparently peaceful, but to us is quite obscure in detail. The Phoenician decline afforded greater freedom to the Spanish kingdom of Tartessus in the middle and lower Baetis valley. This rich realm which flourished in the seventh and sixth centuries B.c. derived its wealth from its great mineral resources and its control of the tin trade- route to Brittany and Cornwall. It traded with Phoenicians and Carthaginians, and especially with the Greeks. The Phocaeans in particu- lar had good relations with the Tartessian ruler Arganthonius, and founded a colony at Maenake, but the shadow of Carthage over the west gradually grew longer.
After the failure of Pentathlus of Cnidus to drive the Phoenicians completely out of western Sicily, Carthage gradually took over from the
! The literary sources for early Punic expansion in Spain are extremely meagre. This is duc in large measure to the success of Carthage in excluding the Greeks from the southern parts of the peninsula, which therefore remained largely unknown to their writers (only a tiny chink in the curtain is provided by the Greek navigator Pytheas, whose Perip/us is reflected in Avienus’ Ora Maritima). The archaeological material is also sparse and difficult to interpret: is it the result of sporadic trade, or settlement, or domination? For the conquest by the Barcids (237-218 B.c.) we have Polybius’ brief accounts which are pro-Barcid (11.1.5—9, 13, 36, 111.8-15, 17, 20-1, 29-30, 33-5, 39), together with some further details, mainly based on the later annalistic tradition, in Diodorus, Appian, Dio Cassius, Zonaras, Livy, Valerius Maximus, Frontinus, Nepos, Justin, Orosius, Plutarch, Polyacnus and Strabo. Polybius drew on the Greek writers who recorded the Hannibalic War; though he contemptuously dismissed Chaereas and Sosylus as gossip-mongers, he probably relied largely on Silenus, who like Sosylus had accompanied Hannibal on his campaigns. On the causes of the Hannibalic War Polybius quoted and criticized Fabius Pictor whose view reflected the position of the anti-Barcid faction at Carthage. Both Silenus and Fabius were probably used by Coelius Antipater, on whom Livy and the annalistic tradition in part depended. The literary sources are collected in Schulten 1935, tt: (B 33).
17
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PUNIC SPAIN BEFORE THE BARCIDS . 19
Phoenicians and became the champion of the Semitic settlements against the Greeks. Their Punic leader, Malchus, checked the Greeks in Sicily and then went to Sardinia, where Phoenician settlements existed at Caralis, Nora, Sulcis, and Tharros, whilea strong hillfort was built ¢. Goo B.c. on Monte Serai a few miles inland from Sulcis. Malchus suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the native population; there is also evidence that the fort at Monte Serai was damaged. However, it was soon rebuilt and the Carthaginians established their control over the Phoenician settlements. But their penetration of the island was slow (though they succeeded in preventing any Greek colonization), and even by the early fourth century their grip was much weaker in the east than in the south and west. Sardinia was valuable as a source of minerals, agricultural products and manpower, and also as a staging-post on the way to Spain. An even nearer foothold was provided by the Balearic Islands: the Carthaginians sent a settlement in 65 4 to Ebusus (Ibiza), where they seem not to have been preceded by the Phoenicians.
A turning-point in Carthaginian relations with the Greeks was the battle of Alalia (¢. 535), where with their Etruscan allies they smashed Phocaean sea-power: one result was that the Phocaeans together with other Greeks were barred from Tartessus and southern Spain, though they retained their influence along the coast of Catalonia and southern France. All this time Carthage was also extending her control in North Africa itself, until before the end of the fifth century it stretched from Cyrenaica to the Atlantic, although the stages of this advance unfortu- nately cannot be traced in detail. However, the terms of her first treaty with Rome in 509 demonstrate that before the end of the sixth century? she was able to close the Straits of Gibraltar to all foreign shipping and had established a commercial monopoly in the western Mediterranean.
In southern Spain the Carthaginians entered into the inheritance of Tartessus and the Phoenicians. They had apparently destroyed the centre of the Tartessians by the end of the sixth century, but how far they and the Phoenicians before them had penetrated into the Guadalquivir valley is uncertain. Finds on the coast at Toscanos and Almunecar, with Phoenician settlements of the latter part of the eighth century and fresh settlers arriving early in the following century, reveal the importance of this area to Phoenicians and Carthaginians. From here their influence spread inland to the Guadalquivir valley, as finds (such as alabaster jars, splendid carved ivories, and Phoenician pottery) at Seville, Carmona and Osuna indicate, but it is uncertain how far this reflected an actual movement of population or merely penetration by traders; many of the burials in which these goods were found are native Spanish, but some
2 For the date see CAF? vit.ii, ch. 8.
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20 THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN
possibly are Phoenician. Nor can we judge the extent of assimilation between native and intruder or the degree of the later Carthaginian political control, if any, in the Baetis valley. The Atlantic coast of Andalusia also received Phoenician goods and settlers. Whether Tartessus lay in the area of Gades (with which the ancient writers identified it) or further north at Huelva, there appears to have been no Phoenician settlement at Gades before the eighth century: its great days belong to its development by the Carthaginians in their exploitation of the Baetis valley and the Atlantic trade-routes. Two incidents have been related to the downfall of Tartessus.* Vitruvius (x.13), in discussing the invention of the battering-ram, records how it was used by the Carthaginians in capturing a fort near Gades: here perhaps Gades has been confused with Tartessus. Secondly, the difficult trade-route over the mountains from Maenake to Tartessus, mentioned by the Massiliote Periplus (Avienus, Ora Maritima 87), looks like an attempt to secure the continuance of trade when the Carthaginians had closed the easier sea- route through the straits. However, whatever resistance the Carthagin- ians encountered, they succeeded in destroying both Tartessus and Maenake so thoroughly that their names disappeared from history, to be succeeded by Gades and Malaca.
The development and exploitation of Carthaginian control in south- ern Spain for the next two centuries or so remain very obscure. Their tightening grip is indicated by their second treaty with Rome: whereas in the earlier agreement of 509 the Romans were forbidden to sail along the African coast west of the Fair Promontory, in the second they agreed not to plunder, trade or colonize beyond the Fair Promontory in Africa and Mastia (Cartagena) in Spain. Thus the Carthaginians claimed control of the southern coast of Spain as far north as Cabo de Palos; north of the Cape, however, Massilia in the fifth or fourth century was able to found two new colonies, Alonis and Akra Leuke (Alicante). Gades became the centre of Punic control in Spain and probably enjoyed some special privileges, such as Utica had in Africa. The Blastulo-Phoenician towns of Malaca, Sexi and Abdera (so-called after the neighbouring native Iberian tribe) also had some degree of freedom. The Iberian tribes of Andalusia probably enjoyed much the same conditions as they had under the ‘rule’ of Tartessus. What the Carthaginians wanted from them was their manpower: in all the great battles fought between the Carthaginians and the Greeks in Sicily in the fifth and fourth centuries Iberian mercenaries played a major part. So too they exploited the mineral wealth of Andalu- sia: gold, copper, iron and especially silver — later one mine alone at Baebelo provided Hannibal with 300 lb of silver a day. Natural products
3 Cf. Whittaker 1974, Goff.: (c 65).
4 See Schulten 1922, 44—5: (B 53); CAH! vit, 775; Schulten and Bosch Gimpera 1922, 87: (B 34), on fines 178-82 of the Ora Maritima of Avienus.
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included corn, oil, wine, esparto grass and salt-fish. Their stranglehold on the straits allowed them to seek the tin of Brittany and the gold and ivory of West Africa, but occasionally they appear to have allowed controlled access beyond the Pillars of Heracles: at any rate the famous voyage of Pytheas (in the 320s B.c.) which started from Gades is not likely to have been launched without their permission. But in general for some two centuries Pindar’s words (Nem. 1v.69) were true: ‘we may not go beyond Gadeira toward the darkness’. Thus the Greeks knew and recorded little about Punic Spain and so our ignorance also is great.
The Carthaginians maintained their command of the sea (until chal- lenged by Rome), but they appear for a time to have lost their grip on southern Spain. If the fate of an empire can depend on a single preposi- tion they will have lost all their influence, since Polybius (11.1.6) records that in 237 Hamilcar Barca ‘set about recovering (avextdro) the Carthaginian possessions in Iberia’. The date and extent of this diminu- tion of power cannot be determined. Perhaps Andalusia successfully asserted her independence during the First Punic War, but Gades seems to have remained in Punic hands, since when Hamilcar sailed there we hear of no resistance. The loss of the Spanish mines in particular was a severe blow and is reflected in the debased quality of the silver coins that Carthage issued during her first war with Rome. But it may be that often too strong a contrast is drawn, and that in the earlier centuries southern Spain should not be regarded as part of a Carthaginian empire, still less as an epikrateia in the sense of a province, but rather as a sphere of influence ora protectorate, while the word ‘empire’ is first really applicable only to the military conquest by the Barcids.
II. HAMILCAR AND HASDRUBAL
When the First Punic War ended Hamilcar Barca remained undefeated in Sicily and was then given full powers by the Carthaginian government to negotiate a peace settlement with Rome. During the subsequent war against the rebellious mercenaries in Africa he won the confidence of the army and overshadowed his political rival, Hanno the Great, although the latter had a share in the final success. According to the annalistic tradition they then conducted a joint campaign against the Numidians, but Hamilcar’s political intrigues led to a threat of impeachment which he averted by leading his army to Spain without the authority of Carthage. This alleged charge against Hamilcar, which is not recorded by Polybius, should be rejected as part of the anti-Barcid tradition.5 The
5 See Appian, Fisp. 4-5. 13-18, Hann. 2.3-4; Diod. Sic. xxv.8; Nepos, Hav. 2.5. This account of Hamilcar’s activities is regarded by De Sanctis 1907-64, 111.1. 338 n. 16: (A 14), asa reduplication of a temporary overshadowing of Hamilcar immediately after the end of the First Punic War. CF. Walbank 1957-69, 1.151: (B 38).
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development of Hamilcar’s political rivalry with Hanno cannot be traced in detail, but he had the support of Hasdrubal, a popular leader and his own son-in-law, and as the Barca family seems to have been ‘new men’, some personal and political clashes were probable. Hanno and his supporters may well have wished to limit Carthaginian expansion to Africa, but the idea that Hamilcar went to Spain against the wishes of the Carthaginian government must be rejected. The loss of Sicily and Sardinia had weakened the economic life of the city; fresh sources of minerals and manpower must be sought, and where better than in Spain where they abounded? Such a move would not be likely to antagonize Rome since Spain was far from her sphere of interest. No doubt Hamilcar’s personality was the driving force that secured the adoption of this policy, but it was certainly not carried against the wishes of a majority of his fellow-citizens, and any opposition that existed would soon be weakened when money and booty began to pour in from the peninsula.
Equally suspect is the tradition that Hamilcar deliberately planned to build up Punic power in Spain as the first step towards a war of revenge against Rome. True, this view is advanced by Polybius (111.9.6-10.7), who finds the three afriac of the Hannibalic War in the wrath of Hamilcar, the Roman seizure of Sardinia, and the success of the Carthaginians in Spain.® The belief that Hamilcar decided to use Spain as a base of operations against Rome (rather than merely as a means of compensating for recent Carthaginian losses) gains some support in the story that before setting out for Spain Hamilcar, after sacrificing to Zeus (Baal), asked his nine-year-old son Hannibal whether he wanted to go on this expedition with him, and when the boy eagerly agreed he bade him take an oath at the altar that he would never be the friend of Rome (undémore “Pupaiors edvoncev). The story was later told by Hannibal himself to Antiochus III of Syria, and (by whatever channels it ultimately reached Polybius) there is no good ground to reject it. Rather, its negative form should be noted: ‘not to be well disposed to’ is very
6 According to Fabius Pictor (Polyb. 111.8), the causes of the Hannibalic War were the attack on Saguntum by Hannibal and the ambition of Hasdrubal (Hamilcar’s son-in-law) which led him to govern Spain independently of the Carthaginian government, as did Hannibal later; thus Fabius blames not Hamilcar but his successor Hasdrubal (for his love of power) and Hannibal (for his attack on Saguntum). This anti-Barcid Fabian view may derive from the attempted self-justification of those Carthaginians who, after the war had been lost, tried to blame Hannibal and Hasdrubal for having caused it (and it would gain favour when in 195 the anti-Barcid party were plotting to exile Hannibal). Polybius rejects Fabius’ view (including his suggestion of Hannibal’s independence of Carthage) and pushes the causes of the war further back to the time of Hamilcar. He also (111.6. 1ff.) records that ‘some authors who have dealt with Hannibal’s activities’ (probably the second-century senatorial historians at Rome) alleged that the causes of the war were Hannibal’s attack on Saguntum and his crossing the Ebro; but Polybius regarded these episodes as merely the beginnings (épxa¢), not the causes (afriat) of the war.
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different from the oath of eternal enmity which the later tradition records (e.g. damecatos €xOpds or hostis).? Whatever Polybius may have thought, an attempt to re-establish Punic influence in the western Mediterranean was not necessarily the same as planning a war of revenge against Rome, a view for which Hamilcar’s subsequent conduct in Spain supplies little evidence.
To whatever extent Punic power in southern Spain had been lost, the Carthaginians decided to regain, consolidate and extend it. Gades was still in their hands and thither Hamilcar Barca sailed in 237, taking young Hannibal and his son-in-law Hasdrubal with him. In the course of the next nine years (until 229) he proceeded to conquer or reconquer southern and south-eastern Spain, but Polybius gives little detail of his campaigns: ‘he reduced many Iberian tribes by war or diplomacy to obedience to Carthage [not, be it noted, to himself] and died in a manner worthy of his great achievements’ (11.1.6-8). Diodorus (xxv.10.1—4) adds more: Hamilcar defeated the Iberians, Tartessians and some Celts and incorporated 3,000 survivors into his own army; he then routed an army of 50,000 men, tortured the captured commander but released 10,000 prisoners. He founded a large city which he called Akra Leuke from its situation. While besieging Helike he sent most of his army and his elephants to winter in Akra Leuke, but was tricked by a false offer of friendship by the king of the Orissi who had come to help the besieged. He was routed, but in his flight he saved the lives of his sons, Hannibal and Hasdrubal: he diverted the pursuit by plunging on horseback into a large river where he perished. Akra Leuke is usually located at modern Alicante, and Helike at modern Elche (ancient Hici). This identification has, however, been questioned on the ground that Hamilcar would hardly have founded Akra Leuke at Alicante which is only some 12 km north-east of Elche while the latter was still unconquered, nor would he have leap-frogged past Cartagena which was a much stronger position than Alicante (although it should be noted that we do not know whether he was seeking the best possible harbour or a reasonably good site as far north as possible). Further, the Orissi lived in the area of Castulo on the upper Baetis. Thus, it has been argued, Akra Leuke should be placed in this mining area in the interior. If this view is accepted, it would mean that Hamilcar had not advanced further north along the coast than the old Punic ‘frontier’ at Cartagena, which had been mentioned in the second treaty with Rome in 348 (Polyb. 111.24.4). The question must
7 Appian, Hisp. 9.34; Livy xxt.1.4. Errington 1970, 26ff.: (c 15), in rejecting ‘the wrath of the Barcids’ as a cause of the Hannibalic War, argues that this view was part of an oral tradition (it was not in Fabius or Silenus) which circulated in Rome about the time of Polybius. He is inclined to accept the basic fact of Hannibal’s oath (unless the story was inveated by Hannibal himself in order
to persuade Aatiochus of his genuine hostility to Rome), but agrees with those who believe that in any case it is evidence only for Hannibal’s hatred of Rome and not for Hamilcar’s intentions in Spain.
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remain open unless fairly secure sites can be established for Akra Leuke and Helike in the Castulo area.8
The Romans took little interest in these events in Spain until, accord- ing to one writer alone (Dio Cassius x11.fr.48; a damaged text), in 231 they sent ambassadors to investigate. Hamilcar received them courteous- ly and neatly explained that he was fighting the Iberians to get money to pay off the remainder of his country’s war-debt to Rome; the Romans were left somewhat nonplussed. This episode should not be dismissed on the ground that, because the Carthaginians had agreed in 241 to pay their indemnity in ten years, their obligations were completed in 231, since we do not know how the extra indemnity imposed in 237 after the cession of Sardinia was to be paid: ten annual instalments seem more probable than a lump sum. How the story reached Dio is uncertain: it was not in Polybius (and therefore presumably not in Fabius), but it could derive from Silenus via Coelius; indeed, since it involved a rebuff to Rome it is more likely to have been recorded by Silenus than by Fabius. But whether true or false, it should not be used to suggest any keen Roman interest in Spain at this date, since Dio expressly states the contrary: pndev pndérw tav “I Bypixkdv odtot mpoonkdvtwv.? If true, however, it points to Massilian rather than any Roman concern. Massilia had long been a friend of Rome, at least from early in the fourth century; later this friendship was sealed in a formal alliance, probably between the First and Second Punic Wars, possibly earlier but certainly before 218. Now Massilia had commercial links with the Spanish tribes, especially through her trading colonies in Emporion, Alonis (near Benidorm), Rhode and Hemeroscopium (near Denia), the last of which, originally a Phocaean settlement, was some fifty miles north of Alicante; she would not welcome the prospect of Carthaginian expansion northwards. Rome’s interest in Massilia was not commercial (indeed it was Rome’s lack of overseas trading interests that made her so acceptable a friend to Massilia), but rather as a source of information about the Gauls whose threatening movements were giving Rome increasing anxiety from 237 onwards. Conflicts with the Ligurians and a thrust by the Boli against Ariminum (236), not to mention troubles in Sardinia and Corsica, forced Rome to consider the defences of her northern frontier. Massilia was in
8 For the rejection of the identification of Akra Leuke with Alicante: Sumner 1967, 208ff.: (c 56), who tentatively suggests Urgao (quae Alba cognominatur: Plin. HN 111.10) between Cordoba and Castulo, and for Ilici he suggests I(n lucia in-Oretanis (Livy xxxv.7.7). These seem possible, but what then was the ancient name of Alicante?
