

A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ON IRAN AS A NUCLEAR POWER IN THE 21st CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

The reflex of nuclear weapon has clearly been seen upon as a contemporary reflection of hold back conflict and guaranteeing global protection. Weapon regulation is at the same time, a less equivocal destination than nuclear disarming, which is not liable, design to reduce the size and capacity of a state's armed military, perhaps preventing it of artillery.

Nuclear artillery is carefully weighted virtuously untenable, if not distinctively ill. The advancement, adopt and vulnerable use of an artillery that would result to the sweeping death of twenty thousand or many possibly, millions of human life can never be account in any matter, moreover, there is likely need for unanimous protection on a global ladder.

The study reveals, among others, that a nuclear Iran, while trying to establish a regional dominance leadership in Iran, veered out to step with the United States which, to all intent and purposes, is bent on consolidating its long-held status as a global hegemony with strategic interests in the Arab enclave. It is recommended, partly, that existing and potential nuclear states shall, in the spirit of collective security stop building and piling nuclear arsenals in the spirit of NPT protocol.

KEYWORDS: Sociological, Analysis and Nuclear Power

INTRODUCTION

The Post-Cold War era, seen in some quarters as the "next step to nuclear historic period", has been qualified by sharpened anxiousness about nuclear increased, purposely, in the sense that such artillery may get into the "improper" hands. In this consideration, efforts to minimise nuclear backlog, or motivate nuclear states to give up nuclear artillery shrivelled.

The control of nuclear weapons has clearly been looked upon as middle most strategies of incorporating misunderstanding (anomie) and ensuring current global prevention. The stage is set for an anomic situation on, unfortunately, a global and inexplicable ramification. Scholars from different intellectual standpoints, viz: Robert K. Merton, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Persons from the functionalist perspective and other liberal thinkers alike have inveighed on the negative impact of anarchical situations on the human society the world over. In his thesis on 'anomie', Durkheim has delineated the extent to which human suffering lead frustration, destitution and in some cases, outright commission of suicide. In his analysis, Durkheim admitted that it is necessary to accomplish the most fundamental amount of integration and guidance in society. (Haralambos and Holborn: 2004: 876). Tacott Persons also revealed that directives, comfort/stability and togetherness in the society are tactically in respect of 'value full of agreement': by definition, a general enrichment by members of, in this case, the international community (society) concerning what is good and

worthwhile. (Haralambos and Holborn, 2004: 3) Liberalism on the other hand, has postulated a holistic means of curbing modern war effects through multi-lateral under the auspices of international, governmental and non-governmental organizations. Engagements Arms control is nevertheless, a less ambitious goal than nuclear disarming, which invariably, aims to minimise the size and capacity of a state's armed forces, possibly depriving it of artillery.

Nuclear weapons are regarded morally incapable, if not distinctively ill. The development, use and threatened use of an artillery that would lead to the un identified death of twenty thousand or many likely, millions of human life can never be vindicate, in any matter, hence the need for unanimous protection on a global order.

Statement of Research Problem

Nuclearization of military capabilities among state or non- state actors, greatly exacerbate the chance of nuclear conflict on a scale that would be intractable. Production and supply of Artillery of Multiple Demolition (AMD) of nuclear techniques, increases the chance that such weapon will slip into the hands of irrational or outright psychotic leaders, thereby stimulating a global nuclear war.

Limited nuclear war between countries with small number of nuclear artillery could escalate into major nuclear wars between super powers. The nation under study (Iran), from a region as strategic as the Middle East (with major super power interest at stake) cannot be ignored. It is believed to have reached a stage of advanced latent capability, and may, in the event of provocation, use the dreaded device with a high propensity to escalate into a global nuclear engagement. International attention has now been drawn to the need to curb or contain the impending danger of nuclear presence in Iran and other countries in the international system.