9 It has been accepted by the majority of modern scholars, but rejected by Holleaux 1921, 123:(D 33), and recently by Errington 1970, 32ff.: (c 15), though not by Sumner 1967, 205ff.: (c 56). Badian 1958, 48: (a 3), and Hoffmann 1951, 69ff.: (c 25), are agnostic. Two differing views of Roman policy towards Spain are given by Errington, who believes that ‘it was directed by nothing more potent
than apathy’ (p. 26), and Sumner, who thinks chat it was ‘entirely concerned with the curbing of Carthaginian expansion’ though Roman interest in Spain was ‘not strong or sustained’ (p. 245).
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an excellent position to provide Rome with news of current movements and would be glad if Rome cleared the Tyrrhenian Sea of pirates. She may well therefore have drawn her friend’s attention to the activities of their potential common enemy in southern Spain in 231, as she almost certainly did in 226. Ifso, Rome could scarcely refuse the token gesture of sending an embassy to Hamilcar. Spain may have lain far beyond the practical limits of Rome’s political horizon and Carthage was weak, but some Roman senators at least may have thought it prudent to keep a weather-eye open, even though the stories that Carthage was trying to stir up trouble for Rome in Sardinia are almost certainly later annalistic inventions.!0
Hamilcar had laid a solid base for a Carthaginian empire in Spain. His personal position, as a colonial governor, accepted by the home-govern- ment, was vice-regal. His increasing success is emphasized by the coinage which he minted at Gades. At first he could issue only debased billon coins and some bronze, but before long he had acquired sufficient wealth by mining and plunder to enable him to issue a coinage of fine silver, together with some gold and bronze; these mostly copied normal Carthaginian types, though the gold boldly displays a head of Greek Victory, while the execution of the bronze varies between very good and crude. It was reserved for his son Hannibal to place the father’s portrait in the guise of Heracles-Melkart on the magnificent silver issued later at New Carthage.!!
At some point the Iberian city of Saguntum made an alliance with Rome, doubtless not without some Massilian prompting or co-oper- ation. Some of those scholars who accept the Roman embassy to Hamilcar in 231 also place this new concordat in this year.!2 The precise date is of less importance than whether it fell before or after the ‘Ebro treaty’ of 226, since this inter-relationship vitally affects the whole tradition regarding the causes of and responsibility for the Second Punic War. A terminus ante quem of 220 is implied by Polybius m1.14.10; in another passage (111.30.1), he is unfortunately vague and merely places the alliance ‘several years before Hannibal’s time’ (aAefoow éreow On
10 Zon. vit.18; Eutropius 1.2.2; Orosius tv.12.2 (Sardinia insula rebellavit, auctoribus Poenis). This tradition is rejected by Meyer 1924, 11.385—G6 and 387 n. 2: (C 37). Nor should the closing and speedy re-opening of the temple of Janus (traditionally in 235) be connected with a renewed Roman fear of Punic intrigues, as is argued by Norden 1915, 53ff.: (B 24). He probably rightly applies Ennius’ lines ‘postquam Discordia taetra Belli ferratos postes portasque refregif’ to this event, but it does not follow that Ennius saw a Carthaginian threat arising as early as 235. In any case the Janus incident, through a confusion between T. Manlius Torquatus (cos. 235) and A. Manlius (cos. 241), may belong rather to 241 and apply to the end of the First Punic War and the revolt of Falerii. See further: Meyer 1924, 11.389: (C 37); Fraenkel 1945, 12ff.:(H 179); Timpanaro 1948, 5ff.:(B 37); Latte 1960, 132. 3: (H 205).
'! See Robinson 1956, 34ff.: (B 130) and a. 37 below.
'2 E.g. Taubler 1921, 44: (c 58); Schnabel 1920, 111: (c 52); Otto 1932, 498: (C 40); Oertel 1932, 221ff.: (C 39); Gelzer 1933, 156: (H 45).
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26 THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN
mpotepov twv Kat’ "AvviBay xaipwv), which could mean either before Hannibal became commander in 221, or before he had dealings with Saguntum, or before the Hannibalic War. But the exact meaning of this phrase is of little importance, since Polybius is.clearly saying ‘some time before 221-219’. The crucial problem is whether wAetoow €reat refers toa time before or after 226, the year of the Ebro treaty. Since Rome was involved with a Gallic invasion in 225/4 and is unlikely to have con- cerned herself with Spanish affairs then, the Saguntine alliance probably fell in or before 226 or else in 223/z. In favour of a date after 226 is Polybius’ remark (1.13.3) that the Romans took an interest in Spain only after the treaty.!3 On the other hand Polybius as we shall see, refers to later Roman intervention in Saguntum as a short time (uixpois xpdvors) before 220/19. In view of the contrast between pixpois and mAeloat it seems difficult to refer the latter to a period as recent as 223/2 for the Saguntine alliance, though some scholars accept this:!4a date earlier than 226 may seem preferable.
However, not only the date but also the nature of this agreement with Saguntum is controversial. For long it was regarded as a full formal treaty, a foedus, but this makes it difficult to understand Rome’s later delay in going to Saguntum’s aid during its protracted siege by Hannibal in 219: could Rome have neglected her formal legal obligations for so long? All that Polybius actually says (111.30.1) is that the Saguntines had placed themselves in the pistis (= fides) of the Romans, as proof of which he advances the fact that atthe time ofan internal dispute they sought the arbitration of Rome and not of Carthage. A deditio in fidem imposed no legal obligations on Rome and left her free to decide how to react to any future requests for help. Thus earlier during the Mercenary War Utica, in rebellion against Carthage, had asked for Rome’s help, though in vain. When Saguntum appealed, Rome may well have thought it was wise to have a foothold in Spain which committed her to nothing beyond her own wishes, and if the initiative came from Saguntum, it is easier to explain Rome’s otherwise somewhat strange commitment. Indeed it has
'3, Heichelheim 1954, 211ff.: (c 24), argued for a later date on the supposition that the Saguntine coinage was influenced by the Roman victoriate and by Massiliote types which were later than 226. But this argument is weakened now that the issue of victoriates has been shown to start only ¢. 211 rather than soon after 229: see Crawford 1974, 7ff., 22ff., 28ff.: (B 88). Thus the Saguntine silver may also date only from the period of the Roman recovery of the city in 212. However, the assumption of the priority of the victoriate may be wrong and it may even be of Spanish origin and based on the early Saguntine silver: cf. Hill 1931, 120 (B 96); Crawford considers (p. 33) that one early victoriate (his no. 96) was issued by Cn. or P. Scipio in Spain before 211. Further, the remarkable Saguntine coin (Hill, pl. 21, no. 12), bearing a head of Heracles, is obviously influenced by the Barcid silver; it would seem therefore co belong to the period of Punic occupation (219-212), and itis significant that its weight corresponds to that of the victoriate standard (3.41 g; cf. Hill, p. 121). Jenkins, however, would date it in the early to mid second century (SNG Copenhagen: Spain and Gaul (1979), nos. 25 1-5),
but why should the Saguntines have revived a Barcid type then? 14 E.g. Reid 1913: (c 45); Badian 1958, 48ff., 92-3: (A 3).
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even been argued that the Saguntines came into Roman fides in some less formal way than by a strict deditio. In any case, if there was no /foedus, Rome incurred moral, but no legal, obligations. Provided that the word ovpycaxot, Which Polybius applies to the Saguntines, does not necessarily presuppose a foedus, then a deditio is likely.'5
Hamilcar was succeeded in the governorship (otparnyia) of Spain by his son-in-law and admiral, Hasdrubal, who was first chosen by the troops and afterwards received confirmation of his appointment from the people of Carthage (Diod. Sic. xxv.12). Fabius Pictor (Polyb. 1.8.2) believed that Hasdrubal’s love of power was one of the causes of the Hannibalic War and records that after he had acquired great duvaoreia in Spain he crossed to Carthage and tried to overthrow the constitution and establish a monarchy, but the leading politicians united to force his return to Spain, where he then governed without any regard to the Senate at Carthage. This attempted coup will fall soon after Hasdrubal’s appointment to Spain in 226 if dvvagreia means his command (imperium) as it probably does, or else later in his governorship if the word means ‘a great empire’. But the story is doubtful and could have arisen from the fact that on one occasion after 237 Hasdrubal had already been sent back to Carthage to crush a Numidian uprising.'© However, if Hasdrubal’s monarchic attempt be questioned, the story may reflect something of the political and constitutional tensions that had been emerging during the Mercenary War when the election to a supreme military command had already been left to the army. In the famous chapter (v1.51) in which Polybius compares the constitutions of Rome and Carthage, he observes that just before the outbreak of the Hannibalic War, the Carthaginian constitution was weakening because the function of deliberation was shifting from the Council to the people.'!? The nature of these political reforms and popular movements escapes us, but they may reflect the power of the Barcid faction. The anti-Barcid tradition has clearly exag- gerated the ambitions of this group in depicting their leaders in Spain as completely independent rulers, and it may be in this hostile context that Hasdrubal’s alleged coup should be placed.
On assuming his command in Spain Hasdrubal first avenged
15 No foedus: Reid 1913, 179ff.: (c 45); Badian 1958, 49ff., 293: (A 3); Errington 1970, 41ff.: (c 15). Deditio: Dorey 1959, 2-3, 6-7: (C 13). No formal deditio: Astin 1967, 589ff.: (c 2). Polybius (1.40.1) does apply avppaxor to the people of Panormus, though it was a civitas libera (Badian 1958, 293: (A 3)), but in a general military rather than a legal context, while he applies the word to Saguntum (111. 15.8, 21.5) in a context of legal obligation. Polybius of course may not have fully understood the position. But non liquet.
6 Diod. Sic. xxv. 10.3. So De Sanctis 1907-64, HLi. gog n. §5:(A 14). But Taubler 1921, 71:(C 58), accepts both episodes and thinks the account told by Polybius (Fabius) represents an attempt by Hasdrubal to seize the otpariyia of Africa which Hamilcar had held during the Mercenary War.
17 Polyb. vi.s1.6. See Poechl 1936, 61ff.: (H 19); cf. Brink and Walbank 1954, 117-18: (B 2), and Walbank 1957-79, 1-734: (B 38).
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Hamilcar’s death by a punitive expedition against the Orissi which took him to the upper Guadiana. The extension of his control enabled him ultimately, it is said (Diod. Sic. xxv.12), to increase his forces to 60,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry and zoo elephants, but he also strengthened his position by diplomacy. He married an Iberian princess, established good personal relations with many of the chiefs, and moved his headquarters from Akra Leuke to Mastia, where he founded Carthago Nova (Cartagena) on a peninsula which commanded a fine harbour; here his communications with Africa were easy and there were rich silver mines close by. In the new city on a hill (Monte Molinete), commanding the entrance to a lagoon, he built himself a fine palace and his power was certainly vice-regal. It is possible that, like a Hellenistic monarch, he even issued silver coins with a diademed portrait of himself and on the reverse a Punic warship. If so, he was the first of the Punic commanders in Spain to make so bold a proclamation, but the coins may well have been issued later by Hannibal’s brother, Mago, and thus it would be safer not to use them as evidence for Hasdrubal’s regal pretensions.'8 However, he certainly consolidated and extended the Carthaginian hold over Spain, before he was killed in 221 by a Celt who had a personal grudge (or else by an Iberian slave who was avenging his own master).!9 He had probably not reached as far north as the Ebro, but this river became the central point of negotiations which he carried out with the Romans at their request.
Late in 226 the Romans ‘sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty (auv8yKas) in which no mention was made of the rest of Spain, but the Carthaginians engaged not to cross the Ebro in arms (émt 7oA€uw)’. Such is Polybius’ meagre statement (111.13.7) about an episode which has provoked much discussion both in antiquity and among modern schol- ars. It will be best to consider Polybius’ view first, unencumbered by the allegations of later writers, since their accounts are often confused by propaganda and misunderstanding arising from recriminations about the dispute over Saguntum and the causes of the Hannibalic War.29
18 This rare issue is attributed by Robinson 1956, 37-8: (B 130), to Hasdrubal and a mint at New Carthage, but the distribution of the finds (two from Seville and one each from Malaga, Granada and Ibiza, with none from the three large hoards of Barcid coins discovered near Cartagena) suggests the likelihood of a mint at Gades and the attribution to Mago, who later campaigned in this area (at Ilipa and the Balearic Islands). True, Hasdrubal had been trierarch to Hamilcar, but perhaps he would not wish to express his earlier subordinate position. Mago too was involved in naval operations.
'9 Celt: Polyb. 1.36.1. Iberian: Diod. Sic. xxv.1z and Livy xx1.2.6, ete.
20 It is not possible here to refer to all the minor distortions and variations given in the ‘apologetic’ Roman annalistic tradition. Only the main differences from the better tradition will be mentioned. The historical fact of the treaty is accepted here despite the doubts expressed by Cuff 1973, 163ff.: (c 10), who is inclined to dismiss it as a fabrication of Roman propaganda, whose purpose will have depended on its date, ranging from 220 to provide a formal ground for hostilities or a deterrent to aggression, to second-century Catonian propaganda.
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First, the nature of the contract. It was clearly negotiated between Hasdrubal and a senatorial commission, but was it accepted by the Carthaginian and Roman states? In later arguments the Carthaginians refused to discuss it, denying either its existence or their ratification of it (Polyb. 111.21.1); the Romans in reply brushed aside the question of ratification but bluntly underlined the fact that Hasdrubal had made the treaty (6poXdoyias) with full authority (adroreA@s: 111.29.3). If the Carthaginians had granted Hasdrubal such authority, they may have done so for convenience and in good faith, but it was in fact a useful device by which they could later repudiate any such agreement (a trick which the Romans themselves often used later in Spain when the Senate repudiated agreements made by Roman generals, such as Hostilius Mancinus, with Spanish tribes). The instrument may from the Carthag- inian side have been a ‘covenanted’ form of oath (berit), a unilateral pledge, given with or without conditions. The form of such an understanding is revealed in the contract between Hannibal and Philip V in 215, and differs from the earlier treaties between Rome and Carthage which were bilateral agreements confirmed by the oaths of both parties. E. J. Bickerman, who made this suggestion,”! recalls how Laban set up a pillar to delimit his and Jacob’s boundaries; neither should pass over the mark ‘for harm’ and Jacob swore by the Pachad of his father Isaac (Genesis 31.53). If this view is accepted, Hasdrubal’s agreement did not bind the Carthaginian government, but the Romans may well not have understood this practice. Since they themselves later insisted on regard- ing it as a valid treaty, it must presumably have been ratified in Rome, though the procedure can only be surmised. If it contained no corre- sponding commitment on the part of Rome, there was nothing for the Roman people to swear to, and it may have been transmitted to Rome in the form of a statement by Hasdrubal concerning the negotiations and his undertaking. The Roman commissioners presumably reported to the Senate in writing or in person. Since the Senate regarded it as a binding treaty, they may have ordered a copy (in bronze?) of Hasdrubal’s letter to be lodged in the Roman Record Office for keeping with the copies of the earlier treaties with Carthage. Thus some reliable information was presumably available to Polybius when he investigated all the treaties between the two states, and his factual statement of its content must be accepted even if his interpretation may be questioned.?4
Polybius’ bare statement of the content, however, affords room for much speculation. Has he given the complete text or only the part which he considered relevant to his argument? Was there some quid pro quo, either formal or informal, such as a reciprocal clause which limited
21 Bickerman 1952, 1ff. and esp. 17ff.: (c 5). 22 Cf. Errington 1970, 34ff.: (c 15), and for the lodging of treaties Scullard, CAH? viv.ii.
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Roman activity south of the river (as recorded by Livy xx1.2 and Appian, Hisp. 7.27, though in Hann. 2.6 and Lib. 6.23 Appian follows Polybius in giving only Hasdrubal’s obligation)?23 Even if the undertaking was given unilaterally by Hasdrubal, was it granted only conditionally? If there was no formal reference to Spain south of the river in the agree- ment, may not the Romans have unofficially assured Hasdrubal by a gentleman’s agreement that they had no interest south of the river and would not interfere there? And when the Carthaginians agreed not to cross the Ebro in arms, was the ban purely military, with the implication that they could cross for peaceful purposes into an area where Massilia had active commercial interests? Such questions make it difficult to see why both parties agreed to this rather strange arrangement. If Hasdrubal had no actively hostile intentions against Rome and if his conquests were still well to the south of the river, he presumably felt that a recognition by Rome of a Carthaginian empire which might reach to the Ebro was a satisfactory settlement, particularly if in fact he had no intention of trying to incorporate the area between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. Polybius’ explanation of Rome’s attitude seems to combine truth and error. He says (i1.13.3-6) that the Romans suddenly woke up to Hasdrubal’s increasing power, but were at the moment unwilling to challenge this because of the threat of a Gallic invasion of Italy; they therefore decided to conciliate him while they dealt with the menace to their northern frontier. The falsity of this explanation is the implication that Hasdrubal was becoming a threat to Rome: this is part of the propaganda story of ‘the wrath of the Barcids’, and there is no evidence that he was plotting with the Gauls. On the other hand the Romans were facing a crisis which culminated in the Gallic invasion of Italy and its repulse at Telamon in 225. At sucha time the Romans might be thought not to want to bother about Hasdrubal unless they had any reason to regard him as an urgent threat. But there was another interested party, namely Massilia, who, if the Roman embassy of 231 is accepted, had already jogged Rome’s elbow about events in Spain. In 226 the position was more urgent for both Massilia and Rome. Massilia had more to fear in Spain, where Hasdrubal was consolidating a powerful empire on the foundations laid by Hamilcar, and Rome, faced by a more serious menace from the Gauls, could not afford to offend Massilia. Thus, although no
23 Heichelheim 1954, 217ff. (c 24), accepts the clause ia App. Hisp. 7.27 that bound the Romans not co ateack the tribes south of the river (ure ‘Pwpaious tois wépav robde Tob woTapou mdAEpov éxpépew) because he detects a Semitism in this phrase which derived, he believes, from the original Punic text. Badian 1980, 164: (c 3), accepts Polybius’ denial that any concessions made by the Romans were connected with Spain: rather they might concern trading concessions or remission of the indemnity.
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ancient source specifically says so, it was almost certainly Massilian pressure on Rome that led her to send the embassy in 226.
The choice of, and agreement upon, the Ebro as a limit for Hasdrubal has also caused surprise. Why was a river so far north chosen, when the Massiliotes obviously would want to keep him as far south as possible and to maintain control over as many of their coastal colonies as they could? Some scholars have been so puzzled by this point that they have supposed that the Hiberus of the treaty was not the Ebro but another river of the same name further south, but the attempt to substitute the Jucar (of which the usual ancient name was Sucro) can be considered to have failed, while the hunt for a Hiberus among the streams around Cabo de la Nao is very speculative.24 It must be supposed that the Ebro was agreed as the result of some hard bargaining and a compromise. If the Romans really did not consider Hasdrubal a potential menace to them- selves, they might have been content to agree to the Pyrenees as a line of demarcation, though in the interest of general security they would no doubt like to keep him at arm’s length. But on behalf of their Massiliote friends they had to press for a line as far south as possible. If Hasdrubal insisted on the Ebro, they had at least won security for Massilia’s most northerly colonies at Emporion (Ampurias) and Rhode (Rosas). An unknown factor is how far northwards Hamilcar’s power did in fact stretch. It is generally assumed to have been confined to the south of say Cabo de la Nao; if so, Hasdrubal won a considerable concession by receiving implicit agreement to his expansion to the Ebro. On the other hand he may well have already been probing north of Alicante in sufficient strength to suggest a growing interest in this wider area, which included Saguntum. This city cannot have been mentioned in the treaty in the light of Polybius’ explicit statement that southern Spain was not referred to. Naturally if Rome had not at this time accepted the friendship of Saguntum, no specific reference would be relevant, whereas if the friendship had been formed before the Ebro treaty, Saguntum’s position must have been passed over in tactful silence in the agreement itself whatever may have been said unofficially in the preceding discussion. The status of the city became a burning issue only when it was threatened by Hannibal: it was then soon enveloped by a confusing cloud of propaganda which has distorted the later tradition by asserting either that it was included in the Ebro treaty or else that the city lay north of the river, beyond the limit set in the treaty.
24 Jucar: Carcopino 195 3:(C 7) and 1961, 18ff.:(a 11). Rejected by Walbank 1957-79, 1.171: (B 38) and fd. JRS 51 (1961) 228-9; Cassola 1962, 250: (H 35), and Sumner 1967, 222ff.: (C 56), Sumner, however, though rejecting Carcopino, has sought a Hiberus in the vicinity of Cabo de la Nao (1967, 228ff.).
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III. HANNIBAL AND SAGUNTUM
On the death of Hasdrubal in 221 the army in Spain enthusiastically conferred the command on Hannibal, now aged twenty-five, and this appointment was quickly confirmed by the Carthaginian government by a unanimous vote (fd yyw): Polybius thus emphasizes (1.13.4), against the view of Fabius Pictor, the support that Hannibal received in Carthage. But Hannibal, who had enjoyed Hasdrubal’s confidence in Spain, reverted to the more warlike policy of his father, although he followed Hasdrubal’s example of marrying a Spaniard, a princess from Castulo. There is no good reason to suppose that Hannibal was at this moment determined on war with Rome: he was following Hamilcar’s policy of empire-building in Spain itself. He at once launched an attack on the Olcades who lived around the upper Guadiana (Anas) and captured their chief city, Althaea.25 After wintering in New Carthage he turned in 220 against the highland tribes of the central plateau and advanced northwards over the Sierra Morena ona line later taken by the Roman road via Emerita (Merida) to Salmantica (Salamanca). He de- feated the Vaccaei, captured Salamanca and reached the Douro, where he successfully besieged Arbacala (modern Toro). Plutarch tells how after the surrender of Salamanca on the terms that all the free population should leave, wearing only one garment apiece, the women managed to smuggle out some arms and then pass them to their menfolk, who succeeded in fighting their way to freedom. However, though they were ultimately rounded up, Hannibal, impressed by the courage of the women, restored the town to the inhabitants. From this northerly point he then turned south, taking a more easterly route than on his approach, through the territory of the Carpetani and neighbouring tribes who faced him in battle at the Tagus near Toledo. Soon after he had crossed the river he found the enemy were close behind him, so he doubled back northwards and faced his opponents as they tried to get across. His cavalry caught some of the Spaniards in the river itself, while his forty
25 So Polyb. 1.13.5; Livy (xx1.5.4) names the town Cartala. Both historians derive their accounts of Hannibal’s Spanish campaigns from a common source, probably Silenus who accompanied Hannibal, though Livy used an intermediary, probably Coelius Antipater. In opposition to the usual location of Althaea, Gomez 1951, 12ff.: (Cc 19), places it at Aldaya some 22 km north of Valencia and 25 km from the coast.
% Polybius (111.14.1) gives “EApavrixy and ’ApBouxdAn; Livy (xx1.5.6) gives Hermandica and Arbocala. Plutarch (Mor. 248&=Polyaenus vit.48) gives a fuller account of the capture of ZLadpatixy, which he derived perhaps from Hannibal's other companion chronicler, Sosylus, since the form of the name differs from that in Polybius (= Silenus?). Clearly Salamanca is meant. Gomez 1951, 35ff.: (Cc 19), however, removes Hannibal’s campaigns from central Spain and believes that he was conquering the area behind Saguntum. He places Elmantica and Arbacala near Chelva, which lies some 60 km west of Valencia, and the battle of the Tagus (=the Valencian Tajo) a little further east.
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elephants patrolled the bank and trampled to death the others as they endeavoured to struggle out. He then re-crossed the river himself and routed the whole surviving force, whether or not they numbered the 100,000 attributed to them.?? Central Spain was thus conquered and although the loyalty of the Vaccaei and Carpetani was guaranteed mainly by the hostages that Hannibal held, and though the Celtiberians of the upper Tagus and Douro and the Lusitanians were still unvanquished, nevertheless Hannibal and his predecessors had won a vast empire from which they could draw immense supplies of manpower and mineral wealth.
Hannibal’s next move was not to plan an attack upon Italy, but to expand his empire up to the Ebro, as the Romans had allowed Hasdrubal to contemplate. But there was one overriding difficulty: Saguntum, where a clash of Punic and Roman interests had flared up. It was an Iberian city of the Arsetani, as the Iberian character of its coinage shows, though the Romans might believe that its name indicated that it was a colony of Greek Zacynthos. However, it shared one weakness of Greek cities: it suffered from stasis in a clash of policy between pro-Roman and pro-Punic factions. An episode led to the need for external arbitration and, though the Carthaginians were close at hand, the pro-Roman party naturally turned to their Roman allies. A settlement followed in which ‘some of the leading men’ (that is, leaders of the pro-Punic faction) were put to death. Polybius gives no details of the cause of this episode beyond attributing to Hannibal, in a subsequent report which he sent to Car- thage, the complaint that the Saguntines (i.e. of course the pro-Roman faction), relying on their Roman alliance, were wronging some of the peoples subject to Carthage (Polyb. 1.15.8). For more detail we have to rely on later authors. Appian (Hzsp. 10.36-38) names the wronged tribe as the (otherwise unknown) Torboletae (the Turdetani, given by Livy XX1.6.1, are too far from Saguntum; possibly the Edetani are meant). He alleges that the incident was provoked by Hannibal, who persuaded the Torboletae to complain to him that they were being attacked by the Saguntines; when the latter insisted that Rome rather than Hannibal himself should be the arbitrator, he used their rebuff as an excuse to attack the city. Whatever be thought of Hannibal’s part in provoking the episode, the factor which led the Saguntines to ask for Roman arbitration was clearly a quarrel with a neighbouring tribe which, if not settled quickly, might, so they feared, have serious consequences.
Polybius dates this episode ‘a short time before’ (yutxpois eumpoobev
7 Polyb. 111.14.5—8. Livy’s account (xx1.5.8—16), though probably deriving from the same source as Polybius, is confused and has misunderstood the movements of the armies. See Walbank 1957-79, 1.318: (B 38). The attempt by Mever 1924, 11.403 n. 1: (c 37) to reconcile the two versions is hardly conclusive.
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xpévors) the events of the winter of 220/19 which he is describing (111.15.7). It should therefore be placed not earlier than 221 and it should not be regarded as the occasion of Rome’s first alliance with Saguntum. This original agreement had been made, as we have seen, several years (wA€toot €reat) before Hannibal’s time, as Polybius states when he reverts to Saguntine affairs in a later chapter (30.1). In this latter passage Polybius is referring back to the arbitration episode of 15.7 when he records that the Saguntines in a state of stasis (otaatdoavres) turned for arbitration to the Romans rather than to the Carthaginians, although the latter were ‘quite near’ (€yyus 6vtwv). The proximity of the Carthaginians again suggests that the incident was recent (e.g. 221 or 220). Tosum up, Polybius seems to believe that many years before 220/19 (whether earlier or later than the Ebro treaty of 226 he unfortunately does not specify) Saguntum had made an alliance with Rome, and relying on this agree- ment had appealed to Roman arbitration in ¢. 221/20 at a time of internal stasis, and as a result some leading Saguntines were put to death. The subsequent course of events is difficult to determine amid much misunderstanding and misrepresentations by the ancient sources. Polybius records that in the past the Saguntines had sent frequent messages to Rome (auvexws): as allies, they duly kept Rome informed of any developments in Spain. But the Romans had paid little attention until they acted as arbitrators in the Saguntine stasis; in 220 a message arrived which induced them to send an embassy to investigate and to meet Hannibal when he returned to his winter quarters at New Carthage after his very successful campaign. If the arbitration can be placed as late as 220, it could have been handled by these ambassadors on their way to New Carthage,?® but it perhaps falls better into 221. At any rate the Romans were at last stirred to confront Hannibal in person: according to Polybius (111.15.5) they requested him to keep his hands off Saguntum (ZaxavOaiwy amexéaGar), which was protected by their fides (7iat1s), and not to infringe Hasdrubal’s treaty by crossing the Ebro. Since the main issue was Hannibal’s attitude to Saguntum which lay 100 miles south of the river, it would have been needlessly offensive of the Roman ambassa- dors to have brought the Ebro into the discussion, and Polybius is probably wrong in saying that they did. His error, if such it be, could have arisen froma false transference to the negotiations in 220 ofa similar request made at Carthage in 218 (see below); it is less likely that he was confused by the later annalistic tradition which, in an attempt to brand Hannibal as a treaty-breaker, falsely linked his attack on Saguntum with his crossing of the Ebro by the barefaced placing of the city to the north
2 Cf. Sumner 1967, 232ff.: (c 56). Livy, Appian and Zonaras place the Roman embassy in 219
after Hannibal had started to besiege Saguntam, but Polybius’ date of the autumn—winter of 220/19 before the siege should be preferred.
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of the river (though some scholars do believe that in a later passage, I11.30.3, he may for the moment confusedly have implied that Saguntum was north of the river). But whatever the reason for Polybius’ slip, it is better to eliminate any reference to the Ebro treaty in these earlier discussions, the more so since Polybius himself records no reference to this treaty in the reply of Hannibal, who confined himself to blaming the Romans for interfering in Saguntum which they had seized treacher- ously: tapeatovdnpévous probably implies a breach of faith rather than of a legal treaty, since it is difficult to establish that any formal treaty was in fact broken. However, although the Ebro treaty contained no refer- ence to southern Spain, Hasdrubal may have been led to believe that the Romans had no intention of interfering there (see above pp. 29-30). On the other hand, Hannibal knew very well that Saguntum was an ally of Rome and that any threat to it would involve Rome’s concern. He there- fore reported to Carthage that the Saguntines trusting in their Roman alliance had attacked a tribe under Punic protection, and he sought instructions. He received unanimous support, apart from the opposition of Hanno (Livy xxt.roff.), and was apparently given a free hand. Polybius adds (11.15.12) that the Roman envoys, who now believed that war was inevitable, also went to Carthage to make the same protest there, but the tradition of this visit is very confused and is open to question.?°
Hannibal would no longer tolerate Roman interference in an area where they had apparently given his predecessor a free hand. Embittered by the bullying to which Carthage had been subjected at the time of the seizure of Sardinia, he determined not to see his country humiliated a second time. In the spring of 219 he therefore advanced against Saguntum as champion of the cause of his subjects, the wronged Torboletae. Relying on help from Rome, the Saguntines refused to surrender, but tragically for them no help came: although Rome’s northern frontier had just been secured against Gallic threats, she was involved with the Illyrians. The Senate was unwilling to face war on two fronts, and decided to clear up the Adriatic, where Demetrius of Pharos was attacking Illyrian cities which were under Roman protection. Thus the two consuls of 219 were sent to Illyricum, not to Spain. Saguntum lay ona steep plateau about a mile from the coast (it is now some three miles distant, owing to coastal changes); it ran for some 1,000 yards from east
2) Cic. Phil. v.27; Livy xx1.6.4ff., 9.3f1.; App. Hisp. 11.40-43; Zon. vitt.21. Confusion may have arisen from a later Roman embassy to Carthage and also from a muddle between Carthago and Carthago Nova. See Sumner 1967, 238ff.: (c 56), who also suggests that Livy’s unlikely account (xx1.19.6ff.) of how the final Roman embassy to Carthage in 218 returned to Italy by way of Spain and Gaul may be a false transference of the return of the ambassadors from New Carthage in 220/19 (on the assumption that thev had not gone to Carthage itself). Livy’s whole account of the Saguntine affair is chronologically muddled, since he places the Saguntine embassy to Rome in 218 instead of 220. He himself tried to straighten out the general chronological confusion in xx1.15.3ff.
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to west but was only some 120 yards wide. The weakest point in its almost impregnable walls was at the western end; there was a slightly more accessible approach just to the west of the citadel, and here Hannibal concentrated his attack (as did Marshal Suchet in 1811). The blockade continued for eight months without thought of surrender, though Hannibal was ready to offer relatively lenient terms. At one point Hannibal himself left to overawe the Oretani and Carpetani who, an- noyed at his severe levying of troops, had seized his recruiting officers (Livy xx1.11.13). The siege continued relentlessly, however, and more than heroism and desperation were needed to resist the assault indefi- nitely: Saguntum fell in the late autumn of 219.
What happened when news of the fall of the city reached Rome is open to doubt. According to Polybius (111.20.1-6) there was no senatorial debate on the question of war (it had been agreed a year earlier, he adds, that Carthaginian violation of Saguntine territory would be regarded asa casus belli), and he dismisses as barber-shop gossip rather than history the statements of Chaereas, Sosylus and other historians who recorded such a debate. Rather, the Romans immediately (wapaxypyjua) appointed am- bassadors and sent them in haste (kara omrovdyv) to Carthage to deliver an ultimatum: either Hannibal and other Carthaginian leaders must be handed over or else war would be declared. But Polybius can hardly be accepted at his face-value. In the first place it is extremely unlikely that in 219 the Senate had agreed to regard an attack on Saguntine territory as a casus belli. lf it had done so, its inactivity throughout the whole siege and the following winter until at the very earliest 15 March 218 (the first possible date for the despatch of the final embassy to Carthage) is difficult toexplain. True, both consuls of 219 became involved in the Adriatic and it might not have been easy to switch some forces to the western Mediterranean (though the war was effectively over by late June when Pharos was captured). Since the consuls of 218 did not start for their provinces until late August, there is a very long gap between Roman words and Roman deeds. Behind Polybius’ statement may lie the fact that many Roman senators, perhaps a majority, felt that an attack on Saguntum might or should lead to war, but a clearcut vote for war in such circumstances is not likely to have been taken in 219 even before Hannibal advanced against Saguntum. Further, the sudden burst of energy after months of allowing Saguntum to resist unaided, as reported by Polybius, looks suspiciously like an attempt at self-justification. If therefore the question of war had not been irrevocably decided by the Senate in 219, and since senatorial opinion can hardly have been com- pletely unanimous, some debate is likely on reception of news of the city’s fall, and in fact such a debate is recorded by Dio Cassius (fr.5 5. 1-9; Zon. vitt.22). This tradition appeared not only in pro-Carthaginian
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historians such as Sosylus but also (since Dio’s source is pro-Roman) in the Roman annalistic accounts and could have reached him by way of a writer such as Coelius Antipater. Livy may well have omitted to record the debate either because he could not believe Rome could have hesitated when once Saguntum had fallen or out of respect for Polybius’ criticism.