Concerns about Iran acquiring nuclear artillery base, largely from the menace it would present (or it poses already) to Israel, which would then be under pressure itself to accelerate the development of its existing warheads, leading to a possible nuclear weapon subspecies in the Middle east. An additional question spring up from the tentative of an Iranian blast on the United States continent. All the same, regardless of the amount of insistence to set apart Tehran from the International economic community through sanctions, which intensified recently, United States political leverage over Iran has been and may be counterproductive against the backdrop of other nation's patronage of Iranian crude oil despite Washington's warnings. On the whole, however, a nuclear capable Iran poses a serious menace to international protection. The research is guided by the functionalist perspectives of sociological thought with Anomie as the focal point of analysis.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The paper considered the possibility or otherwise of a nuclear free world. And it also analysed the significance of a nuclear Iran as a threat to global pacify and security in the world.

METHODOLOGY

The study relies essentially on secondary data. The content of existing literature in academic texts, journals, seminar papers, local and international tabloids, monographs and the internet were accessed in the course of generating relevant information. Content analysis is therefore utilized as an effective tool in the course of the inquiry. The research is qualitative in conception and design. Secondary data generation has been necessitated by the fact that a research of this magnitude cannot be inter-subjectively inquired primarily.

Status of the Iranian Nuclear Enrichment

The most fundamental nuclear improvement reached by Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) on July 14th 2015, is an opening remark after over a long period of negotiations to bring to an end the international anxious about Tehran's nuclear program.

However, years to this historic promises, Tehran had been firmly improving its adequacy to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Although the U.S. intelligence community assessed that Iran leave behind a coordinated nuclear weapons program in 2003, the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran and more-previous intelligence community testimony determined that Iran has acquired a range of technologies, including uranium reworking, nuclear warhead mechanics, and surrendered systems, that would give it the alternatives to launch a nuclear weapons advanced effort in a relatively short time alternatives "if it so certain." Such an achievement is not the same as a crash program formed to create a nuclear weapon as a matter of urgent, which would consider that Iran eliminate examiners and try to initiate weapons-grade material at its made known facilities or perhaps at unmade known facilities before such an achievement could be perceived and break parts respectively. Instead, Tehran came across to be considered a more intended close approximation, building up as much of its technological terrain as a matter of urgent for what is apparently an amicable nuclear energy program while sustaining the alternatives to make a political rating to build and bring in use the nuclear weapons. As Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper make known in his 2012 assertion, "We adjudicate Iran's nuclear approached is guided by a price-benefit approach, which proffer the international community possibility to hasten Tehran." A fundamental deal dramatically improves the price of bewitching the nuclear weapons and make reduction to the benefits.

Iran's Nuclear Desire and Competency

Iran's sense of concern in making it to happen an ambitious nuclear power program came before the 1979 revolution. The United States supplied a starting point to Iran's nuclear program by stamping a nuclear unity agreement under President Dwight Eisenhower's Atoms for harmonious Program in 1957 and afterward established the five-megawatt-thermal (MWt) Tehran findings Reactor. The shah's government later make it known the plans for building more than 20 nuclear power reactors for engendering electricity.

However, starting with the first most important evaluation with Tehran in the 1970's about assisting to create nuclear power reactors, the U.S. government looked to fundamentally impose precaution beyond those needed by the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). For his part, the shah make publicity hard for local development of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, in particular the possession to reprocess spent fuel. Although Iran admits today that Washington have taken a robust nuclear power program in Iran under the power of shah, the United States positively take a firm stand at the time that Iran not possess a reprocessing capability due to fears it would be of important to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.

After a short time between the two resigns government following the 1979 revolution, the Iranian government reopened its pursuit of the previous regime's nuclear aspirations, albeit slowly, as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini at beginning opposed nuclear development for theological reasons. Following Khomeini's death in 1989, the new supreme head, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, exaggerated Iran's undeclared nuclear activities. The nuclear capabilities that Iran has been pushing can be utilised for a calmly nuclear energy program and nuclear weapons improvement, although some of the capabilities on which Iran focused strongly before the July 2015 deal opined a prior intention to develop the option to build weapons.