In the debate, according to Zonaras, L. Cornelius Lentulus, probably the consul of 237, urged an immediate declaration of war and the sending of one consul to Spain, the other to Africa, while Q. Fabius Maximus counselled a more cautious approach and the despatch of an embassy. Not only the debate, but even the names of the speakers may well be historical facts: it is unnecessary to suppose that Dio’s source has invented a Cornelius and a Fabius as prototypes of P. Cornelius Scipio and Fabius Cunctator who later in the war urged an offensive and defensive strategy respectively. Internal political differences in Rome cannot be considered at length here, but the Cornelii may have been eager to start the war as soon as it appeared inevitable (the Cornelii Scipiones certainly pressed forward its vigorous prosecution later in Spain and Africa), while it has been suggested that their political allies, the Aemilii, stimulated by Massiliote pressure, had long urged the checking of Punic aggrandizement in Spain, both in 231 and 226 (and the Scipios, at any rate later, had personal links with the Massiliotes: nostri clientes, Cic. Rep.1.43).3° A more cautious policy was advocated by Fabius who, while perhaps agreeing with the general opinion that Hannibal’s activities constituted a ground for war, nevertheless wished to attempt negotiations on the basis of disavowal of Hannibal by Carthage before war was finally declared.5! The prospects of success for such a move might seem small, but some latent, if not open jealousy and opposition to Hannibal must have survived at Carthage, and an appeal to Hanno and the anti-Barcid faction might help to weaken the city’s resolve at so critical amoment. At any rate Fabius may have thought so and personal contacts may have provided him with the means to learn something of current political feeling at Carthage, since he is said to have had a paternum hospitinm with the father of Carthalo who later commanded the Punic garrison at Tarentum in 209 (Livy xxvii.16.5). Further, another Fabius, the historian Pictor, took the anti-Barcid view (which Polybius strenuously rejected) that Hasdrubal and Hannibal had been acting independently of the Carthaginian government (see n. 6 above). This or other possible debates probably involved discussion of the wider ques- tion of the ultimate objective of Roman policy: was this to be limited to crushing Hannibal and Punic power in Spain and then a negotiated peace, or was it to aimat the destruction of Carthage as a Great Power? At any rate Fabius’ attempt at compromise was finally accepted to the extent
% See Kramer 1948: (C 30). 3! Fabius’ policy: Rich 1976, 109ff.: (H 20).
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that war should be declared only if Carthage refused to disavow Hannibal. Five senatorial /egati were sent to Carthage to convey the ultimatum which Polybius wrongly asserted was despatched immedi- ately after news of the fall of Saguntum had reached Rome. If the Romans had acted more speedily the war might have been fought in Spain or Gaul rather than in Italy. The legation chosen was a weighty one: it was led probably by M. Fabius Buteo rather than by Q. Fabius Maximus; in 218 Buteo, the oldest living censorius, and perhaps the princeps senatus, had greater authority than Fabius Maximus. He was accompanied by the two consuls of 219, M. Livius Salinator and L. Aemilius Paullus, together with C. Licinius (probably the consul of 236) and Q. Baebius Tamphilus, one of the commissioners sent to Hannibal in 220.
The interval between the reception of the news of the fall of Saguntum and the despatch of the embassy has been much debated: the longer the delay, the less credit to the Senate. The extremes of the time-gap are 15 March 218 (the two consuls of 219 could not serve as legates until their consulships had ended) anda date late in August when at last the consuls for 218 left for their provinces.33 One suggestion is that news of Saguntum’s fall did not reach Rome until mid-February and the ulti- matum was sent soon after 15 March, thus reducing the Senate’s delay to about a month, while on another view the Senate normally regarded itself as entitled to postpone wars until the new consuls entered office (ad novos consules).34 On the other hand, a possible reason for placing the despatch of the embassy late in this period between mid-March and late August has been found in the puzzling insistence on the Ebro treaty by the Roman embassy when it met the authorities in Carthage: Polybius (111.21.1) says that the Carthaginians refused to discuss the treaty (on the grounds that either it did not exist or else had not been made with their approval) and therefore implies that the Romans wished to discuss it. But why? It was not relevant since it was not violated by Hannibal’s attack on Saguntum (the two were only linked in later misrepresentations which placed the city north of the Ebro). It has therefore been suggested that the embassy did not leave Rome until news came (in June?) that Hannibal had in fact crossed the Ebro probably in late May or early June.*> On this
32 Fabius Buteo: Scullard 1973, 274: (H 54).
33 Calculations are hampered by uncertainty about the state of the calendar. Thus the position would be complicated if 218 happened to be an intercalary year, which is quite uncertain, or if in 218 the Roman calendar was a few weeks ahead or behind the Julian. See Sumner 1966, 12: (c $5); Errington 1970, 54ff.: (c 15). Nor is it certain whether a ¢rinundinum was obligatory between promulgating a rogatio for war and voting on it: cf. Sumner 1966, 20: (c 55), and Rich 1976, 29: (H 20).
4 See respectively Astin 1967, 577ff.: (c 2), and Rich 1976, 2off., 28ff., 107ff.: (H 20).
35 See Hoffmann 1951, 77ff.: (C 25) (despite the objection that Polybius believed (ri1.37.1) that news of the discussion in Carthage reached Hannibal just before he left New Carthage). Scullard 1952, 212ff.: (c 54), suggested a modification of this view, namely that the Roman embassy may have left lace in May when news came that Hannibal was on the war-path, having left New Carthage (late April or carly May) with a large army, and was heading north towards the Ebro.
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HANNIBAL AND SAGUNTUM 39
supposition the silence of the Carthaginians becomes clear: they obvi- ously would not wish to discuss a treaty which Hannibal had just broken.
Whatever the exact date of the delivery of the Roman ultimatum, the Carthaginians replied to the brusque alternative of disavowing Hannibal or accepting war by refusing all discussion of the Ebro treaty and concentrating on the treaty of 241 which they claimed covered only those who were allies of either Rome or Carthage at the time of the treaty. To prove this they read out the terms of the treaty several times (the actual list of allies probably formed an annexe to the treaty),>¢ and the name Saguntum certainly did not appear. There was no question that Rome’s ‘alliance’ with Saguntum was made after 241, but the Romans brushed the matter aside and said that now Saguntum had fallen their ultimatum must be accepted. Polybius has clouded the issue when he says (I1I.21.6) that a treaty had been broken by the capture of Saguntum. He then turns aside to examine all the earlier Romano—Punic treaties, and when he returns to discuss the Roman embassy of 218 he says (29.1) he will give not what the Roman ambassadors actually said at the time, but what was usually thought to have been the Roman case (as argued in 152-150 B.c.?). This was to harp on the validity of Hasdrubal’s covenant and to assert that peoples who became allies after the treaty of 241 were covered by it since otherwise it would have specifically forbidden all future alliances or laid down that subsequent allies should not enjoy the benefits of the treaty. As to war-guilt, therefore, Polybius condemns the Carthaginians in regard to Saguntum, but he equally condemns the Romans for their previous unjust seizure of Sardinia. Amid so many confusing claims and arguments, at least the outcome of the embassy is clear: Fabius dramatically declared that he carried war and peace in the folds of his toga. When the presiding sufete told him to offer which the Romans wished and when Fabius said ‘war’, the majority (rAefous) of the Carthaginian council cried out ‘we accept’.
Meanwhile Hannibal had wintered in New Carthage and had sent some of his Spanish troops on leave. He visited Gades to pay his vows to Heracles-Melkart and also had been issuing a large amount of silver coinage to pay his troops. The first series, from triple to quarter shekels, showed the laureate head of Heracles-Melkart with what are almost certainly the features both of Hamilcar (bearded) and Hannibal himself (beardless); on the reverse was an African elephant. These magnificent coins were followed by shekels and triple shekels with Hannibal’s head, without laurel wreath and Heracles’ club, and the ordinary Carthaginian type of horse and palm-tree on the reverse (this series may possibly have been issued by his brother Hasdrubal after Hannibal’s departure). The
36 See Taubler 1921, 63ff.: (c 58).
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4o THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN
Barcas were displaying themselves as Hellenistic rulers, with even a suggestion of the divine.>’ In order to secure the loyalty of Spain and Africa, Hannibal interchanged some troops between these two countries and thereby separated the soldiers from their own people; Africa was thus apparently within his command. He instructed Hasdrubal to administer Spain in case he might be separated from him (é€av avrés xwpil%rai 7ov); does this rather naive expression suggest that Hannibal was trying to keep his future movements as secret as possible? He had also been in touch with Gallic tribes, both in Cisalpine Gaul and in the Alps, and when he heard that they were willing to co-operate, he set forth from New Carthage in the spring of 218 (late April or early May) witha large force which, however, probably fell short of the 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and 37 elephants attributed to him. He crossed the Ebro when the spring flooding had subsided.38 His avowed and immediate objective must have been north-eastern Spain between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. If his intention at this point was to reach Italy, as it may well have been, he will not have advertised the fact: the Romans must be kept guessing. In the event he took two and a half months to reduce much of northern Spain and he did not succeed against the coastal cities of Tarraco and Emporiae. It remains uncertain whether this long period was owing to unexpectedly tough resistance or to a deliberate delaying tactic to hoodwink the Romans and then to make a hurried dash forward at the last moment just before the winter closure of the mountain passes. Inany case he must have masked his intention of attacking Italy as long as possible, and he could not of course have carried it out that year if his campaign in northern Spain had not ultimately been successful. By the end of July or early August he had reached the Pyrenees, and the road to Rome stretched out before him.
Hannibal left behind in Spain an immensely strong base. The wealth that he and his predecessors had acquired in the peninsula was spectacular; it was the reply of Carthage to the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. The resources of Numidia and Mauretania would have been easier to develop, as some Carthaginians such as Hanno seem to have argued, but this area lacked the mineral wealth that Spain could offer and in the Barca family
37 See Robinson 1956, 39: (B 130). This view, that these and other heads with very individualized features (cf. nn. 18 above and 41 below) represent the Barcids, has been accepted by Richter 1965, 281:(B 192), Blazquez 1976, 39ff.: (B 81), and many others, but rejected by de Navascués 1961-2, 1ff.: (B 120), and Villaronga 1973: (B 141). It is difficult to believe that the great variation of feature and the presence or absence of symbols (e.g. diadem or club) can refer only to Heracles-Metkart simpliciter.
38 In view of the necessary preparations Proctor 1971, 13ff.: (c 44), sets Hannibal’s departure from New Carthage not earlier than mid-June, after assembling the army at the end of May. But the prolonged interchange of troops may not have been confined to the winter of 219/18: see De Sanctis 1907-64, IIL1i.13 M. 21: (A #4).
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HANNIBAL AND SAGUNTUM 41
Carthage found the instruments to conquer, administer and exploit the peninsula. The political opponents of the Barcids might accuse them of building a ‘private empire’ in Spain, but despite their semi-regal position they remained loyal citizens of their motherland, and if Hannibal’s practice was not a novelty they often consulted a council (auvédprov) which seems to have contained representatives of the Carthaginian government.3? Spain, however, was sufficiently far away from Carthage to allow the Barcids to act with reasonable independence, and far enough away from Rome to prevent the Senate becoming unduly interested.
The Barcids seem to have lost no time in exploiting the mineral wealth of Spain to the full: at any rate Hamilcar’s first debased billon coinage was soon replaced by silver and even gold. Though the gold mines of north- west Spain were far from his direct control (and indeed were not fully worked until the Augustan conquest), there was also gold in Andalusia: Strabo (11.2.8) enthuses over the great abundance of gold, silver, copper and iron in Turdetania, and his statement that gold was previously obtained from what in his day were copper mines is confirmed by modern analysis of the ancient slag heaps at Rio Tinto which contained 13 grains of gold per ton (indeed the modern mining company at Rio Tinto has obtained gold and silver ores, as well as its main production of copper).4° The result of this exploitation is seen in the wealth accumu- lated in the capital of New Carthage when stormed by Scipio in 209 B.c.: he captured 276 golden plates, each weighing about a pound, 18,300 lb of silver in bullion and in coin, a large number of silver vases and quantities of copper and iron, besides a vast amount of munitions, armour and weapons (Livy xxvi.47). As we have seen, one mine (Baebelo) alone provided Hannibal with 300 lb of silver a day; this was in the area of New Carthage which in Polybius’ time produced at least 25,000 drachmas per day.
This great wealth provided the sinews of war, both equipment and mercenaries. The growth of the Barcid armies in Spain cannot be traced in detail, but Hasdrubal is said to have had 50,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 200 elephants (Diod. Sic. xxv.12), Hannibal in 219/18 interchanged some 14,000 infantry, 1,200 cavalry and 870 Balearic slingers from Spain with a roughly similar force from Africa: he is said to have started en route for the Pyrenees with 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. He also left in Spain a fleet of 50 quinqueremes (though 18 lacked crews), 2 quadriremes and 5 triremes. The army figures, though seen by Polybius
39 Polyb. 114.20.8, 71.5, 85.6, VII.9.1, 1X.24.5.
© See Rickard 1928, 129ff., esp. 132-3: (G 26); and for Roman workings see Richardson 1976, 139ff.: (C 24). Healey 1978, 26: (1 20), provides a diagram of the San Dionisio lode at Rio Tinto, showing a thin gold and silver lode above the copper. Strabo explains how the inhabitants of Turdetania also obtained gold from the dry auriferous sand.
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42 THE CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN
himself on the inscription left by Hannibal on the Lacinian Cape, may be slightly exaggerated, and the proportion of Spanish mercenaries cannot be estimated, but they indicate the general level of the Barcid achieve- ment. But more than mere numbers was needed. Among the Spanish tribesmen the unit of loyalty was small; it could be strong (as witness the desperate resistance of Saguntum to Hannibal), but there was no inde- pendent Iberian nation and little national feelings so that the Carthaginians found it easy to recruit them as mercenaries. Further, it was a Spanish tradition (noted by Caesar and Plutarch) for bands of followers (devot?) to swear total allegiance to a leader, to serve as his bodyguard and never to survive him. Ennius (fr.503 v) seems to have emphasized the loyalty of a Spaniard who refused a Roman demand to abandon the Carthaginian cause. Thus with good pay and charismatic leadership the tribesmen might be welded into a fine and loyal fighting force, since they apparently had no difficulty in accepting a leader from overseas (thus after his capture of New Carthage and the battle of Baecula they readily hailed Scipio Africanus as king: Polyb. x.4o0). Carthage meant less to them than did their Barcid commanders, who in the later years of occupation placed their portraits — and that in a divine setting — on the coins which their troops received as pay. Hasdrubal Barca had a gold shield bearing his portrait, which was later captured by the Romans and dedicated in the Capitoline temple.*!
For years the Barcid conquest of Spain had been accomplished by diplomacy and assimilation as well as by war: both Hasdrubal and Hannibal had married Spanish wives, while Hannibal had lived in the country for 19 years. He may not indeed have been averse to trying to increase his prestige by appealing to the superstitions of the natives. He it was who was probably responsible for the first issue of the coins depicting his father and himself in the guise of Heracles-Melkart, and the story that before he crossed the Ebro he dreamed that he received a promise of divine guidance may have been told to enhance his authority still further. The story was recorded by Silenus, who was with him at the time, and it may well have circulated among his troops in 218.42 But
4 Cf. n. 37 above. Gold shield: Plin. xxxiv.1g. Livy (xxv.39.17) refers to such a shield of silver, weighing 137 tb. The coins with a laureate diademed head of Melkart, and an elephant on the reverse (Series 8 of Robinson 1956, 52-3: (B 130)) are recognized by Robinson as Barcid. A hoard found fairly recently in Sicity confirms that they certainly belong to the later years of Hasdrubal, but raises some (though not insuperable?) difficulties in the assumption that they portray the features of Hasdrubal Barca: cf. Scullard 1970, 252-3: (H 77).
4 See Cic. Div. 1.49; also Livy xxt.22.5—7; Wal. Max. 1.7. ext. 1; Sil. Ital. 111.163f.; Dio Cassius XH1.56.9. Polybius (at 111.47.8, 48.9) may have been alluding indirectly to this as well as to similar stories of divine guidance for Hannibal. The view of Norden 1915, 116f.: (8 24), that the council of the gods figured in Ennius is not very probable. The story told how Hannibal was summoned to a council of the gods, where Jupiter ordered him to invade Italy and provided a divine guide who warned Hannibal when on the march not to look back. Hannibal disobeyed and saw behind him a
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HANNIBAL AND SAGUNTUM 43
whether or not supported by any popular belief in their divine mission, the Barcids doubtless lived like princes, if not as Hellenistic monarchs (in whose tradition Hamilcar and Hasdrubal had founded cities). The latter, in his palace on the citadel of New Carthage, in command ofa great army and fleet, with his ships in one of the best harbours in the whole Mediterranean, in control of the local silver mines and holding hostages from many Spanish tribes, must have appeared an impressive figure to his contemporaries, while all the Barcids made a strong impact on later generations. Thus, for instance, Polybius rejected the anti-Barcid tra- dition of Fabius Pictor, praised the gallantry of Hamilcar, and on the whole judged Hannibal with impartiality, and even Cato, the bitter enemy of Carthage, said that no king was worthy of comparison with Hamilcar Barca.*3 But however spectacular the achievement of the Barcids, in the event the rich resources of the peninsula were denied to Hannibal fighting unaided in Italy, thanks to the brilliant initiative of members of another family, the Cornelii Scipiones, and to the strength of the Roman navy: the efforts of his brothers Hasdrubal and Mago to keep him supplied from Spain were too little and too late.
trail of destruction caused by an enormous beast: his guide told him this meant the desolation of Italy and he was to go on unworried (ne /aboraret). However, Meyer 1924, 11.368ff.: (c 37), thought that Hannibal’s disobedience must have led to his destruction which therefore originally figured at the end of Silenus’ account; in consequence the story was suppressed by later Roman writers (starting with Coelius). But we do not know that Silenus’ history went down to 202 B.c. (the latest attested event is in 209), and it is unlikely that as a companion of Hannibal he would have told a story which implied that Hannibal was responsible for his own downfall. Meyer has been influenced by the tragic legend of Orpheus’ disobedience which he cites, but in fact in its original form this story may have had a happy ending, namely the recovery of Eurydice, and Orpheus’ backward look and its consequence may be only an addition by an Alexandrian poet: cf. Guthrie 1935, 31:(117),and Bowra 1952, 117ff.: (H 171). In any case, in Hannibal’s dream we are in the realm of Hellenistic invention rather than of primitive taboo, of the gods of Olympus rather than of the underworld, and it is not impossible chat a story that Hannibal’s march had been commissioned by a council of the gods was circulated to encourage the troops, and then written up by Silenus in the more extravagant vein of Hellenistic invention which Polybius condemned.
43 Polyb. 1x.21-26, xL.19; Pluc. Cat. Mai. 8.14.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
JOHN BRISCOE
I. THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT!
In 241 Carthage had no alternative to accepting the Roman peace terms and surrendering possession of the whole of Sicily to Rome. Three years later the Senate took advantage of Carthage’s difficulties in the Mer- cenary War to seize Sardinia.? Polybius rightly regarded the latter action as unjustified and the subsequent Carthaginian resentment as a major cause of the Second Punic War.3 But even without that additional provocation many Carthaginians, and particularly Hamilcar Barca, the father of Hannibal, would not have been prepared to accept the outcome of the First Punic War as definitive. It was Hamilcar who laid the foundations for a new Carthaginian offensive by re-establishing Carthaginian power in Spain. In 229 Hamilcar died and was succeeded in Spain by his son-in-law Hasdrubal, with whom Rome.concluded the Ebro treaty in 226, which made the river Ebro the northern limit of Carthaginian power in Spain and, implicitly at least, renounced Roman claims south of that limit. The treaty, however, contained the seeds of a new conflict, for its terms were flatly inconsistent with the Roman alliance with Saguntum, concluded several years before the Ebro treaty.4 Saguntum lay south of the Ebro, and while Rome was to claim that the alliance overrode the Ebro treaty, the Carthaginians saw the Ebro treaty as giving them the freedom to proceed against Saguntum.°
Hannibal succeeded his brother-in-law in 221. In 220 the Saguntines, fearing an attack, asked Rome for help and the Senate, which had ignored several previous appeals from Saguntum, sent an embassy to Hannibal urging him to refrain both from attacking Saguntum and from crossing the Ebro in defiance of the treaty.6 Hannibal countered by accusing
' The events leading to the outbreak of the Second Punic War have been dealt with at length in the previous chapter. What is presented here is a brief and necessarily dogmatic statement of the view which underlies this chapter. 2 See CAH? viz.ii, ch. 11 (e).
3 Polyb. 11.10.4, 15.10, 28.2, 30.4. 4 See pp. 25-7. :
5 Several writers, including Polybius himself on cestain occasions (see especially 111. 30.3), twisted the facts by placing Saguntum north of the Ebro; see pp. 34-5.
6 Polyb. 111.15. For most of the events preceding the declaration of war references are given to
Polybius alone. Livy xx1.4-15 is based on a totally confused chronology and is best left out of account.
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THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 45
Rome of interfering in internal Saguntine affairs. We need not doubt that Hannibal was looking for a reason to reopen the conflict with Rome and as soon as he was sure that the rest of the Carthaginian empire in Spain was secure,’ he was happy to take the opportunity of attacking Saguntum. The Senate had concluded the Ebro treaty partly as a security against the possibility of the Carthaginians joining the Gauls in an alliance against Rome. It could now reassert the validity of the Saguntine alliance, and the Senate was confident that the conflict, when it came, would take place in Spain and that its timing could be controlled by Rome.’
The Roman embassy had gone on to Carthage to repeat the message it had delivered to Hannibal. In the spring of 219 Hannibal embarked on the siege of Saguntum; it fell eight months later.° Polybius vehemently denies that the Senate took time to decide its response and asserts that it immediately despatched an embassy to Carthage to declare war unless the Carthaginians agreed to surrender Hannibal and his leading officers.!° In fact it seems very likely that a debate took place, with one side, led by L. Cornelius Lentulus (cos. 237) wanting an immediate declaration of war, the other, led by Q. Fabius Maximus, the future Cunctator, urging negotiations.!! The result — effectively a victory for Lentulus, not a compromise — was that a conditional war-vote was passed and five ambassadors despatched to present the ultimatum. !2
The Roman failure to help Saguntum earlier was criticized by Roman writers themselves, and to many it has seemed strange that complete inactivity during the siege should have been followed by a declaration of war once the town had fallen. In fact once Hannibal had begun to besiege Saguntum there was little that Rome could do. The consuls had already gone to Illyria!3 and it would have been difficult to raise a sufficient force and get it to Spain in time to be of any use. The Senate clearly did not envisage Hannibal moving outside Spain and in that case it was up to Rome to make the first move. There is nothing particularly surprising in the decision to go to war being postponed until the beginning of the following consular year: decisions to embark on wars seem regularly to have been taken at the beginning of a consular year.!4
Hannibal had probably already resolved on taking the initiative by marching on Italy, whether or not Rome declared war.'!5 He had sent
7 Polyb. 11.14.10. 8 Polyb. 11.15.3.
9 Polyb. tt1.17.1. For the chronology sce Walbank 195 7-79, 1.327~8: (B 38). am not convinced by the argument of Astin (1967, 583ff.: (c 2)) that the siege may have begun as late as May 219, with the news of the fall of Saguntum not reaching Rome until shortly before the Ides of March 218.
10 Polyb. 111.20.
' Dio fr. 55; Zon. vitt.20. The story is rejected by Harris 1979, 269-70: (A 21).
'2 Polyb. 1.20.8; cf. Livy xxi.18.1—2. 3 See p. 93.
4 Sec in particular Rich 1976, 38ff.: (#1 20). > 1 reject the view of Hoffmann 19514: (c 25) that the embassy to Carthage was sent only after Hannibal had crossed the Ebro.
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46 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
messengers to Gaul before he had heard of the Roman ultimatum to Carthage.!6 The Senate, however, thought that the initiative still lay in their hands. No further decisions were taken until the return of the embassy from Carthage. It was then decided that one of the consuls, P. Cornelius Scipio, should go to Spain, the other, Ti. Sempronius Longus, should proceed to Sicily and launch an invasion of Africa.!7 At this point the Senate may still not have realized that Hannibal’s ambitions extended outside Spain. Once it was known that Hannibal was in fact marching on Italy, there wasno advantage in trying to meet him in Spain, which may explain the fact that Scipio did not leave until July at the earliest — if, indeed, the delay did not arise merely from practical problems in raising his army, caused particularly by the diversion of the legions originally assigned to him to deal with a Gallic attack on the settlers of Placentia and Cremona.!8
We can do no more than speculate on the plans that Hannibal had when he began his march. It is clear from subsequent events that he had no intention of destroying Rome as such. He did not march on Rome after his victories at Trasimene and Cannae in 217 and 216 respectively,!? and doubtless realized that to capture the city would be a very different proposition from victory in the open field. We may note that the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon (Polyb. vit.g) clearly envis- aged Rome’s continuing existence after a Carthaginian victory. He wanted, no doubt, to bring Rome toa position where he could conclude a settlement that would recover Sicily and Sardinia for Carthage and ensure that Rome would not again be able to hinder Carthaginian expansion in the western Mediterranean. What is not clear is whether Hannibal intended to do this by significantly weakening Rome’s degree of domination over Italy. In the early battles he went out of his way to treat captured Roman citizens and allies in different ways,20 and he may have realized that permanentlimits could not be set on Roman expansion if she retained control over the whole of Italy. But it is unlikely that he had any very detailed knowledge of the political geography of Italy or any very precise idea of the system to be established when Rome had been defeated.
The Carthaginian reaction to Rome’s ultimatum had shown that Carthage accepted full responsibility for Hannibal’s actions. But Hannibal cannot have been certain of the degree of continuing support he would receive from the home government once he had arrived in
'6 Polyb. 111.34; Walbank 1957-79, 1.365: (B 38). Cf. Livy xxt.23.1.
7 Polyb. 1.40.2. Polybius’ statement that these decisions were taken only after it was known that
Hannibal had crossed the Ebro is to be rejected: see Sumner 1966, 14: (C 55). 18 Rich 1976, 37: (H 20); on the Gallic attack see Polyb. 111.40.6-14; Livy xx1.25-26.2; Watbank
1957-79, 1375-7 (B 38). 19 Polyb. 111.86.8; Livy xx1.514.1-5; cf. Lazenby 1978, 85-6: (c 31). 20 See n. 169.
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THE WAR IN ITALY 47
Italy. The Barcids had powerful opponents in Carthage, and even if Hannibal felt confident that peace would not be concluded over his head, he must have realized that for military reinforcements he might have to rely on the support he could attract in Italy and whatever further troops his brother Hasdrubal could send from Spain.?!
The narrative that follows treats the operations in the different theatres of war separately. It is hoped that the gain in clarity will compensate for the loss of a synoptic view of each year’s events. The sources for the war, mainly Polybius and Livy, are full and detailed, though when we do not have Polybius as a control Livy’s narrative must be treated with caution. References to other sources are given only when they add something to the information provided by Polybius and Livy.?2
Il. THE WAR IN ITALY
Hannibal left Carthago Nova, it seems, sometime in May, and reached the Rhone in September.*3 Scipio, with an army destined for Spain, arrived by sea at the mouth of the Rhone at the same time. Hannibal, however, succeeded in crossing the river well inland — probably at Beaucaire rather than further north?4 — and the only military contact was a cavalry skirmish of which the Romans got the better. Scipio now sent the major part of his forces to Spain under the command of his brother Gnaeus, while he himself returned to Italy.25
There has been enormous controversy about the route by which Hannibal crossed the Alps. The balance of probability is in favour of the view that Hannibal arrived in Italy in the area of Turin (in mid-October, about a month-and-a-half after crossing the Rhone), and if this is so the choice for Hannibal’s pass lies between Mt Genévre, Mt Cenis and, the solution preferred by the two most recent writers, the Col de Clapier.”6 Hannibal had incurred considerable losses on his journey from Spain, though, as so often with troop numbers, the precise extent of the casualties cannot be measured.27
The Gauls that Hannibal had encountered on his journey had demon- strated a mixture of friendship and hostility. Those of the Po valley, only
21 See below, p. 56.
22 The best detailed military narrative is that of De Sanctis 1907-64, 111.11: (A 14). See also Lazenby 1978: (C 31).
23 Proctor 1972, 13ff.: (c 44), has shown that to date the start of the march in April, with the arrival in Italy in September (thus Walbank 1957-79, 1.365: (B 38)), does too much violence to Polybius nr.54.1. But Proctor himself pushes that passage too far in insisting on applying it to the middle of November. For the dates here suggested see Rich 1976, 33: (H 20).
24 Lazenby 1978, 35-6: (c 31); for other views cf. Walbank 1957-79, 1.377-8: (B 38).
25 Polyb. 111.41~-46, 49.1-4; Livy xx1.26.3-29, 32.1-5.
% Proctor 1972, 165ff.: (c 44); Lazenby 1978, 33ff.: (c 31); cf. Walbank 1957-79, 1.382ff.: (B 38).
27 For details see Walbank 1957-79, 1.366: (B 38).
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THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
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Map 2. Italy and Sicily in the Second Punic War (for Campania see Map 3).
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THE WAR IN ITALY 49
recently subjugated by Rome, welcomed himasa liberator. The Boii and the Insubres had already revolted, attacked the Roman settlers at Placentia and Cremona and besieged them in Mutina.”8 The first clash with Roman forces took place at the River Ticinus near Pavia, a skirmish of cavalry and light-armed troops of which the Carthaginians got consid- erably the better and in which Scipio himself was wounded. The Romans retreated eastwards to Placentia where Scipio was joined by Sempronius Longus, who had been urgently recalled from Sicily. A little west of Placentia there occurred the first major battle of the war, at the River Trebbia (December 218—January 217). The result was a major victory for the Carthaginians and well over half the Roman army was destroyed.” Livy’s story*° ofan attempt by Hannibal to cross the Appennines immedi- ately after the battle of the Trebbia and of a drawn battle between Hannibal and Sempronius is to be rejected.
Sempronius returned to Rome to preside over the election of C. Flaminius and Cn. Servilius Geminus as consuls for 217. Flaminius took up position at Arretium (Arezzo) but Hannibal proceeded over the Appennines, along the River Arno and past Flaminius southwards to- wards the heart of Etruria. Flaminius pursued him but Hannibal con- cealed his army in the hills at the north-east corner of Lake Trasimene and, with the assistance of early morning fog (the date in the Roman calendar was 21 June, probably 8 May (Jul.)), the Roman army was caught in an ambush. It was, as the praetor urbanus announced at Rome, a great defeat. Flaminius was killed and some 15,000 of his army died with him. The battle was the last time until 207 that Roman and Carthaginian forces met in the northern part of the peninsula.3!
Rome was faced by a major crisis. One consul was dead, the other at Ariminum (Rimini) cut off from the capital. It is now that there begins the period of Roman strategy dominated by Q. Fabius Maximus, the period of attrition and of avoiding full-scale battles. Initially Fabius’ conception was not unchallenged but from the defeat at Cannae in 216 until 210 it was on Fabian principles that the campaign in Italy was conducted. That is not to say that there were no formal battles in this period. It was only in the immediate aftermath of Trasimene and Cannae that the Fabian strategy was applied in its most extreme form. The policy was rather that pitched battles were to be avoided in circumstances chosen by Hannibal and favourable to him. It would not have precluded
28 For the attack on the colonists see n. 18; for the welcome for Hannibal from the Gauls of northern Italy: Polyb. 11.60.11; Livy xx1.39.5. Some, however, were unwilling to commit them- selves completely to Hannibal (Polyb. 111.69.11ff.; Livy xx1.52.3ff.), and later Hannibal was afraid of Gallic attacks on his life (Polyb. m1.78.1-4; Livy xxi.1.3).
% Polyb. 11.64—74; Livy xx1.46—48, 52-56. © xx1.58-59.9.
3 Polyb. 151.77-85; Livy xxu.2-6. For the date cf. Ovid, Fast. v1.763ff.; for the problems
associated with the battle see Walbank 1957-79, 1.415ff.: (B 38), Lazenby 1978, 62ff.: (c 31). 32 Livy xx1i.8.6, 31.9.
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50 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
a full-scale battle in circumstances chosen by the Romans and where Hannibal would have been at a disadvantage — but Hannibal was too good a general to allow thatever to happen. Fabius’ natural caution made him extremely reluctant to commit himself, but M. Claudius Marcellus, though a supporter of the fundamental strategy, showed much more initiative in taking opportunities when they arose. In both 215 and 214 he was not afraid to engage Hannibal when the latter was attempting to capture Nola in Campania, and in the years following 210 he was clearly determined to force Hannibal into accepting a battle. But the basic view was that Hannibal could not be defeated decisively in open conflict. After Cannae the aim was to concentrate on winning back towns and areas that had defected, and by putting a vastly increased number of troops in the field to force Hannibal either to divide his own forces or to leave his allies without support. If Hannibal were unable to replenish his army from his allies in Italy, and as long as Rome continued her maritime domination and her armies in Spain could prevent reinforcements coming to Italy by land, Fabius could be confident that eventually Hannibal’s forces would be so reduced that either the Romans would be able to defeat him by overwhelming numerical superiority or Hannibal would be forced, prior to such a defeat, to abandon Italy. But the cost of the policy was heavy. It meant enormous demands on Roman and Italian manpower, enormous financial sacrifices, and it meant accepting that Hannibal could not be prevented from ravaging large parts of the Italian countryside, the loss in corn production being met by imports from Sicily, Sardinia and, eventu- ally, Egypt.%3
Immediately after the battle of Trasimene Fabius was appointed dictator with M. Minucius Rufus as his magéster equitum. As the surviving consul could not come to Rome, Fabius and Minucius were appointed directly by the people, instead of the dictator being nominated by a consul and the wmagister equitum by the dictator.54 Hannibal proceeded from Trasimene to the Adriatic coast and it was in Apulia that Fabius embarked on his strategy, keeping close to Hannibal but avoiding a pitched battle. From Apulia Hannibal moved into Samnium and thence into the ager Falernus, the plain between the River Volturnus and Mount Massicus. Fabius remained in the mountains watching him ravage the plain. But when Hannibal had to leave the plain to find winter quarters elsewhere, Fabius succeeded in blocking all his exits and it was only by the extraordinary stratagem of driving a herd of oxen, with blazing
33 Compare the perspicacious assessment of the Fabian strategy by De Sanctis 1907-64, ILii.2z0ff.: (4 14). Relations between Fabius and Marcellus: p. 70; Marcellus’ positive attitude: De Sanctis, op. cif. 287, 473. For the events of 215 and 214 referred to see Livy xxit.qq and xxiv.17; for the imports of grain: Thiel 1946, 56: (H 60).