Iran's interest in developing a nuclear weapons capability was openly aligned with the central priority of its leadership: the survivability of its regime. The Islamic Republic's revolutionary government has seen itself under threat ever it came to power in 1979 as a result of Tehran's adversarial togetherness with the United States and from the bitter eight-year war with Iraq, which invaded Iran in 1980.

According to a 2010 Pentagon report on Iran's military power, "Iran's nuclear program and its willingness to store open the possibility of developing nuclear weapons is a central part of its deterrent strategy." Subsequent reports found that Iran "is developing a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to the production of nuclear weapons if the suggestion is made to do so." Iran's nuclear motives also are rooted in the country's goal of exerting influence throughout the region. Tehran's military power is not proportionate to its economic power, however, and its conventional military capabilities are restricted by lack of training and modern weaponry. Similarly, any suggestion by Iranian's leadership to pursue nuclear weapons development would require overcoming significant political and technical hurdles; even more so after a deal is implemented. Iran has long said that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful anticipation. Additionally, there is religious opposition to the development of weapons of mass destruction. Khamenei has characterised nuclear weapons a "grave sin," claiming that Iran "has never pursued and will never pursue" them.

Iranian's apparently worked on developing a nuclear warhead, at least prior to 2004, suppressed Khamenei's declarations; Iran would demand to find some alternatives to give details on the reversal of its stated policy to Iranian local audiences and the international community.

The comprehensive nuclear deal limits the most relevant aspects of Iran's nuclear program that could be used to build nuclear weapons. The deal stopped Iran's uranium-enrichment-related activities, modifies its heavy-water reactor activities, and puts in place a stringent observing and verification regime to ensure that Tehran strictly abides by the agreement and does not engage in pursuing covert events.

Transuranic Enrichment

For more than years now, Iranian's transuranic-enrichment program was the attention made by the international minded about Iran's nuclear motives. Iran's enrichment program provides it with the ability to produce one form of fissile goods for nuclear artillery: artillery-grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU).

The transuranic footpath is the most likely route that Iran would use to provide fissile goods for nuclear weapons, if the decision was made to pursue them respectively. Iran enriches transuranic using a machine identified as the gas extractor, which spins at very high speeds to make thing available for the concentration, or percentage, of the capable of too many transuranic-235 (U-235)

Iran presently enriches transuranic at two sites, Natanz and Fordow. Iran has put together more than 20,000 centrifuges locally for these facilities, but is unlikely to be able to produce indigenously all of the goods, such as high-quality carbon fibre and merging steel, necessary to expand its nuclear program. Tehran based its interest on illicit networks to avoid international sanctions forbidden the purchase of these goods. This dependency on foreign suppliers lowered Iran's production of extractor.

The Natanz plant is Iran's primary transuranic-enrichment facility. An Iranian opponent group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, suggested in August 2002 that Iran was building the equipment. In February 2003, Iran


officially acknowledged the existence of Natanz and give room for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to pay a courtesy call for the facility. At that time, Iran had about 100 extractor installed in a pilot cascade.

The Natanz site includes an industrial-scale enrichment facility, the Fuel Enrichment Plant, which is especially to house about 50,000 centrifuges, and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. The Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant is a research and development facility where Iran is testing more-improved models of extractor, including the IR-2M, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-6S, to substitute the crash-prone IR-1 models. An IR-8 machine is to some extent installed. Gradual improvement on the advanced machines has been sulky and it is unidentified how efficient these machines are.

Earlier to the November 24 Joint Plan of Action, Iran had installed 15,420 IR-1 Extractor at the Fuel Enrichment Plant of which approximately 9,200 are operational in 54 cascades. The IR-1 machines are currently enriching transuranic to 3.5 percent. Another 328 IR-1s enriched transuranic to 20 percent at the Pilot Plant until the November 2013 interval deal removed the enrichment level to 3.5 percent. In January 2013, Iran detailed the IAEA that it planned to install IR-2M machines in production-scale cascades at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Earlier to the November 2013 enrichment, Iran had installed 1,008 advanced IR-2M extractors, but these machines were in a better position for transuranic.