+ Polvb. 111.87.6-9; Livy xxu1.8.6-7; Walbank 1957-79, 1.422: (B 38).
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THE WAR IN ITALY 51
faggots tied to their horns, up a mountain, and thus diverting Roman attention, that Hannibal was able to escape with the main part of his army.>> Fabius followed Hannibal back to Apulia, but was then sum- moned to Rome, allegedly to deal with religious business. The latter may well have been a pretext, discontent with Fabius’ policy, particularly the fact that it involved allowing Hannibal to ravage the ager Fal/ernus at his will, being the real reason. Fabius left Minucius in charge with instruc- tions not to take any risks. But Minucius was eager to discard the Fabian strategy and succeeded in winning a minor victory.*° Opposition to Fabius’ policy, both in the field and at Rome, was increased by this success, and the assembly took the extraordinary step of conferring on the magister equitum an imperium equal to that of the dictator.37 When Fabius returned to Apulia, he chose to divide his army rather than accept Minucius’ alternative suggestion that the two men should command on alternate days. It was, of course, not long before Hannibal was able to entice Minucius into a rash venture, from which he had to be rescued by Fabius.38
The six-month term of the dictator elapsed before the end of the consular year, and the armies of Fabius and Minucius reverted to the consuls M. Servilius Geminus and C. Atilius Regulus (who had been elected to replace the dead Flaminius).39 For 216 the new consuls were L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro.*° Polybius reports that it was decided to give the consuls a force of eight legions of 5,000 men each, which, with the same number of allied troops, meant a total force of 80,000. There is no need to doubt these figures and it is the size of the Roman army that made the third Roman defeat particularly devastating. Hannibal occupied Cannae, by the River Aufidus, an important supply base for the Romans in Apulia. Hannibal was thus able to draw the Romans into battle on flat terrain that favoured the Carthaginian superi- ority in cavalry. In the battle, which took place at the end of June, Paullus fell, and out of the huge Roman army only 14,500 escaped death or captivity.*!
Polybius, perhaps misled by the desire of the Scipionic family to absolve Paullus (Scipio Africanus’ father-in-law and Scipio Aemilianus’ grandfather) from blame for the disaster at Cannae, makes Varro respon- sible for the decision to engage, against the advice of Paullus. Livy goes
35. Polyb. 111.88-94.6; Livy xxit.12—-17. On these events see Ungern-Sternberg 1975, 11ff.: (c $9).
3% Polyb. 111.94.7-10, 100-102; Livy xxu1.18, 23-24.
¥ Livy xxi.25-26, to be preferred to Polybius’ statement (111.103.4) that Minucius was ap- pointed a second dictator. See Dorey 1955: (c 12); Walbank 1957-79, 1.434: (B 38). See further p. 70 below. 3 Polyb. 11.103.5—-1059 Livy xxi.27-30.
® Livy xxit.31.7, 32.1-3, to be preferred to Polyb. m1.106.1-2.
# See further p. 69 and Additional Note p. 79.
4 Polyb. it.106—117; Livy xxut.gi-so.
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52 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
Wy ER
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asilinum
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eo Acairae No Atella, ‘2 S Nota
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further and portrays Varroas the spiritual successor of Minucius, bitterly opposed by Paullus who wanted to continue the policy of Fabius. But it is clear from Polybius (111.106.7, 108.1) that it was the Senate as a whole which took the decision to face Hannibal again in a pitched battle, and that if there was any disagreement between the consuls, it was purely tactical, not strategic. The hostile picture of Varro is belied by the Senate’s vote of thanks to him after the battle, in sharp contrast to the treatment of those soldiers who escaped death or captivity, and to his employment in a number of responsible positions in subsequent years.*2
The battle was not only a disaster in itself, but also led to the defection to Hannibal of a large part of southern Italy, including part of Samnium. The peoples who defected did not, for the most part, fight for Hannibal, but their resources were no longer available to Rome.*3 The defection of
42 Vote of thanks: Livy xxit.61.14, other references in MRR 1.247. Subsequent employment: Walbank 1957-79, 1.448: (B 38). Add his presence on diplomatic missions in 203 and 200 and his membership of the éiviri for the supplementation of Venusia in the latter year. On the /egiones Cannenses sce n. 1§7-
43 Polyb. 11.118.3 and Livy xx1.61.11, but both lists are anachronistic and contain peoples who did not defect immediately after Cannae. At the extreme tip of Italy Rhegium remained loyal to Rome throughout the war. For details of the status of various cities and peoples see De Sanctis 1907- 64, ULii.2tiff., 223ff., 274: (A 14); Walbank 1957-79, 1.448, 11.29, 100: (B 38), Salmon 1967, 299: (H 1514).
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THE WAR IN ITALY 53
Capua, narrated at length by Livy, caused the greatest anger at Rome.*4 In Campania Atella, Calatia, and the Sabatini followed Capua and Hannibal captured Nuceria, Acerrae, and Casilinum. But Nola held out and the Roman forces under the dictator M. lunius Pera and the praetor M. Claudius Marcellus did their best to restrict Hannibal’s successes. Varro meanwhile returned to Apulia to attempt to hold the position there.45 Hannibal was anxious to gain control of a port but repeated attempts on Naples and (the following year) an assault on Cumae by Capua and the Carthaginians were all unsuccessful.‘
The firmness with which the crisis was met prompted Polybius to devote the whole of book vr of his history to explaining the qualities of a constitution of a state that was able to climb out of such an abyss. If we may believe Livy, the Senate refused to ransom those captured at Cannae and took emergency measures against a possible attack on Rome itself. As we have seen, however, that did not form part of Hannibal’s plans.47
L. Postumius Albinus, who was already holding a praetorship, and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, lunius Pera’s magister equitum, were elected to the consulship for 215, but before Postumius could take up office, he was killed in a battle with the Boil in the Silva Litana, north of Bologna. Fabius Maximus was chosen to replace him.*® The year opened with Rome holding her position. As we have seen, an attack on Cumae failed and several towns in Campania and Samnium were recovered, though an attempt to retake Locri was unsuccessful. Hannibal failed in his renewed attempts to capture Nola — though the substantial victory over Hannibal ascribed to Marcellus by Livy is open to grave suspicion.*? It was soon afterwards, however, that Syracuse defected.
For 214 Fabius was re-elected to the consulship with M. Claudius Marcellus as his colleague. Matters in Italy were now in a position of stalemate. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus defeated Hanno near Beneventum but later suffered a reverse in Lucania. A further assault on Nola by Hannibal was repulsed by Marcellus and he and Fabius together captured Casilinum. Fabius also had a number of successes in Samnium and Hannibal’s hopes of taking Tarentum were foiled. In the following year, when Gracchus held a second consulship in company with Fabius’ son, the Romans recaptured Arpi in Apulia.5°
44 Livy xxui.2—-10. See Ungern-Sternberg 1975, 25ff.: (€ $9).
45 Livy xxunGi.it, XXUL14.5ff., 15.273, 17-1-G, 19-20.3, 22.11, XNVIL1G6.5, 33.12.
46 Livy xxrini.gff, 14.5, 1§.1-2, 3§-37-9 (215). XXIV.13.7 (214).
47 Livy xxu.5 5-61.10. See p. 46. 48 See p. Jo.
49 Livy xxiit.37.10-13, 39.6f., 41.10-14, 43.6ff. For the defection of Locri in 216 cf. Livy xxuir.30.8, Livy xxiv.1.2-13, dating the defection to 215, should be rejected. On Marcctlus’ alleged victory see De Sanctis 1907-64, HI-li. 255 MN. 104: (A 14).
© Livy xxiv.14-16, 17 (for doubts see De Sanctis 1907-64, t11.ii.260n. 119: (A 14), 19, 20.1 -2 (for doubts see De Sanctis, op. cit. 274 n. 135), 20.3-5, 20.9-15, 46~-47.11 (for doubts about the details of Livy’s account see De Sanctis, op. cit. 273 n. 132).
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54 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
The Roman recovery inthe years 215—213 had been remarkable and in three years Hannibal had achieved little. Early in 212, however, he scored a significant success with the capture, by stealth, of Tarentum, and this was followed by the defection of Metapontum, Thurii and Heraclea. But the citadel of Tarentum remained in the hands of the Roman garrison, under the command of M. Livius, and since this could control the inland harbour (the Mare Piccolo), Hannibal was deprived of a substantial part of the advantage of the possession of Tarentum.>! The consuls, Ap. Claudius Pulcher and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, began to besiege Capua. Fulvius had earlier inflicted severe losses on Hanno, who had been sent north by Hannibal to thwart the consuls’ plans, and had fought a drawn battle with Hannibal himself. On the debit side Ti. Sempronius Gracchus was killed in an ambush in Lucania.5? An indication of the Roman recovery is that from the winter of 212/11 onwards, with one possible exception, Hannibal retreated to the extreme south of Italy at the end of each year’s campaign.>
The next year, the consulship of P. Sulpicius Galba and Cn. Fulvius Centumalus saw more dramatic events. In an attempt to raise the siege of Capua Hannibal undertook the march on Rome which he had forgone after Trasimene and Cannae. He had no serious hope of taking the city and when he discovered that Rome was adequately defended without the armies of the consuls of the previous year being withdrawn from Capua, he rapidly returned to the south. Soon afterwards came the fall of Capua, symbolically the most important reversal of Hannibal’s successes after Cannae. Meanwhile, the citadel of Tarentum was still in Roman hands and an attempt by a Punic fleet to cut off its supplies failed.
In 210 Marcellus held a third consulship with M. Valerius Laevinus, who had been the Roman commander against Philip of Macedon since 215 and had just concluded the important alliance with the Aetolian League.5> The Romans recaptured Salapia in Apulia and two Samnite towns. But Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, the consul of the previous year, was killed in an attack by Hannibal at Herdonea. A Roman fleet was defeated by the Tarentines but the garrison under Livius continued to hold out in the citadel. Meanwhile Marcellus was eager to bring Hannibal to a fixed battle. After an indecisive conflict in Lucania Marcellus pursued him
31 Pol. viit.2q-34; Livy xxv.7.10-11, 15.6-17; App. Haan. 34-35, 142-149.
32 Livy xxv.13-14, 16-17, 19.1-8, 22.5-13. The story of the defeat of the praetor Cn. Fulvius Flaccus at Herdonea (Livy xxv.21) is to be rejected as a doublet of the defeat of Cn. Fulvius Centumalus in 210: De Sanctis 1907-64, 111.11.459: (A 14); Brunt 1971, 652: (H 82). The story of one M. Centennius obtaining a force of 8,000 men from the Senate and losing virtually all of it in a battle with Hannibal in Lucania (Livy xxv.tg.5—17) is also highly implausible (cf. Miinzer, PW 11.1928).
33 De Sanctis 1907-64, 111.ii.470: (4 14) thinks that Hannibal spent the winter of 210/9 in Apulia.
54 Polyb. 1x.3.1-9.11; Livy Xxvi.g-14, 20.7-11. 55 See pp. 97-100.
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THE WAR IN ITALY 55
through Apulia, though remaining careful to avoid any possibility of an ambush.*%
In 209 Fabius held his fifth consulship, Q. Fulvius Flaccus his fourth. Fabius recaptured Tarentum, though afterwards he was nearly caught in an ambush by Hannibal. Marcellus was still looking for the chance of a full-scale engagement with Hannibal: when he obtained one he was defeated. Livy’s story of a subsequent victory that was mec incruenta probably conceals an indecisive result. Hannibal then returned to Bruttium.‘? In the following year Marcellus was again consul with T. Quinctius Crispinus as his colleague. Their principal aim was the recap- ture of Locri. But first a Roman force sent from Tarentum to Locri was ambushed by Hannibal near Petelia, and then the consuls themselves were caught in another ambush near Venusia. Marcellus was killed immediately and Crispinus fatally wounded. Hannibal obtained posses- sion of Marcellus’ signets, but his attempt to use them in order to retake Salapia was foiled. He was, however, able to raise the siege of Locri and the Roman forces in the south, though numerically superior, made no attempt to confront him.58
The year 207 was a critical one and the last in which engagements of moment took place in Italy. The consuls were C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius Salinator. Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal, who had escaped from Spain after the battle of Baecula, was marching towards Italy, and Rome was again faced with the prospect of fighting in the north. Claudius was appointed to face Hannibal, Livius Hasdrubal. The aim of the two brothers was to meet in Umbria. But Hasdrubal’s messengers were intercepted and Nero, who had begun by fighting not unsuccessfully against Hannibal at Grumentum and Venusia, took the bold decision to march with part of his forces to join Livius in the north. When Hasdrubal discovered that he was facing the combined forces of the two consuls, he decided to avoid a battle and instead to attempt to proceed down the Via Flaminia to his planned meeting-place with Hannibal. The Roman armies pursued him and at the battle of the River Metaurus the Carthaginian forces were massacred and Hasdrubal himself fell. Immedi- ately after the battle Nero returned to the south and Hannibal retired to Bruttium, unable to embark on any further aggressive actions.5?
In 206 there was virtually no military activity in Italy, but Lucania returned to Roman control. In 205, while Scipio was in Sicily, his colleague in the consulship, P. Licinius Crassus, faced Hannibal. But
56 Livy xxv1.38.6-39, xxvil.1—2. Cf. m. 52. 57 Livy xxvit.12.2, 12.7-15.1, 15.416.
58 Polyb. x.32—33; Livy xxvil.25.11—-28. On the unwillingness of the Roman commanders in the south to launch a united and full onslaught on Hannibal see De Sanctis 1907-64, 111.i1.476, 488 (concerning 207): (A 14).
9 Polyb. xi.1-3.6; Livy xxvi.38-58. Cf Lazenby 1978, 182ff.: (c 31).
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56 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
both armies were afflicted by disease and no conflicts occurred. Alarm was caused, however, by the landing of an army under Mago at Genua and the making of an alliance between Mago and the Ligurian tribe of the Ingauni. Two Roman armies were sent north to meet the threat. In the south Scipio recovered Locri, despite an attempt by Hannibal to save the city. The subsequent behaviour of his /egatus Q. Pleminius almost destroyed Scipio’s career and ambitions. In 204 the consuls M. Cornelius Cethegus and P. Sempronius Tuditanus inflicted a reverse on Hannibal in Bruttium and regained a number of towns, including Consentia (Cosenza). In 203 Roman forces defeated Mago and the Carthaginian commander was seriously wounded. Soon afterwards both he and Hannibal were ordered to return to Africa to face the army of Scipio. Before Hannibal left, the consul Cn. Servilius Caepio had regained further areas of Bruttium. The war in Italy was at an end.
III. SPAIN
We have seen that the Senate’s original expectation was that the war as a whole could be fought in Spain.*! That hope was soon dashed but when P. Cornelius Scipio failed to prevent Hannibal from crossing the Rhone he nevertheless sent the greater part of his troops on to Spain under the command of his brother Gnaeus.®? The immediate aim now was to keep the Carthaginian forces in Spain occupied and thus prevent reinforce- ments being sent to Hannibal. In fact the campaigns in Spain, with the exception of the catastrophe of 211, represented an unbroken run of success and the result was to drive the Carthaginians right out of the country and leave a considerable area under Roman control. In 218 Gnaeus Scipio brought the area north of the Ebro, both the coastal strip and the hinterland, into Roman control and defeated Hanno, the Carthaginian commander in the area. Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal, who had been left in overall command in Spain, came north, killed a number of soldiers and marines wandering in the fields near Tarraco and perhaps attempted, without success, to secure the defection of some of the tribes that had just joined Rome.
60 Livy XxXVIIT.11.11-15, 46.7-13, 15, XXIX.§—9, 16.4-22, 36.4-9, 38.1, XXX.18-19.6, 19.10-20. On Mago’s departure from Spain see p. 60.
61 See p. 45. For events in Spain see particularly Scullard 1970, 32ff.: (H 77); Lazenby 1978, 125§ff.: (c 31). 6 Polyb. 111.49.4; Livy xxt.32.3.
63 Cf. Polyb. 111.97.3. Livy’s statement (xx. 32.4) that the aim in 218 was to drive Hasdrubal out of Spain is exaggerated and anachronistic.
Polyb. 111.76; Livy xx1.60-1. | follow De Sanctis 1907-64, Itt.ii.zqgo-1 n. 59: (A 14), and Walbank 1957-79, 1.409: (B 38) (contra Walsh 1973, 235: (B44) in regarding Livy xx1.61.4-11 asa doublet. But I prefer to make Hasdrubal’s incitement of revolt among the Iergetes and others part of his first expedition north of the Ebro rather than to reject it altogether.
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SPAIN §7
In 217 Hasdrubal launched both naval and land expeditions north of the Ebro. Gnaeus, helped by a Massiliote contingent, defeated the Punic fleet at the mouth of the Ebro and captured twenty-five ships. He followed up this victory with lightning raids which took the Roman fleet south of Carthago Nova and to the island of Ebusus (Ibiza). But Livy’s claim that subsequent land expeditions went as far as the saltus Castulonensis (the Sierra Morena) is open to serious doubt. The inhabi- tants of the Balearic Islands (Mallorca and Minorca) sent embassies to Gnaeus seeking peace. Subsequently the Ilergetes revolted and Hasdrubal recrossed the Ebro but was diverted by an invasion by the Celtiberians acting at Scipio’s behest. On news of the naval battle of the Ebro the Senate sent Publius Scipio to join Gnaeus and the two brothers advanced to Saguntum.® In 216 the Carthaginian position became even more difficult. Hasdrubal, who had retreated to south-west Spain, had first to deal witha rebellion among the Tartessii and was then ordered by the authorities in Carthage to join Hannibal in Italy, Himilco being sent to Spain as a replacement. The Scipios’ task was to keep Hasdrubal in Spain, and when the two armies met just to the south of the Ebro, the Romans won a convincing victory which put an end to any prospect of Hasdrubal joining his brother in the immediate future and consolidated the Roman position in Spain.%
The events of the next four years are not easily determined. It seems, though, that in 214 and 213 a revolt by Syphax of Numidia led to a considerable part of the Carthaginian forces being withdrawn, thus enabling the Scipios to make further headway in southern Spain. In 212 Saguntum was recaptured and either then or earlier the important town of Castulo joined Rome.®’ Thus in seven years the Scipios had not only prevented the Carthaginians from sending reinforcements from Spain to Italy but had succeeded in extending Roman control deep into the territory under Carthaginian domination.
The next year, however, disaster struck. Now faced by three separate Carthaginian armies, under Hasdrubal, his brother Mago and another Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, the Scipios decided to split their armies,
6 Sosylus, FGrH 176F1; Polyb. 111.95—-96.6; Livy xxi.19~22. On the alleged expedition as far as the saltus Castulonensis cf. De Sanctis 1907-64, 141.11.242~3 n. G2: (A 14). It was while the Scipios were near Saguntum that the Saguntine Abelux defected to the Romans and, deceiving the Carthaginian commander at Saguntum, succeeded in bringing to the Roman camp all the Spanish hostages held at Saguntum by the Carthaginians. The episode is, however, given unwarranted prominence by the sources: cf. Walbank 1957-79, 1.432: (B 38).
6 Livy xx1t1.26~—29. I see no need to follow De Sanctis 1907-64, tL.ii.24q-5, 246 n. 7: (A 14) in placing the events described in chs. 28-9 in 215 nor in rejecting the statement that Hasdrubal was ordered to join Hannibal in Italy.
67 App. Hisp. 15-16, 57-61, to be preferred to Livy xxitt.49.5—14 (s.a. 215), XXIV.4 1-42 (S.a. 214), XXIv.49.7-8 (s.a. 213). See De Sanctis 1907-64, U1. i1.247-8 n. 76: (A 14). Livy (xxtv.42.9) dates the capture of Saguntum to 214, but also says that it was in its eighth year under Carthaginian control.
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COND PUNIC WAR
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Publius at Castulo taking on Mago and Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo, and leaving Gnaeus at Urso to face Hasdrubal the brother of Hannibal. The Romans were relying on the support of a large number of Celtiberian mercenaries and these Hasdrubal persuaded to desert. Publius, attempt- ing to cut off a force of Ilergetes and Suessetani who had come from north of the Ebro to join the Carthaginians, was caught by the Carthaginian generals; in the ensuing battle Scipio himself was killed and his army fled. Gnaeus, guessing what had happened, attempted to retreat but was pursued by all three Carthaginian armies, and he too met his death, though much of his army, together with that part of Publius’ forces which had not been involved in the latter’s final battle, survived. But the work of seven years had been undone and had it not been for the work of an egues Romanus, L.. Marcius Septimus, in organizing the remains of the Roman armies, the Romans might have been driven out of Spain entirely and the route to Italy left open.%
A new commander had to be found. Initially C. Claudius Nero was sent and he appears to have succeeded in holding the situation. In 210 it was decided that the assembly should elect a privatus cum imperio to the Spanish command, and the young P. Cornelius Scipio, son and nephew of the two dead commanders, was chosen. He arrived in the autumn and held an assembly at Tarraco of the peoples under Roman control.’? In 209 Scipio embarked on his first major campaign, the siege of Carthago Nova, the main Carthaginian supply base in Spain and itself of great strategic importance. Scipio captured the city by sending a wading party across the lagoon that lay to the north of the city and which, as Scipio had discovered, frequently ebbed in the evening. Before the attack he told his troops that ina dream Neptune had promised his aid, an episode that played an important part in the development of the ‘Scipionic legend’. Scipio’s success meant the capture of a huge amount of booty, both material and human, and eighteen ships. The human booty included a considerable number of artisans who had worked in the Carthaginian armouries. The Carthaginians had been holding their Spanish hostages at Carthago Nova and these Scipio released. Several Spanish chieftains, including the Ilergetan leaders Andobales and Mandonius, now defected to Scipio.”! In 208 Scipio advanced inland and met Hasdrubal at Baecula, north of the River Baetis (the Guadalquivir). Scipio was victorious but
6 Polyb. x.6.2-7.1; Livy xxv. 32-39; App. Hisp. 16.60-63, De Sanctis 1907-64, 445ff.: (A 14). For the date ‘bid. 446 n. 4. The achievements of Marcius have perhaps been exaggerated: Walbank 195 7- 79, 11.136: (B 38). 69 Livy xxvi.t7; App. Hisp. 17.65-67.
70 Livy xxv1.18-20.6; on the chronology cf. De Sanctis 1907-64, 1H1.1.454 m. 18: (A 14).
*V Polyb. x.2~20; Livy xxvt.41-51; on the chronology cf. De Sanctis 1907-64, 111.11.468—9 n. 38: (a 14); Walbank 1957-79, 11-14-15: (B 38); on the Scipionic legend see n. 147.
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6o THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
Hasdrubal was able to escape with most of his army and, despite a guard put on the Pyrenees, reach Gaul and the route to Italy.72
In 207 Hasdrubal was replaced by Hanno, who joined Mago in Celtiberia. Scipio sent Iunius Silanus against them and in the ensuing battle Hanno was captured. Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo had split up his army and retired to Gades (Cadiz). Scipio sent his brother Lucius to attack the town of Orongis (Jaen), south-east of Castulo. In 206 came the decisive battle at Ilipa, just to the north of Seville. Hasdrubal fled to the west coast, and reached Gades by sea. What remained were mopping-up operations. Ilourgeia and Castulo, which had gone over to Carthage in 211, were captured. Ilourgeia had slaughtered refugees from the armies of the Scipios and received the severest punishment.”3 Further south Marcius Septimus captured Astapa, whose inhabitants committed mass suicide. At this point Scipio fell illand rumours of his death caused both a revolt by Andobales and Mandonius and a mutiny in the Roman army. When the rumours proved false the Ilergetan leaders abandoned their plans and the mutiny was quelled, the ringleaders being executed. Meanwhile the remnants of the Carthaginian forces in Spain were at Gades under the command of Mago. Another Hanno had collected some Spanish mercenaries, but he was defeated by Marcius, while C. Laelius inflicted a naval defeat on Adherbal. Hopes of the surrender of Gades itself, however, were thwarted. News of the severity of the punishment of the mutineers led to another outbreak by Andobales and Mandonius and a punitive expedition by Scipio. After the defeat of Andobales, he and Mandonius again asked for Roman mercy and, somewhat surpris- ingly, were granted it, a conclusion which casts doubt on Livy’s state- ment that Scipio set out ad caedem Ilergetum.™ Scipio, who had earlier crossed to Africa to visit Syphax, next went to the west of Spain to meet Massinissa.’5
Mago now received instructions from Carthage to sail to Italy. On reaching Carthago Nova heattempted to attack the city, but was severely repulsed and forced to return westwards. Gades, however, refused to admit him and he eventually crossed to Minorca (the inhabitants of Mallorca would not allow him to land) and from there to Genua. Gades surrendered to the Romans,’6
Scipio returned to Rome to stand for the consulship of 205. In Spain the command was taken over by L. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Manlius
72 Polyb. x.34-40; Livy xxvi1.17—20; on the chronology cf. De Sanctis 1907-64, 111.11.468—9 n. 38: (a 14); on Hasdrubal’s escape see Walbank 1957-79, 1.252: (B 38).
73 Polyb. xt.20-24; Livy xxviit.1-4.4, 12.10-16, 19-21. On the identification of Nourgeia, called Hiturgi by Livy, see Walbank 1957-79, 11.305: (B 38).
7 Polyb. x1.25-33; Livy xxvitt.22-34.
75 Syphax: Polyb. x1.24a.q4; Livy xxvitt.17.10-18. Massinissa: Livy xxvu1.16.12, 35. See below pp. 62-3. 7 Livy xxvim1.36-7; on Mago in Italy see p. 56 above.
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Acidinus. Andobales and Mandonius revolted yet again and were yet again defeated. This time Andobales was killed in battle and Mandonius executed. Until 200 there is no further information on events in Spain.””
Iv. SICILY AND SARDINIA
Sicily and Sardinia were the prizes won by Rome asa result of the First Punic War and its aftermath. They were finally organized as provinces in 227 but in Sicily the kingdom of Syracuse, like the city of Messana, remained an independent state, bound to Rome by treaty.78 The loyalty of the Syracusan king Hiero to Rome was unwavering. In 218 he intercepted Carthaginian ships and warned the Roman commander of a plan to capture Lilybaeum. In 216 and 215 he provided corn, money and light-armed troops, and urged Rome to invade Africa. In 216 Carthaginian ships ravaged his kingdom.’? But in 215 Hiero died and was succeeded by his son Hieronymus. The latter, inspired by two of his advisers, made approaches to Hannibal, who in his turn sent Hippocrates and Epicydes, two Carthaginian citizens of Syracusan origin, to conclude an alliance. Before long (214), however, Hieronymus was assassinated.80 Accord was eventually reached between the various factions in Syracuse, but Hippocrates and Epicydes claimed that the council were planning to deliver the city into Roman control and Adranadorus, who had been the power behind Hieronymus, was killed on suspicion of plotting a coup. In the election of new magistrates Hippocrates and Epicydes were chosen. By now (late 214) M. Claudius Marcellus had been appointed to com- mand in Sicily, and as the result of a complex series of events Hippocrates and Epicydes eventually overcame the desire of the upper-class leader- ship to maintain peace with Rome, and Syracuse declared for Carthage. In spring 213 Marcellus began to besiege the city. In addition a Carthaginian force under Himilco had landed in Sicily, captured Agrigentum, and was seeking to bring about the defection of other towns. In 212 Marcellus captured Syracuse, aided by a plague which virtually destroyed the Carthaginian army. The treatment of the city was harsh, the booty enormous.®! There remained only mopping-up oper- ations against Carthaginian forces in Agrigentum (spring 211). Follow- ing Marcellus’ return to Rome a new Carthaginian force landed and secured the allegiance of several states, but they were soon recovered.®2
7 Livy xxviit.38.1, XXIx.1.19~3.5. Itis uncertain how fara permanent organization of Spain was undertaken at this time, but at least some peoples were probably paying a fixed tribute in these vears. Cf. Schulten 1930, 308ff.: (G 28) (for financial payments see Livy xxu1.48.4f.).
7% CAH? vu.ii, ch. 11 (b). 79 Livy xxt.49.2-6, XxX11.37, §6.7. XXIL.21.5, 38.13.
% Polyb. vit.2—5; Livy xxrv.q-7.9. For the chronology see Walbank 1957-79, Ut.2: (B 38).
* Polyb. vit.rgb, vitt.3a.3-7, 37, tX.10; Livy xxiv.21-39, XXV.23-31.11, XXVIL21.1-13; Plut. Mare. 13-21. For the chronology see Walbank 1957-79, 11.3.5~8: (B 38).
82 Livy xxv.go.§—41.7, XXVILZE.14-17.
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Marcellus’ treatment of Syracuse gave rise to an embassy of protest to Rome, but although many senators seem to have agreed that Marcellus had gone too far, the Senate voted to ratify his actions.®3
Little happened in Sicily after this. In z10 M. Valerius Laevinus, through the treachery of the Numidian Muttines, recaptured Agrigentum and transported to Rhegium a number of exiles who had been engaging in brigandage in Sicily. Laevinus also devoted his atten- tion to the re-establishment of Sicilian cereal farming.®4
As far as Sardinia is concerned, there were clearly many people who were discontented with Roman rule, and in 217 the consul Cn. Servilius Geminus demanded hostages. In 215, on the initiative of anti-Roman forces in the island, the Carthaginians sent Hasdrubal ‘the Bald’ to attack it, but his fleet was wrecked by a storm off the Balearic Islands. Later in the same year Manlius Torquatus defeated the Sardinian leader Hampsicora, and when Hasdrubal’s fleet eventually arrived Manlius won a victory over the combined Carthaginian and Sardinian forces. Another attack on Sardiniacame in 210, but nothing more than ravaging was achieved.85
V. THE FINAL CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA
Until 204 Roman activity in Africa itself was confined to a series of lightning raids.86 A full-scale invasion by Ti. Sempronius Longus had been planned for 218 but Hannibal’s arrival in Italy had prevented its implementation.8? The policy of taking the war to the enemy, even if it had been possible after 218, was one entirely alien to the Fabian strategy, and in 205 Scipio’s plans for an invasion of Africa were vehemently resisted by both Fabius and Q. Fulvius Flaccus.88
Before we come to the details of Scipio’s campaigns something must be said about the tangled history of the Numidian princes Massinissa and Syphax. In 214 or 213 the Scipios made an alliance with Syphax, king of the Masaesyli, who had revolted from Carthage. In the ensuing conflict the Carthaginians were aided by Gala, king of the Massyli and father of Massinissa.®9 In 210 Syphax sent an embassy to Rome which was warmly received while Massinissa was active in the service of Carthage. In 206 both Scipio and Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo visited Syphax in person to solicit his support. Syphax pledged his loyalty to Scipio, but later married Hasdrubal’s daughter and transferred his allegiance to Carthage. Fortu-
83 Livy xxv1.26.5-9, 29-32; Plut. Mare. 23: see below p. 78.
% Polyb. 1x.27.11; Livy xxvt.go.
55 Livy XXtl.j4.i, XXUI.34.10-17, 10-41.7, XXVI1.6.1 3-14. 8 See below pp. 66-7. 87 Polyb. 111.40.2, 41.2~3, 61.8-10; Livy xx1.17.6, 5 1.6-7.
88 See below p. 73. 89 See above p. 57.
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nately for Rome, however, Massinissa had also changed sides. In 206 he had made approaches to the Romans and met Scipio himself, though without openly proclaiming his defection from Carthage. Before long, however, Syphax, inspired by the Carthaginians, occupied the kingdom of the Massyli and Massinissa was forced to flee with only a small band of supporters.
In 205 Scipio had been assigned Sicily with permission to cross to Africa if he saw fit. In that year the invasion was restricted to another in the series of lightning raids, under the leadership of C. Laelius. Massinissa urged Laelius to persuade Scipio to launcha major invasion as soon as possible.®! In 204, following the episode at Locri, Scipio did invade and landed near Utica. A cavalry force under Hanno was defeated by Massinissa and Scipio began to besiege Utica. In the following spring the decisive series of events began. Hasdrubal and Syphax had camped near Scipio, who had had no alternative to placing his winter quarters on a narrow, rocky peninsula.° Their camps, however, were constructed of wood or reeds. The details of the camps were discovered in the course of counterfeited peace negotiations, and a night attack on them resulted in the camps being destroyed by fire and large numbers killed. The Carthaginians recruited fresh forces and persuaded Syphax to rejoin the conflict. The armies met at the ‘Great Plains’, about 12okm west of Carthage, and Scipio was victorious. After the battle Laelius and Massinissa pursued Syphax and captured him. Massinissa was restored to his kingdom.
Meanwhile the Carthaginians had taken the twin decisions to recall Hannibal and Mago from Italy and to launch their fleet against Scipio’s ships, which were engaged in the siege of Utica and quite unprepared for a naval battle. Scipio, who had camped in sight of Carthage at Tunis, was forced to use a wall of transport ships in defence. Sixty transports were lost but a major disaster was averted.