However, efforts about Iran getting their nuclear artillery base has created a new dimension which resulted into crisis, largely from the menace, it would poses already to Israel, which would then be under too much pressure for itself to accelerate the development of its existing warheads, leading to a possible nuclear artillery subspecies in the Middle eastern part. An extra opinion was also come up from the tentative of an Iranian blast on the United States country. In the same vein, in respective of the number of insistence to set apart Tehran from the International economic community through endorsement which was already intensified recently, United States political leverage over Iran has been and may be counterproductive against the backdrop of other nation's patronage of Iranian crude oil despite Washington's warnings and exaggeration. On the other hand, however, a nuclear Iran poses a serious problem to international guards and this resulted in serious concern for Iranian to look into a better way for finding solutions to their major problem. As a matter of facts, Iran was deeply interested in these nuclear missiles in order to be independent from other Middle Eastern countries.

Iranian Importance Nuclear Equipment



Source: Arms Control Association 2019

Figure 1.

Nuclear Prevention on Iran

The enrichment expect that transuranic agreement at Fordow and Natanz be strictly and a heavy-water reactor, at Arak, have its core and cause to become not suitable; its plutonium by-product, the P5+1 countries dread, could have been reprocessed into weapons-grade material. These equipment's are now being repurposed for research, industries, or medical purposes, and they are exempted to verification by observers from the UN nuclear defender, the International Nuclear Energy Agency (INEA). The harmony of people imposes boundaries on the numbers and types of extractors Iran can run, and the size of its hidden storage of enriched transuranic. Deep-mined transuranic has reduced the percentage of the transuranic-235 isotope to the minimal level, and extractors advancement that isotope's compactness. Transuranic enriched to almost 5 percent is been utilised in nuclear power installation, and to nearly 20 percent it can be adopted in research reactors or for medical purposes. High-enriched transuranic, at some point 90 percent, is been utilised in nuclear artilleries. The JCPOA's verification regime also aims to protect against the possibility that Iran could improve nuclear weapons in a hidden manner at unidentified places.

Majority of the JCPOA nuclear provision have lasting dates. After ten years and above, for example, extractor restrictions will be shifted, and after fifteen years or an above, consequently it will bound on the minimal-enriched transuranic, it can be adopted respectively, so also the INEA's access to specified location. Other provisions have no end date.

Surveillance and Substantiation

Among the clear provisions, Iran is set to implement and later ratify an extra communications to safeguard agreement with the IAEA, which gives IAEA verifiable unprecedented access to Iran's nuclear equipment. (As a signatory to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has committed to never pursue nuclear weapons, but it is entitled to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes). The authority have enriched to deliver tri monthly account which would give the board of governors and the UN Guard Council on Iran's to enhance implementation of its nuclear commitments. The agency's late director-general, Yukiya Amano, described the arrangement as "the world's most robust nuclear verification regime."

A structure known as the Joint Commission, which includes representatives of all the negotiating parties, monitors implementation of the agreement. Chaired by EU foreign policy Chief Federica Mogherini, it is charged with dispute resolution, and the vote of a majority of its members can gain IAEA observers access to undeclared sites they consider suspect. The body also oversees the transfer of nuclear-related or dual-use stuffs.

The Endorsement Relief

The unity of European Union, United Nations, and United States all sworn to bring up their nuclear-relevant endorsement. While the United States only freeze fresh nuclear endorsement, it promised and solemnly in the JCPOA to remove identified existence from given permission to lists and try to locate law making to repeal to officially cancel the freeze permission within or above eight years, as far as the INEA concludes that Iran's nuclear events stand harmonious in appearance.

Some years back to the camping misunderstanding in 1979, stand still even after the JCPOA start functioning. They screen affairs such as ballistic missile processing, support for U.S allocated terrorist formation and local human rights abuses. Though the United States wrapped up to bring up its permissions on oil transfer, freeing Iran to patronize on international business again, its restriction on the business plan stand firmly, restricting much international business which Iran. Many banks and other industries, in addition to foreign borrowing of U.S. businesses, this remains the basic aspect in

Iran for anxious feeling of uncured amerce or being banned from transaction on the Parries Building.

Fresh protection Council declaration are constantly demanded to maintain UN endorsement freeze, so, by maintaining a greater infringement, more so, any one of the P5 participant can blackball a new maintaining order. This “quick recovery” atomic process is exercise to stay in function for ten years and above, after which point the UN endorsement are set to be countermand.

The Iranian Organization Duties

In the month of January 2016, the INEA qualified that Iran had put together the nuclear enrichment’s preliminary requirements, including taking thousands of extractor’s offline, administering the compulsory of the Arak heavy-water reactor inoperable, and selling excess low-enriched transuranicto Russia.

The day of that recognition, popularly understood as Implementation Day, the United States, European Union, and United Nations both were at front line to repeal and enhanced in the middle postulation. Since then, the INEA has been qualified to intervene in Iranian’s accountability to give way in accepting the most fundamental bedrock of nuclear power. Most realistically, the United States appeared to resist from administering powerful endorsement that would guaranteed the focused oil segment, which gives the Iran to bust up its oil transformation within and outside to almost balance its strategies prior to the endorsement planned. The United States also reopen or released some money collected or seize from Iran.

Trump quickly goes far from criticizing the wonderful agreement that has been accompanied, and the expectation that the United States would set off from it unspecified trading. EU-Iran trading activities reached more than twenty billion euros a year before the U.S disengagement, but afraid of U.S endorsement, many larger European strong halls kept out of Iranian business market.

The Iranian stakeholders were looked and regarded as sentimental administrators of acting in bad manner, admitting that by tiding uncertain claim over its major concerned to the clearly stated decision and blocking economic gain to Iran, the United States was logically in infringement or agreement which was earlier made. United State stakeholders have appeared to be uncertain about the foreign government whose motives were on the issue of business plan to advertising and trading with or from investing in Iran as part of their future planned, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif sanctioned, and the United State Treasury (UNT) under Trump has not licensed the sale of any aircraft or spare parts or new properties to Iranian’s.

Trump official presumed to withdraw or abandoned the United States from the agreement planned in May 2018, reconsidered the banking and oil endorsement or sanctions. They clearly apply not only to Unite State nationals, who generally cannot transact or engaged in with Iran in any case in terms of business, but to foreign nationals as well. To deal or reacted in Iranian markets, they would give up access or room to far larger American ones, as well as access to the world’s predominantly or major banking system.

Making it louder the cancellation or set off the Trump objected to the agreement’s set apart to address Iran’s ballistic missile program or its proxy warfare in the region, and he claimed that the sunset provisions would assist or helped Iran to demand or pursue a bomb in the future. Iran incriminates the United States of renegeing on its tireless efforts, and Europe of forwarding to United State individualism. In a bid to maintain the nuclear enrichment alive, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom came up with a better system, known as INSTEX, to enhance transactions with Iran outside of the U.S. banking

system, but it is only meant for food and medicine and other important activities, which are already exempted from United State endorsement plan.

Following the United State retraction, very many countries, including United State friendly nation among them, carefully continuous to bring in Iranian oil under waivers granted by the Trump regime and Iran move on to be law abiding by its countless efforts. But dated back later, the United States set back the waivers. "This motives or plan is intended to closely admonished and denying the regime its principal source of revenue," as the White House stated.

This was the position which was pointed out for Iran, which said it would no longer be bound to its efforts as long as the other parties to the JCPOA were in breach of theirs. Nearly in July 2019, Iran move further the agreed-upon limits to its stockpile of low-enriched transuranic, and then began enriching transuranic to the higher concentration used in medical isotopes, still far short of almost about 90 percent purity needed for artillery documentations. Zarif said that these volume breaches of the JCPOA were to reverse consequently to be absent as European compliance were in transformative manner. The European signers gained their efforts and commitment to the JCPOA. Mothering said that INSTEX would give much privilege to the added nation respectively, and that its shareholders were to consider using it to trade oil and other commercial activities with and outside the terrain. In September 2019, Iran farther lowers its efforts by starting to improve its extractors to speed up transuranic enrichment plan. Similarly in November 2019, it reopened huge water production at its Arak facility.