Carthage now opened peace negotiations and a provisional agreement was reached. Carthage was to abandon all claims to Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands between Italy and Africa. Her rights to expand in Africa itself were to be limited and Massinissa’s possession of both his own kingdom and parts of that of Syphax were to be recognized. In addition Carthage was to surrender prisoners and deserters, give up all but twenty
% Polyb. xt.24a.4; Livy xxv.34.2ff., XXxvil.g.5-9, §.11, 20.8, XXVIIE16.11, 17.1018, 35, XXIX.29.§-33; App. Hisp. 37.149-150. It should be emphasized that the initial approaches to the Romans by Massinissa preceded Syphax’ attack and that it was not until 204 that Syphax declared publicly against Rome (Livy xxtx.23). In 205 Scipio was hoping for support from both Syphax and Massinissa; cf. Brisson 1973, 277: (c 6). For the chronology cf. De Sanctis 1907-64, IIL.1i.519 n. 122: (A 14). 1 Livy xxvutt.g5.8, XXEX.3.6-5.1. See below p. 67.
% Livy XXIX.23-29.3, 34-35- On Scipio’s exposed position in the winter of 204/3 cf. e.g. Scullard 1970, 123—g: (H 77). % Polyb. xtv.1—10; Livy xxx.3-15.
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© Scipio's Camp
Carthage 9
Map 5. North Africa.
ships and pay a substantial indemnity. The Senate accepted the terms but during the truce the Carthaginians, who were suffering from an acute shortage of food, attacked a convoy of Roman supply ships which had been driven ashore near Carthage, and followed this with an attack on the ship carrying the Roman envoys sent by Scipio to protest about the earlier incident.™
Hannibal had now returned to Carthage, and at a meeting with Scipio he offered peace on the terms of Rome possessing Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and the islands between Italy and Africa. But Scipio was determined that Carthage should be weakened enough to eliminate the possibility of any further aggressive actions, and so rejected Hannibal’s offer. There followed the final and decisive conflict, the battle of Zama.
The peace settlement concluded after the battle contained the follow- ing terms. Carthage was to remain free within boundaries as they were
4 Polyb. xv.1-2; PRy/. 491; Livy xxx. 16, 21.114-25.10; App. Pun. 32.134-137. Livy wrongly says that the Senate rejected the terms. See Walbank 195 7-79, 11.44 1—2: (B 38). On the terms cf. De Sanctis 1907-64, HI.11.5 35—6: (A 14).
% Polyb. xv.g—-14; Livy xxx.2z9—35. For the problems associated with the battle see Walbank 1957-79, 11-446ff.: (B 38); Lazenby 1978, 220ff.: (c 31).
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before the war. Restitution was to be made of the goods seized during the earlier truce. Prisoners and fugitives were to be handed over and Carthage was to surrender all her elephants and her fleet, with the exception of ten triremes. Carthage was to launch no attack outside her own territory without Roman permission. Massinissa was to have all lands possessed by his ancestors — the seed of later disputes. An indemni- ty Of 10,000 talents was to be paid in fifty annual instalments.°6 Despite some resistance Hannibal persuaded the Carthaginians that there was no alternative to accepting these terms. There was also opposition at Rome from the consul of 201, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, eager to command in Africa himself. But the assembly ratified the peace and ordered that Scipio should administer it.%”
VI. THE WAR AT SEA?8
Unlike the First Punic War the Hannibalic War was primarily a land conflict: for the most part the activities of the Roman and Carthaginian fleets form part of the story of the various theatres of land engagements and several have already been mentioned as such. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that sea-power was not an important factor in the war. Indeed, it is clear that Rome’s continuous numerical dominance in the western Mediterranean was of vital importance to the whole course of the war. It was this dominance which made it impossible for Hannibal to transport his army by sea in 218, and equally impossible for Hasdrubal to do so ten years later. Only once did reinforcements reach Hannibal by sea but Rome could transport her troops to Spain and safely import supplies of grain from Sicily, Sardinia and Egypt.”
Neither side, however, made the best of its naval resources. The only year when Carthage made a major maritime effort was in the Sicilian theatre in 212, and then the Carthaginian admiral Bomilcar completely failed to exploit the fact that, for once, the Roman fleet was outnum- bered.!® In the years following the recapture of Syracuse persistent rumours of a major new Carthaginian naval offensive failed to material- ize. Partly, no doubt, Carthage was simply unable to find the manpower for new ships, but another factor may well have been sheer lack of confidence in their ability to match the Romans at sea.!°! In 204, again,
% Polyb. xv.18; Livy xxx.37.1-6; App. Pum. 54.234-238; Walbank 1957-79, 11.466-71: (B 38).
7 Polyb. xv.i9; Livy XXX.37.7-12, 40.7-16, 42.11-43.4.
% The fullest and most penetrating account of naval matters during the war is Thiel 1946, 32-199:
H 60).
” re xxuit.g1.10; Thiel 1946, 64,71~2: (H 60). The only other (unsuccessful) attempt to send reinforcements to Hannibal by sea was in 205 (Livy xxviit.46.14; App. Flaan. 54.226-227; Thiel, op. cit. 150). On grain imports see n. 33.
100 On the naval side of the siege of Syracuse see Thiel 1946, 79-90: (H 60). 101 Livy xxvit.g.13 (210), 22.8 (208); Thiel 1946, 109-11: (H 60).
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Carthage failed to use her fleet to attack Scipio’s exposed camp near Utica and even in 203 they launched their attack on Scipio’s fleet too late.1©2
As to the Romans, they may be criticized for allowing Bomilcar to sail unchallenged into the harbour of Syracuse on several occasions in 213 and 212, for the fact that Mago was able to make an attack on Carthago Nova in 206 with a fleet consisting largely of transports, and for making no effort to prevent either Mago from reaching Genua in 205 or Hannibal from crossing to Africa in 203.!©3 In fact the number of ships actually in commission in 206 and subsequent years dropped sharply. In part this may have been owing to the Senate’s belief that victories over the Carthaginian fleet in 208 and 207 had removed all threat from the Carthaginian navy. It is certainly true that the Romans did not have a ‘naval mentality’. They naturally thought in terms of land engagements and saw the maritime arm as something to be employed only when they were forced to do so by the actions of the enemy. But as far as the latter years of the war are concerned it may be that Rome simply could not raise the manpower needed to put all the ships it possessed into active service, 104
It will be convenient to mention here some of the more significant naval events which have not been touched on in other contexts. Of particular importance is the leet which was based at Lilybaeum — from 217 until his death in 211 under the continuous command of T. Otacilius Crassus. In 217, according to Livy, a Punic fleet making for Lilybaeum and Italy was scattered by a storm. Three ships were captured by Hiero, who warned the praetor M. Aemilius that a further thirty-five ships were on their way to Lilybaeum. This fleet was then defeated by Aemilius off Lilybaeum. Subsequently the Romans captured the island of Malta which was held by a Carthaginian garrison. In 217, after the Roman victory in the naval battle of the Ebro, a Carthaginian fleet tried to make contact with the land army near Pisa and captured some Roman transport vessels off Cosa. They were deterred from further actions, however, bya Roman fleet under the consul Cn. Servilius Geminus, which sub- sequently ravaged the island of Cercina off the African coast, raided the coast itself, and placed a garrison in Cossura (Pantelleria). In 216, after Cannae, one Carthaginian fleet attacked the territory of Syracuse, while another stood off the Aegates Isles, ready to move on Lilybaeum if Otacilius went to the assistance of Syracuse. Later the praetor P. Furius Philus made a raid on Africa in which he was wounded. In 215 another raid on Africa was launched by Otacilius and he subsequently captured
"2 [bid. 159-66. 103 [bid. 80ff., 89, 143-4, 148-9, 171-3.
4 [bid. 1398; Brunt 1971, 666f.: (4 82). Brunt also suggests that in earlier years the ‘paper strengths’ of the various squadrons were well above the actual numbers in commission. He may have a point, but his own estimates of the numbers seem too low.
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THE WAR AND POLITICS AT ROME 67
seven Carthaginian ships. Otacilius’ next raid was in 212 when he captured a large number of grain transports.!® After Otacilius’ death the Lilybaeum squadron was placed under the command of M. Valerius Laevinus, the consul governing Sicily as a whole, and he launched a further attack on Africa under the command of M. Valerius Messalla.1% In 208 rumours of a Carthaginian naval assault on Sicily and Italy led to an increase in the size of the Roman fleet but the alarm proved un- founded.!97 In both this year and 207 further raids were made, and in both years considerable victories were achieved over Carthaginian fleets. !°8 In 205 Carthaginian transport ships were captured off Sardinia!® and in 203 the Sardinian squadron intercepted some of Mago’s transports on their return journey to Africa.!0
VII. THE WAR AND POLITICS AT ROME
There were, of course, no political parties at Rome, and political analysis must investigate the activities and positions of individuals or groups of individuals. Modern writers have taken widely differing views of the nature of political divisions during the war and what follows cannot claim to be more than a personal picture of the situation.!"!
The discussion proceeds from a number of assumptions.
(i) Political activity is not something that can be carried on in isolation and individuals are bound to group together, even if, as at Rome, such groups are not necessarily long-lasting and there may be a constant kaleidoscopic process of persons joining and leaving such groups.
(11) Committed adherents of these political groups were only a minor- ity in the Senate and no group could command a consistent majority there. Similarly the number of votes that each group could control in the comitia (in the case of elections, in the upper classes of the comitia centuriata) was limited. To secure support for a particular view, to secure the election of a particular candidate, were things that had to be worked for on each occasion. It has been claimed that during the Second Punic War the assembly chose consuls simply on the grounds of military ability, and that a choice between different groups did not come into the matter.!!2 The arguments which follow are sufficient, it is hoped, to
105 Polyb. 111.96.7—14; Livy xx1.49~5 1.2 (Thiel’s doubts (44ff.) concerning the authenticity of the events described in this passage do not seem to me to be justified: Thiel 1946, 44ff.: (H 60)), XXH.31.1-7, §6.6-8, XXIH.21.2, 41.8-9, XXV.31.12-15; Thiel, op. eft. 52-4, 58-9, 70, 86.
106 Livy xxvit.5.8-9; Thiel 1946, 113-14: (1 60). 107 See n. tor.
108 Livy xxvut.29.7-8, Xxvilt.4.5-7; Thiel 1946, 130-2, 134-5: (H 60). 109 See n. 99.
"0 Livy xxx.1g.5. A Carthaginian fleet had plundered Sardinia in 210 (see p. 62) and it was not protected by a standing squadron until 208 (Livy xxvit.22.6-8).
On the politics of the period see particularly Patterson 1942: (c 41); Scullard 1955: (H 24) and
1973, 39-88: (H 54); Cassola 1962, 259ff.: (H 35); Lippold 1963, 147ff.: (H 13). "2 Patterson 1942: (c 41).
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refute this position. What is true, however, is that no group could hope to secure the election of someone who was believed to be militarily incompetent and that proven military ability might well help a candidate to secure election even though other factors favoured his opponents. In 217 the /ex Genucia forbidding iteration of the consulship within ten years was suspended for the duration of the war.!!3 This made the election of untried men more difficult and helps to explain the political pattern which will be outlined below.
(iii) In the pre-Gracchan period it is reasonable to regard the gevs as an important political unit and to assume, as a working hypothesis, that those closely related to each other worked together politically. But such an assumption cannot be extended to all the members of long-established and, by the late third century, widely spread families such as the Cornelii or the Sempronii. We shall see that Sempronius Longus, the consul of 218, hasa different allegiance to that of Sempronius Gracchus, the consul of 215 and 213, and that in 201 a Cornelius Lentulus is clearly opposed to Cornelius Scipio.!'4
(iv) Though individual cases of collegiality or succession in office can prove nothing (and in particular the influence of presiding officers at elections must not be overestimated!!5), when members of two different gentes are found a number of times in close connection with one another, that does constitute evidence for association between the two families.
(v) Though the main aim of political groups may often have been no more than securing office for their members, there may be occasions when they differed on matters of substance and when the comitia, in voting for candidates for office, were choosing between policies as well as between men.
From the point of view of Roman strategy the war falls into three clearly defined phases. First, the period of meeting Hannibal in open conflict with the three disasters of the Trebbia, Trasimene and Cannae. Secondly, the period from Cannae until 205, when Roman policy was fundamen- tally defensive, and thirdly, the final period of the invasion of Africa, first planned, it will be recalled, in 218. The significant point is that it is in the first and third of these periods that the consulship is held by the Scipios and those associated with them. In the intervening period, there is only one instance, and that not certain, of a ‘Scipionic’ consul. This should not be regarded as a coincidence, and we may conclude that the ‘forward strategy’ was that advocated by the Scipios and opposed by other leading
"3 Livy xxvir.6.7.
1 For both the importance of the gens and the limits of its influence see particularly Livy XXXV.10.9.
8 On the role of the presiding officer see particularly Rilinger 1976: (H 21).
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families. In 205 Scipio’s proposal to invade Africa met with strong opposition from Fabius and Q. Fulvius Flaccus.!!6 That does not mean, however, that all those opposed to the Scipios were members of one group: all that united them was opposition to the Scipios and the failed strategy. (It is not, of course, being suggested that in the immediate aftermath of Cannae supporters of the Scipios were still arguing in favour of the strategy that had failed. But both the strategy and those who had supported it were discredited.)
We may now examine the consular colleges of the war in more detail (see Table, pp. 5 25-8). In 218 the consuls were P. Cornelius Scipio and Ti. Sempronius Longus: the sons of the two shared the consulship in 194. The original plan, as we have seen, was to fight the war outside Italy - Scipio was to go to Spain and Sempronius to invade Africa. Fabius, moreover, may well have been opposed to going to war at all.!!7 The consuls of 217 were C. Flaminius and Cn. Servilius Geminus, of 216 L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro. Nothing can be surmised about the allegiance of Servilius, but Paullus’ daughter was married to Scipio Africanus and in the second century the close relationship be- tween Aemilii and Cornelii Scipiones is beyond doubt.!!8 We have already noticed the unacceptability of the picture of Varro presented by both Polybius and Livy,!!9 and Livy’s portrayal of Flaminius as an upstart demagogue opposed by virtually the whole of the rest of the nobility!20 is equally unconvincing. In fact both Flaminius and Varro may well have had the support of the Scipios.!?! It is probably true that they were men willing to make a wider popular appeal — at least to those whose votes mattered in the comitia centuriata — than was normal for the governing class and that the Scipios were less opposed to this than were their political opponents. Flaminius was certainly no friend of Fabius, with whom he had clashed violently over his law for the viritane assignation of ager publicus in Picenum in 232.'22 M. Minucius Rufus, the magister equitum of 217, whose views on strategy were clearly close to those of the consuls of 218-216, may also be linked with the Scipios.!25 There is nothing strange in both Fabius and Minuctus being elected at the same time by the assembly, any more than in two consuls of different
"6 Livy xxvilt.go-45. "7 See above p. 45.
N8 See in general the gencalogical table in Scullard 1973, 309: (H 54). Observe that the father of Paullus’ daughter-in-law, C. Papirius Maso, and Scipio’s brother-in-law M. Pomponius Matho were consuls together in 231 (see further Additional Note pp. 79-80).
119 See above pp. 51-2. Notice also that Polybius seeks to put the blame for the Trebbia on to Sempronius Longus and to absolve Scipio: 111.70.1ff.; Walbank 1957-79, 1.404: (B 38). For the complex issue of the elections for 216 see Additional Note pp. 79-80.
120 Livy xx1.63, XxXH.1.5—8.
'21 | accept in its essentials the view of Scullard 1973, 44ff.: (H 54). 122 Cic. Sen. rt.
'3 Another Minucius, Q. Minucius Thermus (fr. p/. 201, cos. 193), was a strong supporter of Africanus at the end of the war (Livy xxx.40.9-16, 43.2-3)-
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Jo THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
views or factions being elected as colleagues. Nor should we reject the story of the equalization of the ‘mperium of Fabius and Minucius:!?4 in an emergency constitutional oddities are always possible. The unpopularity of Fabius’ strategy, together with Minucius’ broader appeal, produced a situation where there was enough support to downgrade Fabius but not enough for the complete deposition of a man of proven military ability. The bill for the equalization of imperium was tribunician and was there- fore passed in the tribal assembly where support for Minucius may have been stronger than in the comitia centuriata'25 (we may note that it was proposed by a Metilius and that in 220 Flaminius as censor had given his support to a lex Metilia de fullonibus'°).
We now move into the period when the offensive strategy is com- pletely abandoned and in which, until the second consulship of M. Livius Salinator in 207, there is no consul whom there is any reason to link with the Scipios. But it would be wrong to think that all the consuls of this period were closely linked to and supported by the great Cunctator. It does appear that in the first three years after Cannae Fabius was able to ensure that the consulship was held by himself or his close associates. In 215, following the death of the consul-elect L. Postumius Albinus, M. Claudius Marcellus was elected as colleague for Ti. Sempronius Grac- chus, but was subsequently declared vito creatus by the college of augurs, of which Fabius was the senior member (he had been elected in 265), and Fabius himself was elected in Marcellus’ place. In 214, when it appeared that T. Otacilius Crassus and M. Aemilius Regillus were about to be elected, Fabius intervened and secured the election of himself and Marcellus instead.!27 Otacilius was married to Fabius’ niece, while Otacilius and Marcellus were half-brothers.!28 It is reasonable to think that Marcellus accepted his removal from office in 215 on the assurance of Fabius’ support for the elections for 214. As for Otacilius, he may well have been no more than a competent