With new information reached on the U.S. drone strike that killed Soleimani, a commander in Iran, and several Iraqi militia leaders that backed by Tehran, Iran loudly communicated that it would not set a destination for transuranic enrichment, but would not also set off INEA observers in the country. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom had set to introduce new method in calling on Iranian to come back to compliance. Tehran has said that it remains clearly open to reach a documented agreement with European partners as part of the deal.

The Iranian Thriftiness

The crucial factor that resulted into limit sanctions waivers on oil exports have sociologically cut into a critical source of national taxation income. Iran commence exporting more than 2.1 million barrels every day after the JCPOA took effect from the day it was established to function, approaching levels from before 2012, when the oil green-light were originally put into practice. With the restoration of United State Sanctions and the end of waivers, has originally dropped sharply to three hundred thousand barrels in a day or even less than that. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects Iran's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will be declined by 9.5 percent in the year 2020, following a 4.8 percent compression in 2019.

The falling in oil exports compounds the damage to an already hurting thriftiness. Iran had never go through the thriftiness recovery that it had desire for. Major European firms, uncertain that the JCPOA would hold up, were wary of investing in the Iranian market even after the deal was concluded.

However, United State sanctions un-compared to the nuclear program. Multinational firms feared being held accompanied for transacting with the numerous sanctioned entities associated with, for example, the IRGC, which holds sway over some industries. With sanctions deterring above-board international trade, smuggling on black markets has come into greater needs, enriching the IRGC at the expense of the regular economy.

On the other hand, factors beyond sanctions are partly to blame. Corruption, mismanagement, and aging infrastructure are widely acknowledged roadblock to the agency and company around, and relatively low oil prices diminished revenues from export; oil prices stand well below the triple-digit prices per barrel they commanded for much of 2011–2014. Economic doldrums and sloping upward lacking the ability to drive considerable protests at the end of 2017, as did eminent of gas prices in 2019. Having no job or work do remains higher at 12 percent, and is especially more predominantly among women and young age respectively.

CONCLUSIONS

Between Iran, North Korea, Syria, china, India, Pakistan and the US, the issue of nuclear enrichment, whether for peaceful or military purpose, has become a recurring decimal. Iran, the state in focus, has found its way into the list of Americas “axis of evil” during the reign of Ahmadinejad who, incidentally, is a hardliner with an unrepentant radical posture against the US and her allies.

He had prescribed that the Israeli state should be “wiped off the world map”. Whatever that means, the US, having established Strategic interests in Israel did not take that as a bluff. This led to sustained espionage, technical scientific and legal efforts by the US to stop Iran from building its capacity for destruction, albeit with not much success.

Today, with the change in leadership in Iran, much is expected from the country in terms of her intent and resolve toward hostility where the US and her allies are concerned, while retaining the long standing regional hegemonic ambitions. The international community now considers the present umpire of the Iranian state as more responsible than the immediate past regime; with sanctions partially lifted, truce reached at different fore and global concerns articulated over the catastrophic tendencies of a Nuclear world, light is anticipated at the end of the tunnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that while searching for the new agreements focused on the nuclear strategies, the following recommendation were provided for understanding the way forward for sociological analysis on Iranian as a nuclear power:

- There is need for advancing the inducement (chiefly endorsement backup) that would be rendered to Iran, put together in the sense of their background and their quality of being dependable to present expectation welfare, in purchase to position or cause Iran to take a regenerated agreement that went outside the JCPOA in ample esteem regards, specifically in respect to the continuance of its nuclear prevention.
- It is also recommended that imposing all the necessary effort to increase a comprehensive local reinforcement in the United States for any fresh dialogue result in order to make it last longer and authoritatively capable, despite the fact that in regardless of presidential leadership change over in Washington.
- With the change of authority in Iran, much is expected from the country in respect to her intention and resolve in the direction of antagonism where the US and her friendly nation are claimed, while holding back the long standing regional hegemonic aspiration.

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